80 comments on Analysis of Decline Rates (Part II)
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80 comments on Analysis of Decline Rates (Part II)
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GAIA Host Collective
Sam, great work, as usual.
I think that the initial Lower 48, overall North Sea and World (EIA, C+C) decline rates are very interesting.
The Lower 48 1970 to 1973 decline rate was -1.4%/year. The 1973-1979 decline rate was -3.9%/year.
The North Sea 1999-2002 decline rate was -0.8%/year. The 2002-2008 decline rate was -6.7%/year.
The world data show that 2008 was essentially flat with 2005, well within any reasonable margin of error, with a measurable cumulative shortfall between what we would have produced at the 2005 rate and what we actually produced.
One common connection for all three case histories is that the regions showed lower cumulative production in response to rising average annual oil prices, over the initial decline periods. Also, based on the logistic (HL) plots, the Lower 48 in 1970, the North Sea in 1999 and the World in 2005 were all about 50% depleted (conventional crude).
I think that the difference is that the world is getting a small contribution from unconventional production, but this analysis suggests that 2009 is to the World, as 2003 was to the North Sea, as 1974 was to the Lower 48, i.e., the start of the more rapid production decline. I suspect that a more rapid production decline worldwide is presently being obscured by the decline in demand.
BTW, in regard to our (Foucher & Brown) joint articles, as I told Sam a couple of days ago, I think that he deserves more credit for the superb modeling work he has done, and in regard to the actual work done, especially in regard to the modeling work, this has been more of a 90% Foucher/10% Brown effort.
--Jeffrey J. Brown
Great analysis. If world production follows the North Sea - would you expect a global decline rate of 7-8%/year? In a severe recession/depression, is domestic consumption by exporters affected such that the export-land model will not exact such a heavy toll - at least
in the near future?
The initial Lower 48 decline was slow for three years, then faster, close to 4%, and the long term decline has been about 2%/year. I suspect that the global decline might look something like the Lower 48. More thoughts down the thread.
Regarding exporters, I think that the $64 Trillion question is what happens, in aggregate, to consumption in the top exporting countries.
EIA's forecasting that in 2008 KSA shows a 164 kb/d consumption increase. You wonder if they will ever reach a ceiling, through maximum total supply for consumers of course, no way will they ever shortchange their citizenry beyond the odd batch of farmers in the east who can't get some diesel during a price spike.
Not knowing anything about the technology, I would like to suggest other factors to take into account.
- North sea fields may decline faster than on shore fields because of the difficulty of infill drilling and other possible secondary recovery methods.
- Prudhoe Bay has shown very high decline rates, in spite of extensive infill drilling.
- After major secondary (or tertiary?) recovery Cantarell has very high decline rates.
- Extensive horizontal drilling will reduce the decline rates for giant/supergiant fields quite dramatically for awhile, but will than probably lead to much faster than historic average decline rates.
I have no idea how these factors might play into your analysis, but they might be worth considering. Murray
Have the fields at the larger end of the spectrum (like the North Slope's) that have been developed more recently generally shown more rapid decline rates than similar sized fields developed farther back? If that is the case I would suspect that extraction having been relatively more efficient for a greater portion of the newer fields lifespans than it was for similar sized fields that went on line much farther back must be factored in somehow.