Trade, Transportation and the Chinese Finger Trap
Posted by Nate Hagens on January 22, 2007 - 11:02am
Topic: Economics/Finance
Tags: comparative advantage, economics, liebigs law, localization, trade, transportation [list all tags]
This post will examine the theory of international trade and the hierarchy of goods transport, production and consumption. It is quite possible that in the next decade, the increase in price (or the decreasing availability) of oil, will offset the benefits of many types of trade.
The pursuit of economic efficiency, through increasingly diverse and extensive global trade has glossed over two important facts which this post will examine: 1)higher oil prices in long distance transport must at some point exceed (economically or otherwise) the benefits achieved from some trade and 2)a complex global trade system is gradually but pervasively decreasing the ability for localities, regions and nations to be self sufficient – so many of our supply chain inputs are imported that a large increase in oil prices may resurrect import substitution policies, not only for less developed countries, but for the US and rich nations as well.
International Trade - A Chinese Finger Trap?
INTRODUCTION
The idea for this post originated on a recent errand to Fleet Farm to buy a replacement spark plug for my dads chain saw. I discovered there are not one or two kinds of spark plugs but hundreds, depending on the type of machine they go into. The plugs were made by a variety of companies, some domestic, some foreign but none from my state (currently Wisconsin). As I noticed this, I looked around the dozens of aisles and hundreds of shelves at the thousands of products and 'saw' for the first time how complex our import/export system has become. And the fact that my dad couldn't cut our firewood without that certain sparkplug reminded me of Liebigs law of the minimum, or in the vernacular - something is only as good as its weakest link. I couldnt help wondering how much oil was embodied in those spark plugs; their parts, their manufacturing, their delivery to central Wisconsin, etc. While my research didnt discover this answer, it did result in my viewing trade, transportation, and our societies consumption habits in a different light.
Much has been written on this site and elsewhere on the exact date or time range when we begin the second half of the age of oil. I will not address timing in this post other than to point out that the later it is, the more can be done to address the systemic risks suggested below. The human pendulum of complacency and panic is in full effect as oil breached $50 on the downside today. Those who read this piece and connect the dots should recognize that $50 oil is not a reflection of its scarcity but is rather an opportunity to effect change(because change is cheaper). There are after all, about Trade has been around almost as long as humankind. Historically it was largely a barter system, before currency was adopted as a medium of exchange. Modern international trade is based largely on Ricardian model of comparative advantage, one of the most eloquent but non-intuitive concepts in economics. Indeed, a story told amongst economists is that when an economics skeptic asked Paul Samuelson (a Nobel laureate in economics) to provide a meaningful and non-trivial result from the economics discipline, Samuelson quickly responded with, "comparative advantage."
ABSOLUTE AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
The early logic that free trade could be advantageous for countries was based on the concept of absolute advantages in production. Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations:
"If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage. " (Book IV, Section ii, 12)
The idea here is simple and intuitive. If a country can produce some set of goods at lower cost than a foreign country, and if the foreign country can produce some other set of goods at a lower cost than can be done locally, then clearly it would be best to trade for the relatively cheaper goods of both countries (or regions). In this way both parties gain from trade.
If a person/region/country can make a product cheaper or more efficiently than someone else, they have an absolute advantage in this product. However, a country that can produce two things (or everything) better than another country can still benefit from trade. This is due to the brilliant (on an empty planet) theory of comparative advantage introduced by David Ricardo.
The Magic of Comparative Advantage – A Hypothetical ExampleBoth Wisconsin and North Carolina have a lot of trees, productive farmland, access to labor, and cows. (assume for this example their labor force and populations are equal) Both produce cheese and furniture. But Wisconsin (for various reasons) has an absolute advantage in both cheese and furniture producing ability. If they were to devote all their resources each laborer could produce 12 units of cheese or 4 units of furniture. In North Carolina, each unit of labor can produce 6 units of cheese or 3 units of furniture.
Wisconsin is better at both products, but applying the theory of comparative advantage, North Carolina is ‘less worse’ at producing furniture. This can be seen via the concept of opportunity cost. For every unit of furniture production, NC is giving up 2 units of cheese production (6/3). For every unit of furniture production in Wisconsin, they are giving up 3 units of cheese production (12/4). Therefore it is ‘more costly’ in terms of opportunity lost, for Wisconsin to produce furniture than North Carolina, in a world of trade.
Specifically, in a position of autarky (or closed economy), each state will devote half its resources to each production pursuit – Wisconsin will produce 6 units of cheese and 2 units of furniture. North Carolina will produce 3 units of cheese and 1.5 units of furniture. In our hypothetical world without trade then, a total of 9 units of cheese and 3.5 units of furniture are produced.
But then a trade agreement is signed. Because they have a comparative advantage in furniture, North Carolina devotes 100% of their resources towards producing 3 units of furniture. (and no cheese). Wisconsin produces 12 units of cheese (and no furniture). Now the ‘world’ has 12 units of cheese and 3 units of furniture. However, Wisconsin can easily shift 3 units of its cheese production to create one unit of furniture. The world now has 9 units of cheese and 4.5 units of furniture with no extra resources or labor.
Trade, through specialization has magically created an extra piece of furniture, with still the same amount of cheese!
WHAT PRICE CHEESE?
A key question in this post: what happens when the cost of transportation of cheese and furniture between North Carolina and Wisconsin(via higher oil prices) exceeds the benefits from trade (an extra unit of furniture)?
I remember in graduate school thinking comparative advantage was really cool. But, like many things in neo-classical economics, comparative advantage relies on numerous assumptions, many of which prove problematic in the real world. Josh Farley and Herman Daly succinctly describe some criticisms of comparative advantage in their textbook "Ecological Economics"(1),
1. "No extra resources" simply means no additional labor or capital - there IS commensurate resource depletion and pollution accompanying the extra production.
2. The neglection of tranportation costs. Transportation is energy intensive, and currently energy is not only directly subsidized, but, in addition, many of its external costs are not internalized in its price. Consequently, international trade is indirectly subsidized by energy prices that are below the true cost of energy.
3. There are two important costs of specialization. First, all cheese makers (cheesesmiths?)in North Carolina must become furniture producers and vice versa for furniture makers in Wisconsin. Making such a shift is costly to all whose livelihood is changed. Also in the future the range of choice of occupation has been reduced from two to one - surely a welfare loss.
Furthermore, after specialization, countries lose their freedom not to trade (the chinese finger trap). They have become vitally dependent on each other... Remember that the fundamental condition for trade to be mutually beneficial is that it be voluntary. The voluntariness of 'free trade' is compromised by the interdependence resulting from specialization. Interdependent countries are no longer free NOT to trade and it is precisely the freedom not to trade that was the original guarantee of mutual benefits of trade in the first place."(1)
CAPITAL MOBILITY
An often overlooked provision of ricardian comparative advantage, but one of extreme relevance in todays world, is that of factor immobility (other than the cheese and furniture). In reality, todays borders are porous to billions upon billions of dollars of capital movements moving to the areas of the world with the cheapest production. In effect, the rich countries have a comparative advantage in 'money' and are trading it for labor and resources in other countries. A countries current account is the difference between the monetary value of exported and imported goods and services. When the imports are greater than the exports, the account is in deficit. If exports are greater, the current account is in surplus. So, comparative advantage, with the assumption of immobile factors relaxed has effectively resulted in the erasure of national boundaries for economic purposes. Some people call this globalization.
The following graph shows the increasing percentage that trade is out of total US GDP:
US International Trade as % of GDP- Source US Census BureauClick to Enlarge
Below is a chart of US imports and exports and our trade balance:
US Imports and Exports - Click to Enlarge
As can be seen, imports have been outpacing exports for some time and the pace has accelerated of late. Though the basic goods vs luxuries trade mix is a complicated analysis, one thing is clear - oil now makes up 10% of the dollar value of our imports:
US Oil Imports by Country - Click to Enlarge.
Finally, it is of some concern that 'services' continue to increase as a % of our national ledger (implying that 'goods' are becoming less). We still do produce huge amounts of food for export, but that is increasingly being accompanied by movies, massages and things higher up the 'discretionary' hierarchy (more on that below). Here is a graph indicating the growth of services vs goods in our Gross Domestic Product and Employment. We seem to have a comparative advantage in 'services'.
US Goods and Services- Click to Enlarge.
THE GRAVITY MODEL OF TRADE
The Ricardian model is not the only economic model dealing with trade. The
It makes sense that trade is inversely correlated with distance because even at todays cheap oil prices (remember - oil is cheaper than water, milk, orange juice, yoohoo, etc), things cost more to ship further. As oil prices increase, this inverse correlation should strengthen.
A recent article in the Economist points out that comparative advantage also works at our most basic level of trade (male/female) and was of historical significance:
Our modern society is structured around just-in-time delivery of people and things. Transportation comprises an increasing amount of total energy use:
In the 1960s transportation accounted for about 23% of all energy expended in the USA- now the figure is approaching 28% (thanks very much to Matt Stone for catching this-NH). The yellow line (almost on top of the pink line) shows of the transportation, 99% of it is oil (there is some electical, natural gas and coal usage)(3). We are really dependent on oil!
The following two graphs show the energy efficiencies of various modes of transportation first for people and then for goods. This first graph is from Richard Heinberg's book "The Oil Depletion Protocol" and is based on data from Britain (which Richard tells me is fairly universal):
As can be seen, the bicycle is the most energy efficient mode of transportation - even better than walking. The other insight from the graph is we gain quite a bit of efficiency from packing alot in on one vehicle. (This is a concept used often in China)
As far as transporting goods, there is a large disparity in energy efficiency per ton mile for different transport methods:
The above graph is somewhat dated (1991), Though there have been efficiency improvements across the board, the general model of water/rail/truck/air in order of efficiency seems to still be intuitively correct, though some argue that rail is more efficient than water. It is actually quite a complicated issue as it depends what one is transporting and the sequence of steps. Alan Drake recently did a study showing rail transport to be 8.3 times as efficient as trucking.
One can visualize the energy efficiency/footprint of various transportation modes as something like this pyramid:
As transportation costs increase, communities and regions that are able to effect movement downwards on the pyramid towards its base will have comparative advantages, due to savings on energy costs, and availability of products.
Let's now shift gears just a bit. Psychologist Abraham Maslow theorized that humans meet basic needs in a hierarchical fashion. Once basic needs are met, we seek to satisfy higher needs such as self actualization and fulfillment. In the current era of cheap oil, at least for western society, a very small % of energy is spent on basic needs in proportion to the energy intensive 'desires' that drive western society:
This concept can be expanded upon. We sometimes take for granted the things that we really need, and make us happy - I am 90% as happy eating fried fish from a local lake as I am driving to Chicago to my favorite sushi restaurant (well at least 80%). Higher personal efficiencies (EROIs) in an energy challenged world are lower on the pyramid.
Finally we come full circle to the spark plug question. There is a great movement (at least in the peak oil circles) towards relocalization. But 'local' labels in many cases are misleading due to the insidious reliance on foreign parts at different moments in the supply chain.
One of my best and oldest friends is an entrepreneur from China. He owns a business in Connecticut that seeks out American companies that need nails, screws, and small metal parts at their factories - he then signs contracts for 5 million screws at 2.5 cents each - screws that in the US would cost 6 or 7 cents due to higher labor etc. He pockets half the difference. The point being that our basic goods might ostensibly be made here, but their component parts may not.
I have not seen a way to measure this so have come up with my own, "the Embedded Transportation Chain". First Order Origin is where you buy something (like in your town would be 100% local). Second Order Origin is where the components and parts came from on the product you bought. And Third Order Origin is where the raw materials came from for the parts to make the Second Order Origin parts. To determine how 'local' (in the sustainability and security sense) a product is, one would multiply Level 1 * Level 2 * Level 3. Of course, there is very little that is truly local, as the world of international trade has increased Third Order Origin percentages dramatically. (I don’t have accessible data on this-the amount of work would be closer to an academic paper – here I just wanted to lay out the idea). True to the field of economics, I have made these terms up. However, also consistent with economics, one can grasp the common sense implications. When looked at in this 3-tiered light, the phrase “Made in America”, takes on different meaning.
I currently reside in Wisconsin. To eat local is cheese curds, fried fish and venison. All these things can be bought (or harvested) locally. But the cheese company gets milk transported from around the state, uses packaging made overseas from natural gas. Its employees drive to work using cars made in Japan and oil from Nigeria and eat food imported from Brazil. Although the dairy farmers themselves use largely local inputs for feed and bedding, their milk buckets are made from steel processed in China, and the wood for the barn comes from a mill in Canada. It is not easy to decipher the ‘localness’ of a product, unless one walks out and picks a wild mushroom. Use your mind however to imagine WHAT IF oil doubles triples or more in price, what sort of domino effects might occur in the production supply lines. It is hard to predict what "Liebigs product of the month" might disappear from the store shelves - Charmin bath tissue one week and Stihl chain saw blades the next.
A quick example is footwear. 98% of all shoes in the United States are made somewhere else, many in China.
Increases in efficiency of goods production in a global context are considered a good thing, as they raise respective countries GDP, and allocate resources wherefore the total pie gets bigger. Once on this track however, participants continue to strive for more and more efficiency, more trade advantage and cheaper production. If taken to its natural extreme, every place on earth will specialize to the maximum profit of corporations. Implicit in this path is the forgoing of expertise and local resources that are lower down the pyramid of human necessities. If transport costs are 20% of a products value and oil doubles or triples, they become upwards of 50% of a products cost. Certain products then become uneconomic to ship. Some of those products are parts of larger products which do not have local substitutes.
High quality and abundant oil has obfuscated the difference between wants and needs. At a Walmart or a Safeway, young people today see quilted bathroom tissue, pork chops, colorful shoes, dental floss, and avocados as a natural smorgasbord, without internalizing the complex energy/trade chain that put them there. This plethora of choices that globalization offers us could just not be possible in local or regionally based economies. In some senses, to revert the global network of specialization back towards less complex, more regional networks is kind of a chicken-or-the-egg dilemma. Unless we change the consumption drivers, there will be little incentive for the manufacturers of nascar lunch boxes to move downwards the production/transport and global/local pyramids.
When (and in my opinion its only a matter of when) oil becomes less available, centralized forms of energy command will not be efficient because different regional blocks and localities possess their own comparative energy and resource advantages and disadvantages. National umbrella energy policies treat all states the same. Corn ethanol roll out is a prime example - what might be great for Iowa and Minnesota has different math for California and Vermont. We know that distance impacts energy efficiency and costs. We also know that different states (and countries) have different indigenous energy resources (Quebec has hydro – Arizona has sun, Montana has wind and coal, etc). It is likely there will be decentralization of energy production as regions move towards building blocks of basic needs in safer spatial scales. The magic of comparative advantage can still work in the second half of oil. But it ultimately will differentiate between basic needs and unnecessary desires - and take advantage of water and railway access.
1. We need oil for more than just driving. It is embedded in almost everything. Unless you're Amish, Aleutian, or have alot of friends, oil is life in the USA (at least currently).
2. High oil prices will eventually make certain types of trade prohibitive.
3. Those nations, regions, communities and families that produce lower on the left graph and consume lower on the right graph will have an advantage when transportation costs increase. Those communities using predominantly rail and water transport will have advantages over those more dependent on truck and air, everything else being equal.
4. As is occuring in some South American nations currently (Peru and Venezuala come to mind), a return to the import substitution model away from the so-called Washington consensus seems inevitable. However, remember the supply/demand wedges in the Hirsch/Bezdek report showing how rapidly production shortfalls could occur. Local, regional and national action needs to be taken soon because of the required long lead times.
5. In rich nations, in addition to conserving, it will be advantageous to begin to be happier with 'less' because the delta of 'desires' may change slower than that of 'things' available in the future, relative to other countries (e.g. Europe and Africa) that exhibit lower energy footprints. In other words, though the USA can easily get by with half as much energy-intensive stuff and conveniences, an abrupt change to this level will be much more mentally painful than a gradual one.
In conclusion, as a thought experiment, the next time you go to your nearest box store, look at the gazillion products on display. Try to imagine where they come from, where their parts come from, and how that supply chain might change when new oil production fails to match decline rates of older wells. While you are there, you might notice how many of the myriad products improve yours or your friends lives, and how many do not. This 'demand' side view of Peak Oil will be the subject of my next post.
Next post (if I successfully defer my addictions): "Evolution, Discount Rates and Addiction"
Nathan John Hagens
Resources cited:
(1) Ecological Economics - Principles and Applications, Herman Daly and Joshua Farley (in my opinion, a textbook that should be used in every college in America)
(2) "Gravity for Beginners" Keith Head. http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/keith/gravity.pdf (.pdf warning)
(3) National Transportation Statistics 2006(pdf warning), US Department of Transportation
Gravity Model of Trade -Commodity Flow Correlation with Distance (2)- Click to Enlarge. A PALEO-ECONOMIC PALATE CLEANSING SIDEBAR BEFORE WE MOVE TO TRANSPORTATION
In existing pre-agricultural societies there is, famously, a division of food-acquiring labour between men, who hunt, and women, who gather. And in a paper just published in Current Anthropology, Steven Kuhn and Mary Stiner of the University of Arizona propose that this division of labour happened early in the species' history, and that it is what enabled modern humans to expand their population at the expense of Neanderthals.
With Peak Oil on the horizon, perhaps I should brush up on my woodchopping and carcass dragging skills.
TRANSPORTATION
Transportation as % of total energy use- Click to Enlarge
MegaJoules per passenger- Click to Enlarge
Energy Intensity per ton mile by freight mode. Source - EIA Click to Enlarge
The Transportation Pyramid. Click to Enlarge
ENERGY USE AND HUMAN WANTS AND NEEDS
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs------------------Nate's Intuitive but Made Up Hierarchy of Energy Use. Click to Enlarge
The Consumption Pyramid - Click to Enlarge
The Transportation Origin Chain- Click to Enlarge
CONCLUSIONS
THE BOTTOM LINE
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I have read, it seems reasonable, that the majority of Americans live off the discretionary income of other Americans. Author Thom Hartmann addressed this in his book, "The last hours of ancient sunlight."
Hartmann described a software company that he used to consult for years ago. First visit: two or three people. Second visit: several more people, after another round of financing, bigger offices. Third visit: dozens of people, after another round of financing, very nice offices. Fourth visit: empty offices, they ran out of money, without ever delivering a product.
The point is that the majority of our economy is largely an illusion, albeit an illusion that consumes vast quantities of energy. Instead of gong to Vegas, you could just mail them a check for $5,000, and it would have the same economic impact.
We are facing a relentless transformation of the US economy--from one focused on providing "wants" to one focused on providing "needs."
Basically my ELP recommendations can be reduced to: Cut thy spending and get thee to the non-discretionary side of the economy.
As I have said about a 1,000 times, if I am wrong, so what?
You will have a lower stress way of life, less debt, and more money in the bank.
This is something that a lot of peak oilers don't understand. We are not going to create an economy based on doing each other's laundry. One, there's that constant growth thing. And two, when the going gets tough, people will do their own damn laundry.
When the going gets tougher, we'll wear dirty clothes.
No, when the going gets tough, most people will be unkempt, poor and surly, doing the laundry and servicing the whims and base needs of the few remaining people with power and money.
We will not be doing "each other's laundry" in some communitarian ideal. We will be doing Their laundry, their nails, their cabinets, their hair, their wigs, their blowjobs and their back-breaking agricultural labor.
GDP is quite interesting when you start digging a few levels deep. 72% of the US's GDP is services. We hear that our economic expansion is due to increases in productivity. How do you measure increases in productivity of services, such as a bank?
The Dept of Commerce measures, for example, a bank's economic contribution to GDP by by "net interest margin" difference between assets (loans mainly) and liabilities (deposits mainly). However, productivity of a bank is measured by the number of "transactions" -- using the ATM is considered a transaction as also when you go to the bank teller in person to get cash. Use of the internet to check balances I believe is also counted as a transaction.
Is it no wonder then that the US's productivity is increasing at a high rate, when the overwhelming majority of the economy is services and the Internet and technology allows for rapid transactions -- ie productivity.
It is also theoretically difficult to justify productivity -- which is defined as output per worker/hours worked for a bank when the GDP impact is net interest margin and productivity is "transactions" -- the two measures do not match -- more transactions does not mean higher net interest margin.
The Dept of Commerce admits that a "stronger theoretical basis" for measuring GDP impact and productivity of services industries is needed.
The GDP is a Ponzi scheme, counting capital as revenue.
http://potluck.com/media/the-unsustainability-and-origins-of-socioeconom...
Pertinent to the discussion here, Oil is capital literally burning up until we are forced to account properly. This goes well beyond oil and has been going on for thousands of years in the form of "agriculture". When all real capital has been consumed, whether in an internal combustion engine or from plowing, we are left with consuming each other. The end.
Bacteria, on the other hand, will live on. Collapse from one complexity state to a lower state doesn't mean we have to suffer or even be less comfortable. Relocalization is a start, but don't forget that we know little about how to preserve humus after 10,000 years of farming. Relocalization will be meaningless, if we start burning humus with tilling, fertilizer, and pesticides. If you want coincidences, look at where all the worlds deserts are located and then think about where agriculture has been practiced for the longest. We are just beginning to dig up the ancient ruins beneath the Sahara. That's righ, the weather is responsible. Sound familiar?
Ahh, yes, the great Yellow River desert, so lifeless and barren after expending its soil as the cradle of Chinese civilization that now a mere 100 million people live along its banks...
Truly, the accuracy of your statement is astonishing!
They're lucky, it's a flooding river, like the Nile. A pity they fucked up the natural fertilizing function of the Nile by building the Aswan dam. China is making the same mistake.
Take a look at the cradle of civilization: from Marrakesh to Multan the landscape is indeed barren. Where once the mighty cedars of Libanon grew, now only dust remains.
Look at our works, ye mighty, and despair!
One example of a cradle of civilization is now a desert; another example is still highly fertile.
Ignoring the second and claiming the first represents a general trend is known as cherry-picking, and represents a very biased and partisan approach to the data.
Unless it really is a general trend, of course. Which I believe is the case: Wherever ancient civilizations appeared, when they disappeared they left scorched earth. The exceptions are where large rivers replenish the soil supply, most notably the Nile, the Tigris/Euphrate, the Ganges and the Yellow/Blue river.
So if those four are counter-examples -- and they involve the cradle of western civilization and the cradle of eastern civilization -- then what are the examples of this actually happening? For something that "really is a general trend", I would assume there are dozens of examples of agriculture leading to massive-scale desertification; what are they?
(I'm also surprised you listed Tigris/Euphrates as a counter-example; I was under the impression that part of the reason for the decline of Sumeria was lowered agricultural productivity due to salt accumulation on the field from their method of irrigation.)
Well, the whole of the Mediterranean (the Greek and the Spanish didn't make their fleets out of the present-day mediterranean vegetation) and the Middle East (the cedars of Libanon, North Africa: the bread basket of Rome). Each time the soil in Mesopotamia became bad enough, the current empire retracted and after a few floodings it was ready to go again.
And farming might be sustainable for millennia in its current form, that's not enough. It must be sustainable practically forever. Even as little as the loss of 1 mm of soil each year is 1 m per millennium. That's unsustainable, the exact period that it goes on depends on the soil supply. How much soil has disappeared in the Dust Bowl area, and how much is left? We can be certain that that kind of agriculture in that area is *not* sustainable.
We're talking about food, not forestry. And Spain is a net food exporter, with a vastly larger population than it had in the days of the Armada, so I really don't see that it supports your claim.
Italy and Greece would be better examples -- both are net food importers -- but both have strongly increased their food yields over the last decades (Italy, Greece), allowing them to support vastly larger populations than in their empire years.
Egypt currently produces enough food for about 2/3 of its population, or about 50 million people. i.e., Egypt alone could feed 80% of the Roman Empire circa 300AD; North Africa could still be the breadbasket of Rome.
In fact, almost every major agricultural area currently supports many more people than it ever did in the distant past. Even Iraq produces millions of tons of cereals, despite its agricultural capability being degraded by successive wars and sanctions, which is most likely more than it produced in Babylonian times.
In fact, the strong trend seems to be that ancient breadbaskets are still strong producers of agricultural goods, which is directly counter to your argument.
One way or another, farming 1,000 years from now will be very different from farming now -- the odds that we'll be at a comparable level of technology are vanishingly small.
I do agree with you that we should avoid long-term damage or degradation to our fertile lands, though.
Of course the yields have increased due to mechanization and chemical fertilizer. What the yields would be now with ancient methods is speculation, though I speculate 'a lot less'. But both mechanization and fertilizer are dependent on limited resources, that are not impossible but very hard to replace, indeed, and will certainly become more scarce in the mid-term future.
So I think we can conclude that long-term agriculture is not impossible, but far from a happy-go-lucky endeavour.
(I appreciate the follow-up of the discussion.)
I'll agree with that.
And that. :)
Yes! Irrigation and plowing release salts that can otherwise coexist in the soil without a problem. Watch the video:
http://www.permaculture.org.au/greening.htm
Those are hand fulls of salt he is showing you from Jordan. So where did he put it? "It's not supposed to be possible", they told him. With agriculture, it isn't and you get desert.
The process depends on the soil and ecology being damaged. Grasslands are the most vulnerable, but that is what you get when you clear a forest to grow yet more food for a "growing" population. Since the forests are so integral to affecting climate, rain, and increasing soil humus, they take longer, but will become deserts, too. Bring the forest back to the yellow river and it will run clear, again.
225 days of the year? Five times as much irrigation as done in 1950? There may be 100 million people there for now, but look at the Sahara for where this ends. The river is "yellow" from the soil washing away. Only clear water runs out of a healthy ecosystem. Those dust storms settle over the Rocky Mountains. The process takes thousands of years, but ends the same way as seen all the way from the Sahara to the Gobi and moving down the Yellow River to the ocean for 225 days in one year alone.
Why do you believe that? What evidence do you have for the assertion that long-term agriculture must inevitably lead to desertification?
The Yellow River has been surrounded by extensive agriculture for something like 6,000 years. If it hasn't become a desert in that time, why should we believe it'll do so any time soon?
Again, an assertion for which you provide no evidence. The Yellow River (which is, indeed, named for the large amounts of soil it carries) hasn't had its name changed recently: it's been the Yellow -- carrying vast amounts of soil -- for thousands of years.
Again, if it's been doing that since the beginning of history, what's the evidence that'll cause a problem any time in the forseeable future?
Maybe you're right, maybe the 6,000-year history of agriculture around the Yellow River is going to come to a crashing halt in the next few years. Without compelling and objective evidence to support that proposition, though, a disinterested observer has no reason to believe it -- the 6,000-year history of the Yellow being bountiful is pretty strong evidence you need to counter.
Especially considering that the land 90% of the river's silt comes from ain't farmland.
The Chinese have practiced fertility management over the ages much more effectively than most of the world. This hasn't sheltered them from famines (only experienced with agriculture), but their land was in decent shape in comparison to other areas when the industrial age began.
Agriculture, being a business, has been well documented through the ages with hard numbers. The pattern is decline, until a new understanding helps put depleted land back into production. These days we speak of hybridized seeds and GMO; 80 to 200 bushels per acre for various grains. Previously, we spoke of deeper tilling and a new understanding of fertilizers; 20 to 30 bushels per acre. Before that they abandoned a field when it produced less than 5 bushels per acre. This is just the recent 200 years of history. Part of what drives this happens as the farmers get squeezed for cheaper food, causing them to rotate one less field or some other short cut when innovation fails them.
For reference, much of what I am referencing comes from Masanubo Fukuoka's work in Japan. Although he calls his work "do nothing farming", it would be a misnomer to think this means that nothing is done. "Doing nothing" mearly represents the ideal case, or Mu. In grotesque summary, the acts of tilling, fertilizer, weeding, and herbicides have all proven to diminish crop yields. His yields were in the 30 bushels per acre neighborhood (no till, weeding, fertilizers, and near zero labor, virtually left wild, but with subtle and well timed day or two efforts). Before you point to the efficiency of today's yields, remember that he doesn't rotate fields, plus he has multiple grains producing on the same acre. His effective yields are comparable to today's high energy efforts with little to no labor (work smart).
Recent revelations in soil ecology explaining the gist of what Fukuoka's research reveals:
http://www.energybulletin.net/23428.html
You can practice hydroponics out in a field as long as you can keep up with the increasing labor requirements. The problem is keeping up with the work you make for yourself in subsequent years based upon a finite resource. Increases in energy perpetuate the pyramid scheme.
We know this is how soil functions, because we know how to directly reverse it. We don't even mind that you have hand full's of salt on the remaining sand:
http://www.permaculture.org.au/greening.htm
China would have been able to keep going with famine cycles for much longer, had they not adopted the hybrid seed, fertilizer, and herbicide regimen. Look into their child swapping traditions to get an idea on how common famines have been over the ages.
Then methods clearly exist for agricultural practices that are sustainable over millenia. QED.
The question is not whether current industrial agriculture is sustainable; the question is whether agriculture is sustainable, and 6,000 years of farming in some places -- as well as Fukuoka, Ingham, and similar agriculturalists -- suggest that it can be, if one uses sensible techniques.
Any evidence for this claim?
I'm guessing not, especially since extensive research on this shows you to be utterly wrong:
"With an extensive database on nutrition and food availability in preindustrial societies, which was compiled in the 1950s, Benyshek and Watson compared twenty-eight hunter-gatherer societies with sixty-six agriculturalist societies. They detected no link between lifestyle and amount of available food, or between lifestyle and frequency or duration of food shortages. Feast-or-famine cycles were probably common throughout human prehistory, and they may indeed favor thrifty genotypes, the anthropologists say. But the cycles seem to have been equally likely among foraging and farming economies. (American Journal of Physical Anthropology 131:120-6, 2006)" (link)
Just because you believe something doesn't mean it's true.
I saw an apt quote in the Internets a while back: "Beware the man of one book."
Many people have a bias, and many people do...less than objective presentations of their observations. I'm sure Masanobu has done some fine work -- and I agree with a certain number of his (less spiritually-based) views on sustainable agriculture -- but I'm just as sure that he's not presenting a full and unbiased view of agricultural practices.
When a man talks about science as if it's a bad thing, I begin to suspect that he may not be giving me a fully objective appraisal of the situation. That doesn't mean he has nothing valuable to say (he does), but it does mean that one needs to be careful to accumulate a balanced perspective.
The problem is that there is no evidence to support the claim that famine happens to Foragers as much as it happens to Agrarians, or that it ever happened to Foragers. You are asking for a proof of a negative. Could you speculate that it happened? Sure, knock yourself out. That's what the article you posted says that they did ("probably" and "may".don't mean they have any basis to state such a thing as fact).
Here's a plausible scenario: Super volcano blocks out the sun for a year.
In this case, for farmers, the crops will surely fail, or be delayed for a year, and surplus must be relied upon. The foragers have a lean year ahead, along with all the animals that they can survive by eating almost exclusively. Many edible bugs will be unaffected, so a change in foraging style will be needed for a time. If you think the Foragers are vulnerable in this sort of crisis, then you don't know much about Foraging. Several animal food sources will be unaffected. For agriculture, no sun for a year would be very bad for the population, as not enough surplus will be available for such a disaster. In fact, famine often coincides with food distribution issues, not as much crop failure. Floods and drought don't affect forests to the extent they affect a field of exposed dirt.
Don't ask for a proof of a negative, it just happens this way, due to the water retention and self-circulation of forests. I already gave you a source for this from Energy Bulletin. Remove the forest and you get drought. Drought cycles translate to famine cycles. The drought eventually becomes semi-permanent.
Are you saying that science should be trusted implicitly? Beware of "new scientific understanding" coming your way. Science is merely the best understanding given the facts that we know about. This doesn't mean that science should be trusted as if fact. In the case of human health and nutrition, there appears to be confusion within the scientific and medical establishment. As energy reserves deplete - whether tomorrow or years from now, science will be looking for ways to reduce agriculture's energy foot print. Considering their best guess, thus far, is more in line with economics, I'm skeptical about science when it comes to our food sources.
In the meantime, you can go get your hands dirty and see for yourself what happens when you follow science compared to what happens when you follow Fukuoka and Permaculture paths. Don't believe me and don't believe anything you read, but believe what you see and try for yourself. The worst thing that can happen will be that you spend less time at the grocery store. The upside is that you avoid all those medical bills from such poor food choices, prepare an insurance strategy against disaster, and save some money. The labor costs are primarily upfront: land forming, sheet mulching, some tree planting to get things started, and time observing what works and what doesn't.
Fukuoka started out as a respected scientist. As one scientific theory proved to be bunk after another, he became increasingly disenchanted by modern agricultural science. In fact, he became alarmed enough to write books, travel the world, and be quite noisy regarding his view of science as a result of his work. Considering his success using "do nothing" farming with close to insignificant energy inputs matching harvests in his area using modern techniques (hybrids, fertilizers, deep plowing, pesticides) and huge energy inputs, I'll be trying his methodology for myself. I can't grow rice, as he does, but that isn't the point of his work. I'll be starting with groundnuts (Apios Americana) for my own area.
Incorrect. I am clearly and explicitly asking for evidence to back up your claim. If you are unclear on the difference between "proof" and "evidence", I'm sure there are web resources you can consult.
Moreover, evidence certainly does exist; e.g., the paper I cited. It's not proof -- hence the use of words like "probably", but that wasn't the question.
Incorrect.
"Probably" -- in the context of a paper using proper scientific methodology -- means "the balance of evidence supports". They don't have enough evidence to state that the thing is certainly true, but they do have substantial evidence supporting it, and no or trivial counter-evidence.
Your idea of "plausible" obviously differs from mine...and from that of the editors of the American Journal of Physical Anthropology, apparently.
If I had meant to say that, I would have.
Instead, I said that anyone bashing science should be viewed with a healthy level of skepticism. One of the tenets of the scientific method is objectivity, suggesting that a man who bashes science may not be fully in support of objectivity either. Indeed, science-bashing is in modern culture most commonly associated with cranks or religious fundamentalists, either of whom tend to have...less than objective messages they attempt to promulgate.
Not all science-bashers are cranks or fundies, of course, but there is an unfortunate correlation, and hence a prudent observer would take science-bashing as a warning sign to examine the evidence carefully and from multiple perspectives.
Hardly surprising - Pimental reported much the same when comparing organic and conventional farming methods. That's not the point of modern farming practices, though. Modern farming practices aren't intended to maximize yields, they're intended to maximize profit. While linked, those aren't quite the same -- detailing a man to tend every acre personally would undoubtedly raise yields, but would be vastly more expensive.
Which, of course, is one of the reasons I'm skeptical about a terrible dieoff if oil supply falls precipitously. There are well-known farming techniques -- such as Fukuoka's -- that can return similar yields to what we're getting now, but for far less energy input. They require many more man-hours of work, though, but that'd be fine in a "post-peak crash" scenario, since the standard assumption is that many oil-related jobs will be lost, so the extra manpower will be readily available. So all that'd be likely to happen is that food would get more expensive; considering how cheap it is now (in the West), there's plenty of slack for that before serious problems start.
Westexas,
Your idea about the value of things is fundamentally wrong. I'm very sorry to say and I hope you don't shoot me for this, but it is so naive and wrong that it is almost laughable.
* The value of things is what you pay for it.
* It doesn't matter if you can touch it or not.
If you think an item you can touch is worth more than a service you cannot touch, then you would be willing to pay more for the item you can touch and less for the service.
I will give another example:
What is worth more?
* a dollar worth of horse manure
* a dollar worth of gold?
or
* a 100 million $ worth of cheap chinese plastic crap
* a 100 million $ worth of a design of a new micro processor from Intel?
Why on earth should we suddenly think the comparative advantage models are no longer valid, just because oil is becoming more scarce & expensive? They have worked for several hundred years before we even discovered the first oil well!
What changed?
Comparative advantage will still work. One of my main points however that if we gain X from trade (due to comparative advantage) with transportation cost Y. If Y suddenly becomes greater than X, why trade that particular product?? Furthermore, we are probably dependent on some products that would qualify in this example.
If we can have an infinite growth rate against a finite resources base, nothing will change (other than perhaps the climate).
If we do live in a finite world, an ever greater percentage of the national income will be spent on food and fuel, which will cause spending on discretionary goods and services to fall.
I simply offer the following advice, which you may of course follow, or ignore, as you wish:
Try to live on half or less of your current income.
Try to minimize the distance between home and work to as close to zero as possible, and commute by walking and/or mass transit.
Try to become, or work for, a provider of essential goods and services.
A case history of forced energy conservation follows. What happens when the following situation moves up the food chain: "Soaring energy prices are moving those necessities out of reach, reversing hard-won economic strides."
http://www.energybulletin.net/22775.html
Published on 18 Nov 2006 by Wall St Journal. Archived on 23 Nov 2006.
As Fuel Prices Soar, A Country Unravels
by Chip Cummins