Update on Megaproject Megaproject
Posted by Stuart Staniford on December 10, 2007 - 11:00am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: megaprojects, peak oil, plateau [list all tags]

New liquids capacity with first oil in each year as estimated from Petroleum Review megaproject reports (last available estimate in each case), and interim estimates from Wikipedia table as of December 10th, 2007. Error bars on Petroleum Review figures are as documented in Is the Decline of Base Production Accelerating.
As of now, we've reached about 350 citations used in collating the information. I have mainly been working on the past - the years 2003-2006 - while the years from 2007 onwards have mainly been handled by Ace and Khebab (though there is some crossover both ways). The 2003-2006 projects, of which there are currently 108, depend on about 140 citations. In attempting to assure completeness and quality of the list, I have reviewed the 2003-2006 annual reports, and/or all press releases, for the following companies:
- Anadarko
- Apache
- BHP Billiton
- BP
- Chevron
- ConocoPhillips
- Deer Creek
- Encana
- Eni
- ExxonMobil
- Hess
- Kerr-McGee
- Kuwait Oil Company
- OPEC upstream investment plans
- Petrobras
- Repsol
- Saudi Aramco
- Shell
- Talisman
- Total
- Unocal
- Woodside
- Nelson
- Statoil
- Tanganyika
- Yukos
- Nexen
- Naftiran
- ADCO
- ADNOC
- Santos
- Husky
- CNR
- Pemex
- Gazprom
- QP
- Sasol
- Petronas
- Norsk Hydro
- Petrodar
- Lukoil
- AED
- Devon
- Murphy
- Marathon
- AWE
- Rosneft
- NMNG
- NIOC
- PDVSA
- Coogee
- El Paso
- CNOOC
- Reliance
- OMV
- PDO
- Surgutneftegaz
- First Calgary
- Maersk Oil
- Hoang Long Joint
- Sinopec
- Cairn
- Dominion
- Barrett
- Premier
- Burlington
- Sonatrech
- Petrofac
- Korean National Oil Company
- PetroCanada
Nonetheless, it should be clear that all conclusions from this data are preliminary and may need to be revised as the exercise continues. So far, it is producing pretty big revisions to our idea of new capacity added in recent years. Here's the evolution of 2003, for example:

New oil liquids capacity with first oil in 2003 as estimated from Petroleum Review MegaProject report in Jan 2004, and estimate from Wikipedia table as of November 24th, 2007, and as of December 10th, 2007.

New oil liquids capacity with first oil in 2004 as estimated from Petroleum Review MegaProject report in Jan 2004, and estimate from Wikipedia table as of November 25th, 2007, and as of December 10th, 2007.

New liquids capacity with first oil in each year as estimated from Petroleum Review megaproject reports (last available estimate in each case), and interim estimates from Wikipedia table as of December 10th, 2007. Error bars on Petroleum Review figures are as documented in Is the Decline of Base Production Accelerating.
It's worth stressing that the above graph is peak capacity of projects, but tabulated by the year they first deliver any oil (at least for the Wikipedia totals - it's not quite clear what procedure Petroleum Review used to get totals). We really would like to see what it looked like when convoluted with an estimate of the composite production ramp-up. We'll get to that, but I don't have a reasonable sample of projects on which to base such an exercise yet.
The wave of oil in 2008 is a prominent feature of the tables at present, and I'm sure will give great comfort to late-peakists. It's perhaps a bit premature to put too much store in it yet. The years 2007, and especially 2008 are different from 2003-2006 in several important ways. One is that they've been largely compiled by different people, and the process might be at different stages of completeness. The other is that 2008 project schedules could still incorporate a certain amount of hope likely to be dashed by the usual complications that enter into all project schedules as they make contact with the real world. So some fraction of 2008 projects, and a much smaller fraction of 2007 projects, will get delayed. The past is less subject to unexpected delays...
Here's the split of the current estimates of new capacity between OPEC and Non-OPEC:

New liquids capacity with first oil in each year: interim estimates from Wikipedia table as of December 10th, 2007 split between OPEC and the rest of the world. Note that Angola joined OPEC in January 2007, so Angola projects are accounted as non-OPEC in 2003-2006, but as OPEC after that.
Finally, for the 2003-2006 projects in the Wikipedia tables, I repeated an exercise I did for the 2006-2010 projects in the 2007 Petroleum Review Megaproject report. That is, I sorted all the projects by size, and then calculated the cumulative capacity from the largest down to each project. Essentially this gives the effect of cutting off project tabulation at each size. Here are the those two curves:

New liquids capacity with first oil in each year, cumulative capacity by size of lower project cutoff. Petroleum Review estimates are for 2007-2010 projects. Wikipedia interim estimates from Wikipedia table as of December 10th, 2007 for years 2003 to 2006. The two curves are not tabulating the same projects.
Finally, this stuff is a lot of work, so I'd like to repeat my appeal: the more folks in the TOD community head over to the Wikipage and help, the faster we'll know what's really going on here.



Stuart,
It never ceases to amaze me the commitment that you guys show to rooting out titbits of info and pulling it all together into useful arguments and articles!
So isn't the increase in output seen exactly what an economist would argue would happen given the increased cost of the extracted product?
I think we may see the same happening with some other commodities that have seen huge rises -such as Uranium. There's loads of Uranium in the ground the economically extractable amount goes up exponentially with the underlying asset price.
Regards, Nick.
There's no question that there's more supply coming on line. The question is at what point will it not be enough to overcome declines (of various kinds) since we know production has been more-or-less flat the last couple of years.
The staged nature of production growth, in the emerging Oil Sands megaprojects, presents a few questions imo for the Wiki page. That said, I have done the work, so far, on the Long Lake Project which is a JV between Nexen and OPTI. And I'm happy to do more, as this is an area where I've invested capital for several years, and I spend most my time reading all this stuff anyway.
What's happening is that the speed by which these projects will bring on subsequent stages is getting tossed and turned on a sea of wage inflation and labor shortages. And more recently, the new royalty regime from Alberta has already caused Canadian Natural Resources, for example, to suggest their staged buildout of the enormous Horizon project may slow down.
Alot of the charts investors were offered back in 2003-2006, therefore, showing production growth at Syncrude, Horizon, Long Lake out to 2015 (not to mention the junior projects), are going to have to be revised.
One wonders, in this context, how useful or even possible it becomes to enter a Peak Capacity/Peak Production number on the Wiki page. Some of these projects now might get stretched out now to 2018. No guidance specifically has been offered yet on this from the companies involved. But it's coming.
Best,
Gregor
In answering my own question, my hunch would be, that the nature of oil sands projects might suggest that the Wiki Page should have not only a column for Peak Production, but, also a column for each stage. Nexen's Long Lake comes on next year (6 month delay) at 60kbd, but, the peak will only come more than several years from now. Contrast this with Nexen's North Sea Project, Buzzard, which although it had a few problems ramped towards peak production pretty quickly after first coming on line.
Gregor
I agree that tar sands projects represent the "long tail" of the composite ramp-up project - I've been amazed at the slow ramp-up of the ones I've looked at. But ramp-up is a more general issue - tar-sands is just a small (albeit extreme) case of it. My feeling is that we are going to have to have to try to get the largest sample we can manage of projects where we know both the first oil date and the date at which we reach plateau, construct a suitable estimated convolution function out of that sample, and then apply it to the new capacity estimates we have.
It's an important issue on which I will focus once I have some confidence that the lists are reasonably complete and correct. At the moment, the gross totals are still changing enough that I'm not ready to worry about the ramp-up issues.
Thanks for your help btw! Feel free to create an account over there so we can see your name in the history.
I prefer your use of "tar" sands rather than the preceeding designation as "oil" sands.
Thanks for the reply, Stuart. When doing further work therefore on the tar sands projects, I will enter the expected peak production rate in the "Peak" column. As opposed to entering merely the expected production rate from the intial stage. (Wiki instructions: "Peak: maximum production expected (thousand barrels/day)."). Based on your remarks, you can then figure out how to handle the Long Tail, as you call it, of these staged projects in the sands.
So for example, I have Long Lake coming on next year with the figure of 60Kb/d entered in the "Peak" column, as their initial stage. I will change that therefore to the expected Peak rate, which, according to Nexen will eventually be about 240Kb/d.
Gregor
If the company breaks the overall development into separate phases with dates and production rates for each, we generally put each phase in as a separate project.
Without meaning to harp on about it - Longlake won't actually be getting 60 kpd of upgraded crude until mid 2009 according to its website (www.opticanada.com). 2.5 Years from first steam through to full capacity of upgraded product.
It is a long wait but I am in for the long run :)
Hi O.K,
I'm not sure that I understand your post completely, but, all guidance from both Nexen and OPTI now has Long Lake producing fully upgraded Synthetic Crude sometime starting in the back-half of 2008. Bitumen production has already started though at a very minimal level. The central problem with the Long Lake project so far has been the shortage of labor to complete the Upgrader. In my opinion there will be a final hurdle for this project to overcome next year: and that is their unique gassification/recycling process, aka "OrCrude." What I imply here is that we have not seen this process actually work, yet.
Fingers crossed.
Gregor
Some collateral damage from the mortgage meltdown.
Apparently several tar sands companies that raised tons of money stuck it in short term institutional money market funds that were heavily invested in US mortgage bonds.
The Canadian Tar Sands...where Finance and Peak Oil meet. Would be a heck of a title for a book!! How many other high-priced extraction/exploration operations have done the same thing with spare dollars...invested in high interest funds to try to help with increasing costs.
Can you point me to any sources regarding oilsands/failed short term deposits? I would be keen to find out who has lost what.
An investor in Canadian oil stocks told me about the money market situation. I don't have any specifics.
Optimistic Kiwi,
If you find out would you E-mail me at billvon@windstream.net I have been investing in tar sand companies for 2-3 years
Gregor
I have been investing in OPTI for several years also. Have you compared OPTI with Suncor and Uts?
I also see that Suncor and Imperial Oil are left out of the above referenced List
I guess the best way to answer is that I have been researching all these companies and their myriad projects for several years. Imperial, which you asked about, is both the largest shareholder in the Syncrude project, and now, is the operator. It's probably wise for the Wiki Megaproject page to follow the Syncrude project as a standalone, rather than break it apart company by company, from Imperial, to COS, to Nexen, and COP. Imperial also sits on the Cold Lake Project.
The four companies you mentioned are quite different from each other. Imperial and Suncor are giants. UTS and OPTI are juniors, really. I either have been, or remain invested, in all of these. They don't really make for good comparisons,imo.
HTH.
Gregor
Gregor:
Thanks for the reply BTW my E-mail address is owvon@windstream.net. Would love to compare notes sometime
Using the Texas and North Sea models and just looking at the initial production declines out for about 8 years after their respective peaks, one could argue that higher oil prices and increased drilling activity result in lower crude oil production.
In the alternative, one could argue that the smaller fields that we tend to find post-peak can't offset the declines from the older larger oil fields, e.g., East Texas & Brent, that we tend to find pre-peak.
http://science.reddit.com/info/62m6z/comments/
thanks for your support.
Wow, amazing how much data coming from committed volunteers.
Stuart,
As I posted in replying to an earlier post by Ace, the 2008 looks to be a significant outlier. When I looked at the wiki data for 2006, 07, 09, 10, 11 etc. the values seemed to vary about the 4mbpd level.
At 7mbpd, 2008 looks massively out of the ordinary. When you look at the data this is also composed of lots and lots of small and medium sized fields (nothing >400kbpd). How confident can we be that all of these are really due to come onstream during 2008? And all under the oil rather than gas heading?
Also, this year its claimed that 4.5Mbpd came onstream. Yet we've seen essentially flat total production numbers. If all of this was real then it implies that the natural decline of all of the old fields is 5.2% - a high decline number.
I'll leave it to Sam and Tony to comment on how reliable they feel 2008 is at this point.
Your point that the base decline rate must have been higher than we thought seems right to me - the more projects we find in the past, the more it seems as though decline rates must have been higher than we knew.
This is what I found most striking about the information. And if the decline rates really are higher than commonly accepted, along with the rational assumption that as oil prices rose, as many producers as possible did their best to produce as much crude as possible to profit as much as possible in the short term (as in the longer term, the consensus was prices would fall again), then the future looks increasingly precipitous.
In my opinion what may be behind a surprisingly high decline rate is the short lifetimes < 10 years of a lot of modern fields. In many cases less than 5. I deep understanding of the various project i.e taking Megaprojects back into time would be great. We know we ramped nearly 10mbd from about 2000. It would be nice to compare that success to the current situation.
So I really think we need to get back to at least 2000 to make good use of the data.
Feel free to start work on that at any time.
I wish. I'm just saying that back in 2000 we seemed to have "normal" increases so the question is what has changed.
2003 is good. 2002 better etc.
The point is that the oil market behaved as expected until say 2004 or so. One problem I've noticed with the older data is that as you go back very little info seems to be web accessible.
ConocoPhillips CEO Jim Mulva:
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/7273
I found this stupifying, electrifying, terrifying, fascinating and about right... all at the same time.
It's a hell of an age we may be entering.
It's pretty close to what Gould of Schlumberger has been saying for about 18 months now. He's been saying about 7.00%.
Gregor
Gould has been saying 8% as well, for at least 30 months.
I now think he's talking about what I'm christening the "petrophysical decline rate". Ie what happens to an average well if you don't do anything more than fix mechanical breakdown. That's different than the base decline rate relevant to megaproject analysis, which is the decline after you've allowed for infill drilling, workovers, rigless shutoffs, etc, etc. Typically the base decline is smaller (and it may even be growth, eg probably in Russia).
And even the EIA is worried about accelerated decline rates.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/depletion/preface.html
They say what I'm saying but hey I'm just a super doomer.
Would you please be clear about these terms. "Accelerated" only means it is bigger than last year, "accelerating" means it will continue to do so.
People throw these words around without any numbers to the point where they are meaningless. How can one possibly predict the future (which I think is your goal) when you cannot accurately describe the past?
I've just created this chart showing the repartition of project sizes:
We have more small project entries for 2008 and 2009 but also more projects in the 250-500 kbpd range. There are also some uncertainties about the exact timing of some large projects in Angola scheduled for 2008 but that could be delayed to 2010. 2009 has a large contribution from the Khurais field (Saudi Arabia). 2004 and 2005 have a relatively small contribution from the 100-250 kbpd segment at almost half what is observed in the following years.
Sam - I'm struggling to reconcile this chart with Stuart's. His chart lacks the spike in 2005. Also, what's going on in 2013 and 2014? The project tables are near empty those years?
It's then worth noting that 2009 is even higher than 2008. And maybe the lower forecast volumes beyond then are a distant horizon feature.
So looking at this, one gets a feel for why CERA have perhaps been a bit more optimistic than us? The world will be building spare capacity like crazy the next couple of years - if this comes to pass!
So will we all live happily ever after? It would be good to see a break down by liquid type. There seems to be a lot of NGL, GTL and syncrude in there.I also wonder to what extent the 2008 hump is due to delayed projects rolling into the front year?
This is great work btw by you Stuart and Ace.
Yes - this graph must be buggy at present. The tables only have 40kbd for 2013 and 280kbd for 2014 at present.
However, the idea of it is interesting. If it turns out, as I expect, that bigger projects are visible further out, we may be able to correct for that if the size distribution of the smaller projects is as regular as it appears to be.
Stuart - its great work. Khebab is having a bad chart day. I suspect that the front year (2008) is inflated with delays rolling up - and if you take that out then we revert to seeing the very tight supply situation that Faith Birol was kind enough to draw our attention to. I think you're almost certainly right that bigger projects are more visible further out.
It will be good to get 2008 settled before the year end - and then see how it pans out in reality. What we may end up seeing is that "next year" is always going to be a bumper year - that never materialises. So Wikipedia stores the edit history, so history matching will be straight forward?
This is a preliminary result, I didn't double checked the numbers yet. This chart is derived automatically from the Wikipedia tables. A perl script running on the TOD server is converting the Wikipedia table into csv files (check the Wikipedia pages, the csv files are linked at the bottom of some tables). I know there are still some conversion issues mainly because commas or alphabetic characters are mixed with numbers. I'm in the process of cleaning the content of the tables so it's possible that some oilfields have been discarded by the conversion program hence the discrepancies.
Ok, I've made some cleaning in the data. Just hit refresh, the result is now similar to Stuart's charts.
2013 and 2014 are still clearly wrong, so you still have some debugging to do. You might want to manually total a sample of the years and make sure your code can reproduce your manual totals before you post results...
Khebab, why does your chart show a local max at 2005 when Stuart's curves above show a monotonic increase in the 2003-2008 time period? Is there something I'm missing here?