For decades, economists (Cornucopians or optimists) have been at odds with natural scientists (Malthusians or pessimists) when it comes to the scarcity of natural resources. The economist’s argument, summarized here by Julian Simon, is as follows:

More people, and increased income, cause resources to become more scarce in the short run. Heightened scarcity causes prices to rise. The higher prices present opportunity, and prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for solutions. Many fail in the search, at cost to themselves. But in a free society, solutions are eventually found. And in the long run the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen. That is, prices eventually become lower than before the increased scarcity occurred. (Simon 1996)

The viewpoint of natural scientists seems to be a bit simpler; the more scarce something is the higher the price, leading to increasing prices as resources deplete over time. These opposing views have led to some famous wagers in the past. The most famous occurred in 1980 between economist Julian Simon and natural scientist Paul Ehrlich. The wager was whether the price of five metals would increase in ten years time. Simon won the bet. Another bet was made more recently. In 2005, John Tierney of the New York Times wagered with Matt Simmons over the price of oil. Simmons bet $5,000 that the price of oil would be $200 per barrel in 2010. Tierney won the bet.

As a result, Tierney has publicly applauded himself and the economists’ view in a recent article in the New York Times. He states: “Maybe something unexpected will change these happy trends, but for now I’d say that Julian Simon’s advice remains as good as ever. You can always make news with doomsday predictions, but you can usually make money betting against them.”

But what is the real message (if any) to be gleaned from these bets? Is it that economists are always right and natural scientists always wrong? Is it that prices decline for commodities over time?

I argue that there is very little (if anything) to be learned from these bets, and I explain why below the fold.

I wrote a post a few days ago about my visit to Chevron's Kern River Heavy Oil facility.

This morning, I received an e-mail from Jean Laherrère of ASPO-France with some graphs of historical production and forecasts that he had prepared for Kern River. The e-mail gave permission to post these graphs, if I "found them of value". I thought a separate short post on the subject might be worthwhile, since most readers are no longer looking back at late comments on my original post.

When I compare Laherrère's forecast with what I learned in my visit, it seems to me that the production forecasts developed using linearization are not tied in well with what is actually economic. Unless one makes careful adjustment for economics, it seems to me that this approach could significantly over-state the amount of oil that will ultimately be produced.

This is a guest post by James Ward. James has a background in science and engineering and is ASPO-Adelaide coordinator for ASPO-Australia. This post appeared previously on Energy Bulletin.

Abstract
By fitting a bell curve to historical phosphate production data, the best fit is obtained by assuming an ultimate recoverable resource of approximately 9 billion tonnes (of which about 6.3 billion tonnes have already been mined). This yields a peak in around 1990. Of course, the USGS claims an ultimate recoverable resource of some 24.3 billion tonnes (i.e. 18 billion remaining); however using this value yields a bell curve that is an inferior match to the historical data. A hypothesis is thus presented whereby phosphorus is considered in two broad forms: “easy” which is able to be mined quickly, but already peaked in 1990, and “hard” which has large remaining reserves and is yet to peak, but cannot be mined as quickly. (In reality there are probably many different forms ranging from very easy to very hard.) Just as with oil, estimates that lump all types of reserve in together will yield a theoretical peak that is high and distant, however the true system may involve periods of decline after exhausting easy-to-get reserves before other supplies come online to replace them. Ultimately we must develop a recyclable phosphorus supply if humans are to continue living on this planet.

An intermittent but longstanding theme here on theoildrum is that dollars do not sufficiently inform us of the long term details of energy depletion, and that the inexorable race between technology and depletion can be better understood using biophysical methods. Essentially this post suggests that it is requiring more and more energy to procure the same amount of natural gas in Canada, and this trend will likely continue into the future. This update makes the initial analysis too pessimistic on the rate of EROI NG decline but also too conservative on the absolute level of energy return. It is going to be a very interesting few years as Canada declines, Barnett peaks, and Haynesville and other unconventional plays ramp up. The treadmill spins on.