158 comments on Book Review: Why Your World Is About to Get a Whole Lot Smaller
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158 comments on Book Review: Why Your World Is About to Get a Whole Lot Smaller
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Here's what I posted at Robert's blog:
I agree that this is a very balanced book that isn't alarmist, even more so than Heinberg's work, and would be suitable to recommend to people who would be easily frightened by the prospect of having to grow their own food - or would dismiss such a suggestion out of hand as totally implausible. Rubin's focus on the economic costs of peak oil is laudable too, IMO - those of a conservative political bent well might reject Heinberg as some kind of tree hugging hippy in short order. I'm by no means a proselytizer but I always had a gut feeling that the way to successfully convey the necessity of addressing peak oil was to focus on its economic impact, since no one likes to lose money, regardless of their background. Convince people to insulate their house and ride a bike - they'll save money and get some exercise, win-win. Repeat that nation-wide and you'd conserve an awful lot of energy.
Still not on board with Rubin's pet theory that energy shortfall is the cause of all our sorrows, for obvious reasons others will likely elaborate on. I was also somewhat put off by how he covered the details of the Export Land Model sans reference to the work done by Brown+Foucher (which was published at least a year in advance of Rubin making his proclamation, and, more egregiously, describing energy return situations with neither the use of the term EROEI or any reference to Hall, Cleveland, et al; instead throwing in a quote from M King Hubbert.
I've been thinking a lot about the Export Land Model theory lately and I'm starting to wonder if it, like "traditional economic truths," something that may not hold up the same in a post peak world.
The ELM is based around the idea that growing domestic consumption will decrease exports. But this ignores possible effects Peak Oil might have on the exporter. It ignores possible feedback loops. What if importers see their demand destroyed by economic meltdown faster than the available exports fall? Price might fall. Then exporter production. Falling prices and productions might have effects on the exporter's economy and their internal demand.
I'm not saying this will happen. I'm far from knowledgable about economics or energy markets. Just pointing out that the shrinking economy paradigm shift might turn even the ELM on its head. Anyone have thoughts on that?
Andrew
I have much the same misgivings
If we look, for instance, at Mexico - the poster-child ELM example, we can see that:
1) exports are falling off a cliff
2) the Mexican economy, heavily dependent on these exports for the delivery of hard currency earnings, is about to succumb to chaos, because their revenues are also falling off the same cliff.
There's no way that the Mexican economy will sustain real growth, year-on-year, that will ensure its oil consumption will grow at 5% plus p.a. It's ignoring the feedback loops, just like the way most of us (myself included) ignored the the feedback loops that led to the collapse in oil prices, following the run-up to July 2008.
Full respect to the excellent work of Brown+Foucher, but I feel it needs a further level of refinement to be really industrial-quality. The extrapolations out to 2025 just aren't credible - the feedback loops will kick in long before that, resulting in a world of complexity and chaos, long before those dates are reached, and rendering the predictions meaningless.
Regards Chris
As noted below, it helps to look at real numbers regarding net export declines in countries like Mexico, which has so far shown an accelerating net export decline rate in the four year period from 2004 to 2008. If memory serves, their production decline rate over this time period has been about -5%/year with consumption increasing at a little over +2%/year. It will be very interesting to see what happens in the next four years.
In any case, by the end of 2014, our best case is that the top five net oil exporters--Saudi Arabia; Russia; Norway; Iran and the UAE--will have shipped about half of their post-2005 cumulative net oil exports. This is the theme of our next paper--the fact that the bulk of post-peak cumulative net exports are shipped early, e.g., Indonesia shipped half of their post-1996 cumulative net oil exports in slightly over two years, as they went from their final production peak in 1996 to net oil importer status in 2004.
I spent an entire day last week looking at the EIA excel workbook on Mexico, which looks at their entire energy record since 1981. It was quite a story. A soon to be very sad story, frankly. We sucked them dry. And they, unfortunately, were only too happy to oblige. Worse, as their supply of oil dwindles, there in the background (as is the case with so many countries) is the ongoing narrative of population growth seen in the yoy rising demand for domestic coal and NG.
I proposed the simplistic little ELM to help me understand the math behind net export declines. I stipulated the following: -5%/year rate of decline in production and a +2.5%/year rate of increase in consumption, with consumption equal to half of production at final peak. Net exports went to zero in nine years, showing an accelerating rate of decline in net exports, versus a constant exponential production decline rate.
We (Foucher & Brown) then compared the ELM to two real life case histories--the UK, with virtually no increase in consumption, and Indonesia, with increasing consumption. All three case histories showed accelerating net export decline rates (note that a constant 5% per year decline would show up on this plot as a line at -5%, parallel to the horizontal axis):
This is really the heart of the Export Land Model--an expectation of a long term accelerating net export decline rate versus a (generally) low single digit production decline rate (with, e.g. Indonesia, or without, e.g. the UK, rising domestic consumption).
And again when discussing supply/demand concepts, it helps to look at real numbers. For example, I estimate that for Mexico to maintain constant net exports of about one mbpd, at their current production decline rate they would have to cut consumption in half in about six years. Also, Indonesia--a founding member of OPEC--went from their final production peak to net importer status at oil prices below $40 per barrel.
Thanks for your responses Jeffrey, they certainly helped put things in perspective.
Regards Chris
Because I view oil as an undervalued raw good whose value is higher than the currency one can receive for it, I'm of the opinion that Mexico should halt nearly all exports voluntarily. Instead, whatever they were buying or making with the currency income they should simply make with the retained oil. Yes it would be a hardship initially. The transition was always going to be hard anyway. They could use the oil to build out massive solar arrays and also to plant huge new tracts of land to grow government food. Whatever.
G