The Oil Drum

This is a guest post by Phoenix, an engineer working in the energy sector, and a friend of mine for well over 3 decades.

In January 2006 Phoenix emailed me a spreadsheet that predicted an oil price of $100/barrel by 2008, followed by an ongoing geometric rise in oil prices. I remember immediately phoning him to point out that the scenario was impossible because it is unsustainable - $100/barrel would cause economic havoc comparable to the oil shock of the 1970s and if a geometric price progression followed, then no economic recovery would be possible and... well, I recall using the phrase “rioting in the streets inside of 18 months”.

As we know, oil hit $100 in January 2008 and kept climbing, surpassing even Phoenix’s predictions. So when Phoenix offered to explain the model that generated those numbers, I leapt at the opportunity. Here is the story of how Phoenix became Peak Oil aware and generated his Price Calculator.

Click to Enlarge

Where's the Demand Destruction?

Oil is close to $120/barrel, "peak oil" is everywhere you look, so where’s the demand destruction? The latest EIA figures actually show a 0.57% increase in US gasoline demand year on year over the last week. The week prior also showed an increase in gasoline demand, but the 4-week average still shows a 0.5% decrease because of lower demand in 2008 for the weeks ending 4/4/08 and 3/21/08. Regardless of which statistic one chooses, this is hardly a convincing case for demand destruction. Admittedly, historical demand growth has been near 1.5%, and the per capita gasoline use is slightly lower since the US grew roughly 0.883% last year. At best, this is not significant "demand destruction." Take a look for yourselves: here are the EIA’s full historical tables for gasoline demand, both week ending and 4-week average. With statistics available to show both minor increases or decreases, recent reports in the press and blogosphere consistently publish reports of declining demand. Other articles, also consistent in claiming that we're driving less, rely on entirely different sources: Businessweek recently claimed that "traffic" as measured by the Federal Highway Administration is down 1.4% last year, and MasterCard claims that purchases at the pump are down 6.8% since last year. If EIA statistics are even vaguely accurate, then MasterCard's figure seems untenable--what is happening to all the additional gasoline being purchased? Gasoline stocks are up from a year ago, but nowhere near enough to make up for these discrepancies. And, of course, it is possible that EIA data is off--there are even internal discrepancies in the EIA's reporting, with this week's Weekly Petroleum Status Report highlights (.pdf) claiming that the 4 week average for gasoline demand rose by 0.9% over last year, directly contradicting the EIA's data tables (referenced above) that show a 0.5% decline in the exact same statistic. Amidst this confusion, the consistency of reporting about a decline in gasoline demand seems like cherrypicking.

With this uncertainty surrounding the concept of “demand destruction,” it’s time to take a deeper look at the mechanics behind how demand destruction occurs. Specifically, this essay will limit its focus to two components of demand destruction in gasoline: the time-lag between high prices and reduced demand, and the need to price alternatives to each gallon of gasoline we consume. Does a lack of demand destruction when oil is well over $110/barrel mean that prices must go even higher to destroy demand? How much higher? Or is it enough that prices hold at this level for long enough to cause people to gradually make long-term purchases with this price in mind, and thereby destroy demand? How long? Finally, how much of current US demand destruction (to whatever degree it exists—even if only as a decrease in growth of demand) is due to current economic conditions, and how much can be attributed directly to the price of oil?

This isn’t an argument about whether or not taxes—particularly energy taxes—are “good” or “bad.” Rather, this essay has a narrow focus: IF we’re going to attempt to reduce gasoline demand through taxation, what is the best way to do it?

Here’s my somewhat counter-intuitive theory: to most effectively reduce long-term gasoline demand, gasoline taxes should increase, not decrease, long-term price volatility.

First, let’s look at European gasoline taxes. In the UK, gasoline tax is .50 GBP per liter plus 17% VAT ($3.75/gallon before VAT, $4.42/gallon with VAT). In Germany it’s .65 Euro per liter plus 19% VAT ($3.80 per gallon before VAT, $4.53/gallon with VAT). Compare that with US taxes, which range from a low of $0.26/gallon (Alaska) to a high of $0.63/gallon (California). The much higher European taxes operate to reduce price volatility because they remain static in the face of changes in the underlying price of gasoline. For example, if taxes effectively double the price of gasoline, then a 10% increase in the pre-tax gasoline price results in only a 5% increase in the after-tax price of gasoline paid by the consumer.

Countries that showed more than 1% decline in oil consumption between 2005 and 2006 as documented by the 2007 BP statistical review of World Energy. Note that 5 of the G7 countries appear on this chart. Click charts to enlarge.

Menzie Chinn over at Econbrowser has put together a thoughtful post on gas taxes, consumption, and the AEI. Seeing as how Bush is in CO at the NREL touting the AEI today, it seems worth a look.

The foregoing suggests that if the objective is to end oil addiction -- at least in my lifetime -- the current set of Administration plans will not achieve that goal.