Articles tagged with "oecd"
According to BP, OECD oil production (C+C+NGL) peaked at 21.67 million bpd in 1997. Monthly production data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) now suggests that production has been stable for 5 years at around 18.5 million bpd (Figure 1).
The North Sea (UK and Norway) is still in steep decline. This has been offset by growing production in the USA and Canada where non-conventional tight oil and tar sands production are offsetting declines in conventional crude in these countries.
Mexico, the other big OECD producer, has managed to arrest declines by switching nitrogen injection supply from Cantarell to Ku Maloob Zaap and has had stable production of just below 3 million bpd for three years.
Figure 1 Monthly crude oil production for the OECD countries. All data published in this interim report are taken from the monthly IEA Oil Market Reports.
From May 2007 to August 2010, Rembrandt Koppelaar published an e-report called Oil Watch Monthly that summarised global and national oil production and consumption data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) of the OECD and Energy Information Agency (EIA) of the USA. This is the third in a series of new Oil Watch reports, co-authored with Rembrandt and details crude oil production data for the OECD countries as reported by the International Energy Agency. Earlier editions:
Stuart Staniford is a scientist and innovator in the technology industry with advanced degrees in physics and computer science.
This post presents the latest data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on crude oil and associated liquids production and price as of January 2012. This article is cross posted from Early Warning, where it forms part of a long-running series of articles that charts monthly changes in global oil supply (total liquids) from the EIA, IEA, and OPEC.
Total liquid fuels were at all time highs in January, according to OPEC and the IEA.
Posted by Euan Mearns on October 17, 2011 - 10:02am
Tags: $100 oil, bank of england, debt, energy efficiency, energy policy, euan mearns, financial times, insolvency, interest rates, iranian revolution, m. king hubbert, oecd, peak oil [list all tags]
David Cameron describes the economic downturn as "no normal recession" UK Prime Minister David Cameron to party conference, 5th October 2011.
This is the fourth post in the series following the oil price, markets and general health of the global economy examining the simple theory that OECD recession may result from annual average oil price exceeding $100 / bbl.
The annual average price (AAP) of Brent went through $100 on around 16th August 2011 and the AAP stood at $105.3 on 12th October. The AAP high point in the 2008 price spike was $104.8 on 9th October that year.
Below the fold are observations and commentary on debt, economic growth, interest rates, commodities prices and government policy. This is not intended to be quantitative analysis but instead is intended to provide a platform for discussion in the comments.
Posted by Rembrandt on December 11, 2010 - 10:45am
Tags: coal, electricity, electricity cost, electricity generation, electricity price, hydropower, natural gas, nuclear, oecd [list all tags]
In this post an overview is given of electricity prices in a large number of countries, mainly members of the OECD. This shows how prices vary between households and industry due to tax differences, and by analyzing the sources of electricity per country, it also leads to a better understanding how different energy sources affect the price of electricity.
The price differences show that industrial electricity users are not or only marginally taxed in nearly all countries, while household taxes on electricity usually range between 10% to 35%. The analysis of energy sources show that: 1) countries with a 35% or higher share of natural gas in the electricity mix have the highest industrial electricity prices, 2) Countries with a diversified electricity mix are in the mid-range of electricity prices, 3) No general price level was found for countries with a high share of nuclear, coal, or both in their electricity mix.
In World Energy Outlook 2009, the International Energy Agency seems to have dropped a bombshell that has been quietly (and politely) ignored. In their main 'reference scenario', the IEA forecasts that OECD demand has already peaked - it never recovers the levels seen before the oil price spikes and financial crisis unfolded.
Figure 1. Increase in consumption since Jan, 2001.
Standard economic principles have demonstrated that price is a function of supply and demand. The same is true for the recent oil prices fluctuations we have witnessed over the last few years, namely the equilibrium between supply and demand. However, the following conundrum has not been resolved: are oil prices high due to greater demand or too little supply? This ambiguity allows for vastly divergent interpretations of the same data and depending on the agenda you are trying to push, will easily support either.
Lately, the concept of "Peak demand" has been suggested in a multitude of recent articles that unfortunately do not qualify their analysis of the status quo. Some suggest that we are willing to and capable of moving away from oil. Are we?
A few years ago, some analysts lectured us about the effect of oil prices on the creation of new oil supply. Now that this argument has clearly failed, they have decided over night that we don't need oil anymore. In this debate, it is important to distinguish between demand (what you want or need) and consumption (what you get based on your ability to buy). Following this logic, consumption is "satisfied demand". Conversly, we can define the "unsatisfied demand" or "excess demand" that has been suppressed. Below the fold, I'll show that the key driver behind the price increase since 2002 has been excess demand combined with unresponsive supply.
Posted by Rune Likvern on May 12, 2009 - 10:00am in The Oil Drum: Europe
Tags: backwardation, china, china oil storage, contango, oecd, oil prices, original, tanker storage, us oil consumption, us oil storage [list all tags]
The present contango in oil prices bears all the hallmarks of an oil market where supplies are well above present fundamental physical consumption.
The recent large inventory build of petroleum, under a steep contango which now is flattening, within the big oil consumers (like the OECD countries and China) have left some with the expectation that major economies soon will begin to grow again, and that the contango now signals increased oil demand and higher oil prices in the future.
My analysis indicates that in recent months, as much as 2 -3 Mb/d of global petroleum supply has been used to build inventories. This is about to come to an end, because available storage is getting closer and closer to full and contango has begun to flatten. When additions to storage cease, the resulting drop in demand can be expected to lead to substantial downward pressure on oil prices.
The chart above shows one component of inventories--US inventories. The chart indicates that US oil inventories (green) have been increasing since after the September 2008 hurricanes, and, in fact, started increasing as early as May 2008. Brent oil prices (red) decreased between June and December, but recently have been slightly increasing.
Below the fold I give a summary of US, OECD and China petroleum inventories, inclusive of oil stored on tankers, and indicate what I expect will happen to near term oil prices.
Posted by Rune Likvern on April 14, 2009 - 9:47am in The Oil Drum: Europe
Tags: bric, china, oecd, oecd europe, oil consumption, oil stocks, original, world oil production [list all tags]
The above diagram shows that the pattern of growth in oil consumption has varied greatly for different groupings of countries. Oil consumption in China and India has continued to grow, whether or not oil prices rose greatly. Oil consumption also continued to grow in the "Others" category, which includes many of the oil producing nations. Oil consumption in the Former Soviet Union also followed a pattern somewhat independent of world oil prices. It was only the OECD whose consumption changed significantly as world oil prices changed.
Based on this comparison, it seems to me that OECD consumption is far more affected by oil price changes than the consumption of other countries. Based on data shown in this post, it seems to me that OECD economies can only absorb a price increase of US$10 per barrel in a year, without experiencing slowdowns in their economies and a reduction in oil consumption. Non-OECD economies (including BRIC countries) are more resilient, and are more likely to continue to show growing consumption.
Below the fold, I examine similarities and differences in oil consumption patterns of OECD and Non-OECD countries and offer my view as to what the future may hold.
When OPEC meet on 17th December, how will they go about deciding the size of the inevitable production cuts?
All OPEC states want the oil price to rise from current $44 / bbl (WTI). Some states will also be concerned that the price target is affordable by their OECD customers. But set against a backdrop of global economic turmoil and volatility in all markets, how do they judge the size of the production cut required to deliver the target price? Saudi Arabia is reported to favor a price of $75 / bbl, just short of the cost of new marginal supply in the OECD. Achieving this price in the medium term would keep OPEC in the driving seat.
This short post is intended to be a discussion thread. Below the fold, I outline one radical idea for OPEC to achieve their goal in the short term.