First of all, I think it's interesting that a lot of background disciplines are starting to put an energy factor into the economic calculus in the period leading up to the current crisis. Since so much of the analytic background noise is finance- oriented, the role that oil prices have played over the past few years has been pretty much swept under the rug.
I see that James Hamilton identified the 2008 leap in oil prices as a flow of funds phenomenon - and I think the flow of funds out of oil and oil- derivatives caused the price to tank. This leads to the obvious question:
What is the role of structured finance in all this and how does it intersect with energy prices besides enabling commodity price runups then collapses?
The next question is what is the relationship between energy prices and interest rates? Oil prices and interest rates have a long history together:
This is Fed data (Fed charts) with 1984 constant dollar oil prices superimposed on historical Fed Funds Target rate.
Recessions are shaded. First of all, the relationship between funds rate increases and recessions is clear. Increases in the funds rate preceded recessions in 1958, 1960. 1970, 1991, 2001 (concurrent with rising energy prices), and 2008.
Oil prices triggered 1973 recession (post- Yom Kippur War energy embargo), the 1980- and 81-83 'Double Dip' recession after the removal of the Shah of Iran and the Iran-Iraq war. Energy prices contributed to the 'Dot Com' recession then fell back. Another sharp rise in fuel prices began around 2003 during the Fed's dramatic easing of short- term rates.
This last period also coincided with the remarkable expansion of structured finance, particularly in its support of asset prices (housing, bonds and stocks). Clearly the expansion of that financing scheme has contributed mightily to the severity of our current recession; a kind of sidebar would be the failure in 1998 of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management whose 'managed liquidation' by the Fed and other New York banks was accompanied by claims similar to those being made today of 'imminent collapse of the entire financial system'. LTCM was a forerunner of current structured finance operators such as PIMCO.
Variations on the theme of energy price- flow of funds- and interest rate dynamics appear to be a trigger for recessions, even if the linkage between causes and effects is not absolutetly predictable. There seems to be sensitivity at the intersection of these dynamics (which would make the modeling fiendishly difficult). But ... one thing seems to be emerging here is that flow- of- funds dynamic may becoming to be just as much a factor in determining the availability of useful fuel as is geology or politics.
This paper develops an efficiency-wage model where input prices affect the equilibrium rate of unemployment. We show that a simple framework based on only two prices (the real price of oil and the real rate of interest) is able to explain the main post-war movements in the rate of U.S. joblessness. The equations do well in forecasting unemployment many years out-of-sample, and provide evidence that the oil-price spike associated with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait appears to be a component of the “mystery” recession which followed.
First of all, I think it's interesting that a lot of background disciplines are starting to put an energy factor into the economic calculus in the period leading up to the current crisis. Since so much of the analytic background noise is finance- oriented, the role that oil prices have played over the past few years has been pretty much swept under the rug.
I see that James Hamilton identified the 2008 leap in oil prices as a flow of funds phenomenon - and I think the flow of funds out of oil and oil- derivatives caused the price to tank. This leads to the obvious question:
What is the role of structured finance in all this and how does it intersect with energy prices besides enabling commodity price runups then collapses?
The next question is what is the relationship between energy prices and interest rates? Oil prices and interest rates have a long history together:
This is Fed data (Fed charts) with 1984 constant dollar oil prices superimposed on historical Fed Funds Target rate.
Recessions are shaded. First of all, the relationship between funds rate increases and recessions is clear. Increases in the funds rate preceded recessions in 1958, 1960. 1970, 1991, 2001 (concurrent with rising energy prices), and 2008.
Oil prices triggered 1973 recession (post- Yom Kippur War energy embargo), the 1980- and 81-83 'Double Dip' recession after the removal of the Shah of Iran and the Iran-Iraq war. Energy prices contributed to the 'Dot Com' recession then fell back. Another sharp rise in fuel prices began around 2003 during the Fed's dramatic easing of short- term rates.
This last period also coincided with the remarkable expansion of structured finance, particularly in its support of asset prices (housing, bonds and stocks). Clearly the expansion of that financing scheme has contributed mightily to the severity of our current recession; a kind of sidebar would be the failure in 1998 of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management whose 'managed liquidation' by the Fed and other New York banks was accompanied by claims similar to those being made today of 'imminent collapse of the entire financial system'. LTCM was a forerunner of current structured finance operators such as PIMCO.
Variations on the theme of energy price- flow of funds- and interest rate dynamics appear to be a trigger for recessions, even if the linkage between causes and effects is not absolutetly predictable. There seems to be sensitivity at the intersection of these dynamics (which would make the modeling fiendishly difficult). But ... one thing seems to be emerging here is that flow- of- funds dynamic may becoming to be just as much a factor in determining the availability of useful fuel as is geology or politics.
More to come ...
Steve, have you read Dr. Andrew Oswald's work showing jobless rates are predicted by oil prices and interest rates?
Unemployment Equilibria and Input Prices: Theory and Evidence from the United States
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/336/1/WRAP_Oswald_cho.pdf