BP's Deepwater Oil Spill - Capping the Riser - Part 1 (Cap on, but leaks) - and Open Thread 2

Please transfer discussion to http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6572.

Update: It is still too soon to know how successful the new cap will be. Spillage of oil was apparently expected by design, initially. As the system is adjusted so that more oil can come from the top, less spillage is expected. Updates on the amount of oil being collected will be provided only every 24 hours. The first estimate is expected tomorrow morning. The ship doing the processing is set up to handle 15,000 barrels of oil a day, so that is the upper limit on the amount the system is set up to handle. - Notes by Gail, based on this afternoon's press conference.

This post describes what leads up to Heading Out's statement at 10:06 PM that they have the cap on but it has not gone down far enough to generate the seal, and so there is a lot of oil still coming out from under the cap.

The vertical section of the riser was cut, using a Shear, at 9 am Thursday morning.


Lower Riser Assembly (LRA) atop the Blowout Preventer (BOP) at the Deepwater Horizon well, with the bent riser removed, waiting for the arrival of the Lower Marine Riser package (LMRP)

The oil and gas are rising vertically, from the top of the riser, the drill pipe (DP) and the saw cut in the side of the riser (just down from the top of the shear)

At 8:30 pm, the ROVs maneuvered the latest version of the “top hat”, variation 7, of the LMRP over the top of the LRA. As the new cap was lowered into place, it was surrounded by clouds of oil and gas, making the actual progress of the event somewhat difficult to follow. The new variation had been finished yesterday, to accommodate the changing upper surface of the remnants of the well.


Building LMRP 7 on June 2nd at Port Fourchon (BP)

The Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) was first connected to the riser, and to a methanol feed that would help, between them, to inhibit the formation of methane hydrides when the gas came into contact with the surrounding cold seawater. It was then slowly lowered to the site, and across into the fountain of oil and gas, and down over the top of the riser.


Lowering the LMRP into the cloud of oil from the riser.

The initial attempt halted after a while, and by 9 pm the situation was, for while static. The cap was sitting apparently on the rubber seal that had been designed to fit between the LMRP and the flange, but the amount of oil that was leaking out of the bottom of the LMRP was still a considerable amount, even though some of the flow was also being bypassed through ports on the LMRP that could later be closed.


Flow through a relief port on side off the LMRP to relieve the pressure within it.


Leakage around the seal between LMRP 7 (yellow), the seal (greenish black) and the LRA. (white)

The question now arises as to whether the LMRP could be lowered sufficiently that it could seal to the flange surface, since it was no longer possible to get the seal needed on the upper surface of the riser, given that it had been distorted by the Shear which had cut the bent riser away.

There was a pause, while the engineers had a bit think for over an hour. Looking at the cloud of oil coming out, it does contain small white specs that could be either methane hydrates or drops of the dispersant. And now, at 10:30 pm, there is a little more action.

Oil and gas coming out from under the LMRP


Leaks under the LMRP at 10:30 pm

For those who may not remember, this was the initial plan as it was proposed.

The Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) option

So far it is not quite as simple as the sketch would suggest. But I will put this up, and then update, as changes appear.

At 11:12 PM Central Time, we received an e-mailed press release with a statement from National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen that the cap was in place.

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3 quick things:

1. B.P. has doubled the number of ROVs dispersing Corexit (chemical dispersant in use) underwater as of approximately 2:00 am EST. Can't tell the flow rate for sure, but identical equipment and what appears to be identical flow rates. This begs a few questions:
- Why are they now pumping twice as much dispersant underwater?
- What purpose does doing this serve if the newly placed LMRP is working as planned?
- Has something changed near the well head?

2. The idea of capturing the oil using large underwater "balloons" seems to be popping up more frequently in various areas and media outlets. Do these things even exist/operate at that pressure or is this more "nuke the well" talk?

3. The WSJ has an article today, "BP Cites Broken Disk in 'Top Kill' Failure" (available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870487560457528013357716426...)

Once again, this goes to show just how far ahead of the curve theoildrum.com is. I'm surely not the only one who read about this likelihood here days ago. This group deserves our support/contributions whenever possible.

Take care, everyone!

1 - I think they are using 2 dispersant wands because they have all the flow in one spot, before they were using two, one at the kink and one and the end of the riser. I don't think it indicates anything about the success or failure of the top hat, that information is on the deck of the ship and not yet available to us lurkers.

2. Unfortunately the balloon ideas are as far off target as the nuke options, but with less potential side effects.

3. Above my pay grade.

Maybe they are using more because the Federal Panel convened by NOAA to examine the issue has recommended continued use of dispersants.

http://calamities.gaeatimes.com/2010/06/04/apnewsbreak-expert-panel-oks-...

Regarding the rupture disc in the casing...does anyone have access to a casing tally that would show at what depth any of these rupture discs are positioned and in what string? I'm glad to see BP mentioned failure of this disc as a possible cause of failure of the top kill. It gives me some comfort that their response team is looking at all the possibilities. The burst disc was pretty high on my list of possible casing failure points early on.

Also, it seems BP is no longer updating the graphic on the relief wells. Does anyone have a link to any data on current depth of the relief wells?

Thanks.

ExDrllgMgr

Do you have any links or info on these rupture disc. I have not heard of them and would like to know more.

Who supples them, weatherford, Haliburton or Drilquip.

Look forward to your update

OK. I made my donation and registered. Thanks for so much useful information. I'm learning and will post my messages at appropriate places. I'm a graduate Ceramic Engineer with an MBA. (No, I never made toilets nor ashtrays)

Ceramic Engineer with an MBA. (No, I never made toilets nor ashtrays)

any proppant for frac'ed wells? LOL

Hi. I have done a fair bit of deep water robotics, surface robotics, and studied fluid flow for many years at MIT. I think I have a solution. The BOP, with its partially closed shears, and junk shot garbage is the problem. I say, get rid of it and start with a clean hole which is spewing oil and gas. Next start forcing steel shafting with a clearance of about 5-10mm (so that it can freely move) down the hole. One could do this either from the surface via a riser, or a frame mounted over the spewing well. Once one has about 200 meters of shafting into the well, the flow should be choked enough to attach a riser and force drilling mud down the hole on top of the shafting. The clearance of the shafting should be such that it will not get stuck in a bend.

The first step of stopping a flow is to choke it. The BOP needs to be removed to get access to the well so that it can be properly choked. Preferably, it could be removed with a flange still on the well casing, but even if it were to be blown off, the steel shafting could be forced down the hole to staunch this flow.

I would appreciate any comments on this idea. If there are no obvious problems, then I will write a report and send it to BP next week. These folks seem to need all the good ideas they can get.

I'm a lawyer, not an engineer, but I am game. Like you, I believe this leak needs to be stopped long before a kill bore. I would first try a good seal on the riser flange with a pipe and clamp system connected to a valve and slowly shut off the flow. On the last thread, I outlined how I think that could be done.

But if that didn't work because the internals of the BOP fail and begin to leak, then I think this is a great back-up. The question I would have is whether the BOP can be removed by these robots or whether the wellhead would have to be sheared. As I understand it, the wellhead was a 36 inch pipe so it might be difficult to take the BOP off the wellhead either robotically or with shears.

But if that didn't work because the internals of the BOP fail and begin to leak, then I think this is a great back-up.

The integrity of the upper casings are questionable, at this time. The last casing run has probably been displaced by the blowout, up into the BOP stack. Or possibly a few joints of it

It is probably wise of them not to press their luck by trying to shut anything in and risk having something worse than there already is now.

The BOP's probably could still handle the pressure.

All of these things will be analyzed once the well is dead and they are in a position to do the final P&A on the top. Then there will be more things made clear to them of what happened when the well came in.

The BOP is designed to be unlatched from the wellhead, pulled up to the rig and re-used (it is a rather expensive bit of hardware). Its is actually in two parts - the lower part with the rams, and the upper part with the control pods, annulars, etc - the LMRP. These can be retrieved separately. Now it has a drill pipe sticking through it, has internal damage, and oil flowing through it - who is to say if the latching mechanisms are functional and what would come with it if removed. That said, the wisdom of removing it....

Gee wiz, sounds odd to me!

Remove the BOP? Jonniesmokes WHAT?

Remove the BOP? Jonniesmokes WHAT?

We used to make jokes about stuff like that, bad rope? bad weed perhaps?

The risk is blowing the casing out deep in the mud from pressure spiking as you quench the flow. I had a similar thought that if you lost the BOP you could push a thin drill-pipe down the hole and pump a LOT of heavy mud, but with no BOP the flow will be tremendous, and likely too high to easily kill.

Another option would be to hot-tap below the BOP and feed in either (a) long heavy rods, like depleted uranium, which would "fall" through the oil faster than the flow moves up (make them long enough to be heavy enough to fall). Put in enough and the flow will slow, or (b) a small-diameter pipe that would go alongside the drill-pipe to the bottom, and then pump mud, or (c) both.

I can't help but wonder what fraction of the oil is coming from the drill pipe (which is high-pressure ready) and whether it is intact through the BOP. If so, you could capture, control, and then just use it to pump mud like God intended -- but I doubt it is.

long heavy rods, like depleted uranium

My scheme was to use gold. Perhaps hexagonal (to allow packing) 8 mm across flats. 16 mm long with a cone on one end and an indent for a cone above to fit in. It should self stabilize "pointy end down" and fall down the bore till it hits as obstruction or makes it to the bottom.

Easily fabricated, no environmental issues, malleable if 24 K is used. LOTS of it available with appropriate payments.

Best Hopes for BP chequeing account,

Alan

"My scheme was to use gold. Perhaps hexagonal (to allow packing) 8 mm across flats. 16 mm long. . ."

I'm pretty sure we could shoot these down the bore with low-yield nuclear flare guns.

Alan, you funny guy you got me ha! This really is a solid gold well though.
I do have to ask you if you think our blood lust for oil will at all be tamed by this global disaster? I don't believe it will for very long. Drill deeper baby, along with two or more relief wells drilled at the same time? Hey what an extra 100 mill among friends?

What's odd, is that it is actually a valid engineering approach.

Inject, say, 500 tons of these gold what ever you call them with the mud during top kill and there is a reasonable chance of diminishing the flow. Depends on the flow path.

And, as I said no environmental issues and easy to fabricate (just tight security !).

Alan

PS: Seeing Tony's face when this would be seriously proposed would be priceless !

Alan, damn your good! Stilling laughing at the BP GOM solid gold well! 500 tons I think that's all the gold the IMF has left? Kill two birds with 500 tons of gold ha! Thanks for making this a better place my friend. People should have listened to you weeks ago. Four relief wells even if they don't get to target is a absolute must! Hey is that why gold is sky high? Did you leak (no pun, oh ok yes pun intended) your plan using most of the worlds gold down the BP rat hole?

I like gold being thrown down rat holes; I keep a hard hat on standby, just in case.

Your plan has one insurmountable obstacle: "All the gold in California...." And Tony don't live in Beverly Hills.

if you think our blood lust for oil will at all be tamed by this global disaster?

Did the bus boycott in Montgomery end segregation ?

Did "Uncle Tom's Cabin" end slavery ?

etc. etc.

No, not directly. But a small minority of people will be affected and start thinking new thoughts.

Perhaps Obama can use this as a teaching moment. Far less than half of Americans will learn anything (see Jimmy Carter), but seeds will be planted.

And in a very few years, post-Peak Oil will create a panic. Any seeds planted now will be useful then.

Best Hopes for a Productive Response to Disaster and Panic,

Alan

For those that have not wondered off the BP spill discussion, I would recommend reading

http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6544

The Oil Drum is *FAR* more than "all BP, all the time".

One of my better comments there.

I have to agree, your best post ever! The thought that runs through my mind is the last 10% is worth far far more than the first 90% and we just hit the wall at that point. We really are so fortunate most oil exporting countries are goofs. Why on earth would you sell the most productive, highest btu content energy per volume for next to nothing? We are so lucky they are not smart enough to understand the economics of VALUE ADDED ( I didn't say that). If I were any of them we would not see a drop of crude ever! Gasoline, Diesel, propane, ethane right down to tar! Do you think they will spring it on us when we least expect it? If you want oil build your factories here? What then? The GIANT (love that word) hissing sounds of trickle down economics (by the way don't ask what that was trickling)sending jobs and technology overseas yet again? Please, please god of physics save us with that all powerful endless yet seemingly unreachable goal of FUSION! Give just a a lot more than a micro second of success please!

At first I found this idea intriguing.

Ok, we get some chunks of gold or DU to fall through the stream.

They start to block the flow.

Wooo hooo!

But this issue niggled at me:

Q What happens when they assemble into a clog that is actually resisting x000 psi of force?

A: They get shot upward as from a cannon

Well not so fast. As a cannon.

The pellets form a packed bed. Assuming that the pellets have a terminal velocity greater than the fluid velocity AND the pressure drop across the packed bed is greater than the weight of the bed what you get is a fluidized bed the depth of which depends on the velocity of the fluid.

The equation for pressure drop across a packed bed is the Ergun equation.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabri_Ergun

Attn jonniesmokes, David

Please don't rebuild anything. There is a subsurface blowout with gas and fluid leaking into a shallow formation, migrating across a salt weld or fault plane. If you shut this well in, it will vent uncontrollably.

The only cure is to kill the reservoir ("relief wells").

That's just fine and f'ing dandy.

Where do you suppose it is?

200 feet below the seafloor?

500, 5,000, 10,000?

Ding, ding, ding, school is open! Return to school please. The well is 13,000 feet deep? So you are going to re-bar the entire well? You don't think 13-14k psi will want to eject your re-bar idea like most people with an understanding of this well? So you want to release 50 million barrels a day while your 1% plan fails? This goes in my book with the battle ship, giant screw, 100k tons of quick setting post cement. The battle ship still gets the cover sorry.

Damn! I thought my expanding foam idea would win it.

Some of these ideas are fun to read. In the "remove propellershaft while at sea to repair it" category.

I like the battleship one. Why a battleship, one wonders? Is it to go down with guns blazing, torpedo-tubes firing? Or is it because a battleship sounds more serious?
And then there's "fill it with gravel." OK, so we're smashing a gravel filled battleship into the BOP. Doing what, exactly?

But removing the BOP entirely seems quaintly attractive - you'd have a solid stream jet of oil and gas spewing - so powerful you wouldn't be certain where the pipe ended and the jet began.
Try pushing rods into that.

Here's a sampler:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5EHqb9wU_NY&feature=related

Thanks, I needed the extra chuckles ha! I know some times you think wow am I the only one that thinks this is so anti-physics ha!

The battle ship has two claims of ownership. One person from a brilliant comment on Huffington post and the other a claimed admiral. Of course the spawned firing cannons with GIANT propeller SCREWS are additions from TOD fans.
Gotta love a country that can defeat the mighty science of Newton ha!

Well, Neils Bohr really screwed up Newton (and Einstein, for that matter) at some level. Perhaps, there's a quantum battleship solution to the spill that needs exploring, you know. Just put in a call to your friends at the LHC and shout "Three quarks for Muster Mark!" at them. ;)

EL, did I tell you I worked at the LHC for 3 months last year? Fun place and great people that are driven. Really did I tell you that?

landrew: And you weren't sucked into The Black Hole? I have a new level of respect for you, Mon. Flash of genius! I just realized that the answer to the Great BP Blow Out is creating a black hole.

Not "fans"

Me, if you please.

And don't forget the J-B Weld.

Otherwise the torque on the battleship's keel will strip the slot in the giant screw.

I had this solved weeks ago.

Couldda dun the fabrication in my basement.

Well, maybe not the battleship part.

You are the best! I think this is so tragic a spot of humor is needed now and then. Thanks for the laugh.

The other day I heard someone seriously suggest ramming a submarine down the well. Aye aye, cap'n.

Subs :)

Johnnie etal,

BP has been a Dril-Quip shop for a long time so I suspect they ran the Big Bore SS-15 subsea wellhed system with a Vetco HD-H4 profile. The wellhead with top flange should have been run on the top of the 22" casing. It appears the 22" x 18" adapter was run to facillitate landing the 18" casing. Subsequent strings would have been hung in the profiles located in the subsea wellhead housing. A ring groove is located on the face of the wellhead flange (looking up) which accepts a VX ring gasket. There may be a newer model but I am uncertain it has been about 9 years since I ran one. There is also a ring groove on the internal face of the connector.

Located on the very bottom of the BOP stack is the wellhead connector which can mate with the HD-H4. Within the connector are a series of "latching dogs". These things are about 6" long and located inside and around the circumference of the connector. The connector is stabbed over the HD-H4 profile and landed. Hydraulic pressure is applied to the connector to push up the "dogs" to latch the wellhead. Slight tension is applied to the riser to pick up the stack weight to ensure the connector is locked. The connector can then be tested against the VX ring the seal. A failry simple, albeit time consuming, operation. This is a 15,000psi WP system as the stack was a 18-3/4" 15K WP.

This connector remains locked until opening pressure is applied. Here is the rub, if you have an inclination >6degrees the dogs bind up and you can not get it to unlatch. Last time I saw the bullseye on the LMRP the stack inclination was well north of 6 degrees.

Point being, given the current setup, I don't think the could unlatch the stack if they wanted to.

The connector between the LMRP and top of the BOP is typically a Cameron HC collet. It is far more forgiving but not as robust.

On a side note, I am profoundly happy that the wellhead system performed as designed in terms of bending moments and torsional shear. When the rig sank a huge bending moment was applied to the wellhead system and it help up. Had that failed everything else would have been a moot point.

I hope this helps and forgive me for any errors as I am running this from memory and I have slept since the last time I ran this system.

This just keeps unfolding and unfolding. What a drama. Things are looking better now but my gut feeling tells me its not going to work this time either...at least not completely. In the meantime we have pictures of oil soaked birds and a riling president - which doesnt help matters. Maybe BP should start using more outside help?

For all those who have no, and I mean no, deep drilling knowledge, this site is still one of the best experiences one can have, I'm old enough to remember listening on the radio with my father to the Philadelphia Eagles beat the Chicago Cardinals 7-0 for the NFL championship and marveling with him at modern technology that sent us that game live. (For those of you who don't remember the game, try the Google.) And now I'm here. "What a long, strange trip it's been." And I have had great thread discussions with Landrew, TheraP, Diverdan (did I just write that?), Alan and many others. This site is more than about oil; it is about where the world is heading... written by people who care. I attended some pretty fancy universities and have had some pretty fancy continuing education classes. theoildrum beats them all. Thank you one and all. DONATE. DONATE. DONATE. [Is that clear?]

"The Oil Drum is a pretty special place."

I agree, Prof. Goose.

But it's also a boring place at times, a place for the like-minded to preach to the choir via censorship of dissenting views.

I for one would like to see more dissention, Prof. Goose. But, hey, it's your website so do as you please.

So the concern seems to be that a 6" pipe isn't big enough to capture much of the flow.

What about taking a series of Tyvek rolls (like they use on houses) and glueing/sewing/heatsealing/whatever them together to create a mile long, 20 foot diameter tube for the oil to flow up to the surface in a small enough area for a ship to suck it up?

Would the gas be totally out of control at that point? What diameter would this have to be for it to be more like an open garden hose and not a pressure jet?

How do we control the Tyvek curtain in the currents?

I've been thinking about this. The no pressure/gentle guidance design appeals to me.

I see it including the following

A framework consisting of

• Heavy hoop on ocean floor connected by cables to flotation/enclosure on the surface.

• Intermediate steel hoops or ribs connected to the cables

The fabric should be a strong geotextile or something like shrimp netting

Passage needs to be wide enough that there is no threat of clogging by hydrates

The mouth should be wide enough and there should be enough water mixing that gas at the surface doesn't present a huge problem (after all it doesn't at the moment, in the open ocean)

Anyway, fun to think about. Having a few such things on hand to immediately drop over leaks might not be a bad thing.

I find it appealing also as it sidesteps a lot of the technical challenges involving pressure gradients, it greatly reduces the amount of oil on shore or in currents, it allows for the oil to be concentrated in a large collection pool, and it would make the dispersants unnecessary. The only drawback I see is a large flammable area of oil and gas around a bunch of ships. I don't know enough to comment on those dangers.

As for anchoring against currents, I think you would need the large hoops and I would think you could anchor the first few hundred feet against the sea floor if you could pile drive some supports into the muck. The top few hundred feet could be anchored to ships. Maybe a few ROVs could be employed to gently push the middle sections against currents. Again, I don't know enough about this stuff to ascertain if it is at all feasible to maintain such a large curtain against the current.

So this would be a giant (love that word in my book) shower curtain like Lucy used in her TV series? The 5000 foot shower curtain? Wow, that is so fun, like a GIANT water weenie? Why don't they just drill all wells like that? GIANT shower tubes. You could print fish and whales on the shower curtains and have glass bottom boats to show the tourists how environmental the shower tube is?

But it can't be a vinyl shower curtain. Those are bad for the environment. ;)

I wish I knew more about this but it seems to me the buoyancy difference would take care of that.
can someone tell me why this won't work? please

Another for the book ha! Better idea wrap yourself in the Tyvek to keep you safe from ( I was going to go mean but not). Tyvek, never ever did I think I would hear that ha! The worlds supply of Tyvek blowing about the ocean killing all things it smothers in it's wake ha! Really, almost tops the battle ship!
Maybe if you experiment with 13,000 psi in your house first? Really?
Wow, the longer I think about this it starts to dethrone the battle ship?
Readers would be so upset with the loss of the battle ship cover.

landrew,

You are a guest here, please act accordingly. Humor that insults, is not funny.

Thank you.

Really, I guess you have never been to Vegas? Watched a tv show, read a magazine? Read many of the posts here in the past? Anti science is fun to a point but really a giant Tyvek shower tube 5000 feet long is too toooooooooo weird even for here. Yes, I wear a Tyvek suit in a class 1 clean room. If they used all the Tyvek in the world, how would I be able to suit up for science?
Ever teach a class on science were the cartoon with Wiley Coyote runs off the cliff and half the class doesn't understand why he can't just hang there?
We wonder why censorship is so popular here?

Have you ever worn Tyvek to protect yourself from chemicals? I have. It's very strong stuff and I'd guess very oil and saltwater resistant. Given they wrap houses in the stuff I'd think manufacturing a few hundred thousand square feet of the stuff in very long sheets (it can be joined using a branched polyethylene and heat with high joint strength) wouldn't take very long, and it could be rolled up and transported in rolls before being deployed.

As for 13,000 psi (isn't that the pressure down in the reservoir?), I can't imagine what you're talking about, but if you're intimating that something within 30 or 40 feet of the oil flow is doomed to instant destruction, the ROV video seems to indicate quite clearly that once released into the ocean, there's not enough oil pressure to actually cut anything.

Perhaps you should have gone mean, at least that might have elicited a laugh...

Did I say I didn't like the GIANT Tyvek shower curtain? Love that idea of a 5000 foot shower curtain in the ocean that is calm as a glass of water. Love that idea using a GIANT sewing machine to create a 5000 ft. shower curtain. Do you think that could finish that before the relief wells? Could they finish that before the sinking battle ship? Really a 5000 ft. Tyvek tube is a great idea really. I just wrote six pages on that idea for the book. Fun stuff this anti-science stuff. Yes, I wear Tyvek almost everyday in a class 1 clean room that has < 1 .5 micron particle per day contaminant. Bringing you real science:)

tell us why i won't work science guy

"Tell me why it won't work, science guy!"

1.9 knot currents?

Do the math.

thanks,
at least someone gave me a number

Since there seem to be no good answers, maybe you should write a book about why we should never drill offshore again.

Your other book is garbage.

Drilling relief wells to stop Gulf oil leak poses challenges:

http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/challenges_inv...

Certainly, the technology today is much more advanced than when engineers fought to shut down Ixtoc, but even in modern context, relief wells don't always go smoothly.

Last August, the Thai company PTT Exploration and Production Co. was drilling the Montara well in 260 feet of water in the Timor Sea off of Australia when it well blew up and began leaking oil into the ocean.

It took 10 weeks and five tries for the drilling rig brought in to drill the relief well to hit its target about 8,600 feet below the sea floor. On the last try, there was another rig explosion, which burned for two days.

The oil was finally stopped on Nov. 3, and it took until mid-January to cap the well, according to news reports.

Don Van Nieuwenhuise, a University of Houston geologist, said that BP will have to tread carefully to avoid the problems encountered at Montara.

"You have to be very careful, because you don't want to have another blowout if you hit petroleum or gas in another level, " Van Nieuwenhuise said. "Any relief or kill well needs to be drilled with more caution than the first well, because you don't want a repeat performance."

Van Nieuwenhuise speaks from experience. In 1979, he worked on killing a gas well in the Gulf of Mexico that blew up when workers ran out of drilling mud. Even though it was only in about 60 feet of water, it took about four and a half months to cap the well by drilling a relief well because of concerns about pockets of gas. "We had to stop drilling every 500 feet, " said Van Nieuwenhuise, who was working for Mobil in New Orleans at the time.

Looks like August might be one of the more optimistic estimates for killing this well, in which case BP will have plenty of time to fiddle with the LMRP.

Cheers,
Jerry

Considering the stakes, one wonders whether two relief wells is the optimum number.

It's probably hard to assign absolute probabilities, but I'd be interested in hearing from industry experts on why two relief wells is "enough".

I'm in contact with a number of people discussing policy and response, and would appreciate input.

best

Last month AlanFromBigEasy concluded that 4 relief wells should be drilled.

Rockman or HeadingOut wrote that he would recommend 3.

Four relief wells makes sense if the probability of success of each well is 50%.

Two relief wells makes sense if the probability of success of each well is 75%.

Basically, when the probability of success is above 90%, no more relief wells need to be drilled.

thanks for the comment.

Basically, when the probability of success is above 90%, no more relief wells need to be drilled.

Anyone agree/disagree with that?

Be that as it may, I think it could be rather an open question what the actual probability turns out to be in this real-world case. If, say, a million human lives depended on killing the well ASAP, what would be the ideal number of relief wells? Hypothetically?

Disagree.

Is the damage that would result from failure less than 10x the cost of an additional well? If so just in a cold-blooded "money is all that matters" sense 90% is too low.

And if the damage is to be born by innocent parties shouldn't the guilty party be responsible for something closer to 100% protection?

It's impossible to characterize simply. We have just proved there is about a 1:30000 chance that the rig will blow-out and collapse, making the problem twice as bad. What if a hurricane dumped a ship on top of one BOP? What if one blows a casing and the other sticks a bit or something?

I'd say it's a probability curve something like this: 0% in 60 days, 50% in 90 days, 90% chance in 4 months or so, 99% in 6, and a small but finite chance it will be leaking the same or worse this time next year.

Two wells makes the same assumption this first well did -- most of the time things go along in a more or less typical manner.

yeah, I do.

Risk management is based on impact and probability. this covers probability, but not impact. When your impact is really high -- you want better than 90%.

you can't look at relief wells in a vacuum, unfortunately -- its a corrective control against the impact of a seriously damaging spill. However, there are other controls -- preventative and detective, for example, that also contribute to probability, and can contribute to impact.

I would first attack probability -- with the right use of detective controls -- procedures, and other corrective controls -- better monitoring and testing and such. The domain experts have covered some really good suggestions in this area.

So calling the number of relief well is tricky, since each additional relief well can add its own level of risk.

Sorry for the non answer, but I guess what I'm trying to get at is that in a risk management landscape, the number of relief wells depends on the other controls at play.

Sorry for the non answer, but I guess what I'm trying to get at is that in a risk management landscape, the number of relief wells depends on the other controls at play.

Good answer.

Of course, the risk management landscape is somewhat opaque to those of us outside the situation looking in. The administration will be under pressure to "do something" additionally; I was glad to see the "nuke it" option rejected by the white house. Clearly the second relief well was mandated for what were considered good reasons. If those reasons were correct, it raises the question whether three might not be better, considering the scale of possible consequence.

I'm hoping that TOD will spearhead a call for at least one, if not two, more relief wells. I'd like to see them do this via a post or two which in describes, in layman's terms, all the reasons extra relief wells would be helpful in terms of solving this leak ASAP. Then all of us who can write blogs or disseminate that info (including lobbying congress and the White House) gear up and move this into the MSM. Maybe, hopefully, before we need to do that the Obama administration will insist on it.

I agree...

and please click on my user name and drop me an email. We should talk.

Please do.

Alan

Done, Alan!

It would be great to offer recommendations based on root cause analysis or a fault tree. Something a little more pithy than "people want oil" would be helpful.

BP would be showing a lot of credit if they were to share that RCA (Root Cause Analysis) in the sense that the larger industry can become safer.

I think if the proper posting were done here, with all of the right reasons stated, a Facebook group could also be started and people could link to it. Don't underestimate the power of social networking these days. It's a good way to get people that care, but aren't going to take the time to write letters let their opinion be known.

Two relief wells are one too many.

I tried looking at this from the perspective of a BP bean counter, and one or two relief wells doesn't seem like enough. If a relief well costs $100 million and BP is fined $4,500 per barrel of spilled oil (plus MMS royalties), then they should drill an additional well if it prevents the spilling of 22,000 barrels of oil. We don't know the exact flow rate, but that's a couple/few days worth?

See brief report on Montara, incl sat pic. The slick visible here is about 150 miles long:

Points:

1. The multiple relief well attemps were side-tracks from the one well, not multiple wells. Basically you directionally drill passed the target well line, run a magnetometer to spot its steel casing, then plug back and drill a side-track in that direction. Repeat till you hit it.

2. The inquiry report is still not out, but the eventual ignition of the blowout appears to have occurred during the kill ops. Probably the target well kicked and displaced something on the abandoned rig, causing a spark.

3. The "bottom kill" target will usually be above the reservoir, so a repeat blowout, while possible, is less likely than on a well that penetrates the reservoir.

G.

Hrm, I wish I had inside data that the BP engineers are looking at. However, just from our layman's perspective don't you all think the cap needs to be larger (and the tubing above it a lot bigger in diameter). It looks like whats happening is that the Oil/NG is trying to fit through this tiny tube/hole and it's just too darn small for all of it to go through, so they go where there's least resistance, the opening around the grommet.

Further, anyone have pics/information on the NEW LMRP (7 was it?) that BP is thinking about replacing this one? And when they are replacing the current one?

However, just from our layman's perspective don't you all think the cap needs to be larger (and the tubing above it a lot bigger in diameter).

No.

some idle thoughts on what happens when the RW misses the target on the first try...(IMHO which it most likely will) ....

1- if a RW misses....it will not start over...instead they will back out a little ...set a plug , run a whipstock, time drill and do a sidetrack...essentially making a little offshoot of the RW and try to approach the leaking well (LW) again .....so every time the RW misses ...you add around 7-10 days before another attempt can be made....

2- now there are 2 RW being drilled spaced out by around 10 days.....both RW's are optimally spaced out....first RW misses the target and back off to run a sidetrack ....while the second RW can make an attempt in the mean time.....and second RW misses and back off for the sidetrack ...again while the second RW is side tracking the first RW is ready to make an attempt.....so really 2 RW`s working in tandem will give plenty of shots at interception within a very small time ...relatively speaking ...(see engineers at BP are thinking two steps ahead also....stop trashing the poor engineers at BP like the dont know what they are doing)......

3- IMHO i have said its more likely to be early septmeber ....i am guessing around 3 or 4 attempts before success.....that is taking into account above mentioned things...

4- the csg on the LW is brand spanking new which means (interms of target acquisition) that it will have excellent magnetic response characteristics ....this is good news for RGR (radial gradient ranging) and PMR (passive magnetic ranging) which are the processes likely to be employed in tandem for the last 100 ft or so ...

5- wellbore surveying is a process where small errors add up .....the presence of above average iron in the Mississippi delta will further skew the survey measurements...but then again every time the RW misses....the next attempt will be a more informed one and the driller will have just the much more information...

other than that you just gotta back your rig crew.....not something BP has done considering they were out pointing fingers at the field people week 1 .... even before there was a memorial service for the 11 top hands was held...I personally owe a couple of fingers or maybe more to such a top hand back when i was a roustabout in west texas to put myself through college and couldn't believe I was hearing such stupidity coming out of such senior management at BP....how do you repay 11 men who willingly run towards a bomb out of sense of duty ....and out of the 120 odd people on the rig these 11 top hands knew they were running towards a bomb better than anyone else on the rig.... one guy died lowering a vessel so others could get away ....why because it was his duty to lower the boat...drilling DW is a risky business ...everyone involved understands this and accepts the risks.....but the 11 or at least their families deserve better than this....just my 2 cents of this

aliilaali: "gotta back your rig crew." Those five words should be tattooed across Tony the Twits chest with a dull needle and high acid ink. And I'm being kind. Then he can go fox hunting with Lord Browne.

Just remember Haywood came up through the ranks starting as a well site geologist. He is not a lawyer, a Harvard MBA, and obviously did not come our of the PR department. I think he knows what working on a rig is all about.(Does not mean that someone did not screw up). Comparisons with Browne are off the mark.

Diverdan: You can be present and not learn much. Earlier Rockman, a site geologist, said he was so upset he couldn't post for several days because it was "blame the guys on the rig first." But what does Rockman know? Bye the bye, I didn't compare Hayward to Browne. I just said that they can share the pleasures of retirement in disgrace together as ex-CEOs of BP.

El: I too worked on rigs and managed companies. Safety and environment was a big deal as was prudent cost control. Let's see what actually plays out. May not be quite so clear cut. As I remember Hayward cited the BOP but did not blame a rig guy directly. Remember though that pilot error does happen and does not always mean the CEO is evil. Could just be wrong place at wrong time.
There is a natural tendency of worker bees to question management and visa versa. Having been on both sides I prefer to take the middle ground until I get all the info and to see it in context. As a society we are hell bent on finding blame....and for many playing the role of victim. Ninety percent of what is written is speculative and biased. Even with politicians I do not like (which is most of them), I hesitate to say they are evil.

Diverdan: I agree with you. But. I have heard first hand Hayward frequently say some pretty stupid things, and I have read quotes that have not been refuted where he has said pretty stupid things. It seems to be a pattern with him. If his mouth is connected to his brain, then I am concerned that he is way over his head in his ability to manage as complex an operation as BP. Perfectly decent people rise to a position where, because of incompetency, they become dangerous to others. If Hayward is publicly humiliated and does not deserve it, that is painful to me. But, I would bet you any sum that his humiliation leads all managers at whatever level in all oil related companies to have public and company safety at the very tippy, tippy top of their agendas. We all now know how risky deep water drilling. Minimize the risk. Bye the bye, I have never said Hayward is evil. He just looks to me careless or incompetent because of his very public performance. And, therefore, he deserves public ridicule for his public performance.

Any experienced working oilpatch crew-man I ever
met I learned respect for (on the job that is.((-;)

When chips were down, any one of them would walk
back into the fire and sometimes did.
It's the ONLY way a well can operate successfully.
'Greenhands' learn quick to follow that, else they
soon go home. Nobody want's somebody on a well that
they can't count on 100% in an emergency.
As there are no excuses & no accounting,
when somebody is hurt or dead Then they are hurt or
dead, period!

It's no 'Willis' movie, no quick rewind,
& everybody working on a rig anywhere for real
gets to know that darn fast.
It's dirty dangerous and damn hard work.

I will bet Monsieur Tony never worked a DAY on a rig,
(let alone ever actually worked anywhere.)
If he was running an actual rig, I'd be swimming home
as fast as I possibly could, that's a fact.

Hayward has offshore rig experience.

Then go update his resume for him
he's gonna need it.

How 'bout goin' back to HuffPo or the Daily Kos where you REALLY belong?

"2 RW`s working in tandem will give plenty of shots at interception within a very small time ...relatively speaking ...(see engineers at BP are thinking two steps ahead also....stop trashing the poor engineers at BP like the dont know what they are doing)....."

You make some great points above, but you are ignoring the fact that the whitehouse forced BP to drill a 2nd RW.

IMHO 2 RW`s would have been sunk WH or no WH ....rmbr this is not east timor or some other timbuktoo country where O&G producers can run rough-shod with the environment .....the fact the 2 were not sunk of east Timor was a financial decision weighted with potential penalties for not doing so ...also east timor was in high seas where HC`s were being displaced all over in rough seas.....not like the GOM which is protected by land and provides HC accumulation potential ...

not disputing what you`re saying....if the WH cracked the whip ...good work WH. But all that arguing is for later...there`s 2 RW headed south and we are better off for that

me I would say put one more rig on this job.....3 to me would be a good balance all things considered

I agree. After your and Alan's remarks (regarding need for more relief wells) If I were in charge I'd sleep lots better with 3 RW's going in rather than 2.

Other than the cost, what's the down side? Seriously.

The risk of another accident. Loss of life. Drilling wells is dangerous.

How common is it for more than one relief well to be started?

Deep Horizon accident happened on 4-20. MMS and BP began discussing two RWs on 4-23. On 4-24 MMS reported they expecting applications for 2 RWs. Testified equipment for both rigs on way. On 4-26 they reportedly got the application for one. There it gets murky. They soon had two applications - the MMS testimony indicates same day.

Sounds like it could have been a call from the White House.

Development Driller III was spud in on 05/02. Development Driller II was spud in on 05/10, and its drilling was temporarily suspended to supply a BOP for the BOP on BOP solution.

The risk of another accident. Loss of life. Drilling wells is dangerous.

Indeed.

I phrased the question a bit flippantly to draw out just such responses. Anyone else care to expand on that theme? There are obviously risks either way. I'm now leaning toward thinking that 3-4 relief wells might be optimum, and taking steps to see if that can happen. I greatly respect this forum, and if there's good reason not to advocate this, I'm listening...

thanks.

What's the difference between one in a million event and a three in a million event?

Two RW blow outs.

They could spud one or two more and stop and wait, but at the rate this is going there will be more DW RWs in the Gulf of Mexico than before the moratorium suspended the DW wells that were active before the accident.

Just remember CEO probability analysis: if 999,999 things in a row go wrong, the next up is certain to go right. BP has to be close.

So you think the odds of a relief well blowout are high?

I know you've got a bit of humor mixed in here. But it would seem that the odds of a relief well blowout are significantly lower than the odds of the existing blowout causing more damage. Disagree?

I'm unqualified to know. aliilaali seems okay with two, describes a try and retry scenario where they are coordinating attempts, so that must mean he does not think it crazy to think they'll both make it. He knows. ROCKMAN says three. He knows. I doubt he's freaking that the effort is doomed with only two.

I'd say any well drilled carries a risk of a blowout happening. Increasing the number of wells increases the odds of success, but also the risk of another blowout. It's a game of balance.

Just money greenie. There's room for 4 or 5 wells that wouldn't interfer with each other.

Thanks. That has been my impression.

I'd go with more than two relief wells, at least until two of them had casing set below salt. To me the odds of losing a well entering or exiting salt are pretty high, and you need to avoid a second 6-8 week process of getting back through salt. Other than the salt interfaces, the fact that they have logs from a few thousand feet away really reduces the unknowns and risks this second time around.

aliilaali:

Thanks for answering--especially Question 1 above.

I was wondering if they would have to start over completely if not success.

Very helpful information for me and anyone else who is totally non-technical.

Tears -- There's such a wide range of possibilities that I can't give much of an answer. First, wells never finish sooner than planned. It can take 90 days to drill a 60 day well even when there are no major problems. Worse case you can lose a deep well shallow and have to start from scratch. There is one good bit of news: they have the drilling history of the blow out well. When you drill a well in a new area you can only guestimate the pressure profile you'll encounter. A while back I was a pore pressure analyst working on DW GOM wells. I would work with the drillers to make changes of the estimate as we drilled. They have that data on the blow out well in the can now. The RW are so close that the profile should be very similar if not exactly the same. This should give them the best shot at getting the RW down as fast as possible.

Rockman:

Thanks for the explanation

As the summmer proceeds, we will all, both professional and non-techies, be eagle eyeing those RWs.

It might be worth looking at the Montara spill in 2009 for comparison (600 feet of water and 8,500 feet depth). It took five attempts to intersect the drill pipe, five separate sidewells, and the original rig (which was still intact) caught fire when they intersected the pipe. We're just at the beginning of this thing, not the end.

http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2010/06/01/how-difficult-are-relief-we...

After the first relief well was drilled on the Ixtoc I spill (160 feet drilled to a depth of 10,000 feet) ... the oil continued to flow for the next three months (until a second relief well was drilled). BP should be making it's seismic data available for the Macondo prospect so that engineers and scientists can be working on all the contingencies associated with the drilling of these relief wells.

From the linked Ft article:

BP itself identified another risk of the relief wells: that they would suffer a similar blowout to the original Macondo well, thus causing even more oil to leak into the ocean.

Bloomberg reported in mid-May that BP, in a regulatory filing with the Department of the Interior, warned that the relief wells risked a similar blowout to the original well:

The relief wells will pump cement into the leak to seal it. To do that, BP will need to first drill into the same deposit of oil and gas that caused a pressure surge known as a blowout at the original well, igniting an explosion that killed 11 workers and sank a $365 million drilling rig.

How likely is this? Wouldn't the wellbore be intercepted significantly above the target reservoir? I'd like to see a little discussion on the risk/benefit of relief well drilling... thanks.

Sounds to me like a whole thread on this topic is in order soon.

(I saw your message, greenish, and sent you an email.)

Relief wells are the tried and tested solution for the problem. The relief wells will intercept the leaking well near the bottom where the hole pressures will be nearly equal - standard procedure. All drilling is risky, but the short and sweet answer is this solution will work - even if they have some difficulties. The drilling crew will be especially careful, given the accident that occurred, however they also have all the information about the geology, formation pressures, etc. that was obtained when the first well was drilled.

If you searched the older threads you would find a lot of discussion on this topic - and perhaps Rockman and aliaali will repost some of that if they are in the mood.

Green -- this is a load from bloomberg

there is no question of the RW drilling into the reservoir...if they did that then it would be a production well not a RW by default....

what they are going to be doing is .....based on geological and seismic data and all that good stuff ...try to get near the reservoir and tap in the leaking well....they will not tap the reservoir in any stage ....

although this time around they will be going slow to be careful and to position wellbore in a way as to make a good approach to hit the leaking well....

a blowout is a risk on any well that has ever been drilled...drilling is a reactive business since you can never predict what lurks miles below the surface.....

thanks aliiaali... this is what I had understood, I just wanted confirmation that the quoted article wasn't correct about drilling into the reservoir. Seemed incorrect on its face, but since I'm thinking about advocating an additional relief well, I'm triple-checking. I tend to think that 3 relief wells would be a pretty good idea. If you'd like to see that happen, (or talk me out of it), might want to drop me an email by clicking my user name.

Thanks again

They probably want to intersect the #1 well near the producing depth - the shallower you hit it, the more likely your mud will just blow on out with the oil rather than accumulating enough column in the blowout well to kill it (essentially the same problem they had with the Top Kill.)

The biggest risk I see is that as the RW intersects the #1 well, that well will act like the world's biggest 'lost circulation zone', at least until/unless the mud going in is enough to kill it. And you MUST keep your RW full of mud, or it too will blow out. When they get close they'd better have big mudpits, full, with work boats lined up to refill them fast.

Yes, this is how I understand it, thanks. Here's a more naive question: are there ever wells which might require a higher flow rate of mud/cement than you could get down one relief well? I reckon the answer is no, but I haven't seen it discussed.

greenie -- The rate at which they pump the kill pill down isn't that critical. It's the pressure that's critical. The good news (if I read correctly) is that they drilled the reservoir with 14.5 #/gallon mud. That's really not that high a mud weight for a deep well. Just a guess but the kill pill probably won't be greater than 16.5 ppg. Too high a mud weight and they could fracture the rocks and lose the RW. The good news: as a soon as they start pupming the kill pill the oil/NG flow will help push the mud up the csg. The bad news: a lot of the kill pill could be pumped out of the well at the BOP. But any amount of KP in the csg will put some additional backpressure on the flow. And that will cut the oil/NG flow some. And that will help keep more of the KP in the well bore. A very helpful feed back loop.

"BP should be making it's seismic data available.."

http://blog.skytruth.org/2010/06/possible-leak-from-platform-23051.html?... "...platform is located at 28.938022 degrees North latitude, 88.970963 degrees West longitude..."

http://blog.skytruth.org/2010/06/gulf-of-mexico-time-to-get-serious.html... "...We've observed the slick on Envisat MERIS and ASAR images taken on April 25 and 26, and May 12, 18 and 31; on RADARSAT images taken May 8 and 11; and on COSMO-SkyMed images taken May 11, 14 and 15..."

I'll ask before it gets crowded. If an event occurred March 12, 2010 at Macondo, then the explosion on April 20, 2010 could this be related? Someone mentioned the link last night on the IRC. I remember that a number of geophysicists identified themselves as TOD members on one of the earlier links. As someone commented in a thread of a couple of days ago, if the mud was going into geological formations, so was the oil.

I wish they would release their sesmic data. Why doesn't the government just nationalize all available data related to the Mississippi Canyon as a matter of national security? Since BP and MMS collaborated in so many studies related to this particular issue, I think that the US can be justified as an equal shareholder.

Just out of curiosity, what would be the purpose of obtaining the seismic data?

Shelburn: it would be submitted to TOD for an objective third party expert analysis.

I still don't understand what we can learn from the seismic data that applies to the blowout.

The people drill the RW might be interested but I'm sure they have all the data - primarily logs - that BP can provide.

We do this professionally. At least a month to give you maps and attribute analysis, minimum fee $100,000. And perfectly useless in the present context unless we have BP well logs and good narrative of stuck tool and directional bypass.

And I still don't think it would tell you much unless somebody is really looking for shallow hydrates or something...

Or a big whopping bright spot.

And then I STILL don't think it would tell you much (again, in this context).

(not that I think you disagree...)

Assuming we had all the data, I could identify the weld or fault plane that's leaking gas and light fluids 5 miles away, develop an intervention scenario.

So not to particularly dispute what you're saying....but I think that a) that would depend on what 'all' the data meant, b) that the leaking fluids actually had an identifiable signature relative to surrounding sediment, c)that there ARE leaking fluids. And it seems it would be kind of a major assumption on where in the well the underground blowout was happening....

I've seen some attribute studies done on the basis of a single well for control that were kinda off target. Unless 'all' of the data means all of the offset wells in the area (Rock mentioned that there are producing leases adjacent to this one).

And does anybody know where the original person who talked about this got the idea of shallow salt? The guys who have been posting that know the geology in the area say that this area is inbetween salt. E.g. none around.

ETA: Well, duh! Just realized nobody would even have seismic that had any leaking fluids on it. Given how faulted up the GOM is, I have no doubt that you could find any number of small faults that reached surface. However, getting from there to 'this is where fluids are leaking' would be a major stretch unless somebody has a satellite fix on a leak thats 5000 feet down. The Skytruth article I saw indicated that fluids were leaking from a nearby platform - it wasn't attempting to say it was this one.

To clarify, not shallow salt, but a salt weld or fault. I don't have access to BP proprietary dip data or seismic, but generally slumping MC tertiary sediments evacuated or displaced salt randomly. In BP's 29977 Drilling Plan, they stated there were no faults in the prospect, which must have been necessarily false.

http://www.searchanddiscovery.net/documents/2007/07083chowdhury/images/c...
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/mmri/programs/LowEtal2.pdf
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/offshore/gulfocs/subsalt/ss_map.html
http://www.searchanddiscovery.net/documents/2009/10215chowdhury/images/c...
http://www.onepetro.org/mslib/servlet/onepetropreview?id=OTC-11863-MS&so...

avon -- I get your point now. And IMHO there is a little merit to your idea. But 5 miles is a long way for the type of event you're imagining. Maybe but I would be very surprised. But Mother has surprised me more than once. OTOH the feds have all this data. And if they wanted to contract someone to do the study you envision the gov't is free to do just that.

But before I would burn up work station working time on seis analysis I would make a survey to prove there's oil leaking from the sea floor in that area. Maybe I've missed it but I've seen no evidence of it...just folks speculating it's happening.

so really 2 RW`s working in tandem will give plenty of shots at interception within a very small time ...relatively speaking ...(see engineers at BP are thinking two steps ahead also....stop trashing the poor engineers at BP like the dont know what they are doing)......

granted the engineers know what they are doing... but... heard on cnn tonight... white house leaned very heavily on BP to run a 2nd RW in the first place...

unrelated to what i blockquoted... now there's stories that the coast guard's efforts at putting out the fire may be what caused the rig to sink... too much water... they quoted a couple of industry veterans... there goes BP's liability... it'll get to john robert's Supreme Court for Corporations circa 2022... and the U.S. Govt will reimburse BP stockholders for the govt's mishandling of the fire rescue...

and though i've retorted your comment... you are spot on to focus on the human loss... hayward may of "come up the ranks"... but he got out a long time ago... now he wants his life back... seems he had complete control of his life before the mess...

once WE stop being pigheaded energy users... and maybe start making ALL CEO's sign a personal liabilty document for the actions of their corporations... we might not see rampant ongoing trashing of the environment...

let's not foget... the niger delat region's normal lifespan is about 40-something... after decades of no-so-dramatic-as-this spills... but who cares about 'dem dare dark skinnned folks oh so far away... we get a heck of lot of oil from other places too... just when it hits home that we all get up in arms...

no to worry... van der sloot just gave the cable shows... MONTHS of new material... i can hear oreilly and greta and what's that other dingbat lawyer become talk show host???? oh well... glad i gave up ALL tv in 2002...

Looks like there will be plenty of disperants dispersed.

Panel of experts recommends continued use of oil dispersant
By The Associated Press
June 04, 2010, 2:09PM

A federal panel of about 50 experts is recommending the continued use of chemical dispersants to break up the Gulf oil spill, despite its harm to plankton, larvae and fish.

Panel member Ron Tjeerdema said Friday they decided the animals harmed by the chemicals underwater had a better chance of rebounding quickly than birds and mammals on the shoreline.

More at Panel of experts ...

and it looks as if we will be seeing less of Tony H.

BP hives off 'toxic' Gulf spill operation to dilute anti-British feeling in US

Chief executive Tony Hayward hands responsibility for clean-up to American as new containment cap is placed on top of leak
Terry Macalister
guardian.co.uk, Friday 4 June 2010 18.15 BST

BP is to hive off its Gulf of Mexico oil spill operation to a separate in-house business to be run by an American in a bid to isolate the "toxic" side of the company and dilute some of the anti-British feeling aimed at chief executive Tony Hayward, the company said today.

The surprise announcement was made during a teleconference with City and Wall Street analysts in which Hayward attempted to shrug off the personal criticism saying words "could not break his bones".

...

Responsibility for the leaking well and the clean-up strategy will placed in the hands of Bob Dudley, one of the company's most able directors.

Dudley, a US citizen, has been looking for a suitable role in the company since he was thrown out of Moscow in a battle with the Russian shareholders of the TNK-BP joint venture in the middle of 2008.

Hayward said the clean-up business would be run separately by Dudley with his own staff but the finances and budget would come from the main BP group. The BP chief executive said the purpose of the split was to allow Dudley to concentrate on the Gulf problem while he and other directors were not distracted from keeping the main business on track.

I wonder if this is the beginning of an emergency disconnect of their US operations.

Oilfield opinions on Mr. Dudley? Is this likely to change anything of importance?

Also, "riserless mud recovery" (RMR) came up in another thread.

http://drillingcontractor.org/new-deepwater-riserless-mud-recovery-syste...

Looks like a complex operation with only ROV access to some critical components. Upsides? Downsides?

He apparently knows how to hide...

Dudley has a reputation for managing confrontational situations after he found himself at the centre of a row with powerful billionaires within the oil firm's Russian venture TNK-BP.

He was eventually forced into running the venture from a series of secret locations, as BP became concerned for his safety.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article-1284087/BP-oil-spill-Bob-Dudley...

This just shows adaptation to Russian 'politics' - deal with confrontation head on and don't back down (find a bigger stick if you can), but in the end if you don't find the right friends to back you up you have to take cover or you will be eliminated...

Yes, I was being flippant.. Russia sounds like a very tough place to do business.

Judging from his bio on BP.com, Dudley has worked his way up the oil industry via the negotiation and strategy side rather than the technical or operational side.

I know a cell tower installer who had worked in Russia. He got out when his boss was killed by the Russian Mafia.

With an X-Acto knife.

Riserless drilling has been used for a number of decades for very deep water holes drilled for scientific purposes. In this context drilling mud is often not used. When it is they use the system diagrammed in the article. But the important thing about these holes is that they do not expect to encounter hydrocarbons. If they do its a bit of a disaster.

Sorry... but somebody has to say it:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dudley_Do-Right

Well Hayward is a British Aristocrat and he wasn't handling the colonists properly with all those inept statements he kept making so no surprise with this decision.

I seriously think BP is trying everything they can to cap this well, they run a huge risk of a hostile takeover.

A few days ago I asked about employment on the clean-up crews for PAY. However after watching the news last night and looking at the dregs of society they have working on them now it's not even a remote option for me. These people if you can call them that are literally smearing feces on the walls of store owners restrooms, not really working, 20 minutes work 40 minutes rest?????? WTF????? No wonder @ 10 dollars an hour what can you expect. Once BP announced a mandatory drug test would happen half the crew went back on the bus!!!!! This is ridiculous, if you want a job done right HIRE good people. BP isn't focusing on the clean-up effort. Right now they don't care since the well is still gushing.

I'm afraid Louisiana is doomed especially the wetlands, can you imagine the damage inflicted on them if the current stock of BP clean-up personnel are used??? Hazmat training for these people???? Heck the only thing most of them care about is loading a rock in a crack pipe!

YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR!

Better not find out what they pay TSA employees and their training. You would never fly.

I really try not to fly, or drive if possible. Since i'm collecting unemployment AGAIN my car sits in the driveway. Since it's a 99 GM this is a good thing since if it's not being driven it can't break down LOL

Seriously though the scum that BP is hiring is beyond belief!!I feel sorry for the store owners who have to deal with this trash. The good news is I noticed ZERO of them have 1/2 mask respirators so they'll probably die in 10 years. The flip side is with national health-care we the taxpayers will have to fork out some heavy duty cash treating all the petrol related ailments they're bound to contract.

NO WINNERS IN THIS DISASTER.

well except for the mfg. of booms, corexit, drilling mud, scientists, and politicians, *cough couch* except for Obama and his crew!

No kidding! President Bush could have stopped this with his bare hands! He would clamp the leak with one hand and wave a "Mission Accomplished" banner with the other!

No way this happens with St. George the Infallible.

I've always found that looks are deceptive. If you really want to know how much feces someone has between their ears, read what they write.

Maybe you can keep the smell down with a little vaseline-soaked cotton in your ears.

I hope that's grammar related, i'm a naturalized American citizen and german is my primary.

A company is only as good as the employees they hire and the crud BP is placing on the clean-up crews in contempt-able to say the least.

Tchuss!

You watched TV and judged people whom you've never met. A previous generation of Germans were cursed to have too many in their ranks who thought like you.

My father also emigrated from Germany, in 1928. But he came to this continent with a spirit of openess and kindness. You have a lot to learn.

those "dregs of humanity" are my family. In fact you are a relative. I am german also. It doesnt matter. Your lack of compassion and arrogance are showing.

I know a little about British corporate law. This move sounds like the beginning of a special purpose vehicle to "ring fence" looming damages from the rest of the corporation's assets. In Indonesia, the mud flow disaster damages have been off loaded to a "special purpose" and separate company isolating damages away from the original corporation's assests. I don't know the details but I'll bet that legal research on "off loading the damages" is being given an equal priority with stopping the blow out.

Sounds like a pretty safe bet. And a good reason for the US to consider freezing assets within its jurisdiction, lest they be transferred elsewhere, leaving the "special purpose vehicle" with only liabilities.

Here in the UK this disaster is getting very little media coverage, and the coverage it gets almost invariably has some financial expert talking about BP being this super-important company in the *markets*, that 12% of all pension fund dividends here in the UK come from BP, that the share price is going up and down with each bit of news about the success or otherwise of the latest attempt to cap the well.

I listen to all this and feel ashamed. Then I come to TOD and get a reality check; I remember that people died in this disaster; I see people losing their livelihoods as an ecological catastrophe unfolds; I listen to the experts talking about the guys, the ROV operators et al who are working their hearts out to try and stop the leak; I follow the analysis of the experts on TOD; I watch the videos of oiled birds lying on their backs dying in the surf.

My personal opinion (I work in many different industries so am making a generalisation) is that profits have been put before safety, that safety has been too much of a paper exercise designed to indemnify management if things go wrong, that there's a culture of Risk Assessment in which permits are issued and signed off without enough scrutiny and supervision of what actually happens once the guy walks away with a permit in his pocket. This is just my personal opinion. We do actually have a Corporate Manslaughter Act here in the UK. The guidance states:-

"The offence is concerned with corporate liability and does not apply to directors or other individuals who have a senior role in the company or organisation. However, existing health and safety offences and gross negligence manslaughter will continue to apply to individuals. Prosecutions against individuals will continue to be taken where there is sufficient evidence and it is in the public interest to do so."

Lovely. "Nice retirement plan you have there, shame if something happened to it."

I have little doubt this move is to protect the larger company assets and interests (circle the wagons). Right around now the "significance" of this event is beginning to get the attention of the big fish at the top of the pond. People are starting to do the math on a "worst case scenario." I wonder what the thinking is in Congress and the WH about one of the US biggest taxpayers taking a loss for quite some time? I am not sure if it is a good idea to force the issue at the moment. If there is even a hint of the bean counters driving this response on either side of the pond, the political fallout will be enormous. I hope the leaders keep stemming the flow the highest priority.

Yes, I thought the same and know nothing of British law!

landrew: But. BP might want to keep the damage threat in house because it's a poison pill in any hostile takeover attempt. And as I said in an earlier post the most blood thirsty piranhas in the financial ocean are circling BP like a sick guppy. Risk assessment in different waters.

Excellent thought! Do I smell merger? EXXON Valdez BP GOM SPILL? What would you call that company? To Big To Fail Oil Company of The World stock symbol
SPILL ha!

It's not anti-British feeling, it's anti-moron feeling. If the American makes the same sort of insensitive, idiotic and false comments that Hayward is making, we will hate him too.

I have to concur. I feel nothing negative against the British because of this spill. It could have as easily been any international megacorp that chucked up. There is a cultural difference though in interpreting Tony's remarks and attitude in the states. As Toyoda recently learned too, marketing and PR in the states is extremely sophisticated and different than in other nations. This is because the USA is (probably) the largest market for products such as petrol and cars and we have a lot of experience being that economic powerhouse.
I don't quite know that I can put my finger on it, but I will try.

The US expects to see extreme emotion, and even crocodile tears from those responsible. But we also want to see that things are being handled and under control. This must be done temporally. First, one must show outrage and sadness, then followup with "it is under control." For the same person to play those two different roles is difficult. Also there is an expectation that ownership of this issue is taken by those in charge that I often find lacking. Americans do not like externalization of problems "The well has had a blowout" versus "Our Well has blown out". We want Donald Trump when you are winning,

We don't want to accept that Tony's attention is on anything but this situation, we want a hero to focus on it 24 hours a day and the "buck stops here" attitude that we expect means you don't appoint someone else to do it. I read in TOD that Tony is appointing an American for the cleanup, the better PR move (from a US perspective, and maybe not the better market move) is for Tony to appoint a Briton (or anyone) to run the rest of the dang company and Tony be seen to be focusing on only this until it is solved.

It may make complete sense from a international megacorporate perspective. But they are really screwing the PR here in the states.

"The US expects to see extreme emotion, and even crocodile tears from those responsible... This must be done temporally. First, one must show outrage and sadness..."

With all due respect, pbnj, I read this and wondered if it could possibly be true because I immediately thought of Duncan's comment in Shakespeare's Macbeth:-

There's no art to find the mind's construction in the face.

Below the dashed lines, I quote a comment posted on the previous thread from Oil Drum member 'shelburn'.

I just thought it shouldn't get lost in the shuffle as it answers a variety of questions being posed here.

Thanks shelburn, for the patient, cogent explanation.

Peter B.

----------------------------------------

"It is obvious that most people do not understand the basics of how the top hat is supposed to operate. And BP, per usual, has not thought it necessary to explain anything.

The Top Hat Seal

For a number of reasons the top hat seal is NOT a pressure seal. It is designed to try to keep seawater out, not to keep oil in.

Let me repeat - The top hat seal is NOT a pressure seal. It is designed to try to keep seawater out, not to keep oil in.

Any water that can get in at the bottom of the top hat will form methane hydrates and probably block up the pipe. If that happens as they are beginning to start a slow flow it just means another setback.

But it is much more likely to happen when there is substantial flow going up the line and they are starting to “pull suction”. At that point there is a high flow rate and the “water hammer” effect of suddenly stopping a mile long slug of oil and gas could easily start tearing the equipment apart, probably at the top hat or onboard the ship so it becomes a safety issue not just another failure.

The top hat is not designed to take any significant pressure, certainly not the pressure that could result from sealing to the BOP so that pressure must be able to escape - through the seal area. Even 1,000 psi would blow the top hat apart and there is potentially about 9,000 to 13,000 psi at the BOP

And at this point I think they are scared enough of the integrity of the well head and BOP connection that they don’t want to have any pressure build up which would happen if you sealed the top hat to the flange.

There are other safety issues that are solved by not having a solid seal.

1. The rig must be able to shut off the flow on deck at any time and the resultant flow has to go somewhere - which is out the top hat seal

2. The rig must be able to pull away from the well at any time in an emergency and just raising the top hat off the BOP solves this problem.

Flow to the Surface

The flow to the surface is through a drill pipe from the top of the top hat. The drill pipe should be able to flow between 20,000 to 30,000 bpd or more if it was 100% oil – NO PUMPS NEEDED. With gas in the flow the amount of potential flow is even greater. In any case the processing system on the ship cannot handle as much as the pipe can transport.

The oil is about 0.85 specific gravity. If the drill pipe was filled just with oil the buoyancy of the oil will raise the pressure at the surface to close to 400 psi. If filled with gas the pressure would be about 2,000 psi.

The problem won’t be to get the oil to flow but to keep it from flowing too fast. They will throttle (choke) the flow back to get the volume they are comfortable with and then pipe the oil and gas, still under some pressure, into a separator vessel where the pressure will be reduced and the gas will go to the flare to be burned and the oil will go into a storage tank.

The product flowing from the bottom will be a mixture of oil (with dissolved gas), NGLs and super-critical methane gas. Hopefully there will be no water as that can really mess things up. During its journey to the surface, and through the processing system there will be a number of changes as gas dissolves out of the oil, the methane goes from super-critical to gas, some of the NGL will turn to gas and all the gas will eventually expands about 150 times before it hits the flare.

The optimum flow at any time will have to be determined by trial and error on the rig. If they were to open it up quickly they might get lucky and obtain a stable flow quickly. The downside of trying to do it quickly is that you could suck in water setting back the whole process for hours or days or worst case end up with an uncontrolled flow on the ship resulting explosion and fire with fatalities and another disaster.

So the fact that it could take a period of days to reach maximum flow is no surprise.

The oil gas ratio in the flow from the well will probably keep varying all the time and coupled with the phase changes and gas expansion will be a continuing problem for the processing crew on the rig. I expect that is the reason we saw daily changes in the amount of oil recovered by the RITT."

-----

I think all of science thanks you :) Now if people will only read your post before they write more Lucy shower curain ideas. Wait don't stop writing my book is only 3/4 finished! More please, just have a better explaination of how you defeat science.

landrew, has anyone suggested using Mighty Putty to plug the leak? I saw the commercial, and it works underwater. "It's not a glue, it's a super epoxy!"

They are always running specials, so I'm sure BP can get a good deal.

Here is an addition for your book:

"Sink a supertanker on top of the well, then pump the oil out of the supertanker."

I saw this on an investing website today.

In reply to shelburn on June 4, 2010 - 3:08p - a now closed thread:

Flow to the Surface

The flow to the surface is through a drill pipe from the top of the top hat. The drill pipe should be able to flow between 20,000 to 30,000 bpd or more if it was 100% oil – NO PUMPS NEEDED. With gas in the flow the amount of potential flow is even greater. In any case the processing system on the ship cannot handle as much as the pipe can transport.

The oil is about 0.85 specific gravity. If the drill pipe was filled just with oil the buoyancy of the oil will raise the pressure at the surface to close to 400 psi. If filled with gas the pressure would be about 2,000 psi.

"..If the drill pipe was filled just with oil the buoyancy of the oil will raise the pressure at the surface to close to 400 psi."

Maybe 400 psi with zero flow. Now let 833 gpm flow (20k bpd) in the pipe with a pressure drop of say 40 psi/1000 ft. So the pressure driving flow at the entrance to the pipe will be 200 psi less than the 5000 ft. water column pressure. Meanwhile the exit pressure of the well is ? And the local dynamic pressure within the this capture vessel is???

the oil alone is 85 percent of the specific gravity of water...but it's mixed with entrained gas, which increases the boyancy. So, the bottom pressure differential is higher than 400 psig. AS it rises, the reduced absolute pressure expands the gas trapped in the oil, increasing boyancy but also increasing volume. Knowing nothing about the engineering of fluid and gas flows, how does that affect the measurement/equations/planning?

Based on your number - certainly as good as mine - using 40 psi/ 1000 ft friction loss then in 5,000 feet you loose 200 psi leaving you 200 psi in the flowing line at the surface some of which is used to get on board the vessel, etc but still leaving you more capacity.

For practical purposes the pressure at the bottom or well head is zero ambient or 2,250 gauge. Pressure at top of the pipe is approx 400 psi gauge at zero flow and zero at maximum flow.

All very theoretical as we don't have the exact pipe ID, coefficient of friction and are using an ideal liquid with no gas. Very different conditions in real life but a number of those changes (gas lift) will increase the theoretical maximum flow.

I might have missed what you said about "driving flow at the entrance to the pipe will be 200 psi". If you were in the top hat swimming around with your snorkel you would see that driving force as a 200 psi suction.

I might have missed what you said about "driving flow at the entrance to the pipe will be 200 psi".

Yes, 200 psi suction.
I should have said "the pressure driving flow at the entrance..." Thanks

Pressure at top of the pipe is approx 400 psi gauge at zero flow and zero at maximum flow.

True, but implicit in assuming a 20k bpd flow is that sea level is the datum, i.e. there is no more energy left. (At least kinetic.)

==For practical purposes the pressure at the bottom or well head is zero ambient or 2,250 gauge==

Yes, if in enters an infinite reservoir at 2,250 psi.

Practically it enters a small, inefficient, blunt space that quickly brings the oil's pressure to at least what is inside the BOP - 500-1000 psi greater than ambient? - if there is some sealing being done at the base of the cap.

From this condition, the oil has to escape - either to the (hopefully) low pressure exit hole on the top, or the known low pressure larger exit hole on the bottom, as the seals are forced open. The end results is the establishment of the low gauge pressure flow through the seals, instead of the desired flow through the small riser pipe.

I surely hope you are right and that their problem will be that the oil is flowing TOO fast to the surface. I have laid out my argument why this is not going to happen.

A quick summary of Dimitry's argument: BP's plan is 10 lbs of $hit through a 5 lb bag.

Read some of the rest of the thread.

The top hat can not have a pressure seal - it will either explode from pressure from the BOP or implode due to gas created suction from the surface.

It is specifically designed to operate at very low pressure by venting some of the oil out the bottom, hopefully as little as possible while the rest is recovered.

If it is meant as a "collection manifold" it should have been designed as such, with a much longer, smooth transition region to facilitate flow formation into the upper pipe. Since it has been designed as a very blunt, small cylinder it produces a VERY turbulent flow, which is opposite of what you want if your goal is to maximize the "chimney effect".

You just can't take a highly turbulent, multi-phase flow and change its flow characteristics drastically over a couple of flow diameters of space to go from 21" to 6".

BP will slowly increase it's siphoning volume to 4-5 kbd, with 3/4 of the oil remaining in the Gulf, declare the operation a "significant success" and that would be that.

Alternatively, since the seals are likely already degraded or gone, they will never reach even those levels.

Try calculating the flow rate of 15,000 bpd (about 440 gpm) in a 18.875" pipe - is it turbulent? In a 6.875" (or larger) pipe?

It obviously becomes turbulent when it hits the water, but inside the top hat it doesn't hit the water.

It is obvious the flow inside the BOP is turbulent, its got the drill pipe in the way and messed up rams and god knows what else.

Dimitry -- "Practically it enters a small, inefficient, blunt space that quickly brings the oil's pressure to at least what is inside the BOP"

"At least?" How would the pressure above the top of the old riser stump ever be ABOVE that in the BOP? This would cause the oil to flow back in to the BOP. If you know a way top do this, then by all means let BP know! You continue to neglect that the pressure at the opening to the new riser will be kept slightly lower than the ambient seawater pressure, by just enough to draw most of the oil that way but not pull water in. I understand your concerns about turbulence, mixing, and momentum; I find it very unlikely that the engineers who designed this scheme are not also keenly aware of these issues. And they are CLEARLY willing to make modifications to their plans as they proceed in response to problems as they arise.

Anyone proposing an alternate scheme needs to ask two questions first:

1. Does it overcome the problem of clathrates clogging the system?
2. Does it avoid the danger of increasing the pressure in the BOP and risking an even larger blowout? Not just in normal operation, but under unusual circumstances and during failures as well.

You generally dismiss the first question as irrelevant and don't even address the second. Any tightly-sealed top riser would seem to pose that second risk.

For cyring out loud, look at where the main flow restrictions ARE.

They are not in the BOP. They are downhole. The pressure in the BOP is a small fraction of what is available in reservoir. How do i know? Look at the flow - that' a 500 psi-1 ksi flow. There is a lot more available down below. If you do end up effectively choking the flow from the BOP - like if they sealed whaterver pipe they use to the flage of the BOP, but it got clogged or they had to throttle it back at the surface, they risk bringing the pressure inside the BOP and the entire well pressure vessel to the full pressure of the formation which people here think is like ~13-14 ksi. That would be catastrophic for the well casing and the BOP.

That's why I am proposing a wide, clear, low friction path to the surface, with ability to divert all or some of the flow back into the ocean on the way, if you don't want to deal with it topside at any given time. That gets the oil up and DOES NOT increase the pressure in the BOP. In what I am proposing there is no danger of ice, sicne the flow is isolated from water entirely and there is no pressure rise in the BOP.

Now, when the engineering problems have a certain amount of complexity, what we do is shift the risk around to different sections of the problem. I recognize and accept that my solution shifts the risk topside, where a crack production crew(s) would have to deal with 20 kpd flow of oil/gas that they can't stop and can only divert and dump. That's a production problem from hell. BP may have concluded that this approach poses too much risk to their personnel topside. But if that is so, they should say so and step aside. There are maybe other companies that are willing to take the topside risk.

Dimitry --

buddy for crying out loud.....there is no company in the world that would even suggest shifting the risk form the mud line to top side...you know why ...because what you are suggesting will cause explosions and another vessel to sink besides killing more folks...

read the explanation that Shelburn has posted ......what part of below do you not understand.

Let me repeat - The top hat seal is NOT a pressure seal. It is designed to try to keep seawater out, not to keep oil in.

this is taken from shelburn`s post

==there is no company in the world that would even suggest shifting the risk form the mud line to top side==

If it is a national emergency, then a decision how to handle the risk shouldn't be the company's alone.

Like a said, you can still have an underwater flow splitter and controllable dump, so if you dont' want the flow topside, you can hit a switch and have it go into the Gulf at any depth you chose to install the splitter.

My approach has an advantage that you have access to ALL the flow if you can handle it and in that case you have NONE of it go into the Gulf.

Having an uncontrolled and ineffective flow splitter at the wellhead (which is what we have now), which allows you to collect only a fraction of the oil at maximum throughput is a bad decision, bad design and will lead to functional failure.

As I was reminded yesterday about the composition of the flow, there is also possibly formation water coming up through the BOP. There is always a risk that this will form clathrates as the flow gets above ground and is subject to chilling by seawater. Sure there are precautions against this, but if precautions were failproof we'd not have this situation to begin with. If the pipe clogged suddenly with clathrates the BOP pressure could spike if your "ocean escape valve" was not opened immediately. Even if it were set to open automatically, well, parts of the BOP were supposed to activate automatically as well, and they did not. You have to plan for failure.

Then the 6,000 psi drop across the BOP is caused by ?? Magic?

There isn't a 6,000 psi drop accross the BOP. The BOP pressure is 1 ksi, at least at the top portion. The main restriction is below - probably in the well piping or casing (I rarely know the right terminology). Maybe there is some additional flow restriction in the rams, but I doubt it's significant.

The flow that comes out is a moderate pressure flow.

My approach will leave the BOP pressure at whatever level it is now. It's not really "my" approach - I should call it the plumbing approach.

It has been reported by the USCG a couple times, the most recent yesterday, that the pressure at the bottom of the BOP is 9,000 psi. To me that means about a 6,000 psi drop through the BOP.

Still well below the 12,000 to 14,000 psi formation pressure so there may be restrictions below, the fluid column is primarily oil with little separated gas and/or the formation is flowing slower than expected.

Off to dinner, may check in later or tomorrow.

But surely there's a big change in rho*g*h from the formation all the way up the well to the BOP? So 9,000 psi would seem possibly consistent with the hydrostatic pressure of the oil column if it started at 13,000 psi at the bottom as reported in some of the diagrams that I've seen here on TOD. There are further drops expected of course, if there's restriction of the flow, and or turbulence.

You and Dmitri have completely different views clearly. In your picture the BOP is strongly restricting the flow, while Dmitri claims it isn't restricting it much at all.

I may have missed it. Certainly at the top of the BOP it is nothing like 9 ksi. Maybe they mean stagnation pressure? Did they measure it?

The approach I advocate shifts the flow separation (take to surface/leave in ocean) under the control of the topside operator. What they are doing has a largely uncontrolled flow separation at the wellhead, with only portion of the flow going to the surface. That's the leak we are observing.

You two appear to disagree on the pressure drop across the BOP. This is a critical parameter, clearly.

So I have a simple question.

How are the pressures being measured? If it's being done via functioning pressure sensors, is BP releasing any of that telemetry? I certainly haven't seen it myself.

Without a good knowledge of those parameters it's hard to imagine even beginning to do CFD calculations of the flow, much less trying potentially very risky operations like top kill, or trying to capture oil through caps. (I'm a physicist, not an engineer, but have some experience in hydrodynamic calculations in supernovae and relativistic heavy ion collisions.)

I've heard different statements about the pressures, some of which seemed to me to conflict with each other about:

1: formation pressure
2: pressure below the BOP
3: pressure above the BOP (though it does seem to be generally agreed that flow above the BOP is
at relatively low pressure relative to the ambient water pressure)

This question came up quite a lot during the abortive "top kill" approach BP tried earlier. The question became if the BOP was a significant flow restrictor and if it was, exactly which part of the BOP was the culprit.

This became important (at least to me), because they were pumping the mud fairly close to the base of the BOP and ostensibly, if there was a flow restriction above that point in the BOP (say from the partially closed rams), they could have achieved the high internal pressures needed to turn the flow back and force the mud back into the well. They were unsuccessful in the "top kill" attempt, which I interpreted as an indication that the BOP was not a significant flow restrictor and that they simply could not achieve high enough internal pressures in the BOP to get static equilibrium with the stagnation pressure of the flow below the main restriction. This indicated to me that the main flow restriction resides below their mud injection point, perhaps in the faulty cement job from the well casing to the well wall. Since then, there was an article stating that they were losing mud through the casing seal into the surrounding ground, which was cited as the primary reason for top kill failure. That seems like an unlikely cause to me, since if the mud found this path, the oil would as well.

I have not seen any published measurements of the pressure. I do not know if BP has imbedded sensors in the BOP they are reading, or if the little subs have stuck pressure transducers into the flow - I have never seen them do that. I have seen them stick a rope on a stick into the flow, I guess to gauge how much oil was in the mud that was flowing from the BOP.

I would have been all over this thing with pressure transducers. One would need to know a lot of pressure and temperature information to start serious calculations. I am not sure BP has been doing a lot of measurement and, by extension, much analysis. I don't think you can sit down and "design" a successful manifold for very complex, turbulent flow by gut feel - almost all humans don't have a gut for that sort of thing.

Dimitry,

Do you have any calculations to back your assertion? I think Shelburn has the situation well characterized as I understand things.

You have to run a CFD analysis to see how a turbulent, multi-phase flow will develop in this particuar circumstances. I have not done that and I am not a CFD analyst. When I do work with them, I use their resutls for pressure/heating type structural analysis (missiles mostly).

I point to the fact that all BP siphoning approaches so far have been total functional failures. They announce they have oil, the amount is very low, they slowly increase it to small, then declare it to be over.

This is a third time they tried to do this, they failed every time before.

If the situation is "well characterized", I would think this characterization is a failre.

You have to run a CFD analysis to see how a turbulent, multi-phase flow will develop in this particuar circumstances. I have not done that and I am not a CFD analyst. When I do work with them, I use their resutls for pressure/heating type structural analysis (missiles mostly).

In short, your wild-ass guess is as good as mine. You could be right, but you don't have any data to back you up. No harm in that, this is an internet forum, but now that the bets are on the table, let's wait and see, hm? BP has said the process of allowing more flow up the pipe will be slow. If the cap comes off tomorrow, odds are you're right. If that oil plume on the ROV camera gets visibly weaker as BP opens up the throttle, you were wrong.

I am sorry I do not have a few grand to hire an analyst for week to turn this around. It would be helpful, if BP has done that, for them to put the work out, so we can see for ourselves. Most of my experience is aero anyway, not hydro.

This kind of analysis is not usually blog published and it doesn't lend itself to the format of the pipe calculations.

I would, however, note that the bar for BP has been lowered consistently by the supporters, with just "weaker plume" as "success". If that is the criteria, they probably already achieved it. As of this morning they were getting 5-8% of the flow. I have written that they can go up to 20%, maybe. The plume will get visibly smaller. They will be getting some oil on the topside. 80% of the flow will still leak into the Gulf.

I would consider this final result as total functional failure - 20% success rate. Anything short of at least 50% would be outright failure, while if they can get more than half of the oil out, it would be considered "partial success".

By the way, the demand "can you prove the thing won't work", well, thought so, therefore it must work, is kind of backwards. Where is BP's analysis that it will work? One presumes some kind of analysis has been done for the first dome and for the second siphon, yet both of them have functionally failed. What can we conclude from this? I guess, one conclusion is third time is the charm and this time it definitely will work. I look at it differently - BP tried to siphon the oil three times now, never achieving more than 25% of the intake of the total flow. That's functional failure and I don't expect the current attempt to beat this record.

Failure is right.

I am so po'ed that there is no back up to fix a leak other than a kill bore.

This contraption leaks like a sieve.

Why anyone would be content with this I don't know.

Shelborn says they are running scared and don't dare risk putting any more pressure on the BOP and wellbore.

That makes me even madder that the well wasn't designed to take the higher pressure of a cut off valve above the BOP.

Plumbing 101. Failed the class.

No planning for a leak at all.

A 6" pipe would be more like 100psi drop in 5000ft at 600gpm?

At 600gpm it would also likely transition to turbulent flow.

I totally agree that there are a lot of unknowns here. What's the density of that oil/gas/sediments/formation water/seawater/methanol/clathrate mixture and how does it evolve with the pressure gradient it is subjected to? An assertion like "the oil is about 0.85 specific gravity" is oversimplifying things.

Equally important but hardly discussed here: what's its viscosity? Keep in mind that the stuff has a very long pipe to go through. There have been a lot of garden-hose analogies on this forum trying to explain why the flow should get going on its own. Well then, what happens if your garden hose has some dirt and/or gelatin in it? The flow will go slower. What good is a top hat if you can only capture a small fraction of the oil that is released?

Also, there's not only a pressure gradient but also a temperature gradient in the pipe. The gas dissolved in liquids or trapped in clathrates may not be released linearly with the pressure while traveling up through the riser. It's very well possible that it suddenly reaches a critical point and start expanding. Sure, they're obviously throttling the flow, but still, a sudden release of gas can make the flow back down, or cause oscillations which may lead to seawater being sucked in periodically, or other undesirable effects. Putting a pump just above the top hat might help control the pressure in the pipe.

I do agree with shelburn that a first-order analysis suggests that the flow will get going on its own, with no pumps required, and that it will be more challenging to keep it under control that to make it go fast enough. However, I have some reservations against applying first order physics on such a complex system. I will accept the assertion that hydrostatic forces will produce a useful flow (in strength and stability)... when I see that huge cloud of oil that is billowing from under the top hat disappear.

Repost from previous thread

It is obvious that most people do not understand the basics of how the top hat is supposed to operate. And BP, per usual, has not thought it necessary to explain anything.

The Top Hat Seal

For a number of reasons the top hat seal is NOT a pressure seal. It is designed to try to keep seawater out, not to keep oil in.

Let me repeat - The top hat seal is NOT a pressure seal. It is designed to try to keep seawater out, not to keep oil in.

Any water that can get in at the bottom of the top hat will form methane hydrates and probably block up the pipe. If that happens as they are beginning to start a slow flow it just means another setback.

But it is much more likely to happen when there is substantial flow going up the line and they are starting to “pull suction”. At that point there is a high flow rate and the “water hammer” effect of suddenly stopping a mile long slug of oil and gas could easily start tearing the equipment apart, probably at the top hat or onboard the ship so it becomes a safety issue not just another failure.

The top hat is not designed to take any significant pressure, certainly not the pressure that could result from sealing to the BOP so that pressure must be able to escape - through the seal area. Even 1,000 psi would blow the top hat apart and there is potentially about 9,000 to 13,000 psi at the BOP

And at this point I think they are scared enough of the integrity of the well head and BOP connection that they don’t want to have any pressure build up which would happen if you sealed the top hat to the flange.

There are other safety issues that are solved by not having a solid seal.

1. The rig must be able to shut off the flow on deck at any time and the resultant flow has to go somewhere - which is out the top hat seal

2. The rig must be able to pull away from the well at any time in an emergency and just raising the top hat off the BOP solves this problem.

Flow to the Surface

The flow to the surface is through a drill pipe from the top of the top hat. The drill pipe should be able to flow between 20,000 to 30,000 bpd or more if it was 100% oil – NO PUMPS NEEDED. With gas in the flow the amount of potential flow is even greater. In any case the processing system on the ship cannot handle as much as the pipe can transport.

The oil is about 0.85 specific gravity. If the drill pipe was filled just with oil the buoyancy of the oil will raise the pressure at the surface to close to 400 psi. If filled with gas the pressure would be about 2,000 psi.

The problem won’t be to get the oil to flow but to keep it from flowing too fast. They will throttle (choke) the flow back to get the volume they are comfortable with and then pipe the oil and gas, still under some pressure, into a separator vessel where the pressure will be reduced and the gas will go to the flare to be burned and the oil will go into a storage tank.

The product flowing from the bottom will be a mixture of oil (with dissolved gas), NGLs and super-critical methane gas. Hopefully there will be no water as that can really mess things up. During its journey to the surface, and through the processing system there will be a number of changes as gas dissolves out of the oil, the methane goes from super-critical to gas, some of the NGL will turn to gas and all the gas will eventually expands about 150 times before it hits the flare.

The optimum flow at any time will have to be determined by trial and error on the rig. If they were to open it up quickly they might get lucky and obtain a stable flow quickly. The downside of trying to do it quickly is that you could suck in water setting back the whole process for hours or days or worst case end up with an uncontrolled flow on the ship resulting explosion and fire with fatalities and another disaster.

So the fact that it could take a period of days to reach maximum flow is no surprise.

The oil gas ratio in the flow from the well will probably keep varying all the time and coupled with the phase changes and gas expansion will be a continuing problem for the processing crew on the rig. I expect that is the reason we saw daily changes in the amount of oil recovered by the RITT.

Thanks, shelburn, for an understandable explanation.

I think a policy statement I posted on my work-site a few years back still holds true - even moreso in this situation:

    "Every project has three parameters: Fast | Cheap | Safe.

    You only get to select two!"

"And at this point I think they are scared enough of the integrity of the well head and BOP connection that they don’t want to have any pressure build up which would happen if you sealed the top hat to the flange."

Why scared?

And if you had a good seal with a larger diameter pipe and with a valve you could slowly close, and slowly build up pressure, (which is how you fix a leak), why be scared?

What is so wrong about the internals of the BOP or the wellhead that gives them the concern you mention?

Current pressure at BOP is reportedly 9,000 psi. Will probably go to 13,000 psi or more if shut down.

I am judging by BP's actions since they tried the top kill. Or it is possibly the government "experts" but they all seem to be very leery about putting any load or pressure on the BOP or wellhead. Lots of ROVs looking at the bullseye, etc

Look, the top kill or junk shot would have put that much pressure on the BOP and wellhead if it had worked and actually plugged the leaks in the riser.

Also I don't think this is "government experts" telling BP what to do. Before you make such an accusation how about some evidence?

Since BP was willing to put increased pressure on the BOP and wellhead with "junk shot," I am not buying it. Unless of course that was just a dog and pony show.

If you are right though, and there is some serious internal problem with the BOP or wellhead, then I am going to have to rethink whether I am willing to continue to support offshore drilling.

I simply am not willing to accept a system where the only way to fix a leak is a kill bore which might happen in three months at best and at worst far longer.

I am absolutely disgusted that so much effort and design time has been put into preventing leaks and no effort or design time has been spent into stopping them when they occur.

This is hubris of the highest order.

There needs to be a system put in place to temporarily stop leaks in a reasonable time until kill bores can succeed before I will ever again support offshore drilling.

Look, the top kill or junk shot would have put that much pressure on the BOP and wellhead if it had worked and actually plugged the leaks in the riser.

Also I don't think this is "government experts" telling BP what to do. Before you make such an accusation how about some evidence?

I've been thinking many of the same things. People keep talking about erosion. Well, the one-inch walls of the riser at the kink, which were supposedly being sandblasted to the thickness of a beer can, still looked like they were one full inch.

If the mud leaking out at 1,000 feet below the wellhead is exiting a rupture disk, then the casing is not ruptured. The rupture disk would have spared it that fate.

I agree. I rather doubt the government has disapproved any recommendation supported by a team of industry engineers and scientists.

Only have time to answer the "government experts" comment. I said that because the White House announced they shut down BP on the top kill of the advice of Sec. Chu's scientists. Doesn't mean I necessarily believe it but it could be true.

I don't think the White House or Secretary Chu ever made any such announcement, it was mere political hearsay gossip from an unnamed source, a rumor attempt that started right here by a commentator on TOD.
If there was such an announcement, please provide a link or at least a quote.
Similar perhaps to that wild story that Obama had stopped ALL drilling, even wells less than 500 ft., which story was a total fabrication, perhaps someone on Wall St made some $ from it tho.

If there was such an announcement, please provide a link or at least a quote.

NY Times, 5/30, White House Tries to Regroup

The administration has left to BP most decisions about how to move forward with efforts to contain the leak. But Ms. Browner made a point of saying that the administration, led by Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, had told BP that the company should stop the top kill. Government officials thought it was too dangerous to keep pumping drilling mud into the well because they worried it was putting too much pressure on it. BP announced Saturday evening that it was ending that effort.

and

Similar perhaps to that wild story that Obama had stopped ALL drilling, even wells less than 500 ft., which story was a total fabrication

Hardly a total fabrication... all those stories, appearing in newspapers coast to coast (WaPo to SF Chron), were based on a memo sent out by the MMS, which was later clarified/denied by somebody higher up in the Interior Dept. The poster here who first commented on the AP release posted later that it had been withdrawn. Here's part of the story as it originally appeared in the SF Chron.

An e-mail Thursday from the Gulf Coast office of the Minerals Management Service says that "until further notice" no new drilling is being allowed in the Gulf, no matter the water depth. A copy of the e-mail was obtained by The Associated Press.

The announcement comes a day after the minerals agency, which oversees offshore drilling, granted a new drilling permit for a site about 50 miles off the Louisiana coast, 115 feet below the ocean surface. Environmental groups accused the administration of misleading the public by allowing work to resume in waters up to 500 feet deep while maintaining a moratorium on deepwater drilling.

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2010/06/03/national/w11...

here you go:

Steven Chu Story Page - USATODAY.comMay 31, 2010 ... The White House said that Energy Secretary Steven Chu on Saturday had directed BP to stop the top-kill procedure which it began on Wednesday ...

Thanks for the information, links, quotes.
You are correct, I had not seen the Browner quote about killing the top kill.

There was some confusion about the drilling freeze, you are correct - MMS did send email - but Sec Int Salazar disowned it right away. But there are new lingering safety requirements to be imposed, as yet unspecified:

Thursday, June 3, 2010; 7:44 PM

The Interior Department denied Thursday that it has extended a drilling freeze to shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico, contradicting an e-mail written earlier in the day by the Minerals Management Service's supervisor of field operations for the Gulf of Mexico.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/03/AR201006...

He did not tell them not to do Top Kill. He told them to give up, and there were a bunch of industry engineers who agreed, including many who post here.

Maui-- I think you have confirmation now.

I had kindly asked you not to comment again on my posts; yet here you are again.

`A rumor attempt that started right here by a commentator on TOD` --- at-least you could have been straight and said it was aliilaali.

I am going to ask you again -- kindly don`t comment again on what I post

It was a dog and pony show, petitioning the court of public opinion for "gee whiz" brownie points and stay of execution. Had no chance of achieving anything downhole.

If that's the case, then containment is impossible.

If that's not the case, then containment is possible. But they have to get a high-pressure seal on a high-pressure piping system to control a flowing high-pressure well. This low-pressure, no-pressure, duct tape approach is not going to work.

The weak point is the 13 5/8 casing which has a burst of 8 K psi. The last string prior to penetrating the reservoir, the 9 7/8 wasn't even strung to the wellhead, but was hung off a liner hanger chain that includes the 8 K psi mentioned. I just can't understand how BP would have been given approval to run such a casing string, and it sounds like they are going to do it the same way on the relief wells.

I think there is something wonky at the wellhead as well. There shouldn't be communication between the outside and inside of the production casing. Fluid is coming from the production casing as evidenced by flow from the drillpipe which is about 3000 feet below the BOP, but this flow could be up the bottom through the cement shoe, or down the top by a seal failure at the wellhead. Either way they are not certain where the flow is coming from.

Lots of potential problems and a lack of information.

All I have gotten out of it is that somebody (BP, government scientists, MMS, ?) really is reluctant to put extra pressure on the BOP/well head/casing until they can get a bottom kill.

And if they are scared then I'm scared.

OUTSTANDING EXPLANATION shelburne!

Would you please forward this to Obama? I am really getting frustrated with non-technical people trying to manage a complex engineering project....

THANK YOU.

Why can't BP find someone to explain this? Really, it shouldn't be that hard to find someone to translate these concepts to the press and public.

Questions:

1. Why is everyone saying that they're trying to feed all this through a 6 inch pipe? The pipe at the top of the cap is at least 9 if not 12 inches around. Look at the construction photos... it's far larger than a man's head.

2. If there's a problem with getting enough flow up the pipe, due to pressure differential between water and oil, isn't pressure differential also INCREASED by the amount of expanded gas in the pipe, but also the CFM you need to get through it, making it a wash?

3. If they intend to keep the oil flowing upward, don't have the prevent cold water from getting into the cap?

Thanks to all you who have technical understanding of the matters at hand, and for your tolerance of the "noise" of those who insist they know best...

1) the outer pipe on the LMRP caps fits OVER a drill collar attached ultimately to drill pipe - which is used as the conduit for the oil/gas to the surface - since it (and the mudswivel, etc) are already made to resist pressures/oil/gas/... .

video (LMRP cap overview, June 3) at:
http://bp.concerts.com/gom/lmrp6_060310.htm
also recommended:
http://bp.concerts.com/gom/kentwellstechupdatelong053110.htm

2) others have answered the flow question with calcs - it ain't a problem.

3) yes, thus they will throttle the flow out the drill pipe so as to maintain a bit of leakage around the base of the LMRP cap to keep water from being sucked up.

IMHO, they shoulda' done hot taps on the riser pipe instead of whacking it off. They when they had enough to get the flow out of the kind to a minimum, plug the end of the riser and monitor what would be slow seeps at the kink. too late for that now.

Thanks Shelburn for reposting your clear concise explanation. This whole process sounds like a truly complicated high wire act. Many questions come to mind. I'll focus on two.

What is holding the Top Hat in place over the cut off riser on the BOP?

Is it simply the weight of the Top Hat and steel piping to the drilling vessel that is keeping the Top Hat in place? That would demand serious position abilities of the drilling ship especially in adverse seas, high winds.

On the other hand if the Top Hat was secured to the BOP head, the torque on it from the attached pipe to the drilling vessel could be very serious and dangerous if the drilling ship is forced off station. Better that the Top Hat can pop off rather than torque on the BOP in high seas. Or is there a detaching mechanism close to but below the surface??

This latest attempt at gathering oil is NOT trying to mimic a production set up, correct?

Thanks, balanceact

The top hat is held in place with weight. But the weight is down near the top hat, they aren't trying to push it down from the ship. Besides some heavy drill collars they have another LMRP just above the top hat.

In practice they hang the whole thing from the drill string and lower the top hat until they have the proper weight on it which they can gauge accurately by knowing how much load came off the hook holding the drill string. Most of the drill string is still in tension but the heavy weight at the bottom is holding the top hat down.

One of the drilling people could answer the production question better but I believe that once the oil and gas enter the drill pipe it is handled about the same as you would test a well for production through a drill string.

And the Discoverer Enterprise was built to do exactly that; with processing and separation facilities and oil storage.

Very good description. And yes, once in the pipe it would be handled just like a production well. And just so everyone remembers, it is not just oil and gas but a mixture of oil, formation water, and natural gases

I haven't heard anything about the water cut but I'm guessing its very, very low or they would have had hydrate problems with the RITT.

Actually it is probably pretty high. Keep in mind that the formation water is at the same temp as the oil. Using a general gradient of 1.65 degrees F per 100 feet in depth, I estimate the temp of the fluid in the borehole could be as high as 300 degrees F. It is much more complicated than this simple calc. due to entrained gas. Actual ice formation from this formation water might be encountered as soon as it cools to the 2 degree C temp in the ocean water. Just another complication.

Way beyond my area of expertise but remember methane hydrates at this pressure form at about 18C (64F).

I'm not sure what the refrigeration effects are from expanding gas (which is mostly super-critical) from 6,000 psi pressure drop across the BOP.

Someone reported the formation temperature was very low, like 180F. Or maybe 140F, anyway surprisingly low.

I got the 180F from roger_rethinker and he got it from the leak estimate team.

Alan

Thanks for the clarifications shelburn,and thanks also to mandobob, wilbur, and rainyday for follow up comments. balanceact

"Most of the drill string is still in tension but the heavy weight at the bottom is holding the top hat down."

Really? That is incredible, not that I doubt you. So what happens when the GOM rocks, when a swell comes, when rough water happens? Is the rig so stable that it can hold constant tension on the drill string? Some sort of gyroscopic control? Amazing.

Within an inch to a few inches, even in fairly heavy seas.

Alan

they have riser tensioning systems.
The Discoverer Enterprise's can hold:
2400mt maximum tensioning capacity
(per http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/Discoverer-Enterprise-61C17.html?Layout...)

Looks something like this:
http://www.dtillc.com/technology/direct_drill.htm

and motion compensators for the traveling block,
the DE has:
Varco/Shaffer CM-25-1000-DA crown mounted 907mt static

http://www.nov.com/Drilling/Motion_Compensation/Crown_Mounted_Compensato...

Must be the 1000 imperial ton (1,000K pounds) model.

a movie about the DE
http://www.deepwater.com/_filelib/FileCabinet/movies/Ent2.mpg?FileName=E...

You can see the yellow motion compensators atop the derrick.
Neat shots of mechanical pipe/casing handling.

Near the end, there is a very brief shot of the riser tensioner and moon pool,
just after some comment about using the other drilling station to test logging equipment.

'Serious position abilities' are *exactly* what this class of vessel have. They have multi-megawatt azimuth thrusters, and very sophisticated position sensing systems (probably a combination of DGPS and sonar/ultrasound). In addition to the x/y position, the riser/drill-string is heave compensated so that the vertical movement of the ship is not communicated to the subsea equipment.

Of course, there is always a combination of weather which can defeat this, but it's supposed to be pretty severe.

Those 'Serious position abilities' were in clear evidence yesterday, when the Discoverer Enterprise neatly, if slowly, moved a mile of pipe plus a LMRP plus the top hat next to the leaking well. Maybe it did nudge the BOP a bit, but it was certainly amazing to watch.

whats with this guy simmons and the "second leak"?

Indeed - How do they know there isn't another leak below the BOP?

What happens when a BOP closes and has to seal not just against the reservoir pressure, but also against the dynamic pressure of having to decelerate a few thousand feet of not very compressible oil galloping up the pipe?

Is is possible that the pressure spike could burst the pipe and let oil leak out into the surrounding mud?

They sent a little rov down and gamma x ray'd the area and also checked the integrity of the BOP.

It's been interesting that they haven't said much about the results of that experiment. As I understand it was suggested by the gubmnt I would have thought we would have heard all about it if successful.

Sorry my English isn't the best for reading all these comments and explanations. According to Mr. Chu Obama's scientist it was because of the Xrays that BP was allowed to precede with top-kill initiative. Also they examined the base of the well and from what the consensus it looked OK. However if something was iffy I doubt general public would learn of this, because of 'doom n gloomers'.

Better for a drilling hand to answer but I think that is a concern and just one more reason they don't like to activate the shears on a BOP.

Once the pipe shears are activated the hole is generally lost. Obviously in the case of a true loss-of-well-control the hole lost due to the pipe shears is preferable to a full scale blow-out.

That is my "BOP Pop" fear, like the cork from a bottle of sparkling wine.
"water hammer" x many millions.

Alan

Search previous thread, bopposocko. Matt Simmons is/was a very smart and knowledgeable guy, but he seems to have wandered away from reality on this one.

now that we know one of the plumes is coming from macondo, going long simmons is looking like this weekend's play.

Laboratory tests confirmed that oil from a spewing Gulf of Mexico well has accumulated in at least two extensive plumes deep under the surface, scientists with the University of South Florida said Friday.

http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2010/06/04/science-energy-us-gulf-oil-spi...

Simmons thinks the plumes are coming directly from the sea floor.

I think anyone who's studies deep water blowouts just thinks they're coming from the riser leaks. The high pressure turbulent flow, cold, and dissolved methane make nice (?) plumes of very fine oil droplets.
This TA&R report is well worth reading.

Fate and Behavior of Deepwater Subsea Oil Well Blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico
http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/287.htm

direct link to pdf:
http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/287/287AA.pdf

Yes i believe so,
If one were to accept Simmons theory the BOP blew-off the well head and landed 5 miles away in an upright position? A five story object this large....I dunno seams incredible

Besides he was commenting about plume that NOAA spotted and well of course because they are spraying dispersant in order to keep this from ocean surface. Therefore detecting a large plume 5 miles away at sea level would be the more plausible explanation.

I did like his nuke theory, but Obama and BP would never ever try it because if it fails you're in the history books as the people responsible for destroying the world oceans.

It is totally ludicrous. I am sure that the position of the wellhead is known to fine accuracy via GPS. If the BOP was 5 miles away it would be totally obvious.

This fact alone makes me believe Simmons is 100% mixed nuts.

It gets tiresome to repeat myself. There is a subsurface blowout. Gas and liquid is migrating across a salt weld or fault plane at a shallow horizon, bubbling up through the mud about five miles away. Poseidon ROV2 documented it yesterday. I saw it. Simmons was right.

hen provide a link

You are right. Last night I was switching between rov feeds and noticed they had fired up the poseidon rov and were lowering it down. It went to a depth of about 5300' and went along the bottom
for a good distance until it reached what looked like another leak on the bottom. The rov had made this trip before.

There have been a lot of drawings, but I am not sure everyone has a grasp of the scale of this equipment here is one of our guys standing next to annular actuator sort behind some accumulator bottles on an LMRP:

http://s372.photobucket.com/albums/oo164/Tunaholic/Deepwater/?action=vie...

Thanks Tunaholic - Those pictures are worth a 1,000 drawings! Real Scale.

can someone who knows what they are talking about please comment on this:

http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/gulf-oil-spill-supertankers-051310

this is the idea that supertankers could be used to siphon the oil off the surface at a rapid rate. it would help the cleanup go much faster. it was suggested by Hoffmeister and Pozzi.

is this BS? i have seen this all over the web, but i cannot seem to track down a reliable analysis of this. i assume that they would be doing it already if it were possible. (but the suspicious part of me thinks that they would skip it if its too expensive).

thanks.

They were used, quite successfully, on the world's largest oil spill when Saddam Hussein opened the valves on tanks farms and supertankers when he left Kuwait (no that's a man made spill) but the conditions were very different. The oil was very heavy and concentrated inches or even feet thick in places.

This is very different. Tankers can't gather the oil together so booms and skimmer vessels are used.

Just because it worked in one situation doesn't mean it always works.

If you live at 5,000 foot elevation and your work is 10 miles away at 3,000 feet a bicycle works great getting to work. Going home is a different situation.

thanks for the response.

i laughed when i read it, as i do live at 5000ft (Albuquerque, NM) and my work is 10 miles away. :)

Methinks Pozzi has very little idea of what he is talking about. Google him and Simmons together and you may find the interview the two of them did together--be prepared for a good laugh! They invent such terms as concrete casing, blowout patches and, of course, super tanker vacuums.
Yeah you could use super tankers, but the way the GOM spill strings out, they would have to be highly inefficient.
I have met, talked with and heard Hofmeister's presentation. I was impressed. He is a very astute businessman, having been with GE, Nortel and AlliedSignal before Shell. But I am surprised he would put himself in a position of supporting this Po(n)zzi scheme. But he does have a new book to promote.....

*LAB TESTS CONFIRM UNDERWATER LAYERS OF OIL* - Same day a government appointed panel approves continued use of the dispersant (Corexit 9500) that's most likely causing these layers/plumes. Confidence-inspiring, isn't it?!?!

Associated Press
Lab tests confirm underwater layers of oil
By CAIN BURDEAU , 06.04.10, 04:02 PM EDT

BATON ROUGE, La. -- Laboratory tests confirmed that oil from a spewing Gulf of Mexico well has accumulated in at least two extensive plumes deep under the surface, scientists with the University of South Florida said Friday.

Available at: http://tinyurl.com/2w7t2hv

William T. Hogarth, the dean of USF's College of Marine Science and a fishery biologist, said it was too early to say whether the underwater oil posed a serious threat to the Gulf's ecosystem.

but

Scientists are worried, though. In the Gulf, the Atlantic bluefin tuna is at risk because they spawn almost exclusively in parts of the Gulf, including the region around the Deepwater Horizon spill, said Peter Hodson, a fish toxicologist at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario.

Hodson said the tuna's free-floating eggs can be killed at levels as low as one part per million, meaning a gallon of oil for every million gallons of water.

"You can wipe out reproduction," Hodson said. He added that could "have an ocean-wide impact" since tuna depart the Gulf in late summer to spread out across the Atlantic.

The hope with corexit is to enable to the biological process time to work quicker and stop the bulk of the oil from making landfall. So far it appears to be working.

This site is great and I feel like I'm learning a lot; though, just like the oil, the info is coming so thick and fast I'm having trouble catching it all.
Getting a bit confused too. Perhaps someone can help?
First of all BP wanted to get a good smooth surface to seal to (hence the diamond wire saw.)
But now people are saying that the seal mustn't be "hard"; not absolutely sure what's meant by that term.
In repairing a hose (on land) we can usefully use a kind of tape called self-amalgamating tape. Damn' useful stuff but I don't think it'll stick to itself when wet :( . If the problem of its poor underwater performance could be overcome, would it be useful to wrap some layers of a very wide band of it, or of some aquatic equivalent, round the not very well sealed area of the top hat's base? Might not look very neat but I could live with that if it helped make a better seal.

Almost as if the N2S is being ramped up deliberately.

My 2¢ worth. Some of you guys might want to take a break.

One of my pet theories is that most Americans are going crazy, just at different rates. As our collective sense of loss combined with the growing sense of futility increases, as the volume of leaked oil increases day after day, I suspect that the going crazy trend is going to accelerate--all the way from the Gulf Coast to various corners of the blogoshere.

Yeah, look at what BP did for today's job report and the stock market!
I think the spill is adding incrementally to the angst and frustration of the country but is not the root cause of the people going crazy. For some it is probably a good diversion.
Heck if it was not for this we would be talking about deficits,Europe, Korea, the Mid East, Arizona, Blagojevich and Van der Sloot. Better to be learning about ROV's, Top Hats, BOP's and Gulf Coast currents.

http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/04/blood-in-the-water.html
Blood in the Water
To some Christian fundamentalists, the oil plume in the Gulf of Mexico heralds the apocalypse.

A sign! A sign!

Yeah well, back in 1973, when I was a Christian fundamentalist, that Israeli-Arab war was "obviously" the end times.
(Proxy) war between a nation represented by a bear (da! Comrade! the USSR of course) and a nation represented by an eagle (the US, clearly) - how could it be any more clear?

uhhhh, well, "never mind."

John of Patmos (purported author of Revelation) was an old man (maybe like Matt Simmons of recent pronouncements!? - sad), exiled to an island - powerless against the Roman empire.
Between the heat, rotten fish sauce, moldy rye bread (LSD!) and longing to see the Romans grovel before John's all-conquering God before John dies, you get some pretty wild images.

Ah - how could I have been so foolish? (I was raised up as a child... - that's why)
Where is that post about Dunnig Kruger?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect

Most people will NOT go crazy from this. Will they feel a sense of helplessness and maybe at times futility? Yes. Will they feel anger, maybe even rage? Yes. Will they have anxiety? Yes! But outright delusions. Not likely!

Just remember that getting upset about this is in some ways an opportunity for people to realize, really REALIZE, that we as a society and as individuals must change.

People do not usually change unless they're feeling unhappy or afraid. So this is really a crisis that may help people wake up, inform themselves, and agree to change.

That's my personal hope for good coming out of this terrible, agonizing situation.

The one thing I brought home from counseling which changed my life (and continues to help me survive =) ): the energy of crisis can be used to make positive change.

It's kind of like using waves to surf.

like using waves to surf

What a beautiful analogy! Thanks for that! :-)

TheraP: Step 2 in grief counseling? But I don't think the coming pain of "Resource Wars" has penetrated the public's consciousness. Mass denial is still dominant. Mass anger may become totally misdirected. I don't want to wander into the political side, but demagogues thrive in the Step 2 atmosphere.

Remember, the so-called "stages" of grief are not really in a lock-step "order". It's more like waves on a beach. Some come in one way. Some another. Some are angry. Some have an undertow. And so on. They vary over time. There's no predicting them. You don't really "get over" one "stage" and move on to "another".

Yes the anger can be manipulated. But so can fear and denial.

The "public" is an abstraction. So we need to think of people, one by one, coming to "awareness" - and being ready and able to provide information and encouragement as they do so. The "public at large" is paying attention to this crisi in the gulf. By overwhelming percentages. It's a "game-changer" in my view.

I recommend we all stay calm and be ready to assist when people arrive at their moment of clarity and are looking for some way to take action, to feel a sense of control. This is a slow-motion crisis. Not like 9/11. And it will "hit" people in unexpected ways - at unpredictable times.

Sorry for the repetitious statements. But that's the way grief goes.

TheraP: Of course. I'm over simplifying. But Resource Wars, including Peak Oil, will be political in the end (think Clausewitz cliche) and anger springing from the Resource Wars is fertile grounds for a mass movement to thrive based on anger and ignorance led by a demagogue. I'm thinking of the politics of the 30's. And Latin America and Spain for a long time after. And I see some signs of a demagogue trying to lead here right now with some success... stoking anger for power and, above all, profit fed by the MSM.

You are so right! Why is that? One would think an opportunity to change when a given situation is NORMAL would give people a feeling of control with the option to return to a safe for the moment path? You are so right! Would we have been better off not knowing (other than Alan) going about our lives like nothing happened. This would allow our sovereigns to act in our best interest ha! This will not happen until the middle class can not drive to work in any car let alone an SUV ha! I wanted to build a 3 giga watt reactor in the middle of our lab as a test reactor with output back to the grid and people cringed saying that isn't our stated mission! People won't change will they, that saddens me. Why not change while there is time and a non emergency? BO has stated yet again we need America to be domestic energy driven while doing next to nothing to make that happen. Hey what a great jobs program, reactors and an energy grid!Whos kidding who? Change interesting, CHANGE we didn't want ha!

West Texas: That is probably very true. Where is Thera P?

The information the public trying to process produces MASSIVE cognitive dissonance.

The link below uses ice cream and weight loss to explain the concept. Try assessing comfort levels when it's a life threatening issue that's being dealt with.

And btw, the blowout affects food and shelter for a whole buncha humans and other creatures so that puts it on a pretty primitive level as far as emotion is concerned.

"The basic idea behind cognitive dissonance theory is that people do not like to have dissonant cognitions. In fact, many people argue that the desire to have consonant cognitions is as strong as our basic desires for food and shelter..."
"http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/cognitive_dissonance/

Actually "cognitive dissonance" is a state where a person can potentially jump from one world view to another. This is not a bad thing! Yes, people will continue to avoid that state, via hanging onto beliefs that are being disconfirmed right and left. But when they ultimate get to this "state" - it's like going from a flat earth to a planetary system around the sun. We WANT them to make that leap!

Seems to me people get too worried about others being able to grow and develop as they go through a crisis. Our society is so fearful of aging, for example. So anxious about trying to find pills for every ache and pain. So concerned about people coping with reality, it would seem.

As for calling food and shelter "desires" - I'd say they are needs. Avoiding cognitive dissonance is a desire.

I think it's crazy to stop deep water prospecting provided 1 relief well is drilled. This disaster was created by people, the equipment should have worked properly. Even the BOP which from my reading was re-designed and BP didn't know about it until hours after the disaster. Keep in mind PEOPLE build the BOP so if it malfunctioned it's not the equipments fault.

My only issue really is with MMS and that if we the USA lease off shore drilling sites all the oil should go into the emergency reserves or into our petrol usage

repeat post...sorry...this is bugging me and i just need a simple answer...

can someone who knows what they are talking about please comment on this:

http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/gulf-oil-spill-supertankers-051310

this is the idea that supertankers could be used to siphon the oil off the surface at a rapid rate. it would help the cleanup go much faster. it was suggested by Hoffmeister and Pozzi.

is this BS? i have seen this all over the web, but i cannot seem to track down a reliable analysis of this. i assume that they would be doing it already if it were possible. (but the suspicious part of me thinks that they would skip it if its too expensive).

thanks.

"is this BS?"

Not exactly, but it isn't likely to work very well in this situation/environment. If you search the recent threads *here*, you'll learn why it won't.

At this point, shouldn't they at least try? We should be throwing everything we've got at preventing the oil from coming ashore. We've already destroyed one ecosystem, do we have to destroy our wetlands too?

See my post on this page for math discussing the magnitude of the job.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870487560457528013357716426...

"WASHINGTON—BP PLC has concluded that its "top-kill" attempt last week to seal its broken well in the Gulf of Mexico may have failed due to a malfunctioning disk inside the well about 1,000 feet below the ocean floor."

This link is a must read for Rockman and and the other people with real world oilfield expertise. I don't have a clue what the first part of this article could be talking about.

i wish roger rethinker would chime in as well. i'd like to know if his theory of pressure differential driven fractionation would apply at a breach 1,000' below the seabed.

So they put a rupture disk in an annulus casing wall?

Are they designed to reseal, or is it a one-time pop off?

In all my years in the oilfield the last few which have been working in the deepwater GOM, I have never heard of any kind of disk being put in a casing string.

I also have never seen any schematics or other information alluding to this on this particular well, so what in the hell are the guys that wrote this article talking about?

The blow out is bad enough, the deep water moratorium will gut our economy in South Louisiana and the BP people are looking like complete idiots everytime they speak to the media or congress. They are making the rest of the industry look like idiots too and for that we are all being punished.

Of yeah three shelf rigs in the GOM stacked today, because they couldn't get permits to drill.

WHY would you do such a thing, when any rupture there would uniformly be catastrophic?

I am very curious as to where all the mud went. Either the "leak" was way bigger than they thought, or there is a massive formation frac somewhere now, and a hole in a casing to match. If it had gone to the bottom, the well would be dead......

Palecon - if you look at the schematic there is a void between the 16' and 22' casing that is quite tall. It would have filled that void bottom to top as long as long the liner hanger held - I have no idea of what they can do in terms of holding pressure.

Do a search for "liner hanger rupture disk" and you will find them. Halliburton has them and so does Baker Hughes. You understand this stuff; I don't, but to me it sounds like they are added to the liner hanger.

But, BP said they thought they were losing mud 1,000 feet below the wellhead through a rupture disk, but there is no liner hanger at 1,000 feet in the Halliburton schematic of their cement plan, so i thought, well, maybe they put a rupture disk in the casing.

Okay, I looked this thing up, and I never really understood what it was for but it's seems to be about what I thought; a case of the media misinterpreting an industry term. There is no reason in the world to put a fail point in between the bore and a casing, what is the point? Whether the casing fails catastrophically or at a set point (who wants to be the guy who picks that number?) you end up in the same mess. From what I could find out about these gremlins and there was not much popping up in the time I was willing to spend tracking it down, this is little more than a packer or stop that seems to self actuate or grab at a set DP in order to take some of the guesswork out of cementing a plug at a particular drilling fluid interface. They seem to be offered as a sort of "luxury" item versus setting a normal packer the old way. Or, what I think is more likely, someone was talking about how a cement job could fail, and while attempting to explain this to a layperson they mentinded a "disc" that may have failed and were taling about nothing more than an ordinary elastomeric element packer unit.

Well BP is taking Hayward off the spill so that has to be good news!

I keep going back to MMS as the root of all EVIL in this disaster, after looking intensively at their website accident reports and other info, this whole agency should be gutted! Quite a few sent away for long prison terms, not just BP people. The government employees always get away all the time and it's not right.

Otherwise KEEP DRILLING I can't believe Obama's advisors didn't inform him of the serious impact of this decision. Purely a political move in appeasing the general public. The fact is Americans are still buying SUV's in droves and still consuming more oil not less. The American people are the PKB= pot kettle black not the people whom drill oil they need. The American people should be punished in the form of death taxes on large non fuel efficient vehicles. Until this happens nothing is changing.

This is why I think that MMS should be operating more like the FAA where a 'near-miss' results in corrective action to ensure the those events can not happen again.

The listing of times where the BOP we the only thing that prevented disaster seems to have produced nothing but an over-confidence in the ability of the BOP to solve all of your problems.

BTW - I remember comments that the casing design for this well was substandard. Wouldn't a fix for this sort of thing be for any casing design to be sent 'outside' the company for an engineering review? (I kind of see something where the external review costa are included in the license fee from MMS. This will mean that the people conducting the review are working for MMS and are more likely to comment on things they don't like.)

A couple of comments that I found over on the board at the driller's club...poster called 'holodril'. Don't ask me what it means, I have no idea...

http://drillingclub.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=wellcontrol&action=dis...

The rupture disk would have been in the intermediate casing and close to the top of the 16" at about 5,150' RKB. It would be rated to 99% of theoretical burst. It is installed to ensure that thermal expansion during production does not burst the casing. Such devices are a deep water tool because although the production annulus is available the other annuli are isolated by the subsea Xmas tree. In this case it may have burst due to the extreme pressure in the annulus plus the pumping of the kill mud.

The rupture disk concept is a production thing that needs to be installed in the second to last casing string in this case the 16" intermediate casing. The 99% is the figure that will ensure that if it bursts the casing will not be stressed. Remember that the casing burst is only a fraction of the actual pressure that it will actually require to burst it. A large fraction depending on the numerous SF's added added during the design phase. On a platform the annulus can be monitored and pressure bled off during the production phase.

The deep water well Xmas tree does not provide this faculty.

Realize that this is a well that was designed to be worked and have a tubing string added. Though that string the produced fluid would flow. The Tbg - Production casing annulus would contain packer fluid. This would be continuous and not have a rupture disk. The next section the production Casing intermediate would be filled with drilling fluid. If it over heated the escaping fluid would be old drilling fluid and only until the pressure due to thermal expansion ceased, i.e., reached a stable value, The annulus outside that would start to pressure up but it is Old drilling mud and would leak-off into the formation depending on the casing cementing program.
There will not be a blow-out, only a very small volume of fluid is moved from one annular space to the next. This small volume is Drilling fluid and it stops once the maximum temperature is achieved. 2 - 3 months after production commences.

Thank you t-twins. In the Halliburton schematic the 16' casing is the annulus' outer casing at 1000' below the wellhead.

http://media.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/photo/oil-halliburton-cement-0...

Ah...so if they thot that the rupture disk was rupturing (holodril indicated in another post that these are pretty small), then the fear would be that they were close to casing rupture pressure,,,,and lotsa bad stuff could happen...!

I'm a first time poster and as a person who cares very deeply about the Gulf Coast, I want to say thanks to all the people on here who know a lot about this stuff and are giving everyone a better idea of what's happening. A lot of the information is way over my head though, and if someone could answere these few questions for me I would greatly appreciate it.

1. Is the consensus among experts that the "saw and cap" procedure has been a failure?

2. Will the 'cap' they are using be able to capture an amount of oil equivalent to the increased amount thats been being released ever since they sawed off the part they needed to?

3. Is trying out different 'caps' to collect more oil than they are now even realistic, wasn't this procedure a one chance deal?

4. Besides trying different 'caps', has this procedure limited BP's options to contain the well until they build the relief wells?

5. Does BP even know exactly what's going on; besides uncertainties about stuff like water pressure etc, do they even know the full extent of the damage or what the problem is?

*If anyone on here is actually working on containing this leak, good luck and God's speed, we are counting on you*

Not an expert, but:
1) Too soon to tell
2) it should. Too soon to tell.
3) Depends on the design differences and presumes failure of the current approach. Size, shape, internal components may differ.
4) Not really. Not too many options left that aren't high-risk
5) They've stated their opinions, and they could be right. I think most of us agree the problem is that the well is leaking. :)

Now that the riser has been cut off, can the old LMRP be unlatched? Either slip it off the DP stub or go in with a pipe cutter. The well is essentially open to the top of the shears, so it won't get worse. A new LMRP and riser to be attached.
Benefits:
-known and tested procedure with existing equipment
-after installation 100% oil capture
-potential for another try at top kill (via choke and kill) with the advantage of 5000' of static mud pressure.
-possibility of opening shears - fishing DP then proceeding to a bottom kill.

Downside:
-more ugly video of uncontrolled spewage while work is slowly taking place

Yes. I've been wondering why they have not unlatched the LRMP and run a new one and riser in the normal way.

Also, what is the purpose of the LRMP that sits above the "top cap" now?

This sounds good:

WASHINGTON (AFP) – A cap fitted over a ruptured Gulf of Mexico wellhead is capturing roughly 1,000 barrels of oil a day, a top US official said Friday.
Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, the official in charge of the US government response to the spill, said the figure was a "rough total" of the amount being collected since remote-controlled submarines fitted the device late Thursday.
The current flow of oil gushing from the leak is estimated at between 12,000 and 19,000 barrels a day, so the amount is still small, Allen acknowledged Friday morning.
"Production is slowly moving up. It's around 1,000 barrels a day right now," said Allen. Workers are "slowly closing the vents and increasing the flow of oil. LINK"

So a flare should be burning on the surface. Any photos of this?

No photos, but it was noted by the researcher Samantha Joye, who is a member of the science party currently on the R/V Walton Smith taking deepwater plume samples. She mentioned it in last night's entry in her blog on the voyage, Gulf Oil Blog

Tonight the drill ship is burning off methane (in a huge flare) as they attempt to cap the cut off riser. I wish my camera took better night photos because this is quite a site, particularly with a beautiful orange half moon seemingly floating aside the drill ship.

Here's a video taken of the Discoverer flaring last month during the RITT DH chapter.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3VksaY9GiO8

Current (5:30pm Eastern) view of the underwater action http://mxl.fi/bpfeeds2/ still shows quite a bit of leakage, which seems to match with the 1,000 barrel a day capture estimate. I'm assuming that BP hasn't attempted to aggressively close the "side vents" on the LMRP while they gain experience with the operation. Tough to tell (for me) how good the bottom seal is versus what is part of the controlled venting.

FYI that mxl . fi link just crashed my computer I've been watching on this site which also has a video wall page.

James Cameron backs off "Morons" comment

On MSNBC, James Cameron has backed off his previous comments or at least provides more context. Basically he never got to finish what he was trying to say. He related the story, that watching the media early on, "these [BP] guys" seemed like "morons," but after meeting with petroleum engineers and other professionals he realized that the problem was a lot more complicated than he realized - specifically talked about downhole well integrity issues which he admitted he didn't understand originally. Overall, he was quite respectful and rational. He did say his group thought top-kill couldn't work because of injection pressures limited by well integrity downhole.

Cameron also suggested that the fed govt needs there own intervention team or at least qualified engineers to monitor private intervention efforts. He also offered his groups submersible fleet for research farther afield or later on, but said BP was right to say they didn't need his submersibles as they now have what they need in that regard.

I guess you can't blame the guy for wanting to help, and then quickly figuring out he was out of his depth.

Given these kinds of blowouts happen pretty rarely, you'd think the real expertise for this would reside in a private consulting company that would be paid by insurance companies to hang around ready to jump on any incident for huge money, rather than every drilling company. And certainly not the Federal government. That would be like having specialists on staff to take care of the President when he had a [insert problem here].

I don't think the government should have a problem hiring their own consultants to look over the shoulders of these contractors, should they?

p.s.- Do you think Cameron would have gained entry if he were a conservative supporter of the GOP?

All of the GoM oil companies contribute to a common "Spill Response Team".

Just the scale planned for was <1% of the BP spill.

Alan

Actually, I think yes. He got his access (hopefully he didn't waste too much of decision maker's time) because he's got a high profile via Hollywood, not his politics. I don't even know what his politics are. Perhaps I'm naive, but then I'm a kneejerk liberal in the oil industry; go figure.

Do you think Cameron would have gained entry if he were a conservative supporter of the GOP?

Gained entry to what? It was Cameron who called the meeting, not the gummint.

http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/why-cameron-is-diving-deep-...

Dear IdeaPeople!

Before you make any comments about capping the well, or perfecting the seal, chant this a few times, until you understand it thoroughly:

"top-kill couldn't work because of injection pressures limited by well integrity downhole."

The well itself is unstable at high pressures, so it can't be capped at the top, only drained, like a carbuncle(boil).

The max flow that the processor can handle is 15000/day...
Initial estimates were <=5000/day
current estimates are at <=19000/day

So..We could have 19000 - 15000 = ~4000/day uncaptured.
2 weeks ago, we thought it was an awful tragedy that ~5000/day were leaking.
My brain hurts... and not from doing the above math.

Maybe that's why there going to reverse the top-kill equipment and produce some amount back to the Q4000.

the 12.000-19.000 bbl/day figure is the lower boundary

The numbers released by the government last week and quickly adopted by the mass media actually represent the lower range of "lower bounds" generated by using conservative assumptions and flawed measures, according to documents released on Thursday.

The newly-released summary of the report from the Department of Interior's "Flow Rate Technical Group" doesn't disclose the higher bounds, however, declaring that a reliable upper figure was incalculable due to -- get this -- "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns."

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/03/gulf-oil-spill-latest-fed_n_599...

Huffpo = nutters.

If unknown unknowns can potentially mean the flow rate is higher than the estimate, how do they know it can't be lower? Simple logic says that this means that we must then know something about the so called unknown unknown, in which case it isn't really an unknown unknown, right?

All this means to me is that they are making a SWAG* at it.

*SWAG = Scientific Wild Ass Guess.

Anyone who has worked as a scientist immediately recognizes what is going on here. The FRT is doing the best they can with the data they have, and then like scientists they add a bunch of caveats because they are smart enough to realize that they could be way off, and they also realize they can't say "we don't have a freaking clue" because the President will ban them from getting any research grants if they say that.

Which is the real answer.

Do you have a brother named Darwin's Dog?

As one who works as a scientist, I concur. Your estimates are only as good as your assumptions and their associated uncertainty. Work enough uncertainty into a model and you still get a result, but it's often smeared across such a range of values as to render the result worthless.

That said, it's not quite the same as having no freakin' clue. There's a reasonable lower bound based on observed flow rates and oil seen so far, and there's a reasonable upper bound based on performance of similar wells, but there's not enough data (or it hasn't been released) to nail down where we are in between those bounds.

But it's still fun to try...

perhaps you might read the article before commenting?

it is not huff po that said 'unknown unknowns' it is not huff po drawing the conclusions. these words are direct quotes from the "Department of Interior's "Flow Rate Technical Group".

if you have different information, please post links.

stop it with the fact free commentary please. your bias is obvious.

My bias is obvious?

The title of the HuffPo article is:

Latest Federal Government Estimate Still Understates Oil Flow.

It does not do any such thing. The government estimate presents exactly what the experts in the field feel is their best approximation given the data available.

It is HuffPo that in their own transparent way that is trying to spin the facts for their own agenda.

Anyone know if they are going with a new cap or are they going to wing it with the current one on there?

In the last thread a participant mentioned piping the oil into an artificial pond. Simple to create using booms, wouldn't this be far safer versus burning the gas off on the surface ship? Tons of it(OIL) is already floating in the GOM so if some of it escapes this isn't a big deal.

The last thing we need now is that ship blown-up and everyone on board incenerated!

Just a few numbers to provide some context on the amount of dispersant being used (last number seems like an outlier, but it's fresh from New Orleans Times-Picayune):

May 6th – 250,000 gallons
http://tinyurl.com/37xz9or - Bob Dudley Speech at the Chief Executives' Club of Boston – “Between surface and seabed targets, we've applied a quarter of a million gallons of dispersant.”

May 27th – 850,000 gallons
http://tinyurl.com/346urjv - Houston Chronicle - “BP, which is responsible for the cleanup, has used more than 850,000 gallons of dispersants in an attempt to break up the oil before it reaches Louisiana's fragile coast.”

May 30th – 920,000 gallons
http://tinyurl.com/35d2nax - New York Times – “Approximately 920,000 gallons of dispersant have been deployed — 720,000 gallons on the surface and 200,000 gallons below the surface.”

June 1st – 900,000 gallons
http://tinyurl.com/3y827bo – Wall Street Journal – “BP and the federal government said they have applied more than 900,000 gallons of dispersant onto the oil so far, an unprecedented amount.”

June 2nd – 1,000,000 gallons
http://tinyurl.com/39mfn3d - Biloxi Gulfport Sun-Herald – “In all, Meiburg said, about a million gallons of dispersant has been used. (Stan Meiburg, regional EPA representative)”

June 4th – 1,800,000 gallons
http://tinyurl.com/29xrth4 - New Orleans Times-Picayune – “Officials have released nearly 1.8 million gallons of chemicals on and in the water since the April 20 blowout.”

Some interesting reading, the MSDS sheet for the dispersant Corexit:

http://lmrk.org/corexit_9500_uscueg.539287.pdf

Light Hydrotreated distillates = kerosene
Propylene glycol = widely used food additive - Cake mixes, salad dressings, soft drinks, popcorn etc.
Organic sulfonic acid salt = compounds of this class are commonly used in hair shampoo and other soaps/cleaners. This is the active ingredient.

Kerosene is likely to be the most toxic component of this mixture. Since you are applying it to crude oil it isn't likely to increase marine toxicity. You definitely don't want to shave in it though.

Exactactly correct! This stuff is litle more than industrial strength shampoo, I used to by it by the barrel. Take a fatty acid, ionize it, elevate the PH, and what have you got? SOAP

Sorry if this has been covered - hard to keep up with comments.

I'm tired of hearing on tv and radio from Hofmeister and talking heads that we should "use supertankers."

I don't know how they were used in the PG as Hof. never seems to describe the process very well (well, you know he has a very strong technical background in HR, and is selling a book). I have heard that the official response is "the oil's too dispersed." That seems likes a thin argument, so what's really wrong with the idea?

I came across a comment from http://ricksblog.biz/?p=10307 which made some sense. Basically you can't just park a supertanker in a crowded area in deepwater - no dynamic positioning. You would have to retrofit moorings (which take up a very large footprint in DW) or "install" dp (I'm sure that's easy). So given this, the idea that the "oil is too dispersed" starts to make sense. I guess I now have an answer to give to my friends that keep telling me "just get the supertankers."

I love the passion on WWL radio (AM 870 from NOLA --> can be streamed online and has a giant transmitter, btw), but my favorite unchallenged moronic call in comment today was that we should just bring the supertankers into Barataria Bay to suck up the oil -- In case you don't know, the max water depth in Barataria bay is probably like 5 feet and the pirates Lafitte liked Barataria, because the "big" sailing ships of the early 19th century couldn't make it through the passes.

Am, I missing anything here?

the official response is "the oil's too dispersed." That seems likes a thin argument, so what's really wrong with the idea?

I think that's a really solid argument. The USF researchers found a plume of dilute oil they suspect is 6 miles wide, 20 miles long, and 3200 feet deep.

The pumps on a a 2 million barrel VLCC are large enough to fill it in 24 to 48 hours.

So do the math. How long would it take 1 VLCC to pump a 6 mile x 20 mile x 3200 foot deep patch of seawater? Go ahead, I'll wait, break out the ol' calculator...

Answer: 2600 years.

We're gonna need a bigger boat.

PS: there are only 300 oil tankers this size on the planet, and commandeering a large fraction of them would cause a global energy catastrophe.

Look on the bright side - the shipyards could come roaring back! ;^)

Yeah, ok, good point, but there's certainly plenty of less dilute oil on the surface - why not collect that. I'm thinking it's because this concentrated surface oil is in an area where we can't realistically moor large vessels other than dp drillships. Right?

And then it keeps on moving and expanding as well.

Dispersion arguments also turn into a double-edged sword. People think that reservoir oil is extremely dispersed and that's what keeps us searching about for oil in far-off places. Yet people forget the fact that systematically searching for an immobile target and excluding areas physically impossible to contain reservoirs is a lot less demanding than reversing the effects of the entropy genie. Which is what we are dealing with right now. Lots of lessons to be learned from your calculator exercise.

How much oil in that plume compared to, say, some oil and vinegar dressing?

My guess is the salt in the water would cause you a lot more trouble than the oil...

I wonder if any thought has been given to this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VfypUzx1tI&feature=youtube_gdata

It worked then, but I've seen no mention of it anywhere on BP, MMS USCG, etc.

As I understand it there are enough natural oil seeps in the Gulf of Mexico that there are lots of naturally occurring oil eating microbes which multiply violently when they have some oil to eats.

I was saying this at the start of the spill......makes me wonder why ($) it isn't being used? Does BP own the dispersant companies and is there more profit in NOT solving the problem?

It turns out that
BP owns the company that makes Corexit,
and Corexit is banned in the UK.
(http://pasaudela.blogspot.com/2010/05/corexit-banned-in-uk-for-reason.html)
BP can't sell it at home,
So this is a real prime chance to flog it elsewhere.
lucky Gulf..

Completely wrong, BP has no ownership in the company that makes the dispersant

Corexit is made by Nalco which is a publicly traded company (stock ticker NLC).

http://www.nalco.com/applications/corexit-technology.htm

take your conspiracy theories elsewhere

Slatz

Right. And Nalco's largest shareholder is Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway. They own 6.5%.

BP doesn't own Nalco, but Nalco apparently has very close ties to the oil industry, including a BP executive on its board:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/business/energy-environment/13greenwir...

As to its being banned in the U.K., this is from the Marine Management Association's document entitled "Oil spill treatment products approved for use in the United Kingdom," dated May 18, 2010:

All products approved after 1 April 1996 have been required to pass both the Sea/Beach and Rocky Shore Toxicity Tests. Any products coming up for renewal that have only passed the Sea/Beach toxicity test in the past are required, before they can be renewed, to pass the Rocky Shore Test also. The following products have been removed from the list of approved products because they did not pass the Rocky Shore Test when submitted for renewal:

-- Chemkleen OSDA JAC (removed from list 21/01/1998)
-- Corexit 9527 (removed from list 30/07/1998)
-- Corexit 9500 (removed from list 30/07/1998).

Existing stocks of these products may still be used away from rocky shorelines in appropriate conditions. Approval should be sought from the relevant licensing authority before any proposed use.

(my emphasis)

http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/protecting/pollution/documents/approv...

The information that Corexit 9500 is banned in the UK is actually false, possibly an intentional lie started by who knows who. If is perfectly legal to use it except in the vicinity of rocky coastlines - the reason being that in interferes with some crustacea's ability to adhere to the rocks.

The use BP is putting it to here would actually be approved in the UK.

Oh yes, and of course BP doesn't own Nalco. Another falsehood.

Hi oilyman,

Anytime you see a video that does not include independently verified "hard data", but instead shows you seemingly miraculous results, you can be pretty sure they are blowing smoke. This does not pass the smell test.

I'm guessing this one was dead on arrival as soon as it was properly tested. If it's too good to be true...

I just want to say thanks to the OilDrum residents for providing such an excellent site for the discussion of this disaster. Even though I'm here in NC I'm still interested in these efforts, and I appreciate the descriptions and opinions of those with experience in this field. The links to the robot cameras and news stories are also well appreciated, and the discussions here have greatly improved my understanding of the complexities involved in this kind of work.

There's been a lot of comment on this site about the probability of success in drilling of one or more relief wells, but it seems wrong to use the term "probability" in this way. Drilling relief wells isn't a random process like flipping a coin or tossing dice. Instead, it's an deliberate process where the skill of the operator is paramount. How long (or how many tries) it will take to obtain success depends entirely on the skill of the operators.

Consider a truly random process like flipping a coin. How many tries would it take to assure a "heads" result? There's no way of saying, but you can predict very definitely that after 10 tosses, there's only about 1 chance in a 1000 of *not* getting a "heads" toss, and after 20 tosses there's only about 1 chance in a million of not getting a "head". And that's true **regardless** of who does the tossing. The "skill" of the operator doesn't matter one bit here (assuming "honest" players and equipment). It's perfectly acceptable to quote odds like these because they apply regardless of human skill or intentions -- tossing coins is a purely "random" process.

Now consider an entirely non-random process: throwing darts. How many darts would have to be thrown before the thrower hits a bulls-eye? There's no way to answer that question, nor is there any way to quote the "probabilities". Success depends *entirely* on the thrower. An expert darts thrower might hit a bulls-eye in just a couple of tosses, while your average joe might take a whole lot longer. There's really no way of knowing if any given person is *ever* going to get a bulls-eye -- it could easily take forever.

Actual performance by humans can range from far better to vastly worse than the odds of any "random" process succeeding. It all depends on the individuals performing these tasks. This is where we really have to hope the "best of the best" are on the job here trying to stem this leak. If they are, and they have good tools, and sufficient knowledge of the subsurface geology, then they should be able to succeed with the first relief well, even if it takes some number of "back and fill" retries part way down the hole.

The main reason to start more than one relief well would be to recover more quickly from a disaster (i.e. blowout) on the first well. Another reason would be to try a different drilling technology or strategy, in cases where there are competing concepts of how to approach the task. Note: We won't mention CYA here as a "reason" for doing something -- that's better left to management.

Realistically, I'd say "staggered starts" are a pretty good approach here, with one relief well following another by a space of time, such that if a given well fails, the next is pretty far along, and another will be started forthwith -- until it's over. One batter up, one on deck, and one in the dugout checking bats.

Starting more wells at once, and having them proceed more or less in parallel, would increase the risk of another blow-out, especially if the geology of the region is a bit uncertain. After all, this was originally supposed to be an "exploratory" well, not a "production" well. That must indicate they (BP, etc) don't really know all that might be in store for them down there.

Also, having multiple drilling operations going on at once, at pretty much the same stage, invites unwanted competition between teams. Face it -- this would happen! It would turn into a NASCAR thing. Competition is wonderful, but not in every context. We don't need to smell the testosterone here.

Of course, good managers know all this stuff already, and understand both the technology and the human factors involved. So they'll make the right call. That's how Tony Hayward got the job, right? Surely the BP Board of Directors had all that in mind at the time of his appointment.

The wild well was 1.5 months over drilling schedule. One cause was losing over 2 weeks because they lost a drill string from drilling too fast. BP was pressing to "bump it (the drill rate) up !".

I cannot imagine the pressure on RW #1 now !

Starting RW #3, say tomorrow morning and RW #4 three days later will allow them to be drilled at a safer and more sane rate. They will have logs from the wild well plus RWs 1 & 2 so the risk declines with more knowledge.

Let RW #1 be the wild man dash (it will be regardless of what anyone does or says now), RW #2 fast and furious and RW #3 and #4 safe and sane practices.

I think your caution is misplaced. You may not realize the devastation that ONE MORE DAY of BP pollution causes !

Best Hopes for RW #3 and #4,

Alan

Alan

As much pressure as there is on speed, these are the most closely watched wells in recent history, and the pressure for safe operation is even higher. They are not gonna cut any corners here, Alan. You gotta know that all their best folks are on these wells and that there is a lot of internal oversight. Also, they now know the pore pressures quite well (unlike the wildcat). Hope the cut-and-cap starts workin tonight. Unfortunately, there will almost certainly be set-backs and delays in the kill ops.

Regards.

With underground blowouts charging up higher formations they have less certainty than they did with the original well.

Hmmm ... adding another two relief wells would provide backup should the first relief well blow out.

Hello Alan

You come off as a nice person so I will tell you about what BP should really focus on PUBLIC RELATIONS especially with the clean-up effort on the beaches. In Louisiana we literally have dregs of society smearing defecation on the walls of store owners bathrooms. ANIMALS!! I see no organization and the effort appears the same as chain gangs in the old south. Please if you do not believe me visit the clean-up sites and verify.

Meanwhile we have GOOD people who do RESPECT the residents whom for some unknown reason BP will not hire. It's pretty clear BP is collecting most if not all employees from the bottom of societies barrel.

I myself would never work with animals such as them

As I noted over a month before, BP cannot be serious about cleaning up when they offered $10/hour. For work in heat & humidity, mosquitoes and swamp, staying away over night in company bunkhouse, etc., $10/hour will not attract an effective work force. But an effective work force may not be BP's goal.

I disagree with your characterizations though. A mixed bag of "who ever" (many staying over night at the homeless shelter on cold nights or a step away, DESPERATE for any chance to climb out of the hole they are in, or addicted to alcohol/other drugs).

A couple, or more, bad apples will come in with "who ever". But most are not.

Best Hopes for More Sympathy,

Alan

PS: I have not disclosed this, but I let two people that live in their cars shower in my home and share a few meals. Decent, hard working people struggling to get back.

Here is a place where the government could usefully take over: running the cleanup on and near shore. The feds should hire and equip the workers, manage and supervise the work, and set the pay rates. BP should pay the bills.

Did the drilling rate cause a problem with the well? If you believe so, please explain how you figured out that it did.

Thanks

There's been a lot of comment on this site about the probability of success in drilling of one or more relief wells, but it seems wrong to use the term "probability" in this way.

Good comment.

Of course, in the case of complex situations probabilities still exist, they're just harder to nail down. Clearly the rationale for two relief wells is that one may not be sufficient, all things considered. It is a precaution based on a rough assessment of probabilities, and a rough assessment is often the best you can do.

Using the "darts" analogy, I agree there would be no way to determine in how many throws it would take for a single user to get a bullseye, and an expert would be better than an amateur. Of course "darts" is not a perfect metaphor for this situation, but the odds of three experts throwing at once to lessen the time of a bullseye would probably beat one expert, all else being equal.

The increased odds of another blowout should be considered, certainly, but there's no question (is there?) this formation will ultimately be tapped with production wells.

Please shoot holes in my statements as appropriate. Thanks.

I agree the "darts" analogy isn't perfect, but I wanted to convey the idea that the skill and dedication of particular human operators is a hugely important factor here (as it is *not* with coin tossing). But the throwing of a dart is single "gesture" or "act" with an immediate result (hit or miss the bulls-eye), and that does not correspond to "extended actions" like drilling a relief well that unfold over time and allow for corrections during the possibly-lengthy process. This is something completely different.

Other "single actions" that either succeed or fail *all at once* would be calligraphic writing, playing a jazz solo live, kicking a goal in the World Cup, doing an acrobatic dive off a platform at the Olympics. These actions may be practiced hundreds or thousands of times to improve the odds of succeeding when it counts, but still you never know how it's going to turn out until the moment is at hand.

Other kinds of tasks unfold over time and allow for "mid-term corrections" in case things don't go perfectly the first time (even after lots of practice, etc). Examples are making a movie or a studio recording, oil painting, modeling with clay, writing a short story, or guiding a spacecraft to Mars. You've got to have a lot of skill just to get pointed in the right direction here, but there's still plenty of room for "tweaking" in case things go a little bit awry, if you're willing and able to hang in there.

My own field (computer programming) is another one of those "forgiving" areas where it's (almost) always possible to tweak a piece of code to improve its performance or reliability. It may take a long time (which is the bane of software development) but eventually the code *can* be made to work -- if you or "the team" know what you're doing and have the fortitude to hang in there and keep tweaking it.

I'd like to believe the drilling an oil well is something like computer programming in that it is a process that does allow for a certain amount of "tweaking" as you go. Thus, if you hire the right crew to begin with, they ought to get the job done, and done right, eventually.

I realize the idea of "eventual success" is pretty hard to take in this particular case, but if BP puts the right people on the job the first time, and gives them the leeway to fully utilize their expertise -- no micro-managing! -- that really will be the best we can get here.

To start multiple teams sounds like management "second-guessing" and might undercut morale. And starting different teams at the same time will certainly turn the event into a race and that could be downright dangerous (which really bad management could make even worse by offering bonuses and rewards, but let's not even go there).

There are two variables at play here: whether a given relief well succeeds, and when. Even if the chance of either RW failing is very low, odds are (in a literal sense) that one will get to the target before the other -- even if both drilling teams are 100% efficient -- simply because they'll be operating in different environments. This is where the programming analogy breaks down: your computer doesn't kick back. If your team were operating in an environment where the power occasionally failed, and you had to go back and restore from last weekend's full backup, you might think seriously about having two teams in different locations working on the project. Especially if the marginal cost of an extra week, or two, or five, of delay is as high as it would be here.

I think you are exactly right! I do not believe anyone, even the best driller expects himself to be able to bring that bit down on the wild well casing at exactly the right place on the first stab. But, unlike debugging a piece of software each succesive attempt is based on finer and finer granulation of error in a singular context. Nothing other than actual physics and the information of reliable instruments are at play. No users, compiler eccentricities, loose typing, etc. matters. It is an iterative process for sure, but a linear, exponentially increasingly precise process.

The advantage of the second drilling stab if done from the same intermediate casing is that you have a target that is relative to your casing shoe (wherever that might actually be) and you have a shorter distance to work with so the same percentage of measurement error is also a smaller distance. If you have to try again all the way from surface, as with additional rigs, you have to start at square zero each time.

The intermediate casing needs to be designed for both reservoir pressure, through the intercepted well, and also to be high enough that subsequent stabs can be done from the same casing. If the casing design is still the same as for the LW then it needs to be reevaluated.

Been a while since I looked at the actual math, but if memory serves, if the probability of finding oil with a given wellbore is 50% (same thing as flipping a coin), one has to drill five wells to have a 90% probability of at least one well finding oil.

Only need three to get to 87.5% for a 50% individual success rate.

Here is a simple Markov model if the success ratio is 2/3 and you stagger 3 relief wells (also a rate is included so you can get an idea of how time plays into it).

So theoretically you can get to 97% average success rate with 3 wells, if on the optimistic side of 50%.

I'm sure some group of analysts somewhere is doing this kind of calculation. Whether it is worthwhile or not for a single case, can't really say. Just that this is the way that the probabilities work out.

Is that fair, if there's no transition out of the 'not leaking' state? Or am I misinterpreting the model?

"not leaking" is a label for the "fixed" state

If it is truly an end-state, then there is no transition out. All probabilities eventually wind up in the end-states where the aggregate value sums to unity.

If you have transitions out of the "not leaking" end-state, then you are dealing with a maintenance situation where the "fix" eventually breaks down and something needs to be repaired.

A pretty good observation if that's what you are getting at.

Getting a base hit is largely skill (and a little luck) and we roundly agree that a player hitting .400 is a better pinch hitter than one hitting .173. We further understand that an MLB player is expected to hit over .200 minimally and people are delighted with over .300 in most cases.

None of this tells us anything for ceratin about any given at-bat, but it does lead to some pretty stable batting orders.

Is it my imagination, or is more of the fins visible and maybe even the flange peeking out once in a while indicating that recovery is improving?

I don't see the cap hopping around any more either.

That's what it looks like to me as well.

perhaps just possibly

I also notice that the fins aren't hopping - before it was very clear - every few seconds it'd lift and release a large blast of oil.

For those interested, CNN's Anderson Cooper has an interview with the survivors of the rig disaster tonight on his show at 10pm Eastern.

And Dateline (NBC) has an interview (Friday, 8:00 P.M. Central Time) with the crew of the supply boat, who rescued the survivors from the rig. Preview:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/37518228#37518228

I had posed an earlier idea for trying to put a literal dome (I was thinking something geodesic) over a taller section of riser and aim for the spew to be close to the center, in order to disperse turbulence... and in order to capture most of the downward backflow. ("Riser" of some nature attached to dome top... maybe more than one riser in more than one location..?)

Dimitry's posts seem to confirm my layman's hunch that a small rectangular prism or small cynlinder is just the wrong shape and size to do this. It seems that with a decent guess as to the well pressure you could model what would happen fluid dynamic-wise (I don't claim to know how to do this but others obviously can) at the center of a sphere pretty well. You could have cut the riser to a veriety of heights to accomodate the size of the ideal sphere. Heck, it sounds like you could excavate to even get more height if that was what was needed. You could stick a number of smaller risers in this thing maybe..?

Supposedly the dome was "too light" but now BP is using a two-ton hat. I figured if the dome needed to be weighted or pushed or held the shape and ability to withstand internal and external pressures would be much greater.

It doesn't even need to be all metal; it could have a skin selected for any number of properties that engineers would prize at these temperatures and depths. (Incidentally it appears the mix flowing out is presumed to be quite hot; a well engineered structure at the right size to stabilize the turbulence might not even need overly much -anol of your choice pumped in..?)

Maybe we don't attach this to a riser per se. Maybe we just contain the upward flow using any conceivable form of material. The oil will always flow UP, right, once the turbulence is killed..? There have to be a million ways to do this which don't involve high pressure and the possibility of a dangerous back-kick into the well.

In any event any attempt to throw some sort of fabric or other mile-deep 'boom' or crude tubing out there could have been done all along AT THE SAME TIME as attempting the various failed methods that concetrated on the riser and high-pressure capping.

It seems that we have people who are used to piping high pressure through pipes and their engineering solutions all involve trying to fight the pressure and force the oil/gas mix back into a toothpaste tube.

ANYTHING that guides the mess to the surface is fine with me, I don't care if it's some form of giant curtain or boom like structure, a lake-within-the Gulf or what have you.

I can't believe that we've made a cut that has increased flow without KNOWING with a very high certainly that more than that increase WOULD be recovered. Because this is about the 6th or so idea trotted out, I doubt there is a really high likelihood of this collecting a very high % of oil.

Was there a single professional in the past few weeks on these boards advocating what's going on right now as a preferred solution? I've been reading TOD for a few weeks and I don't recall anyone suggesting "hey why don't you cut the riser [not terribly well] way down near the BOP and try another top hat?"

This is the type of thing that strongly suggests to me that the best people available are not in fact tackling this problem. These folks not only don't engineer for this problem for a living, they didn't have a plan in place for this eventuality... As another poster said, if people engineer pumping through one pipe for a living all solutions will focus on one pipe. Very restrictive (no pun intended) thinking.

You can cite whatever "effect" you like for this conclusion being my technical ignorance, but I think there are more qualified people to tackle the problem in the pool of several billion humans with real world problem solving experience who don't happen to have BP (apparently the most felonious, least safe oil extractor in the USA) jobs. They've been so wrong about so many things to this point the only two options are A) liars doing window dressing or B) incompetent and unaware. (How is it, incidentally, that the 'best and brightest' at BP could be ignorant of hydrate crystal formation in designing the first couple of metal boxes..?)

If no human being has any concept of how to contain a flow like this until a kill well is drilled, that is an EXCELLENT argument for ceasing all deepwater production ASAP. The social and economic costs are ill-understood they're so high.

I am STUNNED that we're dumping millions of gallons of toxic dipersant into the Gulf. Is the plan to keep doing that for months..? Goodbye manatees, hello two-headed babies. The world actually wants the oil contained in one area, NOT dispersed. CONTAINED IN ONE AREA. More lives and livelihoods depend on this, and instead BP wants to do the equivalent of sweeping dust under a rug. When I was 7 and my mom told me to clean my room, I shoved things under the bed like this. Didn't really make the room 'clean.'

End of rant...

I will bite on a couple of these.

One thing I know (from hydraulics of bridges): water which is flowing into a restriction can decrease its width at a 1:1 ratio. Meaning, for every running foot it can shrink in one foot. I don't know for a fact that this gas/oil/water mix will behave the same but I think it's reasonable to expect this top hat arrangement to work, based on my understanding of water.

Was there a single professional in the past few weeks on these boards advocating what's going on right now as a preferred solution?

I didn't post about it but I am one engineer who thinks that having one leak is better than having several leaks. It was only a matter of time before the damaged riser would have eroded and we'd be here anyway.

Also... "two headed babies"? Really?

Corexit contains "endocrine disruptors."

"Endocrine disruptors are chemicals that mimic the effect of our bodies’ natural hormones. Exposure to endocrine disruptors (EDs) has been shown to increase the risk of cancers of hormone-dependent tissues (including breast cancer), infertility and other reproductive problems, as well as developmental defects and low birth weight."

Nobody knows what this does in the food chain, of which we are a part. Just more wingin' it.

BP was ordered to switch to different dispersers apparently. The funny thing is the claim was a couple of weeks ago that Corexit "wasn't much worse" than the competing products. Now can we argue that the competing products are a whole lot better?

Corexit 9500 DOES NOT contain endocrine disruptors.

There was an article published a while ago that tested the interaction between dispersants, fish, and several dispersants that is beng quoted widely (and incorrectly) to show that Corexit enhances uptake of PAH (which is believed to be an endocrine disruptor) from crude oil. In actually the article says that Corexit does not induce PAH uptake.

http://firedoglake.com/2010/05/24/bps-corexit-increases-uptake-of-endocr...

Evidently some blogs are picking this up to mean Corexit contains endocrine disruptors when it does not.

There is an UNBELIEVABLE amount of false information on the net about this.

PLEASE READ

Several of us have raised the option of bio remediation, here is someone doing something about it. It was used very successfully in Texas and there is a government study confirming no long term effects to the environment. God knows the chemical dispersant being used now can't say the same.

Please go to: http://spillfighters.com/ and sign the petition, spread the word. Write your senators and congressman, it will be your federal tax dollars at work cleaning this mess up.

The dispersant being used is very much biodegradable. Most of the people whining about it have no clue whatsoever what the issues are and why it is being used.

I do know it contains arsenic, and I also know it does nothing to dissolve the oil. It works by forcing the oil in smaller droplets with hopes it will sink to the bottom. Ask the people in Pensacola how that is going. If the current product is so effective, why are the marshes soaked with oil? Might the motive to use it be BP also owns the chemical company which makes it?

Bio remediation might cost 1/10th the price and work within 1-2 months on the marshes. It can be applied by small boats directly to affected areas, not sprayed from the air hoping it hits an oil patch.

And they can't spray the chemical dispersant on the shore because.......something about long term toxicity? Oh yeah, there I go whining again.

This idea that Corexit contains arsenic comes from an EPA data sheet in which materials are routinely tested for a wide variety of elements including arsenic. Modern analytical equipment is extremely sensitive and can detect tiny concentrations of most elements in most materials. The concentration of arsenic in Corexit is 150 parts per billion. The concentration of arsenic in open sea water is usually about 2 parts per billion.

Diluted down to 1 litre per cubic metre of sea water and you are barely raising the natural concentration and, as used, it will be diluted by this amount or more within a few metres of the point of application including directly into the leakage. It only needs diluting 15 to 1 to reach the 10 parts per billion WHO limit for drinking water.

The basic principle of toxicology is that statements that do not give concentration are meaningless. Almost everything is poisonous at high enough concentration and everything is harmless at low enough concentration.

The basic reason for using the dispersant is to increase its surface area to increase the degree that microbes will digest it or, if you prefer, so that natural bio-remediation can occur as it does for natural seeps.
I am not trying to dismiss the enormity of the disaster that has hit us. There can be no good outcomes, only various grades of bad ones. The use of dispersants gives a somewhat less disastrous result than not doing so.

Nick is correct.

The ratio of surface area to unit mass goes up rapidly as the diameter of a sphere goes down. So having the oil dispersed as small droplets or as a sheen on the surface will present much greater surface area exposed to sea water and bacteria per unit mass of oil than having it in the form of larger globules or a thicker slick on the surface.

That is what the disperant accomplishes. So, yes, the dispersant will enhance the activity of the Gulf's bacteria that break down the oil, resulting in a faster and more thorough elimination of the oil in the Gulf.

*IF* the water does not run out of oxygen.

As it does every summer (see Dead Zone),

http://www.tulane.edu/~bfleury/envirobio/enviroweb/DeadZone.htm

Also the related Red Tides.

Add oil to corn farmer fertilizer and sewage for 100 million Americans, etc. and there will not be enough O2.

Alan

Not to downplay the environmental damage here, but if the "Dead Zone" anoxia is bad enough to kill oil-eating bacteria, it'll kill most other marine life, so it doesn't matter if there's toxic oil in the area.

The places to watch out for are areas which *wouldn't* be anoxic normally, but bacterial respiration of the oil has used up all the oxygen, making new areas of anoxia. I haven't worked out the chemistry to calculate if there's enough oil to make this a serious concern.

The Dead Zone was first noticed in the 1970s and was an every 2 or 3 years phenomenon at first.

Now EVERY year, and the trend is growing larger. It moves around a bit with currents.

I fear a MASSIVE Dead Zone this year, dwarfing any ever known.

The combination of oxygen consumed to digest oil with the nutrient induced algae blooms (and then die off) could well be extremely deadly.

An issue not mentioned, yet.

Alan

I would think other nutrients may be limiting, not just oxygen. The usual culprit in low oxygen areas is phosphate.

ok first post, hope still enough on topic to be appropriate

first the mandatory lauding of this site - great source of info and hat tip (or blame) to Prof Goose for the heads up over at Democratic Underground

my question: yesterday someone posted a screen cap of the inside of the "crawed" off riser tube/pipe showing what appeared to be TWO segments of drill pipe inside. Was there ever any further discussion or conclusions about this? It seemed rather extraordinary to me - so much that I snagged the shot and put it on my desktop!

(related housekeeping question - how does one do a search on this site?)

quite a bit of discussions on the pages immediately prior and after this one:

http://drillingclub.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=wellcontrol&action=dis...

thanks for the link, doesn't seem quite as interesting to others as it did to me, I guess

would a chunk of broken pipe travel down with the pressures being what they are? or did it travel up? the idea that it was a figure 8 shape, single, larger diameter pipe sure didn't seem to be what I was seeing

Indeed, thanks for the link toller. I read the discussion but all I saw was plausible speculation - not enough info. On the other hand that chunk of riser was brought to the surface and someone knows for sure what was in there. Too bad they aren't sharing.

would a chunk of broken pipe travel down with the pressures being what they are?

I spent some time reading up on the Lodgepole blowout in Canada in the 1980s. They asked the same question, and the consequences for getting it wrong were... exciting.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t5RkUbGC9Gs&feature=related#t=1m09s

ooops

Wow, quite the video.

It's part of a five-part series, all of which are on Youtube. It's a bit dry and History Channeley, but when I watched it a few weeks ago, it really gave me a good feel for just how SNAFU-filled blowout control can be, even when you're *not* under 5000 feet of water.

Thank you! What do we think of removing the BOP now? Hum, I guess we don't know all the facts in the well do we. Maybe that GIANT screw would do I added the gold plating ha!

No mandatory lauding rule - I'm a newbie too and I think people are just so thrilled to have found this place...

Now to answer your question about searches. Top left corner. There's a "google" space. I used it this afternoon to search for a user. Comments by that user popped right up. I'm pretty sure that's what you're looking for!

Welcome! From a newbie.

there has been some number crunching on probabilites of RW hitting the target...that in my considered and respectful view is hogwash because to be able to compute probability you need to be able to decide

1- the probability of the RW hitting the target on the first try
2- hold roughly the same operating conditions to be applicable to the ensuing RW's
neither can be guaranteed with any certainty in drilling nor can a probability function generated for success to rely on

the only option is to make educated guesses...or like a dear departed mentor once described RW drilling to me once

cross your fingers, say a hail mary, drill safely and keep plenty of dipping tobacco on hand

Perhaps, but people ignoring probabilities is what keeps Las Vegas going.
Markov chain kinds of analysis are pretty simple and get you in the ballpark. And of course use prior data to formulate your guesses.

ali - A wise man your mentory...you have learned well, grasshopper. I avoided the stat chat up to now but I always hate to pass on the best stat lesson I ever learned. The prof always asked the same question the first day of class: you flip a coin 19 times in a row and it's heads every time. What's the probability of the 20th flip being heads? Naturaly most answer 50%. And naturally he would laugh at all of us. He would tell us that regardless of what the stat tables say none of us would ever see a coin flip heads 20 times in a row. It was a much greater probability that it was a two-headed coin. Note: he never said it was an honest coin. His real point: before you start cooking your numbers be damn sure you understand the populaion you're studying. IOW what are the odds of pulling a white marble out a bag of 100 marbles? A $1,000 for the first right answer.

"IOW what are the odds of pulling a white marble out a bag of 100 marbles? A $1,000 for the first right answer."

Yes, the answer depends on the "population" of marbles in the bag. If they are all black, the odds of pulling a white one are zero. So the question cannot be answered rationally without knowing something about the population one is sampling -- which, of course, is precisely your point.

How many relief wells are you recommending? (I recall you saying 3 wells) If that isn't a probability argument, I don't know what is. You can say that it is a "feel" for the effectiveness of the approach, but we have learned over the years that this analysis can be quantified. Perhaps it doesn't work for a specific case, but it works better the larger the set of observations.

Historically, the oil industry never has treated probabilities quantitatively. The closest they ever got was the qualitative terms possible, probable, and provable. It didn't really matter because the monetary pay-offs always outweighed the risks to them.

RM -- IOW what are the odds of pulling a white marble out a bag of 100 marbles?

answer -- 0% and 100% and every number in-between :)

That's what algebra is for. You postulate "x" as the number of white marbles and build your equation from there.

With 100 marbles, every integer % inclusive from 0% to 100%. *IF* a marble (and not multiple marbles) is actually pulled from the bag.

If no marble is selected, then the odds of pulling a white marble are 0%.

Allan

The probability is the number of white marbles divided by the number of non-white marbles, it doesn't matter how many marbles are in the bag.

Sorry if everybody has seen this link already, but I found it really helped me understand what the BP team have been doing with the LMRP cap, and just how complex the whole thing is.

http://bp.concerts.com/gom/lmrp6_060310.htm

I have to say, after watching this operation solidly for the last three nights, that these BP guys are just incredible.

I have been glued to the live stream; I just could leave it to go to bed. The BP team were working so hard and it became clear to me that they are throwing absolutley everything at this problem. What they can do with those ROVs is just amazing. The engineering is brilliant and I cannot believe there is another group in the world that could make a better job of this operation, can anybody think of other teams who could do better?

However, when I listen to the media and the politicians all I hear is that BP are basically a bunch of evil, selfish, lying, small minded, incompetent clowns. I guess this just reflects the general ignorance of the complexity of the problem and the sophistication of the responses from BP, but it must be very difficult for these chaps, working out there in the Gulf, to keep their spirits up in the face of this continuous stream of criticism.

So if any of the BP team are reading this comment, keep up the good work, you are doing a fantastic job.

You are seeing Oceaneering at work. As I understand it, they are the dominant sub-contractor for ROVs and "the ones you call".

BP just pays their invoices.

Alan

Is this Tony H., getting his life back?

I honestly feel bad for Mr. Hayward, he's not very skilled at public relations if this never happened who can really say how good of a CEO he could have been for BP.

I honestly feel bad for Mr. Hayward, he's not very skilled at public relations if this never happened who can really say how good of a CEO he could have been for BP.

I honestly feel bad for Joe Firefighter. He's not very skilled at fighting fires, if this fire had never happened who can really say how good a firefighter he could have been?

I honestly feel bad for the 11 men who died and their families because of the penny pinching negligence of the company as led by Mr. Hayward. Hey he's getting 3 million pounds a year per a previous post. I don't feel sorry for the troubles of anyone making that sort of money.

I honestly feel bad for the fishermen who's lives are being ruined through no fault of their own. I honestly feel bad for the dead dolphins and other sea life who certainly had no fault in this mess.

Junkshot think. CEOs get paid tons of money. If they can't handle the problems their companies create they shouldn't get paid. I suppose they thought that the Gulf was little different from Ecuador and Nigeria where they have totally ruined the lives of the indigenous people. They forgot it was the USA and here oil companies have to do a little PR when they ruin lives.

junkshot: And if pigs could fly....

I honestly feel bad for the 11 dead, the businesses and individuals who will go broke and the gulf coast residents who will never be the same. I feel bad for my grandkids who may never know LA as I did. I couldn't give a rats ass that this freaking idiot hayward is "misunderstood". I think he is just worried he may lose his style of living

Hayward's gaffes

"This was not our accident … This was Transocean's rig. Their systems. Their people. Their equipment." 4 May

"The Gulf of Mexico is a big ocean. The amount of oil and dispersant we are putting into it is tiny in relation to the total water volume." 14 May

"No one wants this over more than I do. I would like my life back." 30 May

"So far I'm unscathed ... Sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me." 4 June

don't forget food poisoning

Yes, it is easy to take shots at Hayward.

Out of BP's 80,000+ plus employees, he is the one out front comprising the easiest target. He is also, in all probability, the one with the least day-to-day contact with, and influence over, drilling operations.

It was not Hayward that made the evidently fateful decision to withdraw the mud and replace with sea water -- it was not Hayward who ignored or otherwise missed the indications that the well was flowing. And in all probability, Hayward had nothing to do with whatever caused the BOP to fail to do its job.

Hayward's critics will maintain that he is responsible for fostering, causing and encouraging a corporate-wide attitude of "speed and profits first, safety be damned!" -- and that said attitude is the root cause of this disaster. That *might* be true, and if it is, I will join in the condemnation. But I will need some evidence -- some proof -- of that before I hop on that bandwagon. So far, as near as I can tell, no such evidence and proof has not been presented.

Hi Michael,

Normally I'd have time to provide the link to the specific C-Span hearing, but my wife will kill me if I don't get off this computer ;-)

During the first Congressional hearing, bear with me, I have a severe memory deficit which makes it difficult to give you more that a summary, the BP rep talked about an internal BP program to clean up their safety act because of the numerous problems they had in the past. The gist is BP knew they had a serious problem with safety and were trying to do something about it.

I seem to remember this program had been running for 3 or 4 years. Maybe someone else can jump in and provide more info.

Got to run!

In case MichaelWSmith hasn't seen this:
(copied/pasted from elsewhere)

The following is my theory on what happened on April 20th. I have listed factual information to the best of my knowledge, and base this theory on 33 years of experience working on these rigs, with 16 years working as a consultant worldwide. The contractor (Transocean in this case) typically does not do anything without direction and approval from the operator (BP in this case). I believe that there was nothing wrong with the BOP, or the conduct of the crews prior to the catastrophic failure. If any operator drills a similar well using the same flawed casing and cement program, the same results will be very possible.
The well was drilled to 18,360 ft and final mud weight was 14.0 ppg. The last casing long string was 16 inch and there were 3 drilling liners (13 5/8”, 11 7/8” and 9 7/8”) with 3 liner tops. A 9-7/8” X 7” tapered casing long string was run to TD. The bottom section of casing was cemented with only 51 barrels of light weight cement containing nitrogen, a tricky procedure, especially in these conditions.
The casing seal assembly was set in wellhead and pressure tested from above to 10,000 psi. Reportedly, a lock down ring was not run on the casing hanger. The casing string was pressure tested against the Shear rams, only 16.5 hours after primary cement job. A negative test on the wellhead packoff was performed.
The rig crew was likely lead to believe that the well was successfully cemented, capped and secured. Normally a responsible operator will not remove the primary source of well control (14.0 ppg drilling mud) until such conditions were met. However, the crews were given the order to displace heavy mud from riser with seawater, prior to setting the final cement plugs. They were pumping seawater down the drill string and sending returns overboard to workboat, so there was limited ability to directly detect influx via pit level. This is the fastest way to perform the displacement operation, and the method was likely directed and certainly approved by operator. There was a sudden casing failure during this displacement procedure that allowed the well to unload, with ignition of gas and oil. Evidently, the crew was able to get the diverter closed based on initial photographs, showing flames coming out of diverter lines.
It is likely that pressure built up between the 9 7/8” and 16" casing under the casing hanger, due to gas migration from the pay zone. Based on reported mud weight, the reservoir formation pressure is in excess of 13,000 psi. The pressure building in the cross sectional area below the casing hanger would have increased casing tension and caused casing to collapse and part (rapidly separate) at a connection, probably a joint or two (50’ or 90’) below wellhead. The collapse pressure for 62.8 ppf 9-7/8” casing is +/- 10,300 psi. However, the collapse resistance of casing is considerably reduced in presence of axial stress (i.e. tension). Engineers - see formula from API bulletin 5C3, section 2.1.5 and run the math. The well then came in violently through parted casing and caused the blowout. Without lockdown ring on hanger, the casing hanger and joint(s) were slingshot up into BOP. That would explain why all components of the BOP are unable to seal or shear. The parted casing section remains across all BOP ram cavities and probably all the way up into the riser.

Shortcut #1: Running a tapered long string rather than a liner with 9-7/8” liner top packer, followed by tieback string and pumping heavy cement all the way to seabed. Perhaps the original permits for this casing program were based on a planned appraisal well, and changed midstream to a producer well, then hastily approved by the complacent or under-staffed MMS. This tragic shortcut may have saved about 1.5 rig days.

Shortcut #2: Insufficient time was used to cure the mud losses prior to cementing the open hole reservoir section, depending instead on using lightweight cement to prevent losses to the formation.

Shortcut #3: The nitrified primary cement job. This is difficult to pull off, even under ideal conditions.

Shortcut #4: Hanger without lock ring may have used due to the previously unplanned long string, and to avoid waiting for hanger with lock ring to be fabricated or prepared.

Shortcut #5: No cement evaluation logs were performed after a job with known high calculated risk (mud losses to formation). This shortcut may have saved 8 hours of rig time.

Shortcut #6: Pressure testing casing less than 24 hours after cement in place can expand the casing before the cement is fully set. This shortcut can “crack” the cement and create a micro annulus which will allow gas migration.

Shortcut #7: Displacing 14 ppg mud from 8000 ft MDRT with 8.7 ppg seawater, less than 20 hours after primary cement is in place. How many tested and proven barriers can you count? I count zero satisfactory barriers. Industry standards dictate that at least two tested (to maximum anticipated pressure) barriers are in place prior to removing the primary source of well control (weighted mud or brine).

My ire is directed at those responsible for ignoring warning signs in the hours leading up to the blowout. The flow of mud out of the well exceeded the flow of mud into the well. Despite that danger sign, BP continued to displace heavy drilling mud in the well with seawater. In my opinion, that was criminally negligent. It appears they were trying to save the cost of the mud, less than a million dollars. A classic case of penny wise, pound foolish, don't you think?

My understanding is that they were displacing the drilling mud directly on to a service boat and that the people on the boat did not know that the mud pumps were no longer running.

In that case the inflow vs. outflow was not being monitored, and that would be just as negligent.

Questions:

1) On a big rig like DWH whose job is it to ususally watch the return flow? The mud loggers?

2) Whose job is it to see that the responsible person does it? The tool pusher?

3) In the old days (30 years ago in Wyoming) I am pretty sure we had a flow meter prinout up in the drill floor and a tape recording the weight on the drill pipe string. Certainly these new rigs have sensors and monitors remoted to the drill floor. Don't they?

4) Because of the off loading of mud where these sensors unable to be used and monitors turned off? Or just not being watched?

Evidence that BP is evil:

1. Refusal to accurately estimate the leak rate accurately

2. Refusal to allow free access to oil damaged areas by the press

3. Refusal to disclose decisions made leading to the rig explosion

BP is a profit-seeking corporation. It has no obligation to serve the public good. Its primary motivation is to maximize the wealth of its stockholders and managers. The damage inflicted by this disaster was the consequence of badly miscalculated risks taken by managers who knew that they would be enriched and promoted if they succeeded and protected if they failed. Such an incentive structure assures further ecocide incidents.

We are watching a profit seeking corporation wreck the Gulf of Mexico because the ecosystem is an "externality" that does not figure in their incentive schemes. If such organizations continue to run amok they will literally destroy the world while we salute their "efficiency."

Hopefully humorous internet 'BP is evil' creativity:
http://bp.isevil.org/simulator/

Was Chernoble operated by a "profit seeking" organization?

How about the Hansford site?

Are you familiar with any of the Pacific Ocean test atolls?

Your analysis or causes is simply flawed, JMHO.

Lessismore claimed:

"We are watching a profit seeking corporation wreck the Gulf of Mexico because the ecosystem is an 'externality' that does not figure in their incentive schemes. If such organizations continue to run amok they will literally destroy the world while we salute their 'efficiency'".

Oh baloney.

"Profit seeking corporations" have been in existence since the dawn of the industrial revolution. Over that period of time those "profit seeking corporations" have produced sufficient wealth to make it possible to increase mankind's standard of living enormously. Just since the year 1900, life expectancy in the U.S. has increased from 47 years to 77 years.

Today, the oil industry provides a vast array of products that support and power the global economy -- which is the engine of production that makes it possible to feed, clothe and house 6+ billions human beings every day.

And the notion that the possibility of company-killing, multi-billion dollar disasters like this leak is ignored is preposterous. The very profit-seeking motives that you spit on demand that all reasonable steps be taken to prevent/avoid such disasters. If this were not so, then such disasters would be commonplace and not rare, as they are, in fact.

Someone in your education aborted your faculty of reason -- and filled the resulting vacuum between your ears with stale, lame, leftist talking points that were refuted in the prior century. You ought to demand your money back.

You talk as if the vast majority of oil was not owned and produced by state owned oil companies.

Investor owned oil companies are a small and shrinking share of world production.

Alan

Available evidence does not support your position.

If this were not so, then such disasters would be commonplace and not rare, as they are, in fact.

I have been reading recently that they are not so rare in the Niger Delta.

Wikipedia article

National Geographic article

Guardian article

Run Ops on guy making call to replace the mud with seawater... Al-Qaeda ???

The more they try to push on that flimsy 5000 foot 6 inch pipe to seat that gasket the more it's going to bow and bow.

I am a little confused about all the hand wringing about a tight seal on the top cap. I just read that the ship up top can process 15,000 bpd and if the well is producing at a rate greater than that then its gotta go somewhere. So if the well is producing 19,000 bpd then 4,000 is going to be leaking out the bottom no matter how good a seal you have.

I think they can add other ships up top, divert some of the flow to ship #2 and they will be ok. The "tight seal" may never happen because if they have a leak of cold sea water into the pipe it might wreak havoc with freezing and pressure surges. Another total failure is not that far fetched even with this fix working at full capacity. I expect we will see a minimal oil leak to maintain a safety margin for the whole process.

Could not get any video at this time stamp.

yeah, everyone just got home and turned on their computers ...

I haven't been able to get anything for the last 10 minutes. All screens are blank on the link I've been using.

I'm getting only one (Skandi Herc 14) here: http://bp.isevil.org/

Shep Smith just reported on Fox News that BP has said that in the 24 hours since they placed the cap, they've sucked up 1800 barrels of oil.

looks like BPs feeds have been HACKED

http://www.deepwaterbp.com/

I don't think that's an official BP site despite the name.

Sigh. Every time I see the term "Corexit" it sounds like "Corrects It" ......which it is *so* not doing.

It works great at hiding BP's mess though.

If it was a BP site they should have a screen shot of a firetruck or ambulance on the move with some text pointing out that just this one well could produce enough gasoline to power every ambulance and firetruck in North America.

Good work, whoever did it.

It's not about playing around in subs.

The more I look at current operations, the more I am reminded of Chief Brody's (Roy Schrider) famous quote in Jaws, "We're gonna need a bigger boat." Here's to swimming with bowl legged women.

"Farewell and adieu to you fair GOM fishies..."

It does look like more of the fins are now exposed. In fact, in the Skandi OV2 image you can now see an area in the fin on the left where the paint appears to have been scoured to bare metal by the oil/sand/gas/whatever mixture, yet the tip of that same fin still has most of its paint.

I gather that means that that either increased flow up the pipe has reduced the amount of oil escaping the cap, or the current is moving from left to right.

Looks that way to me too. But it also looks like there is less gas now, so this might be temporary.

IMO defintely less flow than last night when I watched last. Can consistently see the fins.

Absoultely irrefutably confirmed - my wife agress!

BP is bringing us together!!!

I've been lurking here all week and first-time posting now. Great forum!

I've been away from the videos for the last four hours and looked at 9pm CDT and the fins are much more exposed than I last saw at 5pm. I should have done this before but I took screen shots of all three views working as of 9pm. Will repeat tomorrow to compare.

new kid on the block sez:

do this

http://s157.photobucket.com/albums/t79/SirKlaydon2/BOP%20Top%20Flange%20...

check it out it is sooooooo

goooooood

:)

Grab your little Playskool tool kit and swim on down there and take that bad old flange apart and bolt down this revolutinary new thing you call a "Tee"; brilliant, no I mean brilliant, no really!

How is the responsibility (legal and moral) shared between BP and Transocean?

Someone posted that the contract was available for inspection somewhere. BP is responsible for everything under the contract. You can expect that there will be some lawin' for a few years over those terms and whether RIG does have some responsibility. My guess is that the Trial Lawyers will get RIG involved in some way. Feeding on two large fish will give them more livelyhood.

TOTAL BUMMER>>>>ROFF'S NO LONGER PROVIDING TRACKING!

http://www.roffs.com/deepwaterhorizon.html

Not sure if this has been hit on yet.....per their statement the core biz is off 30%.

Can no longer afford to work on this stuff......COME ON BP.....ANTE UP!!!

They have been doing an outsanding job providing data.

Seem to be positioning themselves for a stake in the payouts.

But I guess, that contract has no influence on the criminal case. It would be interesting to know, to which extent Transocean personnels are responsible for decisions especially, when regulations/safety rules were violated.

I have been lurking for many many days, marveling at the wisdom of those in the industry. But to a yokel, it is obvious that either the cap is not heavy enough to suppress the flow, or BP failed to have anchor points from which to cinch the top hat down. Could they not drill and cement some anchor points (ala trailer tie-downs) and use them to counter the pressure?

It's been said here many times by others -- so it must have some kind of "truthiness" by now -- but the basic idea seems to be that the looseness of the cap is not a "bug" but a "feature" -- a safety feature.

If the pressure inside the cap builds up too high, the fact that it can and will "pop off" makes it an effective relief valve, something you generally want to have in a high-pressure plumbing system.

Pressure could build up because of methane hydrates blocking the riser, or if someone up on the surface closed down too much on the valve controlling the flow, or perhaps if a giant bubble of methane gas belched up out of the well. Something has to be done in these cases to avoid another blowout.

One problem would be that the cut the cap is sitting on is not level. If you tried to cinch it down, the cap or something near it would crack. Also, you have the NIH problem: Not Invented Here.

On the other hand maybe be cap is sitting on some kind of gasket. Who knows.

Peakoilerrrr at gCaptain has this remedy:

There are 2 major problems handling oil/gas release, while we wait for Relief Well:

1. Avoid Increasing back-pressure onto BOP...might cause BOP/casing catastrophic failures.
2. Methane-hydrates must be mostly avoided to enable flow.

I predict both problems will be overcome as follows, using buoyant [undersea-floating] storage just above BOP outlet, preliminary gas/oil separation and then pumping stages get oil/gas phases up to surface...

A. Direct the BOP flow upward, say 500 feet, into horizontal buffer-storage "pipe" [buoyancy plenums on a wide-diameter cylinder to maintain desired altitude above BOP], of length long enough for gas to rise to top of cylinder.

B. Allow for release of gas from upper area of cylinder [dump into ocean or separately route to surface for standard flare-off].

C. Arrange for pumping 4500 ft. up to surface of mostly-liquid-phase remaining in cylinder, in stages, with pressure-isolation from BOP, i.e. isolate 4,500 ft. head pressure cylinder-to-surface from the 500 ft. head between BOP and buoyant cylinder.

The above avoids seawater-contact so no methane-hydrates can form. As gas will be further released immediately upon of pumping from cylinder, it is handled as usual in the cylinder-to-surface riser, without a solid-phase of hydrates. The staged-pumping, 4500 ft rise to surface must not contribute to back-pressure on the BOP...that's just a routing engineering matter...I guess?

How all this would respond to lesser problems, like hurricanes, is also handled by engineers...or tolerated by disconnecting and allow oil to spill into ocean until surface rig can re-connect. What's a million-gallon spill these days?

http://gcaptain.com/forum/offshore/4805-deepwater-horizon-transocean-oil...

shelburn:

With all due respect:

1. We would recall that the object here should be to keep the oil out of the water, not to obtain production from this blown out well.

2. If there is any question of processing capacity at the surface, the better answer is to increase processing capacity, not to send more oil into the water.

3. The top hat may not have been designed to take any significant pressure, but there are various kinds of containment structures even of the size of the BOP that will take a lot of pressure, like 15,000 psi. They are not cheap. But they are cheaper than what the spilled oil costs the nation and the world.

4. There exist various techniques for "gasketing" the bottom of such a containment structure placed over the BOP etc. now gushing oil, including into the mud of the sea floor, such that oil will not be forced out the bottom because the top is sealed. Interlocking heavy concrete pads, with multiple packing structures, etc.

5. If there are concerns about the strength and ability to handle pressure of the BOP structure or the well casing below it (as well there may be) the right answer is to drill into the sea floor in the area surrounding down to solid rock (even if it is some distance down), set fasteners of great tensile strength, and then pull against them (through sheaves, etc.) using cables from surface ships, pulling down any device (containment structure) that one needs to seriously seal. (With tons of force.) The reserve buoyancy of the large surface ships is the biggest physical "fulcrum" in the whole picture. (The weight of a drill collar under water is laughably small in the scheme of things.)

One can tell you are a very smart guy, and know the oil business, and can think carefully in an "oil business" kind of way. For the rest of the country watching the live feed videos, however, the anger and frustration at watching the various "cutesy" and, basically, "fussing" approaches taken when we want to see executed a very simple, very certain, very capable, approach that will stop the flow of oil from the blown out well into the water, without any concern as to cost (whatever it is, it will be vastly cheaper than the costs imposed by the spill), or as to production (the world will be just fine without ever seeing a drop of oil from this reservoir). Quite literally, put a very, very strong bucket over it. Tie it down very tight. Then talk to us about any other issues.

shelburn:

With all due respect:

1. We would recall that the object here should be to keep the oil out of the water, not to obtain production from this blown out well.

2. If there is any question of processing capacity at the surface, the better answer is to increase processing capacity, not to send more oil into the water.

3. The top hat may not have been designed to take any significant pressure, but there are various kinds of containment structures even of the size of the BOP that will take a lot of pressure, like 15,000 psi. They are not cheap. But they are cheaper than what the spilled oil costs the nation and the world.

4. There exist various techniques for "gasketing" the bottom of such a containment structure placed over the BOP etc. now gushing oil, including into the mud of the sea floor, such that oil will not be forced out the bottom because the top is sealed. Interlocking heavy concrete pads, with multiple packing structures, etc.

5. If there are concerns about the strength and ability to handle pressure of the BOP structure or the well casing below it (as well there may be) the right answer is to drill into the sea floor in the area surrounding down to solid rock (even if it is some distance down), set fasteners of great tensile strength, and then pull against them (through sheaves, etc.) using cables from surface ships, pulling down any device (containment structure) that one needs to seriously seal. (With tons of force.) The reserve buoyancy of the large surface ships is the biggest physical "fulcrum" in the whole picture. (The weight of a drill collar under water is laughably small in the scheme of things.)

One can tell you are a very smart guy, and know the oil business, and can think carefully in an "oil business" kind of way. For the rest of the country watching the live feed videos, however, the anger and frustration at watching the various "cutesy" and, basically, "fussing" approaches taken when we want to see executed a very simple, very certain, very capable, approach that will stop the flow of oil from the blown out well into the water, without any concern as to cost (whatever it is, it will be vastly cheaper than the costs imposed by the spill), or as to production (the world will be just fine without ever seeing a drop of oil from this reservoir). Quite literally, put a very, very strong bucket over it. Tie it down very tight. Then talk to us about any other issues.

Drilling a brand new well will only cost a few tens of millions of dollars. The spill will end up costing on the order of a billion a day. Salvaging production doesn't come into the picture at all from a cost/benefit standpoint.

Not an engineer, but the surface being sand combined with erosion from high pressure oil and gas makes a bucket solution difficult.

Could someone quickly explain the logic precluding explosively sealing the well? The most convincing explanation I heard involved the topography of the sea floor in the area.

Can we create a plug working like the Amplatzer Vascular Plug delivered through a catheter in blood vessels? http://www.amplatzer.com/products/vascular_plug/vascular_plug_animation/...

It is not obvious why a short thimble, only slightly larger in diameter than the chopped riser pipe could not be fashioned with a bottom seal for sealing against the top of the BOP at the base of the riser to fit between the riser and bolt circle. And a top seal or seal surface to match the first LMRP sealing grommet. This would eliminate the jagged openings of the chopped riser pipe. BP must have good dimensional data for the top of the BOP including any deformation of the riser. One might speculate this would be an easy way to get a tight connection.

I am looking at the PBS feed
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/horizon-oil-spill.html

On the right there appears to be something yellow probe sticking into the oil flow.
It seems to be attached to some kind of black box with a white stripe.

Is it a flow gauge?
jal

In case MichaelWSmith didn't get to see this:
(copied/pasted from elsewhere)

The following is my theory on what happened on April 20th. I have listed factual information to the best of my knowledge, and base this theory on 33 years of experience working on these rigs, with 16 years working as a consultant worldwide. The contractor (Transocean in this case) typically does not do anything without direction and approval from the operator (BP in this case). I believe that there was nothing wrong with the BOP, or the conduct of the crews prior to the catastrophic failure. If any operator drills a similar well using the same flawed casing and cement program, the same results will be very possible.
The well was drilled to 18,360 ft and final mud weight was 14.0 ppg. The last casing long string was 16 inch and there were 3 drilling liners (13 5/8”, 11 7/8” and 9 7/8”) with 3 liner tops. A 9-7/8” X 7” tapered casing long string was run to TD. The bottom section of casing was cemented with only 51 barrels of light weight cement containing nitrogen, a tricky procedure, especially in these conditions.
The casing seal assembly was set in wellhead and pressure tested from above to 10,000 psi. Reportedly, a lock down ring was not run on the casing hanger. The casing string was pressure tested against the Shear rams, only 16.5 hours after primary cement job. A negative test on the wellhead packoff was performed.
The rig crew was likely lead to believe that the well was successfully cemented, capped and secured. Normally a responsible operator will not remove the primary source of well control (14.0 ppg drilling mud) until such conditions were met. However, the crews were given the order to displace heavy mud from riser with seawater, prior to setting the final cement plugs. They were pumping seawater down the drill string and sending returns overboard to workboat, so there was limited ability to directly detect influx via pit level. This is the fastest way to perform the displacement operation, and the method was likely directed and certainly approved by operator. There was a sudden casing failure during this displacement procedure that allowed the well to unload, with ignition of gas and oil. Evidently, the crew was able to get the diverter closed based on initial photographs, showing flames coming out of diverter lines.
It is likely that pressure built up between the 9 7/8” and 16" casing under the casing hanger, due to gas migration from the pay zone. Based on reported mud weight, the reservoir formation pressure is in excess of 13,000 psi. The pressure building in the cross sectional area below the casing hanger would have increased casing tension and caused casing to collapse and part (rapidly separate) at a connection, probably a joint or two (50’ or 90’) below wellhead. The collapse pressure for 62.8 ppf 9-7/8” casing is +/- 10,300 psi. However, the collapse resistance of casing is considerably reduced in presence of axial stress (i.e. tension). Engineers - see formula from API bulletin 5C3, section 2.1.5 and run the math. The well then came in violently through parted casing and caused the blowout. Without lockdown ring on hanger, the casing hanger and joint(s) were slingshot up into BOP. That would explain why all components of the BOP are unable to seal or shear. The parted casing section remains across all BOP ram cavities and probably all the way up into the riser.

Shortcut #1: Running a tapered long string rather than a liner with 9-7/8” liner top packer, followed by tieback string and pumping heavy cement all the way to seabed. Perhaps the original permits for this casing program were based on a planned appraisal well, and changed midstream to a producer well, then hastily approved by the complacent or under-staffed MMS. This tragic shortcut may have saved about 1.5 rig days.

Shortcut #2: Insufficient time was used to cure the mud losses prior to cementing the open hole reservoir section, depending instead on using lightweight cement to prevent losses to the formation.

Shortcut #3: The nitrified primary cement job. This is difficult to pull off, even under ideal conditions.

Shortcut #4: Hanger without lock ring may have used due to the previously unplanned long string, and to avoid waiting for hanger with lock ring to be fabricated or prepared.

Shortcut #5: No cement evaluation logs were performed after a job with known high calculated risk (mud losses to formation). This shortcut may have saved 8 hours of rig time.

Shortcut #6: Pressure testing casing less than 24 hours after cement in place can expand the casing before the cement is fully set. This shortcut can “crack” the cement and create a micro annulus which will allow gas migration.

Shortcut #7: Displacing 14 ppg mud from 8000 ft MDRT with 8.7 ppg seawater, less than 20 hours after primary cement is in place. How many tested and proven barriers can you count? I count zero satisfactory barriers. Industry standards dictate that at least two tested (to maximum anticipated pressure) barriers are in place prior to removing the primary source of well control (weighted mud or brine).

Cheeses H. Crust!!!!!

Embiciles are now coming out of the woodwork like cuccaraches!!Puhleeze start a newbie thread so nobody has to explain again to the vitims of a massively failed educational system, why we don't just send Flipper down there to stick a CORK in a wild well and secure it with duct tape and secure it with moon beams and fairy dust!!! They are really beginning to chap my craw, do these pukes forget their own name everytime they fart or what?