The Oil Drum

One wonders, sometimes, why folk would want to get into political office these days, given the pervasive problems starting to arise from the end of cheap and easy to produce oil and natural gas. The rising costs of providing fuel for everything from school buses to emergency responders eats away at one end of a budget. The demands for wage increases to help employees cope with rising fuel and food prices nibbles away both at another part of the budget, but also at public and labor relations. And then there is the cost to repair and maintain the existing infrastructure, let alone make provision for future alternate choices for power and transportation. Sectors of the population, such as truckers, are becoming less shy in complaining about their problems, as unemployment bites into their numbers.

Fortunately there are legislators and candidates for office that do understand both the problems and the complexity in finding answers where options are not immediately responsive or popular. For the rest it often becomes easier to try and unify a constituency by invoking an enemy –someone who can, by their actions, be blamed for constituents’ problems. Sadly the world’s history has been filled with stories of such scapegoats, as an easy way of switching attention. Today it is possible that as oil prices rise, both OPEC and Saudi Arabia may become the villain in articles and political slogans. Given the possible outcomes of such positioning, it is perhaps not surprising that, as another American election swings into the beginning of the end game, that oil suppliers, perhaps sensing this, are indicating the chance of a greater flexibility in supply.

This post originally ran 4 MAR 08, but it seems with the recent discussions about Saudi Arabia and OPEC (for example these pieces by Jad Mouawad and Fatih Birol) that the information in this post, in addition to the over 20 very important and related posts by TOD researchers linked at the bottom of this post in summary, is quite important to the recent discourse.

Furthermore, on 22 JUN 08, Saudi Arabia's Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi will "convene a meeting of representatives of producer and consumer nations and firms operating in the production, export and trading of oil to discuss the jump in prices, its causes and how to deal with it objectively". Kuwaiti oil analyst Kamel Al-Harami added that this meeting "is an opportunity for a transparent and clear dialogue between producers and consumers to collectively explore solutions to the world's energy crisis, now and in the future". Perhaps there is a chance that Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members will offer some transparency about their oil reserves to the world at this important meeting in one week's time.

Executive Summary

1. Saudi Aramco has effectively used propaganda methods for at least the last fifteen years to convince many governments, corporations and individuals to believe their statements. However, Aramco’s statement that it is the world’s leading oil producer is now false as it now second after Russia since 2006. Nevertheless, Saudi Aramco’s repeated statement about remaining recoverable oil reserves being 260 billion barrels (Gb) is still generally accepted.
   

2. In 2004, Saudi Aramco stated that its oil initially in place (OIIP) has been growing steadily since 1982. There is considerable doubt about the validity of this increase, given the lack of new oil discoveries and the unusual nature of its steady continuous increase. Aramco stated the OIIP was 700 Gb at year end 2003 while a more realistic estimate is 580 Gb.
   

3. Aramco may have some high recovery factor fields such as Abqaiq and Shaybah, but an average recovery factor range from 30-37% is assumed for the total OIIP in Saudi Arabia’s fields. The trend of the recovery factor for Saudi Aramco indicates that there has been no effect on the recovery factor by recent technological advances in producing wells. Saudi Aramco has kept remaining recoverable crude oil reserves constant simply by artificially increasing the OIIP each year since 1982, accompanied by an unrealistically high average recovery factor of 52% since 1988.
   

4. Saudi Aramco’s propaganda campaign is failing. Saudi Aramco is no longer the world’s leading crude oil producer. Saudi Aramco’s statement of 260 billion barrels of remaining recoverable reserves is almost certainly false. Instead, the remaining recoverable crude oil reserves are probably less than 100 Gb, instead of 260 Gb. It is time to call on Saudi Aramco and the other OPEC members to tell the truth about their reserves.

Executive Summary

1. Saudi Aramco has effectively used propaganda methods for at least the last fifteen years to convince many governments, corporations and individuals to believe their statements. However, Aramco’s statement that it is the world’s leading oil producer is now false as it now second after Russia since 2006. Nevertheless, Saudi Aramco’s repeated statement about remaining recoverable oil reserves being 260 billion barrels (Gb) is still generally accepted.
   

2. In 2004, Saudi Aramco stated that its oil initially in place (OIIP) has been growing steadily since 1982. There is considerable doubt about the validity of this increase, given the lack of new oil discoveries and the unusual nature of its steady continuous increase. Aramco stated the OIIP was 700 Gb at year end 2003 while a more realistic estimate is 580 Gb.
   

3. Aramco may have some high recovery factor fields such as Abqaiq and Shaybah, but an average recovery factor range from 30-37% is assumed for the total OIIP in Saudi Arabia’s fields. The trend of the recovery factor for Saudi Aramco indicates that there has been no effect on the recovery factor by recent technological advances in producing wells. Saudi Aramco has kept remaining recoverable crude oil reserves constant simply by artificially increasing the OIIP each year since 1982, accompanied by an unrealistically high average recovery factor of 52% since 1988.
   

4. Saudi Aramco’s propaganda campaign is failing. Saudi Aramco is no longer the world’s leading crude oil producer. Saudi Aramco’s statement of 260 billion barrels of remaining recoverable reserves is almost certainly false. Instead, the remaining recoverable crude oil reserves are probably less than 100 Gb, instead of 260 Gb. It is time to call on Saudi Aramco and the other OPEC members to tell the truth about their reserves.

Executive Summary

1. World total liquids production (Fig 1) remains on a peak plateau since 2006 and is forecast to fall off this peak plateau in 2009. Increasing numbers of oil experts are forecasting impending peak production plateaus. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the current peak production of 87.2 mbd occurred on January 2008. As long as demand continues increasing then prices will continue increasing.
   

2. Forecast world crude oil and lease condensate (C&C) production retains its 2005 peak (Fig 2). The forecast to 2100 shows declining C&C production, using a bottom up forecast to 2012 (Fig 3). The forecast to 2012 shows a slight decline to 2009, followed by a 3%/yr decline rate to 2012.
   

3. World oil discovery rates peaked in 1965 (Fig 4) and production has exceeded discovery for every year since the mid 1980s. Discoverable reserves in giant fields also peaked during the mid 1960s (Fig 5). The time lag between world peak discovery in 1965 and world peak production in 2005 of 40 years is similar to the time lag of 42 years for the USA Lower 48 (Fig 6).
   

4. World C&C year on year production changes to October 2007 and November 2007 (Figs 7 and 8) show significant declines for Mexico, North Sea and Saudi Arabia and significant increases for Russia, Azerbaijan and Angola. As Russia is likely to be on a production plateau and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE have probably passed peak production, the world C&C production will continue to decline slowly.
   

5. Saudi Arabia retains its 2005 C&C peak (Fig 10), which is the same as the peak year for world C&C (Fig 2). Saudi Arabia C&C production has dropped to 9.0 mbd which is 0.6 mbd less than its peak in 2005. It is now almost a certainty that Saudi Arabia passed peak C&C production of 9.6 mbd in 2005 (Figs 9 and 10).
   

6. Kuwait retains its 2006 minor C&C peak (Fig 12). Kuwait C&C production has now dropped to 2.5 mbd which is less than its peak in 2006. There is a strong likelihood that Kuwait has passed its minor 2006 peak (Figs 11 and 12). Kuwait’s major peak was 3.3 mbd in 1972.
   

7. UAE retains its 2006 C&C peak (Fig 14). UAE C&C production has now dropped to 2.6 mbd, adjusted for maintenance, which is just less than its peak in 2006. There is a reasonable likelihood that UAE passed its 2006 peak (Figs 13 and 14).
   

8. World natural gas plant liquids is forecast to increase due mainly to new OPEC projects (Fig 15). World ethanol and XTL production is forecast to almost double by 2012 (Fig 16). World processing gains are forecast to decline slowly to 2012 (Fig 17).

PLEASE NOTE: click on the link below for the most recent oil forecast update
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3623 which includes forecasts for Kuwait and the UAE.

Executive Summary

1. World total liquids production (Fig 1) remains on a peak plateau since 2006 and is forecast to fall off this peak plateau in the middle of 2009. According to the IEA, the current peak production of 86.13 mbd occurred on July 2006 and only one year later, June 2007 total liquids production fell to an unexpectedly low 84.50 mbd. A good increase up to 85.10 mbd occurred for September 2007. As long as demand continues increasing then prices will also continue increasing.
   

2. Forecast world crude oil and lease condensate (C&C) production retains its 2005 peak (Fig 2). The forecast to 2100 shows declining C&C production, using a bottom up forecast to 2012 (Fig 3). The forecast to 2012 shows a 1%/yr decline rate to 2009, followed by a 4%/yr decline rate to 2012.
   

3. World oil discovery rates peaked in 1965 (Fig 4) and production has exceeded discovery for every year since the mid 1980s. Discoverable reserves in giant fields also peaked during the mid 1960s (Fig 5). The time lag between world peak discovery in 1965 and world peak production in 2005 of 40 years is similar to the time lag of 42 years for the USA Lower 48 (Fig 6).
   

4. World C&C year on year production changes to June 2007 and July 2007 (Figs 7,8) show significant declines for Mexico, North Sea and Saudi Arabia and significant increases for Russia, Azerbaijan and Angola. As Russia is likely to be on a production plateau and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE have probably passed peak production, the world C&C production will continue to decline slowly.
   

5. Saudi Arabia retains its 2005 C&C peak (Fig 10), which is the same as the peak year for world C&C (Fig 2). Saudi Arabia C&C production has dropped to 8.6 mbd which is 1 mbd less than its peak in 2005. It is now almost a certainty that Saudi Arabia passed peak C&C production of 9.6 mbd in 2005 (Figs 9,10).
   

6. Kuwait retains its 2006 minor C&C peak (Fig 12). Kuwait C&C production has now dropped to 2.5 mbd which is less than its peak in 2006. There is a strong likelihood that Kuwait has passed its minor 2006 peak (Figs 11,12). Kuwait’s major peak was 3.3 mbd in 1972.
   

7. UAE retains its 2006 C&C peak (Fig 14). UAE C&C production has now dropped to 2.6 mbd which is just less than its peak in 2006. Once again, there is a strong likelihood that UAE passed its 2006 peak (Figs 13,14).
   

8. World natural gas plant liquids is forecast to increase due to new OPEC projects (Fig 15). World ethanol and XTL production is forecast to double by 2012 (Fig 16). World processing gains are forecast to decline slowly to 2012 (Fig 17).

PLEASE NOTE: click on the link below for the most recent oil forecast update
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3623 which includes forecasts for Kuwait and the UAE.

Executive Summary

1. World total liquids production (Fig 1) remains on a peak plateau since 2006 and is forecast to fall off this peak plateau in 2009. According to the IEA, the current peak production of 86.13 mbd occurred on July 2006 and only one year later, June 2007 total liquids production fell to an unexpectedly low 84.28 mbd. As long as demand continues increasing then prices will also continue increasing.
   

2. Forecast world crude oil and lease condensate (C&C) production retains its 2005 peak (Fig 2). The forecast to 2100 shows declining C&C production, using a bottom up forecast to 2012 (Fig 3). The forecast to 2012 shows a 1%/yr decline rate to 2009, followed by a 4%/yr decline rate to 2012.
   

3. World oil discovery rates peaked in 1965 (Fig 4) and production has exceeded discovery for every year since the mid 1980s. Discoverable reserves in giant fields also peaked during the mid 1960s (Fig 5). The time lag between world peak discovery in 1965 and world peak production in 2005 of 40 years is similar to the time lag of 42 years for the USA Lower 48 (Fig 6).
   

4. World C&C year on year production changes to April 2007 and May 2007 (Figs 7,8) show significant declines for Mexico, North Sea and Saudi Arabia and significant increases for Russia, Azerbaijan and Angola. As Russia is likely to be on a production plateau and Saudi Arabia has probably passed peak production, the world C&C production will continue to decline slowly.
   

5. Key producer Saudi Arabia retains its 2005 C&C peak (Fig 10), which is the same as the peak year for world C&C (Fig 2). Saudi Arabia C&C production has now dropped to 8.6 mbd which is 1 mbd less than its peak in 2005. It is now almost a certainty that Saudi Arabia passed peak C&C production of 9.6 mbd in 2005 (Figs 9,10).
   

6. World natural gas plant liquids is forecast to increase due to new OPEC projects (Fig 11). World ethanol and XTL production is forecast to double by 2012 (Fig 12). World processing gains are forecast to decline slowly to 2012 (Fig 13).

In this revisions post I want to update my views on Ghawar reserves incorporating 4 main changes:

1. A model base assumption error in the way initial reserves in Uthmaniyah were calculated is corrected.

2. The data vintage for the Linux oil saturation map has been revised to 2002 (from 2004).

3. 2002 based figures are re-based to 2006 by adjusting for 4 years production at 5 million barrles per day.

4. The production prognosis for Hawiyah has been revised down.

These adjustments result in the initial whole field reserves figure rising to 173 billion barrels and show the field in a more severly depleted state in 2006 than previously shown.

Two volumetric simulations (2D) of the initial and remaining reserves in Ghawar, the world’s largest producing oil field, have been determined. The High Case scenario uses somewhat more optimistic assumptions than the Base Case scenario. Background and methodology are described in detail here.

Estimate of initial oil in place = 162 billion barrels (same for High and Base cases)

High Case
Produced oil = 63 billion barrels
2004 reserves = 43 billion barrels
60% depleted

Base Case
Produced oil = 55 billion barrels
2004 reserves = 34 billion barrels
62% depleted

The Base Case production model shows Ghawar on the edge of irreversible production decline that may start around 2010 or it may already have started. The High Case production model is more robust and shows plateau production maintained until around 2013.

A two dimensional (2D) volumetric reservoir model has been developed for the Ghawar oil field in Saudi Arabia which is the world’s largest field producing over 5 million barrels of oil per day. This represents 6% of global oil supplies. Understanding the current status of this super giant is central to the peak oil debate and to understanding the security of future global energy supplies.

This article was too large for a single post and has been split in two. Part 2 - "The Results" will follow very shortly.

Stuart Staniford has been working independently on the same problem and will post his results next week.

This post, in a way, is in homage to Connections, which I have just started to watch. I noted today that Leanan had posted that Matt Simmons is giving a talk at UCSB tonight, and I suggested to the Engineer that he might go downstairs and listen. (His report – among other things that the room was too small, but also that Matt did say that we at TOD do “an excellent job” – why thank you, kind sir).

And then I got a bit more curious about the program and found that there is a Conference coming up there on February 9-10 dealing with the need to transition from carbon fuels to renewables. While the current program looks fairly interesting, it is the second in the series. And so I went back to see what they had on the program last year. And there I found a paper on Natural Gas by Chris McGill, from which I took the following graph.

This is the first time that I have seen a comparison of relative production rates between horizontal and vertical wells that were relatively close, so I thought I would pass it on. More under the fold.