 | Post-peak mechanized agriculture: the RAMSES project | The Oil Drum: Europe | Europe Forum Lucerne: Energy – A Conflict Area, Trends and Horizons |  |
50 comments on Review Response: Depletion and the Future Availability of Energy Sources
Comments can no longer be added to this story.
| Show without comments | PDF version
50 comments on Review Response: Depletion and the Future Availability of Energy Sources
Comments can no longer be added to this story.
| Show without comments | PDF version
User login
Personnel
Editors
Contributors
Peak Oil Primers
Archives
- November 2009
- October 2009
- September 2009
- August 2009
- July 2009
- June 2009
- May 2009
- April 2009
- March 2009
- February 2009
- January 2009
- December 2008
- November 2008
- October 2008
- September 2008
- August 2008
- July 2008
- June 2008
- May 2008
- April 2008
- March 2008
- February 2008
- January 2008
- December 2007
- November 2007
- October 2007
- September 2007
- August 2007
- July 2007
- June 2007
- May 2007
- April 2007
- March 2007
- February 2007
- January 2007
- December 2006
- November 2006
- October 2006
- September 2006
- August 2006
- July 2006
- June 2006
- May 2006
- April 2006
- March 2006
Vital Trivia
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 United States License.
GAIA Host Collective
http://graphoilogy.blogspot.com/2007/06/in-defense-of-hubbert-linearizat...
In Defense of the Hubbert Linearization Method
(June, 2007)
In the captioned article, we looked at two producing regions with wildly different production profiles--the US Lower 48 and Russia. Khebab used Lower 48 production data through 1970 and Russian production data through 1984 to predict post-1970 Lower 48 cumulative production and post-1984 Russian cumulative production (using the HL method). The Lower 48 model was quite accurate in predicting post-1970 cumulative production, and the Russian model was quite accurate in predicting post-1984 cumulative production, and one inference that we drew from the Russian plot was that Russia would in all likelihood resume its production decline in the near term, which is a point we first made in early 2006.
IMO, the HL method gives us a plausible estimate of cumulative production for a given region, even areas like Saudi Arabia. And I think that the tool is invaluable since it allows us to derive a plausible estimate, without depending on dubious reserve estimates. The weakness of the HL method is that it really only gives us an estimate for URR from mature basins, but in mature regions the question arises as to how material frontier basins will be. For example, Alaska helped, but it was certainly not a game changer for the US. I suspect that the frontier basins in Russia are to Russia as Alaska is to the US.
And BTW, as I have repeatedly noted, Peaks Happen--even in areas like Texas & the North Sea, two regions developed by private companies, using the best available technology, with virtually no restrictions on drilling:
Note that the initial declines in both regions corresponded to rising oil prices.
And as I have repeatedly noted, when we plug in Net Export Math (Export Land Model, or ELM), our expectation is for a long term accelerating rate of decline in worldwide net oil exports, with Mexico serving as the latest example of plunging net oil exports.
accelerating rate of decline in worldwide net oil exports
Your "accelerating rate of decline" is a scam.
Consider these export figures from hypothetical country A:
2000: 1000kbd
2001: 900kbd
2002: 800kbd
2003: 700kbd
2004: 600kbd
2005: 500kbd
2006: 400kbd
2007: 300kbd
2008: 200kbd
2009: 100kbd
2010: 0kbd
Most people would call this a steady, linear decline at a constant rate. You, however, translate this into year-on-year decline rates:
2001: 10%
2002: 11%
2003: 13%
2004: 14%
2005: 17%
2006: 20%
2007: 25%
2008: 33%
2009: 50%
2010: 100%
Isn't that amazing? The magic of statistical chicanery transforms a totally boring linear decline into "accelerating decline rates"!
JD, it is your hypothetical country that is the scam. A linear rate of decline would be 10% per year or 6% per year, or the same percentage rate of decline every year. What you are showing is truly an accelerating rate of decline. That is, the percentage of decline increases every year, even though the total amount in barrels per day stays the same.
If the percent of decline increases every year then that is truly an accelerating rate of decline. After all it is the rate of decline we are talking about here, not actual barrels.
All that being said, your post was not only wrong it was also rude and unnecessary.
Ron P.
Edit: Please note that WebHubbleTelescope's post below is referring to JD's post, not mine.
Ron, the example is simple and self-explanatory, and readers can take what they want from it. The bottom line is that Westexas uses the term "accelerating decline" to describe quantities which decline by a constant, unchanging amount year after year.
No, he did not say that at all. He said:
He said absolutely nothing about a constant, unchanging amount year after year. An accelerating rate means an accelerating percentage of decline each year.
Whenever the words rate of decline or increase are used, then percentage is automatically assumed, not actual numbers.
Ron P.
It looks as if John Denver stumbled and fumbled over some fairly relatively innocuous math.
I wonder once he understands the mistake he made that he might change his outlook toward a more pessimistic outlook? .... I kind of doubt it, he has made up his mind.
Yes, and whether it's accelerating or not, peak economy still means we have trillions of dollars of debt to "unwind." Or, said another way, the bankruptcies and other debt defaults are just in their early days.
Collapse has begun.
http://www.energychallenge.tv/index.php/archives/226
What I find particularly silly about JD's misunderstanding is that in some cases ELM does predict accelerating export decline in absolute terms, for periods of time, and not just acceleration in year to year percentage decline. So he's accusing westexas of using exaggerated language when in fact westexas may be understating the direness of ELM predictions.
With some exceptions, such as Matt Simmons, and some prior work that Nate turned up, almost everyone in Peak Oil circles had been assuming that a simple low digit exponential decline rate was the worst case. For example, it would take about 36 years for production to fall by 50%, assuming a -2%/year production decline rate.
What we have been endeavoring to show is that a far greater threat is the net export decline resulting from the difference between production falling an exponential rate and consumption increasing at a generally exponential rate. To help me understand what happens, I proposed the simplistic Export Land Model (ELM), which stipulates a country consuming half of its production at final peak, with a -5%/year production decline rate and a +2.5%/year rate of increase in consumption. Here are the initial and final annual net export decline rates for the ELM (final year is last year of net oil exports):
Year One: -14%/year
Year Eight: -61%/year
At their final production peaks, the UK and Indonesia were consuming about half of their production. Here are the initial and final annual net export decline rates for the UK and Indonesia (EIA data):
UK;
2000: -38%/year
2005: -237%/year
Indonesia:
1997: -16%/year
2003: -73%/year
And of course, if consumption increases fast enough, a former net exporter can become a net oil importer, even as their production increases, e.g., the US and China. Here are annual net export decline rates for China, from their start of their net export decline to their final year of net oil exports:
1986: -5%/year
1992: -57%year
All of this is of course pretty elementary, but it is an elementary fact that massively overlooked worldwide. Regarding terminology, I am simply describing the rate of change in net oil exports the same way that the rate of change in production and the rate of change in consumption are calculated.
Note that the production decline rate and rate of increase in consumption were constant for the ELM (-5%/year and +2.5%/year respectively), for both Year One and for Year Eight, but the net export decline rate went from -14%year to -61%/year:
Year One:
Production: -5%/year
Consumption: +2.5%year
Net Exports: -14%/year
Year Eight:
Production: -5%/year
Consumption: +2.5%year
Net Exports: -61%/year
No, you are wrong. People (and governments and corporations) plan their future around the status quo and want to anticipate any change that comes about. This translates into usually wanting to know how much something changes in percentage terms from the previous year. So we automatically infer without knowing the exact price of an item that a 5% sales discount is nothing to worry about. But if this gap keeps increasing, then we have to worry.
If the gauge is exponential decline, then what WT says is right and it is indeed accelerating faster than exponential decline.
A double pox on your own chicanery.
If hypothetical country B's sole source of oil is imports from A, then it's very significant indeed to speak of an "accelerating rate of decline".
Of course that's unlikely, but so is your scenario's hypothetical country A.
People use statistics in all sorts of dodgy ways. For example, "with recent wind turbines built, we are now 20% renewable." People will take this to mean that emissions have dropped, but... if a state begins with 1,000MW of coal-sourced power, and then,
in each of those scenarios, the country has become 20% renewable. In the first, emissions dropped; in the second, they stayed the same; in the last, emissions rose. But when people hear "we're 20% renewable!" they get all excited and imagine emissions have dropped.
This is why I say we should beware graphs. Because while certain graphs or percentages or other figures may be the truth, they're not always the whole truth.
The whole truth of country A isn't complete without knowing about country A's balance of trade - maybe their country has a civil conflict or is mostly rural, so their oil exports are their only source of income. Or knowing about country B's imports. Or whether country B has gone all renewable and electric. Or whether A's exports could rise again if they conserved their domestic consumption a bit. Or maybe they have heavy sour crude, too. And so on.
While percentages can be misleading, so can raw figures, graphs, and all sorts of blanket statements based on just a few simple facts.
When you look into things in more detail, what you usually find is that everyone expressing some extreme position like doomerism or cornucopianism is talking bollocks; things are more complicated than that.
JD,does it really matter HOW we describe the numbers or WHAT the resulting consequences of these numbers are?
Methinks thou art in denial.Mayhaps the barber wilt bleed thee,until thy veins are spent, and verily no more blood will issue forth,and then all thy troubles will be but as a passing cloud.
No doubt the all ills of the citizens of your hypothetical country will be likewise cured when thier oil wells run dry.
Your comment is childish at best.If you are working undercover for some BAU outfit,I expect they are looking for your replacement.