Peak Lite Revisited
Posted by Robert Rapier on July 16, 2007 - 10:00am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: oil prices, oil production, peak lite, peak oil [list all tags]
Introduction
While I believe that a global peak in worldwide oil production presents an unprecedented challenge to the way most of the Western world lives our lives, I do not believe that world oil production has yet peaked. However, in looking at the new oil capacity that is scheduled to come online, and contrasting that with the projected demand growth, it became clear to me over a year ago that demand was going to rise faster than new supply could come online.
This prompted me to propose the idea of "Peak Lite." It is "peak", because the symptoms will mostly manifest themselves as those of a true production peak: Not enough supply to meet demand. In fact, we have already passed the point at which there is enough $25/bbl oil supply to meet everyone's desires. But production can still grow in this scenario, which is why it is "lite". In that case, people may underestimate the significance of the problem.
Visualizing Peak Lite
If excess capacity had not been eroded in the past 5 years, I believe the oil price would have remained around $25/bbl as shown in Figure 1 (figures are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to reflect exact prices and volumes). This figure is based upon the presumption that a constant 4 million bpd excess capacity existed from 2002-2007. That is enough excess capacity that even a fairly large disruption in supply can be managed by bringing excess capacity online.

Figure 1. Projected Oil Price Behavior at Constant Spare Capacity
Figure 2 shows a more realistic picture of the behavior of the oil market over the past 5 years. As excess capacity has eroded, the price has risen and volatility (no volatility effects are simulated) has increased because any disruptions (or perceived disruptions) may be difficult to manage.

Figure 2. Projected Oil Price Behavior with Eroding Spare Capacity
If current trends continue, Figure 3 may provide an indication of things to come, although I do expect the price rise to be incredibly volatile. I also think we will see periods of stability as demand is destroyed, but once the wealthier countries are the ones left bidding on the remaining oil, the price will likely increase dramatically.

Figure 3. Oil Prices in the Future?
Figure 3 shows demand exceeding supply in less than 5 years, although the exact timing is uncertain. And while some will argue that in economic terms demand can't exceed supply, in real terms it can. If a man starves to death because he can't afford food, does this mean that he did not demand food? No, he did demand food, but perhaps could not afford the supply at the market price. Many will find themselves in this position as prices increase, although demand for oil is admittedly more elastic than demand for food.
The IEA Endorsement
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has now endorsed the same general idea. In their July 2007 Medium-Term Oil Market Report (available for now here), they reach the conclusion of Peak Lite:
Despite four years of high oil prices, this report sees increasing market tightness beyond 2010, with OPEC spare capacity declining to minimal levels by 2012. A stronger demand outlook, together with project slippage and geopolitical problems has led to downward revisions of OPEC spare capacity by 2 mb/d in 2009. Despite an increase in biofuels production and a bunching of supply projects over the next few years, OPEC spare capacity is expected to remain relatively constrained before 2009 when slowing upstream capacity growth and accelerating non-OECD demand once more pull it down to uncomfortably low levels.
It is possible that the supply crunch could be deferred – but not by much. The demand side of this analysis is based on country-level GDP growth forecasts from the OECD and IMF, which amount to a global average of around 4.5% annually.
Lowering GDP growth to around 3.2% per year from 2008-2012 reduces annual oil demand growth from 2.2% to around 1.7% and the call on OPEC crude drops by around 2 mb/d by 2012. But this merely postpones by a year the point at which oil demand growth surpasses the growth in global oil capacity – in effect, delaying the return of minimal spare capacity by only a few years (unless the trend in upstream
capacity growth changes).
They further note that it isn't only the oil markets that look tight:
But the oil market cannot be looked at in isolation. Not only does oil look extremely tight in five years time, but this coincides with the prospects of even tighter natural gas markets at the turn of the decade. Over the past 25 years there has been substitution away from fuel oil and towards natural gas. However, when natural gas supplies have been insufficient or there have been supply problems (such as those seen following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, Russia in 2006), fuel oil has been the natural substitute. By the end of the decade, such flexibility may be constrained, producing upward pressures on all hydrocarbons.
The IEA suggests that current OPEC spare capacity is 2.50 million barrels per day, but this will dwindle by 1 million barrels per day by 2012. I believe the erosion of spare capacity we have seen since 2002, when oil was around $25/bbl, is primarily responsible for the price increase to the $70/bbl range. With several million barrels of spare capacity, there are a many different producers that can bring capacity online in the event of a disruption. As that capacity erodes, there are fewer options for bringing on supplies if they are needed. The price creeps up, and volatility increases.
Whereas OPEC may not have been able to control prices in 2002 because there were too many suppliers to compensate for throttled production, in 2007 it is clear that other suppliers can no longer compensate for idled OPEC capacity. OPEC members have seen that as long as they maintain solidarity, they can maintain a floor price for crude oil (maintaining a ceiling is a different matter, as volatility in a tight market can push up prices much faster than they can react).
What to Expect
In the event of a worldwide peak in oil production, there won't be enough oil to go around. Poorer countries will find themselves priced out of the market at various price points. The situation will be the same for Peak Lite, and this is what we have observed in the past 2-3 years. Many developed countries have seen their oil consumption rise over the past 2 years, even though world oil production has been slightly negative. This means that demand destruction is occurring in some locations. I expect this trend to continue.
At the point that developed countries are bidding against each other for remaining supplies, the price of crude is likely to go much higher. Until now, demand has been moderated as poor countries in Africa and Asia are increasingly unable to afford $70/bbl oil. This price point is unlikely to significantly alter the demands of the United States, Europe, or Japan, which means that at some point of capacity erosion we could see oil prices quickly shoot past $100/bbl. While I think I will win my $1,000 bet on oil prices this year, I am not confident that the price won't reach $100/bbl within 2 years.
To the extent that OPEC actually does have spare capacity, I expect them to continue to test the limits of what the world can withstand as far as oil prices go. If I managed their oil reserves, my goal would be to extract the highest possible price for the oil, but not so high as to trigger a global recession which would destroy demand and collapse the price. OPEC has gradually increased the price that they are satisfied with as they have seen that demand has remained strong at $50, $60, and finally $70/bbl oil. I expect them to continue to push this limit. By 2009, they may be suggesting $90/bbl as the price they are comfortable with.
The bottom line is that I believe the world has now reached the point at which the symptoms of peak oil are starting to manifest themselves - even though I still do not believe we have reached a true production peak. But, the consequences will be much the same as if we had.



Robert:
Surely $90 in '09 has important numerolgical significance!
Thanks for your hard work. I think I like Steve's sound bite, "Its not the size of the tank, its the size of the tap". I think we passed the peak in crude plus condensate in 2005. And, call it what you will, supply isn't keeping up with demand these days, even counting ethanol and the synthetic crude from Canada.
Schlumberger, whose opinion I value highly, suggests that we will experience an 8% rate if decline, leaving us with around 50mbpd by 2020, Matthew Simons figure of estimated world production.
Bob Ebersole
If the U.S. oil + liquids production in the past 35 years has fallen less than 50% from peak production, then you have a model of a large system decline of less than 2% per year.
At that rate, it might be possible to switch to natural gas cars in some cases and conserve some without widespread panic.
As OPEC is likely holding some production back, and other areas are below maximums due to narrow pipelines, you might get more of a flat gentle deline than a steep cliff. If you put more lines per inch on your chart it seems like a crisis of unprecedented proportions. 1-2% declines are less dramatic.
A number of people refuse to account for NG liquids in their speculative peak predicitons. NG liquids production is expected to grow with a number of NG projects being brought towards completion.
Price spikes might cause people to go without the oil. Whether or not that want gasoline, they will buy it.
The us has indeed declined at a low rate, but this is because we were blessed with deep water in the gom plus arctic reserves to tap. On a % basis the world cannot do what we did.
A 2%/y world decline may be possible, but anyway represents 2x the decline rate since 05... and we are continuing to see a geometric increase in demand from china and the exporters. The us decline came during an era when other countries were able to fill the gap, thereby allowing world and us consumption to continue climbing 2%+ even as our supply declined at the same rate. A world declining at 2%/y will have serious affects, and meanwhile NA/europe are quickly running out of ng.
If you add a U.S. inflation rate of 2-4%, then you get some more appreciation of the value of oil. There were technological advances all along the way since 1932 when it was estimated there were 10 billion barrels left in the United States. They did not have horizontal or offshore drilling yet. The technological advances to come might reduce the decline rate of some mature areas, but cannot restore the hundreds of billions of light oil gone from the world.
The problem in my opinion is not so much that oil is getting expensive. In fact if the increase were slow and steady I think we would adjust well enough and in time learn to live without. But it is the financial response that is likely to be the most dramatic. Will lenders continue to lend in a collapsing ecomony? I have heard many excuses for the dotcom debacle, but I really think it was banks upon realizing that the North Sea was in permanent decline that pulled capital from the market that killed the dotcom. If I recall correctly it was a Bank of America guy that first called the downturn and was met with ridicule, for a few days anyway. If oil is determined to be beyond peak, then I think we will see money dry up and rather quickly as those that have, move to shore up their wealth and find ways to protect it. Gold is relatively flat, so I don't think the time is upon us yet. Housing today is sort of like the dotcoms in that it relies on an increasing supply of money. I expect that the housing bust will excelerate over the next year or so, if we are well and truly beyond peak, and Kunstler will be able to finally say "I told you so". It was interesting to watch the exchange rate with the Euro drop again last week just before wall street made its heroic jump. I expect they are related since the DOW is more a reflection of the M3 money supply, than the relative health of the economy. But of course when the DOW is doing well, we tend not to dwell on other matters that are less propitious.
Hello Rainsong,
Your conjecture for slow decline has merit, but I suggest you are not giving enough weight for deleterious blowback cascading into ever greater supply disruptions. Expect ever greater amounts of pipeline explosions [Nigeria, Iraq, Mexico, etc], burning of utility company offices and maintenance vehicles [Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc], theft of copper wires and other essential equipment [now occuring worldwide], and so on.
IMO, universal Peakoil Outreach is the best way to make people understand that enhancing blowback by criminal action is a sub-optimal goal. Community protection of existing infrastructure plus rapid community conversion of these assets to relocalized permaculture is the best path.
Rioting is counterproductive: recall my earlier posting whereby the Bangladeshi people should be peacefully collecting bottles for solar hot water setups instead of making Molotov cocktails when the blackout occurred. If they want to act stupid: the Grim Reaper will gladly mow them down. Their choice.
Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?
For example:
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/images/ED-AG121_sethi_20070715160...
"Daddy, I sure am tired of walking everywhere. Why don't we try Not-Blowing-Up the buses and trains so we can ride them instead?"
Taken from this WSJ commentary on Pakistan:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118454710945867204.html?mod=googlenews_w...
Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?
Apparently you have never lived or worked in Bangladesh. Strikes, called hartals, which normally include putting fire to something, at least old tyres, are quite common on a number of standard occasions whether this be an increase of bus fares or brownouts. The average Bangladeshi has no choice at all. Some of the riots are even paid by politicians. Why don't you take a plane and go there to tell them that their behaviour is counterproductive? Good luck.
War is chaos, and the chaotic will die off. There was also an end to war. Columbia was going insane with madness for some time. Have not read of any recent pipeline explosions there. One might have to accept that a percentage of production will always be down due to maintenance, break-downs, storms, violence, and inefficiency. One does not need these things, but must consider they happen and factor that into the equation.
This is the rule of tens - in 2002 oil was in the $20's, 2003 $30's, etc....2007 $70's etc. I wonder how long it will hold for?
Hello Saildog,
Once people have to start the daily lugging of two 5 gallon water jugs a mile to their houses-- I would expect FF-prices to rapidly escalate thereafter.
Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?
It's been roughly 6 months since you made your $1000 bet and prices are roughly at the mid-point between the January forward-month price and $100. Would you make the same bet now?
Robert, forgive me, I do enjoy your writing, and take into consideration almost everything you say.
But I still hope, come December 31, 2007, that you lose your bet.
- rick
It's been roughly 6 months since you made your $1000 bet and prices are roughly at the mid-point between the January forward-month price and $100. Would you make the same bet now?
The bet was specifically front month WTI. That was $60 when we made the bet, and after the recent run-up is at $74 today. So, I am in pretty good shape, barring a series of unfortunate events. If oil headed toward $100, I think there would be a lot of profit taking by speculators that would dampen that rise.
Now, will I make the same bet for 2008? No. But would I bet another $1000 that oil still won't hit $100 this year? Yes.
how are the speculators going to sell at a higher price? prices have been steadily climbing for the past 6 months with no hard supply disruptions.
without a price spike, oil will continue rising as supply falls, and it is falling oh so slowly (but soon to accelerate). may 2008 will be the death knell of suburbia and most of the USA caused by oil price explosion, and hyper-inflammatory expenses.
The bet was specifically front month WTI.
I just had to check your profile page to make sure you wern't managing a refinery taking feedstock from Cushing or somesuch...
:-)
--
Jaymax
Michael Chertoff's gut tells me the black line has already crossed over the red. The signs and symptoms are here...
Canaries in the Coal Mine
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/2749#comment-209910
Thankfully, not rats in a drain ditch
"demand has been moderated as poor countries in Africa and Asia are increasingly unable to afford $70/bbl oil."
Demand isn't moderated. They are still demanding; they just can't afford to buy a commodity where the supply is less than demand.
Starving people can't afford food, but their bodies still demand it. But Michael Chertoff's gut has never rumbled from hunger before.
The Borborygmous Rat
According to my unsophisticated methodology there are 32 countries or areas in the world currently experiencing energy shortages. These have been reported in their local media within the last week. Most of these areas are in sub Saharan Africa but there are a few exceptions: Algeria, Argentina, and briefly Mexico which experienced some power failures to some 1200 business do to the gas line attack.
Interestingly, the price of energy is becoming a big issue in the South Pacific. Notably Saipan, Fiji, and PNG. I suspect local news media will report energy shortages soon. Pacific Island coverage has always been very very sparse, so the extent of energy issues might be grossly unreported.
Today was a bad day as Malawi was added to the list and Algeria returned with chronic gas shortages in Algiers. The Philippines, India, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Bolivia, and Ecuador all had local news reports of energy issues within the past 12 hours.
WharfRat: "Thankfully, not rats in a drain ditch"
Definitely, but it does feel like a nine mile skid on a ten mile ride.
:>)
That is what makes "demand" an almost meaningless word in the PO debate. What people often mean is "how much can the world afford to buy at this price", not "how much do people want".
Demand will always be for more than is supplied when it comes to energy. If you take a years' supply of oil, distribute it, and then ask "who wants some more?" there will always be a few billion hands up. When you ask "who can afford some more", there will be a lot fewer.
The whole debate over supply vs demand is just an economics exercise. It gives little insight into the real number of people hurting for want of oil...
"You can never solve a problem on the level on which it was created."
Albert Einstein
Robert, IEA is calling for 88 mbpd demand in the fall of this year but production is going to be down around where it is now - 85 mbpd or maybe a hair higher, unless KSA antes up over 2 mbpd of production. Further, the current peak in all liquids and in C&C are both behind us. The all liquids peak looks breakable but C&C? I don't think so without some extraordinary event.
Question: Let's assume that 2005 was C&C peak and 2006 was all liquids peak. How far into the future do we have to go before you change your position and recognize those dates? One year? Five years? Ten years? I am not suggesting that you recognize those dates now, I am just curious as to what array of factors would cause you to reassess your position. Do we need to see year over year declines larger than X%? Or what other factors would cause you to recognize one of the current peaks as the actual peak?
For me, my position is simple - I'll revise my belief in a peak date when we get higher production numbers than prior. My belief is testable, falsifiable, and adaptable to the facts. Right now 2005 is the peak C&C year no matter what anyone else wants to say. And it will remain the peak year until production exceeds that.
Ghawar Is Dying as we slide Into the Grey Zone
"The greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function.
I'm with this guy; I get a chuckle out of this.
Matthew R. Simmons, head of Simmons & Company International, a Houston-based energy investment bank, doesn’t just believe that peak oil has already happened. He told EnergyTechStocks.com that in another year or so the world will wake up and say – in Simmons’ words – “Oh, damn. We peaked in May 2005.”
http://energytechstocks.com/wp/?p=47
Not RR, but my take:
1) Several consecutive years of actually falling production (not a mere 'plateau').
OR
2) Combined and straight admittance of final global peak production from those with the biggest reserves and biggest anticipated spare capacity (i.e. KSA/Iran/Iraq/etc).
Option number 1 isn't going to be very helpful and option number 2 just is not going to happen.
I'm with Deffeyes/Simmons and the rest of the bunch on this. It cannot be known for sure until it's in the rear view mirror (for some years) and by then it's mostly academic rather than of any practical value.
Or, you could define the peak as 'the end of cheap oil' ... if so, then I think we are now at that point and I think RR might agree on that.
If 'the end of cheap oil'is indeed here now then I think a lot of people are going to be caught out ... CERA for example!
Xeroid.
xeroid,
I'm with you. We can argue with the cornucopians forever about when we are peaking in which commodity, and what is oil. But its damn hard for anyone to argue that enough oil is going to come on the market to satisfy everyone's wants and needs at a price of say, 1 Yeargin($40/bbl), except of course, Daniel. Bob Ebersole
Or, you could define the peak as 'the end of cheap oil' ... if so, then I think we are now at that point and I think RR might agree on that.
Yes, I agree with that. In fact, in 2005 when oil crossed $50, I told my then boss that it would never go back down to $50. He laughed and said that we were just in a bubble.
But the purpose of this essay is that while I think oil has not yet peaked, it doesn't matter. If my thesis is correct then for all practical purposes we have peaked.
How much production growth do you think is left in the system, Robert? 2mbpd? 5mbpd? I certainly will not hold you to this since any guess any of us make is just as likely to be wrong as right.
I do find your second paragraph illuminating:
So are we, for all practical purposes, past the question of "when" and should we be discussing "what do we do" instead?
Ghawar Is Dying as we slide Into the Grey Zone
"The greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function.
How much production growth do you think is left in the system, Robert? 2mbpd? 5mbpd?
I have thought that we might squeeze 5 mbpd on top of where we are at, but the more time that goes by, the less chance of that we will have as we continue to deplete existing fields. But I think there is probably 2 mbpd idled around the world right now.
So are we, for all practical purposes, past the question of "when" and should we be discussing "what do we do" instead?
Regardless of any position I have ever held on peak, my position that we need to be addressing the eventuality right now has been consistent. I have never suggested that we don't need to be moving ASAP to slashing our fossil fuel usage and changing the way we live.
"you could define the peak as 'the end of cheap oil'"
For me, that was '72; 24.9 cents a gallon. Not much of a way to define peak oil.
Quite how the concept of demand can be reduced to a figure when the price is an unknown is beyond me. Where's the Demandometer? What would demand be if the price today were $25? How many solar panels and Priuses would have ben sold? The Idiot Energy Agency talks about a demand of 88 million, but how do you know it was there if only 85 are produced and sold? I'm sure they have a mumbo jumbo to cover their behinds, but as has been said, predictions are very difficult, especially concerning the future.
The salient fact in all this is that some OPEC producers are not about to be bribed to increase production, assuming they are capable, by a higher product price because they know the price will rise regardless. This nightmare in which inevitable future elasticity of supply figures into current pricing is as good a reason as any why the military is in Iraq. While all sorts of excuses as to why we should stay or leave are bandied about, those 'enduring bases' will endure as the oil patch police station for quite some time, Congress notwithstanding.
I always knew it wasn't going to be pretty.
Robert,
Thanks for your lucid presentation--top notch, as usual.
Now just one teeny tiny quibble about usage of the term "demand."
In economics, the term "demand" is well-defined; it includes both the willingness and the ability to buy something at a particular price. For the man starving to death, there is no demand for bread because he has no money to purchase any bread at any price. For me, I go out to buy bread I don't need, let it go stale and then feed it to the birds, but because I'm willing and able to fork out $2 a loaf (or whatever the market price is) I get counted as part of effective demand.
Thus "demand" has nothing whatsoever to do with needs, except insofar as these needs can be financed with money. If you have no income and no savings, then you can demand nothing, no matter what you need nor no matter how urgently.
Because usage in economics is so well established, so long established and so unambiguous, my inclination would be to stick with the definition of "demand" in economics rather than redefining the term or expanding it to correspond to current sloppy usage by journalists.
Robert's (and our) concern and intent in using the word demand is pretty clear. On a crowded life raft with one quart of water, "demand" clearly exceeds supply. If you don't like using the economics term, what word do you suggest?
I suggest using the terms "demand" and "supply" as they are defined in the discipline of economics. For one thing, only by adhering to such usage can there be any credibility among economists (who regard incorrect usage as a symptom of fuzzy or incorrect thinking--not without some justice).
Instead of misusing the term "demand," I'd go to the dictionary and thesaurus--probably the term "need" comes closest to what Robert means.
I do believe it is worthwhile to use correctly defined terms, both for clarity and for credibility.
My question was a sincere one. I would note, however, that as with many words, there is more than one valid meaning to the word demand. Webster offers not only the economics definition, but also the more common one, i.e., "a seeking or state of being sought after." I don't think the fact that a specific discipline has adopted one specific meaning for a word means it cannot continue in its more common usage. For example, in psychiatry, "panic attack" has a very specific meaning, rather different from the more common use.
If we go to words like "need" or "requirement" we are still very fuzzy because there is a wide range of what would be considered need.
I think for credibility among psychiatrists, the term "panic attack" needs to be defined as the psychiatrists define it. There is nothing wrong or obscure or quirky about the usage of "panic attack" by psychiatrists. If you want to talk psychiatric symptoms, use the correct vocabulary. Similarly, if you want to talk about economics, use the correct vocabulary.
Incidentally, in sailing we have hundreds and even thousands of well-defined terms that have a particular meaning in sailing. "Beating" means something very specific in sailing, and it has nothing to do with hitting anybody.
"Pinching" means something specific and something not to do in sailing, and there is no synonym to be found outside the sailing vocabulary. It would be quite wrong to redefine "pinching" to mean, for example, sailing close to the wind. (Pinching is when you try to sail too close to the wind and stall out the sail and hence slow down the boat.)
I see nothing to be gained by misusing the term "demand." In the context of economics ("supply and demand") terms are well-defined, and I think it is very useful to respect and adhere to these traditional and established definitions.
Consider some real life examples.
Last year, the New York Times profiled several American drivers, as oil prices climbed past $3 per gallon.
The only drivers who had really curtailed their total miles driven were the ones physically incapable of buying gasoline, e.g., a college student who literally did not have the money to buy gasoline to drive home every weekend to see his girlfriend.
In economic terms, we might say:
"Despite an increase in price, quantity demanded also increased, which reflected an underlying increase in demand. Some people were priced out of the gasoline market."
Perhaps the appropriate terms are "quantity demanded" and "quantity supplied".
Yes, this is a legitimate economic concept...it is called a shortage. It represents a disequilibrium in supply and demand, where quantity demanded exceeds quantity supplied. I'm not sure how to insert an image here, but here is a link to graph that depicts this: