Further Saudi Arabia Discussions

Update: North 'Ain Dar is soooo over...:

2004 Fig 9b cross section from SPE 93439, together with location on map from Ghawar: The Anatomy of the World's Largest Oil Field., with hat-tip to garyp. Click to enlarge - really, it's worth it.

Update:

And the rest of North Ghawar might not be too far behind... Bob Shaw found this picture here:

Oil saturation in reservoir simulation of all of Ghawar. Date unknown but believed not later than 2004. Click to enlarge.

The temptation to publish all this gorgeous reservoir simulation porn has just been overwhelming to Aramco's engineers I guess...


This post is a place to continue the Saudi Arabia discussion. To keep the ball rolling, I've extended a couple of my graphs. The above graph is the production data, with all series extended back to January 1995, or as far back as they are available online. I've also added a fifth series from the Oil and Gas Journal. Plotted on the picture is Saudi Arabia's OPEC oil quota.

Five estimates of Saudi Arabian oil production, Jan 1995-Feb 2007, together with OPEC quotas at the time. Click to enlarge. Source: US EIA International Petroleum Monthly Table 1.1, IEA Oil Market Report Table 3, Joint Oil Data Initiative, OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report, Table 17 (or similar) on OPEC Supply, Oil and Gas Journal, and OPEC for quotas.

I showed production against the quota since some folks have been suggesting that perhaps the recent declines represent Saudi Arabia's attempt to return to quota. Here's a production index constructed from the five series, together with quota (and rig count at top).

Top: Rig count in Saudi Arabia from Baker Hughes. Bottom: Average production index constructed from five estimates of Saudi Arabian oil production, Jan 1995-Feb 2007, together with OPEC quotas at the time, together with OPEC quota. Click to enlarge. Source: US EIA International Petroleum Monthly Table 1.1, IEA Oil Market Report Table 3, Joint Oil Data Initiative, OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report, Table 17 (or similar) on OPEC Supply, Oil and Gas Journal, and OPEC for quotas. Index is the average of the five series between January 2002 and December 2006. Outside that range it is extended by applying month to month differences of however many series are available in each time frame.

I don't find the "return to quota" explanation very appealing, since the decline begins over a year before quota starts to drop, when prices were rising, and the index has now gone below quota despite continued fairly high prices. But another few months of data should say a lot more.

"I don't find the "return to quota" explanation very appealing"
Looks more like a "return to below quota" at a glance.

"I don't find the "return to quota" explanation very appealing"
Just 'glancing' at the first chart - without the average production, I see that Saudi production tends to lead the quotas (especially for IEA data). That is what it is doing now. I fail to see an anomoly based on the chart..
----
My grandfather pumped oil with an engine-house,
my father pumped oil with a 20 lb. electric motor,
can't I just pump it online?

Just 'glancing' at the first chart - without the average production, I see that Saudi production tends to lead the quotas (especially for IEA data). That is what it is doing now. I fail to see an anomoly based on the chart..

But I'd say that they're historically quick to lead on the upside and reluctant to lead on the downside. You'll also notice that when prices were going up, or were staying high, they were far exceeding the quota (most likely to take advantage of the high prices). So that last bit of the trend, being quick to lead on towards the downside, and at or below quota during times of high prices, represents a departure from history (over the span of that graph) to me.

Re: So that last bit of the trend... represents a departure from history (over the span of that graph) to me.

Yes but oil inventories are still at record level for OCDE countries and OPEC has historically always used inventory levels as a way to assess the demand and supply equilibrium.

ROFLMAO Great tag line. Keep that.

Actually to me it looks like quotas are reactive to what production is already doing.

Request

I'll put up a new thread after I get home tonight (Pacific time) -- as this one is getting full -- but in the meantime, if anyone isn't busy and wants to help the project, see if you can dig out any information that bears on the thickness of the Arab D reservoir throughout Ghawar, and particularly in North 'Ain Dar. We have the Greg Croft average numbers for each area, but if someone can find a map or picture that shows in detail how the reservoir thickness varies throughout the topography, I think that would be a big help.

Don't know if this is what you are looking for but here is a title: Geostatistical Model for the Arab-D Reservoir, North 'Ain Dar Pilot, Ghawar Field, Saudi Arabia: An Improved Reservoir Simulation Model.

Behind firewall at:

http://www.gulfpetrolink.net/publication/vol1.php

Deleted

Sorry, I just posted the Greg Croft URL before realizing you already had it.

Hello SS,

Jean Laherrere has an excellent, next generation 3D rendering of Ghawar looking from the SW --> NE [opposite direction of garyp's post]:

http://lpsc.in2p3.fr/gpr/Dautreppe/Laherrere/Image78.jpg

This might come in handy later, maybe Jean has original software.

F_F & Euan: I am fascinated with Uthmaniyah's far eastern ridgeline. If you look at GaryP's cross-sections and compare with Ghawar Oil Sat graphic--hasn't the waterfront rolled over the crest? How is the fractional flow skewed, watercut ratio best managed, and reservoir sweep best accomplished with pressurized water going downhill? I have no idea, hope you can help SS out.

Where do garyp's slices go on the Laherrere 3D and on this Uthmaniyah Graph [scroll down inside website please]:

http://home.entouch.net/dmd/ghawar.htm

Notice this above graphic from Alexander was in 1996-- has Uthmaniyah had a lot worse waterfront problems since then? We can't see the Western side of the Eastern Crest

My guess is the thick green rollover about halfway down Uthmaniyah Eastern ridge, but on the unseen western side in the Ghawar Oil Sat is where those slices best match up--but you guys might have better ideas!

From Greg Croft website:
--------------------------------
The fact that the Ghawar oil-water contact is substantially higher on the west flank than on the east indicates a hydrodynamic gradient to the east, which may explain the much larger volume of oil in Ghawar than in Khurais.

The oil-water contact at Ghawar dips to the northeast, dipping more than 660 feet between the southwest end of Haradh and the Fazran area.
-------------------------------------

This suggests to me that Aramco should have put Uthmaniyah's water injection more heavily on the west side to drive the oil east and upcrest--they did the opposite [eastside injection wells watered over the crest in a western direction instead]. Could you explain?

Another thing from Ghawar Oil Sat graphic: why is the Southern lower half of Abqaiq orange instead of yellow--what is the significance? Major reservoir sweep problems compared to Northern lower half, which is solid yellow?

One last thing:

When I blow up the PDF of the Ghawar Oil Sat graphic with the magnifying tool to 1600%--you get much more detail--for example the Shedgum to Uthmaniyah thin connection looks all blue at normal resolution but shows green breakthrough at high magnification. Farzan is only 3 miles wide at its max [approx. 3 cells wide at 1600%]--can this be a tool to generate our own cells for our own Ghawar graphics?

Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?

Bob, your doing an amazing job here digging up all this stuff - heres the picture you posted. Does Lahererere indicate what the coluours mean here? I'll respond to your questions in a separate post

http://lpsc.in2p3.fr/gpr/Dautreppe/Laherrere/Image78.jpg

Any idea on the data source(s) for this impressive graphic ? Date of data ?

My guess is that this is an educated guess for today based on available information.

It may be worth noting that the most important thing I have learned so far from this extended discussion is NOT when Ghawar production will drop

A) Now
B) Very Soon
C) Soon

although that it is critically important.

The most important lesson is that it will be a very sudden and rapid collapse for each affected section, and the "at risk" sections (see multiple choice above) total an irreplacable ~4 million b/day !

Best Hopes,

Alan

Hello Euan,

Sorry, can't help with any more details on the graphic--I don't know French.

The TopToders have got to carry the ball forward. I have practically turned into a zombie trying to stay up with you guys. I have even been googling, then reading sponge coring links after F_F mentioned it---is that sick? =)

Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?

OK Bob, doing the same as yesterday (and wasting even more time).

First off the modeling grid from the "When 4D seismic is not available: Alternative Monitoring Scenarios..." and "Reservoir Monitoring with Permanent Bore Hole sensors", both by Shiv Dasgupta are the same. You can have great fun lining the things up and finding that there are more bore holes on one than there are on the other. That means we have the top down data from one and the cross section data from the other to compare.

Doing the now normal and arranging each on top of the 3D view leads to the two resultant image below. Its harder to decide exactly where these lie this time, but I think this is about right. I've highlighted the area I think is oil from the cross section in the overlay.

Thus in 2004 there was a good 120feet of oil across a reasonable area of Uthmaniyah.

Everyone can now commence saying I've got it all wrong !

Has anyone "picked up the phone" so to speak and called/wrote greg croft, Laherrere and asked to signon and take a look at the discussions here? Matt Simmons talked about this series of posts(financialsense.com), etc.

These two as an example have put alot of work into these pictures and graphs, would they be interested in the discussions here?

How about sending out emails to Heinberg, Croft, Laherrere, Simmons and asking them to take a look and maybe comment?

Worth a try.

If you refer to yesterday's discussion about how North Ghawar will or has played out would you rather

1. Accept the fact that North Ghawar is watered out and it is reflected in that 1 MMBOPD production drop and deal with it.

2. Know that if that drop hasn't occurred it is bound to happen, it is in process right now and who knows where we will end up. Some other problem has or is occurring.

Next stop Uthmaniyah.

Hi Stuart

Euan Mearns argued here that the average oil production per well did not show any sign of decline until 2005. are you arguing that it dropped actually since this date.? what's the difference between number of rigs and number of wells, is it the same?

Gilles,
The post you reference is a post where the comments are tremendously important. Euan's post had a few pretty big and important holes shot in it in the comments section...visit these links for the greatest hits...

Ace's original post proposing the effects of MRC/Hori wells on well productivity: http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/2372#comment-170432

Well productivity with cumulative horizontal wells on same graph: http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/2372#comment-171280

Well productivity revised for 3 to 1, vertical to horizontal equivalent: http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/2372#comment-170649

I addressed the issues I saw with Euan's post toward the end of Water in the Gas Tank

What Substrate said. Read the comments. IMO, the meat grinder of TOD pretty much blew Euan's post right out of the water.

Which doesn't mean he's wrong, but if he's right, that post doesn't provide any support.

IMO, the meat grinder of TOD pretty much blew Euan's post right out of the water.

Leanan, since you are an editor of The Oil Drum, I think you really need to back this comment up with some pretty meaty details.

As far as I was aware I was merely reporting a data set and making what I still consider to be reasonable interpretations. The main weakness was the fact the data series stop in 2005 - and I did not feel inclined to simply make up data to plug the gap.

So a detailed response please of all the errors and weaknesses in what I presented. I think you also need to add some details on how you would interpret the OPEC data - or would you simply choose to ignore them?

I'm just the news editor. I have no say in the content of the other articles.

So a detailed response please of all the errors and weaknesses in what I presented.

It's all laid out in the comments to your post. Substrate and Darwinian have already posted in this thread the most salient points.

Don't get upset. This is how it's supposed to work. This is TOD at its best.

I agree. That's TOD at its best.

All the contrubtors take their knocks. I just wish I had as much to offer the board as you.

Euan keep posting, without great contributers such as you TOD suffers.

I'm not upset I'm just sober and waiting for a response. WRT to the opinon you expressed I would have thought you should have at least 2 to 3 good arguments at your fingertips and could at least have the courtesy to jot these down for everyone's benefit.

Hi guys

I didn't intend to cause any trouble between all TOD contributors ;-). I really find you're all doing a fantastic job, and I understand quite well that there may be some divergence and/or dispute to establish the truth, considering the complexity of the problem.

I DO believe that Euan's approach is potentially interesting - but may be a little bit more argumented : for instance, do we see, or not, a clear variation of the average oil production per well in the historic cases of peak production? (Texas, US, North Sea?) Is there a linear trend similar to HL, or an abrupt phase transition? and of course, what is the situation of KSA since 2005 ? looking at Stuart's plots, it seems obvious that nothing very special happened before 2005 - just chaotic production caused by the "swing state" status of KSA, but that something actually changed after 2005. It confirms the study I made on EIA's forecasts vs real production, showing a sudden plateau after June 2005, which was not planned at all. So is there a clear indicator that we can construct, clearly showing something has changed (and may be rotten) in the Kingdom of Arabia?

I DO believe that Euan's approach is potentially interesting - but may be a little bit more argumented : for instance, do we see, or not, a clear variation of the average oil production per well in the historic cases of peak production?

Gilles - I think you are entirely right that the avearge well porductivity with time needs to be examined in other countries - I've been thinking about doing this and will now give this priority.

The key points to me were the ones you conceded (or at least, it seemed to me that you did - perhaps I am mistaken).

1) The data ends just before it gets interesting. Therefore, it doesn't prove your point. It doesn't prove Stuart's point. The data you presented is mute on the period we were discussing.

2) The horizontal vs. vertical wells. Your graph looks very different when that is taken into account (and you posted it yourself, to your credit).

Given those two issues, the rest really doesn't matter.

Leanan, thanks for repsonding. As I've said here on several occassions the only time your hear the word crash used in the oil industry is with reference to stock prices and hellicopters.

So if Saudi production was about to crash (as the current decline rate would suggest if this were natural decline) I'd expect to see some evidence of trouble ahead leading up to 2006 (though note my comment in response to Gilles). I still find evidence for trouble ahead lacking in the average well productivity data. I'm sorry the data series ends in 2005 and as noted I feel disinclined to make data up to plug the gap.

I've also indicated that I find the horizontal versus vertical well debate to be rather sterile. The fact is that the Saudis used to have vertical wells that did 50,000 + bpd, but as these have progresively watered out, the productivity of these wells has declined.

The Saudis are using horizontal wells in two main settings:

1. Short radius horizontals placed at the top of old vertical wells to provide a tool for balancing dry oil production with wet oil production to acieve a target water cut.

2. Single bore and multilateral horizontal wells to produce oil from low permeability reservoirs (which are the norm throughout this part of the Arabian Gulf). These reservoirs are very difficult to produce at high flow rate using vertical wells.

Given those two issues, the rest really doesn't matter.

I'm afraid I just plain don't understand this statement.

I'm afraid I just plain don't understand this statement.

To me, the essential argument of your post is that well productivity was not declining, and it should be, if Stuart is correct.

But given the two factors I listed previously - that we don't have data for the period Stuart thinks the decline began, and that horizontal vs. vertical wells could make a big difference - that argument doesn't doesn't hold. It doesn't mean you are wrong, but it doesn't provide any reason to believe you are right, either.

Given that, I just don't think the rest of it matters. It's like arguing about what color you want to paint the walls when the foundation has collapsed.

There may be solid arguments that prove you are right, but if so, they will be built on a different foundation than well productivity.

At least until we have more data...

Euan - have you read the discussion of the monthly interpolation I did in Water in the Gas Tank yet?

No - but I guess I better had.

TOD could be described as a "meat grinder" but does that mean we have to act like "meat heads"? We can surely have a discussion about very speculative areas without this continual degradation into veiled personal attacks on people we happen to disagree with?

Sure, there's a robust and confrontational atmosphere, but where does the bile get us? The current discussion about Saudi Arabia is a case in point. It's hard to know what's going on there. It's a difficult and complicated country, yet some people appear so sure of what's happening their, based on data which is highly problematic. The publically available data is only part of the story, the real numbers are a state secret. Twenty years ago my Saudi friends didn't trust their government's statistics, and nothing's change for the better since then.

Given the "difficult" nature of this whole subject, and the fact that there's a lot of gropping around in the dark going on, arrogance is not only irritating, it's also juvinile. I think arrogance is a kind of ignorance.

Two things: one is to avoid being provocative other than with ideas; two is to not take an occasional jab in the ribs too personally.

"Don't get upset. This is how it's supposed to work. This is TOD at its best."

It's called peer review.

Writerman, DaveBG and Cid, I'm not sure who your comments here are aimed at and I do appreciate what is being said. I certainly take this as part of the TOD rough and tumble. I took exception to what Leanan said for a number of reasons. This is what she said:

What Substrate said. Read the comments. IMO, the meat grinder of TOD pretty much blew Euan's post right out of the water.

Which doesn't mean he's wrong, but if he's right, that post doesn't provide any support.

This in my opinion is devoid of objective technical analysis and laced with subjective opinion - we've come to expect this from certain posters.....

It's called peer review.

This is an interesting concept. From the first weeks I contributed to this site I have asked PG where the truth lies. The real question here is how many posters contributing here are genuinely qualified to read and understand SPE papers published by Saudi Aramaco and the interpretations placed upon those by TOD contributors?

This is a serious issue, because we are increasingly rulled by the technically ignorant masses, who rule the media. IMO, on ceratin issues, technically sound minority views must prevail.

I have no gripe with Leanan's off the cuff remark - and I don't want to start a serious debate on Web - based peer review right here. But I think there are some serious media based issues at large here.

I'll mail this to PG, HO, Stuart et al and see if they want to join in - I want to concentrate on the technical content.

FWIW, I am totally in favor of involving as much expertise as is willing to comment. The more expert the better. I am willing to champion guest posts at TOD from anyone willing to put a decent effort into the subject regardless of their conclusion. But I think what we need is detailed technical forensics on the data that is in the public domain. What I don't think we need more of is CERA style PR blasts with no supporting detail, or vague assurances based only on the quality of Nansen Saleri's resume or a general sense that life usually works out ok.

And while it's true that other fora might have had more qualified people, I'm not aware of any public debate on this topic to go look at. It's happening here because it hasn't already happened somewhere else.

This in my opinion is devoid of objective technical analysis and laced with subjective opinion - we've come to expect this from certain posters.....

Sorry, I honestly thought it had been hashed to death already in the other threads. It wasn't my intent to do a drive-by trashing, just to avoid beating a dead horse.

Leanan, this is about the worst Troll comment I've seen on the site for months.

I got a lot better things to do with my time that sit here to be insulted by the likes of you.

Have the site to yourself and wallow in doom!

Huh? How is it an insult?