The Oil Drum

In May 2007, the work of Stuart Staniford and Euan Mearns culminated in a new and unprecedented assessment of oil reserves in Ghawar, the world's largest oil field. This article (also written in May 2007 and well overdue for TOD posting) combines their assessment with additional information sources, to produce a revised estimate of reserves in Saudi Arabia and the other OPEC countries.

Oil Reserves in Saudi Arabia

In their 1986 study “Giant Oil and Gas Fields”, Carmalt and St John (American Association of Petroleum Geologists²) published a list of the largest five hundred oil and gas fields known at the time. This included field size estimates for 24 major fields in Saudi Arabia (crude oil and condensate).

Analysts Neil McMahon and Ben Dell from Bernstein Research are back with more analysis. When we last heard from them, they were looking for Haradh in all the wrong places and reporting on the widespread dismantling and bulldozing of oil wells in Ghawar, the super giant oil field in Saudi Arabia. As promised, they have returned with a study purporting to show that Ghawar is not rapidly depleting because it is not sinking. Using the the technique of Synthetic Aperature Radar (SAR) Interferometry, which is capable of measuring millimeter vertical movements via satellite, they found not subsidence but actually a slight rise in one area. Despite the rather dubious premise behind this, given that Ghawar is being pressurized by injecting water, it warranted another look. However, before getting to that question, my analysis of their analysis rapidly became one of forensic pathology. Alas, they have misplaced Ghawar by a few miles, rendering their interpretations misplaced as well. Also, their technique for quantifying changes in oil field infrastructure was found to be rather inaccurate. This can't end well.

NOW SHOWING: a movie on the drilling of Uthmaniyah. Using a set of wells in a productive (but now rather depleted) slice of this part of the Saudi oil field of Ghawar, it is possible to deduce to drilling sequence of these wells using the identifiers assigned to the wells as they are drilled. Given a few known dates for well placement, a timeline for overall development can be constructed and displayed as an animation. Enjoy the movie.

Everybody talks about the Saudi Arabian Oil Miracle, but most seem to be saying the same things. And those things usually consist of quotes or statistics provided by Saudi Aramco. This presents us with the following dilemma: if we believe what they say, why don't we just quit worrying about whether or not their oil will continue to flow? Or, if we don't believe what they say, why do we bother making future oil supply projections based on "production capacity" figures by them -- figures which can never be verified because their production levels always remain below capacity? What we need is some independent verification of the things they tell us. Hence the birth of Saudi Satellite Sleuthing using Google Earth. Following a brief introduction, I will show how Google Earth can be used to shed some light on the Haradh III Megaproject brought onstream in 2006.

Executive Summary

1. World total liquids production (Fig 1) remains on a peak plateau since 2006 and is forecast to fall off this peak plateau in 2009. Increasing numbers of oil experts are forecasting impending peak production plateaus. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the current peak production of 87.2 mbd occurred on January 2008. As long as demand continues increasing then prices will continue increasing.
   

2. Forecast world crude oil and lease condensate (C&C) production retains its 2005 peak (Fig 2). The forecast to 2100 shows declining C&C production, using a bottom up forecast to 2012 (Fig 3). The forecast to 2012 shows a slight decline to 2009, followed by a 3%/yr decline rate to 2012.
   

3. World oil discovery rates peaked in 1965 (Fig 4) and production has exceeded discovery for every year since the mid 1980s. Discoverable reserves in giant fields also peaked during the mid 1960s (Fig 5). The time lag between world peak discovery in 1965 and world peak production in 2005 of 40 years is similar to the time lag of 42 years for the USA Lower 48 (Fig 6).
   

4. World C&C year on year production changes to October 2007 and November 2007 (Figs 7 and 8) show significant declines for Mexico, North Sea and Saudi Arabia and significant increases for Russia, Azerbaijan and Angola. As Russia is likely to be on a production plateau and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE have probably passed peak production, the world C&C production will continue to decline slowly.
   

5. Saudi Arabia retains its 2005 C&C peak (Fig 10), which is the same as the peak year for world C&C (Fig 2). Saudi Arabia C&C production has dropped to 9.0 mbd which is 0.6 mbd less than its peak in 2005. It is now almost a certainty that Saudi Arabia passed peak C&C production of 9.6 mbd in 2005 (Figs 9 and 10).
   

6. Kuwait retains its 2006 minor C&C peak (Fig 12). Kuwait C&C production has now dropped to 2.5 mbd which is less than its peak in 2006. There is a strong likelihood that Kuwait has passed its minor 2006 peak (Figs 11 and 12). Kuwait’s major peak was 3.3 mbd in 1972.
   

7. UAE retains its 2006 C&C peak (Fig 14). UAE C&C production has now dropped to 2.6 mbd, adjusted for maintenance, which is just less than its peak in 2006. There is a reasonable likelihood that UAE passed its 2006 peak (Figs 13 and 14).
   

8. World natural gas plant liquids is forecast to increase due mainly to new OPEC projects (Fig 15). World ethanol and XTL production is forecast to almost double by 2012 (Fig 16). World processing gains are forecast to decline slowly to 2012 (Fig 17).

As you may have noticed President Bush commented this past week on his (and apparently their) doubts that Saudi Arabia could significantly increase crude oil production. While this comes as no great surprise to those of you that have been reading Stuart and Euan’s excellent articles, I thought I would try and summarize the situation as I see it, and expand a little beyond the short summary paragraphs that Leanan is providing, to give more of an overall picture.

To begin you should know that when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) talks about the size of their oilfields, they refer to the amount of oil that was there at the beginning, rather than that which is left. You can do this calculation for yourself, but I exemplified it with a small calculation on the amount of oil that originally existed in the Abqaiq field , by making some simple assumptions.

Seven am breakfasts in O’Hare are not a habit I plan on developing but there was I, for the second day running, at the same table even at Wolfgang Pucks.. But all in a good cause, as I headed off to Houston for ASPO. Going to the hotel - very new and needed, as the cabby proudly told me,– he asked which Convention I was here for (there is an Olympics meeting of some sort down the hall). I explained about Peak Oil and though initially he had not heard about it, he then mentioned a Houston City Council effort to have the cab companies use hybrids. This is now on hold, since it did not appear to be a well-received suggestion. Concerns that he brought up included the small size of the cars, that they were only 4-cylinder and would not stand the wear that a cab life would impose, and that the cabbies, who have to buy the cabs, could not afford the $3,000 to replace the batteries. Apparently the cab companies had suggested that they would comply right after the police Department bought theirs. Talking at an ASPO break about this, apparently Denver are experimenting with the process, but have only just introduced it with a few cabs., and a quick Google shows that a number of cities have already bitten that bullet.

With getting here a little late I walked into the first joint sessions after they had started, and, as with the ASPO in Cork, the atmosphere immediately conveyed that the meeting would be a success. (Though the initial judgment was made because I had to drop my bag and lean against the wall since there were no free seats, and when more were brought they were still not enough). The audience was obviously knowledgeable and the questions were technical, as were the answers. For the first “Workshop” day the sessions were divided, with TOD stalwarts Stuart Staniford and Euan Mearns giving the story of their incredible detective work in, as an audience member put it, developing the story of Saudi oil with virtually none of the resources or computing power of Aramco, and yet coming very close to what has to be the real story. Stuart explained how the numbers that he, and others at TOD, had put together and painted the picture of Ghawar depletion, (which is in the citation so I won’t repeat it) and Euan put this in the broader context of Saudi Arabia in general. Gail Tverberg acted as moderator to the session and the discussion. Perhaps the crux of the issue is that the authors do not think that Saudi Aramco can produce the volumes that they claim for Ghawar since, in part they assume a higher recovery factor that has been historically true for this type of rock, and with around half the production gone, things are not looking all that good. Reference was made in questions to other papers coming in the meeting that will bring further light to the topic, including such a comment from Matt Simmons.

PLEASE NOTE: click on the link below for the most recent oil forecast update
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3623 which includes forecasts for Kuwait and the UAE.

Executive Summary

1. World total liquids production (Fig 1) remains on a peak plateau since 2006 and is forecast to fall off this peak plateau in the middle of 2009. According to the IEA, the current peak production of 86.13 mbd occurred on July 2006 and only one year later, June 2007 total liquids production fell to an unexpectedly low 84.50 mbd. A good increase up to 85.10 mbd occurred for September 2007. As long as demand continues increasing then prices will also continue increasing.
   

2. Forecast world crude oil and lease condensate (C&C) production retains its 2005 peak (Fig 2). The forecast to 2100 shows declining C&C production, using a bottom up forecast to 2012 (Fig 3). The forecast to 2012 shows a 1%/yr decline rate to 2009, followed by a 4%/yr decline rate to 2012.
   

3. World oil discovery rates peaked in 1965 (Fig 4) and production has exceeded discovery for every year since the mid 1980s. Discoverable reserves in giant fields also peaked during the mid 1960s (Fig 5). The time lag between world peak discovery in 1965 and world peak production in 2005 of 40 years is similar to the time lag of 42 years for the USA Lower 48 (Fig 6).
   

4. World C&C year on year production changes to June 2007 and July 2007 (Figs 7,8) show significant declines for Mexico, North Sea and Saudi Arabia and significant increases for Russia, Azerbaijan and Angola. As Russia is likely to be on a production plateau and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE have probably passed peak production, the world C&C production will continue to decline slowly.
   

5. Saudi Arabia retains its 2005 C&C peak (Fig 10), which is the same as the peak year for world C&C (Fig 2). Saudi Arabia C&C production has dropped to 8.6 mbd which is 1 mbd less than its peak in 2005. It is now almost a certainty that Saudi Arabia passed peak C&C production of 9.6 mbd in 2005 (Figs 9,10).
   

6. Kuwait retains its 2006 minor C&C peak (Fig 12). Kuwait C&C production has now dropped to 2.5 mbd which is less than its peak in 2006. There is a strong likelihood that Kuwait has passed its minor 2006 peak (Figs 11,12). Kuwait’s major peak was 3.3 mbd in 1972.
   

7. UAE retains its 2006 C&C peak (Fig 14). UAE C&C production has now dropped to 2.6 mbd which is just less than its peak in 2006. Once again, there is a strong likelihood that UAE passed its 2006 peak (Figs 13,14).
   

8. World natural gas plant liquids is forecast to increase due to new OPEC projects (Fig 15). World ethanol and XTL production is forecast to double by 2012 (Fig 16). World processing gains are forecast to decline slowly to 2012 (Fig 17).

The following analysis is based on a chart from Frederik Robelius (see Figure 2 below) from which I retrieved the production profile for Ghawar from 1950 to 2003 (xls file). Using the Hubbert Linearization method to fit a logistic curve, we get a size estimate for Ghawar close to what other TOD contributors (Stuart and Euan) derived using advanced analysis. A possible decline of Ghawar is happening in a context of record oil rig counts, record domestic consumption and record oil prices.


Fig. 1 Sources: oil supply from the EIA (crude oil + condensate); proven reserves, oil prices and domestic consumption from BP statistical review (2007); population from the UN; oil discoveries from IHS; the major currencies index from the Federal Reserve; Ghawar decline based on a logistic fit. Click To Enlarge.

Executive Summary:

• The fitting of a logistic curve (Hubbert Linearization) on Ghawar production produces an URR around 100.59 ± 8.59 Gb with a possible decline rate around 2.6%/year (asymptotic decline at 7.41%/year).
• The fitting of a logistic curve on non Ghawar production (crude oil + condensate) produces an URR around 60.13 ± 12.78 Gb.
• The Hubbert Linearization on total crude oil + condensate production gives an URR at 200 ± 24 Gb which is 20-40 Gb higher than the sum of the two above components.
• If Ghawar is in terminal decline, supply growth from other fields has to be at least 2% a year in order to maintain a flat production and 4% a year in order to maintain flat exports.