Net Oil Exports and the "Iron Triangle"

This is a post by Jeffrey J. Brown, an independent petroleum geologist in the Dallas, Texas area.

As Matt Simmons pointed out several years ago, the critical problem with post-peak exporting regions is that we would have two exponential functions (declining production and generally increasing consumption) working against net exports. From the point of view of importers, it is quite likely that we are facing a crash in oil supplies. In my opinion, what I have described as the “Iron Triangle” is doing everything possible to keep this message from reaching consumers.

In an essay posted on The Oil Drum blog in January 2006, I warned of an impending net oil export crisis, and I used what I called the Export Land Model (ELM) to illustrate the detrimental effect on net oil exports of declining production and increasing consumption. Figure One is a simple graph that illustrates the ELM.


Figure One
Until recently, I had never quantified what percentage of remaining Ultimate Recoverable Reserves (URR) on the ELM would be exported. Note that the ELM is a simple mathematical model for a hypothetical exporting country, but the model is based on actual producing regions.

Also note that the percentage of production that goes to consumption at the start of a production decline has a significant effect on when a net exporter becomes a net importer.

For example, the top five net exporters, in 2006 (Saudi Arabia, Russia, Norway, Iran and the UAE), consumed about 25% of their total liquids production. Offsetting this, many of the top exporters, based on our mathematical models, are at fairly advanced stages of depletion, especially the top three (Saudi Arabia, Russia and Norway), which showed a combined 3.8% decline in net oil exports from 2005 to 2006 (EIA, Total Liquids).

In any case, the answer to the question of how much oil would be exported from the ELM follows (I based URR on Texas URR versus peak production):

Assumptions:

  1. URR 38 billion barrels (Gb), peaking at 55% of URR (approximately same range as Texas and Saudi Arabia, based on the premise that Saudi Arabia has peaked);
  2. Post-peak production decline rate of 5% per year (approximately the same range as Texas, historically, and Saudi Arabia, currently);
  3. Post-peak rate of consumption increase of 2.5% per year (less than half the current rate of increase in consumption for top exporters).

Results:

  1. Net exports go to zero in nine years (note that the UK went from peak exports to zero exports in about six years).
  2. From Year Zero and Peak Exports on the ELM, only about 10% of remaining recoverable reserves would be exported.
Given the accumulating evidence for declining net oil exports worldwide, it’s useful to remember what the conventional wisdom is regarding world net export capacity, i.e., basically an infinite rate of increase in the consumption of a finite energy resource base. While many economists don’t have a problem with this, back in the real world an infinite rate of increase tends to be hard to sustain.

Figure Two

Figure Two shows Total US Crude Oil and Petroleum Product Imports, which have increased at about 5% per year since 1990.

In my opinion, we will see an epic collision between the conventional wisdom expectations of a continued exponential rate of increase in net oil exports, versus the rapidly developing new reality of an exponential decline in net oil exports.

My frequent coauthor, Khebab, is presently working on some mathematical models for production, consumption and net exports by the top net oil exporters. Based on the data that I have seen so far, it will not be a pretty picture. I suspect that the models may show that not much more than 25% of the remaining URR in the top net exporting countries will be exported.

In regard to discussions of Peak Oil and Peak Exports, I have described what I call the “Iron Triangle,” which consists of: (1) Some major oil companies, some major oil exporters and some energy analysts; (2) The auto, housing and finance group and (3) The media group.

If one resides in the oil industry leg of the Iron Triangle, and if one has concluded that Peak Oil is upon us, or extremely close, does one say, "We cannot increase our production," and thereby encourage massive conservation and alternative energy efforts, or does one say "We choose not to increase production and/or we are temporarily unable to increase production for the following reasons (fill in the blank)?"

The latter course of action would tend to discourage emergency conservation efforts and alternative energy efforts, and it would encourage energy consumers to maintain their current lifestyles, perhaps by going further into debt to pay their energy bills, and it would in general have the net effect of maximizing the value of remaining reserves.

I always find it interesting that people like Matt Simmons (who are encouraging energy conservation) are widely blamed by some critics for high oil prices, while some major oil companies, some major oil exporters and some energy analysts are--in effect--encouraging increased energy consumption.

The prevailing message from some major oil companies, some major oil exporters and some energy analysts can be roughly summarized as follows “Party On Dude!”

Meanwhile, over on the other two legs of the Iron Triangle, the auto, housing and finance group is focused on selling and financing the next auto and house, and the media group just wants to sell advertising to the auto, housing and finance group. The media group is only too happy to pass on the “Party On Dude” message to consumers.

To some extent, what we are seeing across the board, from large sectors of the energy industry to the auto/housing/finance industry, media and beyond, is the "Enron Effect," i.e., many people know that we have huge problems ahead, but their paychecks are dependent on the status quo.

The suburbanites are caught in the middle of this, although they have a strong inclination to believe the prevailing message from the "Iron Triangle." As in the movie "The Sixth Sense," for most of us the automobile based suburban lifestyle is dead, but we just don't know it yet, and we see only what we want to see.

However, it is increasingly difficult for many suburbanites to ignore reality as it slowly dawns on them that Jim Kunstler was right when he said, “Suburbs represent the biggest misallocation of resources in the history of the world.” We shall probably soon see that hell hath no fury like a Formerly Well Off suburbanite who just had his SUV repossessed and his McMansion foreclosed.

At least those of us trying to warn of what is coming can try to be ready with a credible plan to try to make things "Not as bad as they would otherwise be,” when it becomes apparent to a majority of Americans that we cannot have an infinite rate of increase in the consumption of a finite energy resource base. How's that for a campaign slogan?

I recommend FEOT--Farming + Electrification Of Transportation (EOT), combined with a crash wind + nuclear power program.

Alan Drake has written extensively on EOT issues, for example in Electrification of transportation as a response to peaking of world oil production.”

In simplest terms, we are soon going to need jobs for hordes of angry unemployed males, and in my opinion “FEOT” is a way to put them into productive jobs.

On an individual basis, I would also recommend “ELP,” which is summarized in the following article: “The ELP Plan: Economize; Localize and Produce.

Good luck to all of us. We are going to need it.

Jeffrey J. Brown is an independent petroleum geologist in the Dallas, Texas area. His e-mail is westexas@aol.com.

Jeffry, Thanks. I really appreciate your hard work and the work of Khebab on this problem.I'm with you on the cascading effects of depletion.

First question: Many exporters have very small internal economies and no surplus for export except oil. Will they therefore export all their remaining oil? I feel this is more likely in countries where a small elite controls the country and has massive overseas investments-like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the kleptocats of Nigeria.

Second question: Many countries that export production are building or have built refineries and petrochemical complexes, as they want the refining markup as well as the production markup. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are both in this category. Does your decline in exports include net products, or is it crude plus condensate only?
Bob Ebersole

The EIA tracks production and consumption in terms of Total Liquids. Let's assume that we have production land and refinery land. Let's ignore refinery gains, transportation costs, energy used in energy production, etc.

Production Land produces 2 mbpd, and ships all of it to Refinery Land. Production Land consumes one mbpd of product, and Refinery Land consumes one mbpd of product.

So Refinery Land ships one mbpd of product to Production Land, and consumes one mbpd domestically.

On a net basis, Production Land shows a net total liquids export rate of one mbpd, and Refinery Land shows a net total liquids import rate of one mbpd.

Following is a slightly edited copy of a post I made on the 7/12 Drumbeat, regarding the ELM:

As Pitt pointed out, the ELM basically asks a hypothetical question for a hypothetical country (consuming 50% of production at peak production): What happens to net oil exports if production declines at 5% and consumption increases at 2.5%?

The answer is that net exports go to zero in 9 years, and only about 10% of remaining production would be exported. In any case, I suggest that you check out the ELM versus real data in Mexico post that Kkebab did. Also, the UK went from peak exports to zero exports in about six years.

In regard to economics, my premise is, and was, that once net exports started declining, oil prices would rise, generating increasing income for the exporters, even as their net exports fall. This would tend to have the effect, in short term at least, of increasing domestic demand in exporting countries. This is precisely what we saw in 2006. For example, the top five showed a 1.3% decline in production, a 5.5% increase in consumption and a 3.3% reduction in net exports (EIA, Total Liquids from 2005 to 2006).

IMO, almost everyone (Matt Simmons being a notable exception) in the Peak Oil community has been focused on the wrong thing--total production--when what counts is net exports.

If I recall correctly, at the beginning of 2007 the EIA was going to track net production with regard to other liquids (notably biofuels).

I think they already have enough data for inputs and outputs, and publish them so that we can see how the inputs and outputs "net."

Would you re-post the diagram from yesterday showing the actual production, consumption, and export figures for Mexico against the ELM shown above? I think it makes a stronger case for a theory when current date fits the model.

Flavius Aetius

Khebab,

Could you post your graph on Mexico's production, consumption and exports?



I'm not sure it's a completely accurate picture because Mexico is also importing petroleum products (and growing) but I don't have time to redo this chart right now. Also, only consumption numbers for total products are available from which I roughly deducted a crude oil equivalent (by dividing volumes by 1.1). Consequently, this chart has to be taken with a grain of salt.

I'm just eyeballing it, but it's interesting to note that although the predicted exports go from 2mbpd to 1 mbpd from 2004 to ~2011, the rise in the price of oil to date keeps the export income relativity healthy.

I wonder what the 'income' lines would look like. Pretty ugly as you go from an exporter to an importer (If you can afford to import at all.)

It'd be interesting to see a few predictions of oil income, based on a range of price targets for 2020 (Say $75 to $300)



Production peaked in 2004 but profit may have peaked in 2006 because so far prices in 2007 are not higher than in 2006. Problem is that Mexico's importation of oil products is growing rapidly so they reach a negative trade balance sooner than we think (2010?).

This is the important graph. I think if you did this with KSA you will see that their investment in Petrochemicals is going to pay off even as crude oil exports decrease. Iran I don't think so. Norway I don't know. Some of the other Persian gulf countries are also investing heavily in petrochemicals.

The ones without significant petrochemical investments and significant imports are going to be the ones having problems.
Venezuela ??

Where did you find this info btw ?

Take quarterly data for Mexican oil consumption (all products) from here: http://omrpublic.iea.org/omrarchive/12june07tab.pdf page 3 Here's the data):
1Q05 2.04
2Q05 2.11
3Q05 2.06
4Q05 2.10
1Q06 2.08
2Q06 2.02
3Q06 1.99
4Q06 2.03
1Q07 2.08
2Q07 2.05

and do a linear regression. The result: a decline of 4,000 barrels per quarter, with an r squared of .104 (which is pretty low).

So, we don't see rising consumption. Are the IEA's projections wrong again?

As I noted down the way, the top 10 net oil exporters, inclusive of Mexico, showed an annual rate of increase in consumption, in aggregate, of 3.3% per year, from 2000 to 2006. Just the increase in consumption by the top 10 from 2000 to 2006 is equal to all of Nigeria's net exports in 2006.

Ok. Does my data and analysis look ok to you?

Bob,

In regard to your first question, in post-peak exporting countries, I think that we will see Phase One and Phase Two.

In Phase One, their cash flow from export sales will increase, even as their net exports decline--because of higher oil prices.

In Phase Two, their cash flow from export sales will decline, as their net exports continue to decline--because rising oil prices are not sufficient to offset declining net exports.

It will be extremely difficult--if not all but impossible--for exporting countries to curtail domestic consumption in Phase One.

And even in Phase Two, I expect to see massive resistance against efforts to curtail domestic consumption, probably leading to varying amounts of violence.

Also understand that as time goes forward the demands for investment in the oil industry to maintain production only increase. Look at Mexico and Venezuela and now Russia as example where needed investment is not forthcoming. As a country moves from phase 1 to phase 2 pressure to lower investment in the oil industry to continue to support internal projects only increases. Here Venezuela is the poster child.

So its reasonable to expect that as time goes on these countries will not reinvest in their oil infrastructure at anything like the rate investments where made in the western nations at the same time that the amount of needed investment is doubling or tripling in price because of the intrinsic nature of oil in our economy.

We have already seen the costs for investments in oil infrastructure spiral out of control as high oil prices and demand cause more general inflation.

I'd like to see some projections on when a country moves from phase one to phase two.

Finally I think the market will remain fairly clueless about ELM for some time and thus we can expect oil to remain under priced vs the real price needed to prevent exporting countries from going from phase one to phase two with the potential for major cutbacks in investment.

So in my opinion the market by underpricing oil will force most oil producing countries into a phase two situation far sooner than most people realize. I actually think we are already in phase two since we have every indication that all the major oil producing nations are pulling back rapidly on re-investment in the oil industry. At that point ELM becomes a optimistic model probably highly optimistic as producers continue to cut so they can get back into phase one growth.

We have every indication that we have already entered this war between and unrealistic under priced market and producers steadily cutting to get the large profits they need for internal use at phase one growth rates. At this point only a rapid repricing of oil above that needed to get back too phase one along with continued strong demand at the higher price point will spur a reversal of this game of chicken.

See Iran for early Phase 2.

Indonesia, deep into Phase 2 (and importer of oil by quantity, but still a SMALL exporter by value due to high quality oil produced) endured blackouts rather than buy heavy bunker oil while waiting for new coal fired power plants to be completed.

A worthwhile point of discussion is when will the Phase 1 to Phase 2 transition take place.

My guesses:

Mexico within 2 or 3 years.

Venezuela just after the next Presidential election in about 5 years.

Russia within eight years, but more than three years.

Oddly, Norway, with the HIGHEST gas taxes in the world, could be said to be in Phase 2 and never in Phase 1.

I expect 70% or so of Norway's remaining URR to be exported, the highest in the world.

Best Hopes for doing SOMETHING now,

Alan

Norway is rather a special case. Due to their low (c 5m) population the percentage of total prod'n available for export remains high well into their decline phase. Their population is relatively stable and living standard already among the world's highest. It's also one of the last places you'd expect to see unrest, quite unlike many ME states.

Phase One could last a very long time. My guess is that we are likely to see price spikes to high levels that will be sustained ($100-200) and this will generate tremendous income and raise living standards significantly in exporting countries everywhere but Norway. The difference between $40 oil and $150 oil offsets a lot of years of 5% production declines as far as net income goes.

Prius / Suburban = 4.6

Ken

Westaxas,

I'm wondering what the real shape of the production curve will look like. As countries get past peak production, and especially then they get to Phase Two, it seems like we will be seeing more "above ground" disruption. Thus, at some point production is likely to drop more than normal decline rates would suggest.

It also seems like there will be other changes that make the model more complex. Exports will more likely to go to favored countries - ones that can provide things the country needs, like military protection, medicine, and food. Other non-favored countries may see their imports drop much more rapidly that the model would suggest.

I agree, and as I suggested down below, I suspect that the US is basically making "an offer that they can't refuse" to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, since oil prices and inventories would suggest that oil exports to Asia should be going up, while Saudi Arabia and Iraq are cutting exports to Asia.

The Neocons might argue that things are going according to plan regarding Iraq and oil exports to the US. As I have previously discussed, the flaw in their plan may be the willingness of the American military to continue to put themselves in harm's way to keep H2 Hummers well supplied.

This ELM is the most”in your face” -way to understand the realities concerning Peak oil – after peak that is. It is simply not possible to go wrong in understanding where this will go … and a sample-ELM-chart should be laying on the table of every decision-makers of this world

Cheers Jeffrey J. Brown / Khebab - and not least Westexas

I think that there is a lot of resistance to this concept, even within the Peak Oil community, because the implications are so dire, but as I previously said, I'm sorry to be the bearer of bad news, but sometimes reality sucks. There is just no way to sugarcoat the effect on net exports of an exponential decline in production and an exponential increase in consumption in exporting countries.

Following is a copy of a post I did yesterday, regarding ELP:

Someone asked me the other day what to do, in the context of ELP, if you are currently making a good salary in an industry that you know is doomed.

Probably the best answer is to ruthlessly (very small one bedroom rented apartment?) implement E & L, while continuing to work at your current job, but while also training to be a producer of essential goods and/or services in a post-peak world.

A very good idea is probably to get a small group together to buy some farmland, preferably not too far from a mass transit line. In the short run, if nothing else, you could lease it out to an organic farmer. The key point is to try to lock in access to a food supply. Remember the billionaire who is expanding his ability to grow his own food?

If you don't have the money yourself to buy the farmland, I would suggest trying to option a tract of land, and then get three partners, with each of them paying one-third of the acquisition cost, with the ownership split four ways. You get carried for 25% in exchange for putting the deal together.

There is just no way to sugarcoat the effect on net exports of an exponential decline in production and an exponential increase in consumption in exporting countries.

I’m left wondering how realistic the exponential increase in consumption is post peak oil, or even as national export revenues decrease. Let’s assume that Russia for example has peaked and is in decline – let’s also assume the world has peaked. In this scenario I can’t see Russian internal consumption continue to increase exponentially. If the global peak initiates a global recession-depression it’s unlikely that any country will continue with exponential economic and oil consumption growth (major oil exporter or not).

I’d agree with the model pre global peak, but I’m not convinced by the constant internal consumption growth rate in a post peak world.

Is Mexico’s consumption still increasing?

Mexico's consumption hasn't continued to grow irrespective of their peak as ELM assumes.

Mexico's economy is tightly coupled to the US economy. And worse tightly coupled to the housing bubble. Mexico was the number one benefactor of the housing bubble. What your seeing is the housing bubble crash and illegal aliens no longer committing fraud using no doc loans to buy homes in Mexico and working building houses here. Needless to say the housing bubble crash is causing a major recession in Mexico right now.

Once this clears you will see demand grow esp as some illegal immigrants move back to Mexico to weather the storm as its cheaper to live.

Because of this tight coupling you need to correct ELM. I think you will find growth turn around and Mexico start various monetary games to paper over this housing lead recession.

If you adjust for the devastating effect of the end of the American housing bubble on Mexico's economy you will see that demand remained strong and increasing.

The EIA shows the following for Mexican consumption:

2004: 1969 mbpd
2005: 2078
2006: 2029

So, consumption is up over 2004, but down relative to 2005. However, in this respect, Mexico is pretty much alone. For example, another exporter in the bottom half of the top 10, Kuwait, showed a 17% year over year increase in consumption, while the top five, in aggregate, showed a 5.5% year over year increase in consumption.

As Memmel pointed out, a plausible explanation for Mexico is the decline in money shipped home from migrant workers in the US, as home construction employment has tapered off.

It's worse than that WT. The amount of fraud in OC and the IE using illegal immigrants is unbelievable. The money moving back to Mexico from honest labor is a fraction of that coming from fraudulent transactions around here. We are talking billions moving out of California into Mexico. I think few people have any idea what was really going on in California.
Illegal Immigrants with fake SS make the ultimate straw buyer.
Not to mention some of the legal Hispanic immigrants that used fraud to buy houses in Mexico and move back.

Sure the legit part is suffering.
http://www.lendingclarity.com/2007/05/01/employment-the-housing-bubble-a...

Most of the fraud rings in California have made heavy use of legal and illegal immigrants with false papers.

Remittances are dropping to Mexico for the first time since 1999. Remittances are second only to oil revenue in Mexico. So declining oil exports combined with lower remittances could be double bad for Mexico which could cut into national oil consumption economically by way of recession/depression. Does the ELM take this into account?

"MONTERREY, Mexico, July 12 (Reuters) - Stricter U.S. border controls and a housing slump are cooling the once red-hot growth in remittances migrant workers send to Latin America, challenging economies to cut their dependence on the money flows.

Cash sent home by Mexicans living abroad fell 5.5 percent in May, the first fall since 1999, and countries across Latin America forecast that the growth of remittance flows will slow substantially this year."

http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSN1240009520070712

Mexico was trying to get a drilling platform for its Maloob field, part of its KMZ program. There are a number of offshore Carribean fields not yet tapped. Development is not moving quickly enough to reverse the damage done by accelerated production from Cantarell.

Mexico has a literacy rate of about 90%. In Nicaragua the literacy rate was about 68%. Some illegal immigration was from Central America and the migrants did not know how to read or write Spanish or English.

And it is a cash economy where no one pays taxes.

The range is too short to infer a trend, only 2 years.

I'd have to think that oil exporting nations will behave like any other country when faced with recession. Inflate and invest to spur their economies. If oil revenues are dropping the only route open is to increase investment in expanding the other sectors of the economies. Oil producing countries are just as capable of deficit spending as any other. So if anything a global recession will simply encourage the countries to plow more resources into their local economies the only difference is they will be doing it from a deficit/inflationary approach. Short term increased demand for goods and services from these countries will lessen the effect of such a global recession.

I think Mexico is getting ready to enter this sort of deficit/inflationary spending phase for example so I expect the value of the peso to tank. Iran has been on this path for quite some time. Iran is flirting with hyperinflation.

http://www.jordanembassyus.org/01092007003.htm

Normal economic games apply equally to oil exporting and importing nations and outside of Iran most of the oil exporting nations have plenty of room to play games.

Consumption in some of the key exporters could continue to increase even if OECD nations are in debt / energy induced recession. We've seen WT's thread re Russian car sales, foreign vehicle sales there up 50% in past 12 months and several fold since 2002. It's hardly conceivable that all these new vehicles won't be used substantially; furthermore several key exporters have built up large currency reserves which will act as a 'cushion'.

Will they go guns?or butter?

there will have to be some kind of reaction to the gurrilla actions...will it be talk?economic assitance,butter?or will it start to get real real bad down south{guns}.. this could affect oil supplies more than any consumption models

Khebab has a good point. I went back and looked at the increase in consumption by the current top 10 net exporters, from 2000 to 2006. It increased from 9.1 mbpd to 11.2 mbpd, about 23% (EIA, Total Liquids), an increase of 2.1 mbpd. This is an annual rate of increase of 3.3%, and as one would expect pursuant to the ELM, their overall rate of consumption has increased, as cash flow increased in 2006 (because of high oil prices) even as net exports dropped.

Let me put it this way--it took 100% of Nigeria's 2006 net exports to just meet the increase in consumption by the top 10 net oil exporters, from 2000 to 2006.

What will happen to internal consumption in these exporting countries when oil prices hit the $100 to $200 range, even as their net exports continue to drop?

Look at Russia right now. Foreign car sales are going up at 50% per year--doubling every 1.4 years.

Chris,

I think that we will continue to export the problem to countries clinging to the lower rungs of the economic ladder. If the US doesn't collapse from its CDOs and its collapsing housing market, then we will see other small countries being priced out of the market. Onward to the material collapse.

The countries with oil to export will continue to grow their economies as long as we print fiat scrip and they are willing to take it.

But, if the economy tanks, then you will have massive demand destruction. This effectively extends the URR but it also results in the conditions we are all fearing -- collapse.

It also means that there will be enough oil left for dramatic and very destructive military operations designed to corner oil supplies. With enough civil disorder, the PTB will declare martial law. It is only a short hop to totalitarian government from there. The media will become even more the PTB's lapdog, and should we decide to take off the nuclear mittens, we will not be hearing about our use of nuclear weapons from the MSM.

Everyone loves to say it can't happen here. If you are one who says that, you are a fool. Tell that to a holocaust survivor. Tell it to the Chinese, to the Spanish, to the Russians.

Before various democratic movements arose late in our history, strongman rule was the rule, century upon century, millennium upon millennium. Though it will never be a cut and dried argument, we may be seeing or have recently seen peak democracy.

Consider the many new car factories being built in Russia and the increase in new car sales. Unless oil prices plummet (for a short time) due to a recession, car sales and consequential oil consumption will continue to increase in places like Russia

Let’s assume that Russia for example has peaked and is in decline – let’s also assume the world has peaked. In this scenario I can’t see Russian internal consumption continue to increase exponentially. If the global peak initiates a global recession-depression it’s unlikely that any country will continue with exponential economic and oil consumption growth (major oil exporter or not).

One aspect hardly touched on is this: the dire consequences of declining oil exports will be quite apparent sooner rather then later. Many Americans consider it a god-given birthright to be able to fill-up their SUV's and other toys with unlimited quantities of cheap gasoline. If its accurate that net crude oil exports will cease in about nine years, there will be disastrous responses starting almost immediately. In other words, life will not be unchanged until the last drop of crude oil is exported; it starts now.

Gasoline prices in the USA are climbing upward, but the full economic effects are just starting to be feft.

Just imagine what's going to happen when world net exports of crude oil decline by 10%, 20%, let alone when they stop altogether?

Dr. Duncan's Olduvai Gorge is beckoning humanity's survivors back home.

Flavius Aetius