Steve Mohr's Thesis: Projection of World Fossil Fuel Production with Supply and Demand Interactions

Steve Mohr is a young man who recently received his Ph. D. in Chemical Engineering at the University of Newcastle in Australia. His Ph. D. thesis is titled Projection of World Fossil Fuel Production with Supply and Demand Interactions. We published an article of Steve's earlier, called Forecasting Coal Production Until 2010.

In his thesis, Steve makes projections of future oil, coal, and natural gas production, using approaches he developed that consider both supply and demand for each of these three fuels. He makes these estimates assuming three levels of reserves: low estimate, best estimate, and high estimate. In his analysis, natural gas is the fuel that offers the biggest future potential for energy supply, not coal.

Below the fold, Steve provides a summary of his thesis.


Projection of World Fossil Fuel Production with Supply and Demand Interactions

Historically, fossil fuels have been vital for our global energy needs. However climate change is prompting renewed interest in the role of fossil fuel production for energy. In order to plan appropriately for our future energy needs, a new detailed model of fossil fuel supply is required. It is critical to know whether fossil fuels will continue to be able to supply most of our energy requirements and meet the ever increasing energy demand in the future. This knowledge is essential for identification of possible periods of energy shortage so that alternative energy resources can be utilised in a timely fashion. The aim of this study was to develop a model to predict fossil fuel production for the long term based on historical production data, projected demand, and assumed ultimately recoverable reserves for coal, gas and oil. Also, climate change is an important issue confronting society and it is hoped that the work contained in this thesis will aid climate change modeling by focusing attention on realistic fossil fuel production projections.

The modelling applied an algorithm-based approach to predict both supply and demand for coal, gas, oil and total fossil fuel resources. Total fossil fuel demand was calculated globally, based on world population and per capita demand; while production was calculated on a country-by-country basis and summed to obtain global production. Notably, production over the lifetime of a fuel source was not assumed to be symmetrical about a peak value like that depicted by a Hubbert curve. Separate production models were developed for mining (coal and unconventional oil) and field (gas and conventional oil) operations, that reflected the basic differences in extraction and processing techniques. Both of these models included a number of parameters that were fitted to historical production data, including: (1) coal production in New South Wales, Australia; (2) gas production from the North Sea, UK; and (3) oil production from the North Sea, UK and individual states of the USA.

The combined supply and demand model included the capability that demand and production could be influenced by each other, i.e. if production could not meet demand then future demand for that energy source was reduced. In this study, three options were considered. Firstly, the STATIC option resulted in demand and production acting independently of each other at all times. Secondly, the DYNAMIC option allowed both fossil fuel demand and all fossil fuel production to change from the STATIC situation when there was a difference between the two. Finally, the INDEPENDENTLY DYNAMIC option was an extension of the DYNAMIC situation, but treated each fuel source individually when applying the supply and demand interaction, with both demand and production able to vary.

The model required estimates of Ultimately Recoverable Resources (URR) for coal, gas and oil, where the following definitions were used for each resource:

(1) Coal: anthracite - lignite;

(2) Gas: conventional and unconventional (tight, shale and coal bed methane);

(3) Oil: conventional (API>10o) and unconventional (natural bitumen, extra heavy oil, oil shale).

Following a critical review of the literature, included in this study, three cases were adopted. CASE 1 and CASE 3 being lowest and highest recent estimates, respectively, and CASE 2 being the author's best guess based on the information available. The URR values for CASE 2 were, total (60,800 EJ), coal (19,350 EJ), gas (17,680 EJ) and oil (23,780 EJ).

The supply and demand model was used to obtain future predictions for individual and total fossil fuel production for a number of different scenarios, including CASE 1, CASE 2 and CASE 3 and STATIC, DYNAMIC and INDEPENDENTLY DYNAMIC supply and demand interaction options. The following results were obtained:

Coal: For CASE 2 (based on the author’s best informed guess of URR), peak production year remained constant at 2019 for STATIC, DYNAMIC and INDEPENDENTLY DYNAMIC options, with peak production varying only marginally between 212-214 EJ/y. Similarly, for CASE 1 (based on the lowest recent URR estimate), peak production year was the same at 2014 for all three demand-production interaction options. However, for CASE 3 (highest recent URR estimate), there was some variation in the peak production year at 2020, 2019 and 2030 for STATIC, DYNAMIC and INDEPENDENTLY DYNAMIC options respectively. Of interest also, was the projected peak in Chinese production, accounting for well over a third of the total production, occurring between 2010 and 2018, which compares with reported literature values in the range of 2015-2033.

Gas: For CASE 2 (URR best guess), peak production year varied from 2028, 2047 and 3034 for STATIC, DYNAMIC and INDEPENDENTLY DYNAMIC options, respectively. The corresponding peak production outputs were 145, 157 and 143 EJ/y. For CASE 1 (lowest URR), peak production year varied from 2019, 2033 and 2026, respectively, for the production interaction options. For CASE 3 (highest URR), the peak year range was much narrower, varying between 2060 and 2062. The overall range of between 2019-2062, was much wider than that reported in most of the literature of 2020 ± 10 years. While it was found that the production of unconventional gas was considerable, it was unable to mitigate conventional gas peaking.

Oil: For CASE 2 (URR best guess), peak production year remained almost constant at 2011-12 for STATIC, DYNAMIC and INDEPENDENTLY DYNAMIC options, with peak production varying only marginally between 179-188 EJ/y. Similarly, for CASE 1 (lowest URR), peak production year was the same at 2005 for all three supply and demand interaction options. For CASE 3 (highest URR), peak production year varied only slightly at 2019, 2011 and 2016 for STATIC, DYNAMIC and INDEPENDENTLY DYNAMIC options, respectively. The important outcome was that, of all scenarios, the latest peak year was 2019.

Great thesis!!!

If shale oil kicks in as forecast in case 3, we have another 100 years to solve the oil problem.

Wonder if people will respond by then?

Due to the lower EROEI and lower flow rates than conventional oil I wonder how oil derived from shale will kick in and save the day for another 100 years?

It seems to me that the Canadian tar sands and the very heavy sour oil from the Orinoco Belt are better bets than trying to extract oil from shale. Better bets...but not great bets, and not the only thing to pursue.

Many people could buy a Prius or Volt or a new Ford Fiesta or other similar cars over the next 10 years and we could cut our oil consumption for driving in half or likely more.

And no, I do not think that the Jevon's Paradox effect would soak up all the fuel savings with more vehicle miles traveled per person...people who are working are busy working, and there is only 24 hours in a day. People who are not working probably won't be able to afford to drive very much.

Huge efficiencies could be realized...with the proper price signals.

Many people could buy a Prius or Volt or a new Ford Fiesta or other similar cars over the next 10 years and we could cut our oil consumption for driving in half or likely more.

I don't think there is any way your assertion will come true. Can you walk us through the math you are using?

Here is a comment I made a few days back:

That said, the real-world impact of EVs is this: not much.

In the U.S., auto sales have nudged up to just under 11 million sales per year. Pretty much none of those are EVs. The Volt is starting with 10,000 per year and the Nissan Leaf with 25,000 per year — peanuts, really. This projection puts EV sales at 400,000 annually by 2020. However, even that number is too high because they haven't banked on a depression occurring between then and now, which will cause sales of all goods and services to decline — especially high-ticket items like cars. I wouldn't be surprised if auto sales in the U.S. decline to 3-5 million per year.

It's a similar thing with hybrids, which currently make up at best 3% of annual sales. As the economy contracts from higher oil prices, sales will go down, precisely what happened in 2008.

In other words, I can't see how your scenario can possibly occur.

Where was your comment made, André? Googled the text but all I get is this story. We were discussing EVs on DB a couple days ago, was it there? Haven't followed up and don't have the time at the moment.

The thread starts here:
http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/6720#comment-684699

Nick was asserting that, somehow, as the economy contracts EVs and partial EVs would dramatically increase in numbers. Even if they were to increase in relative terms (a possibility because in theory gasoline will become more dear), in absolute numbers the number of cars that will be sold in this decade will be half or less of the number sold in the previous one, is my guess. Thus, his and the others' predictions of amazing decreases in oil usage will come from a contracting economy primarily, not a shift to EV-type vehicles.

BTW, the same thing happened to me with Google...haven't seen that before.

Thanks, interesting reading. Nick puts up a good case, albeit so often his model is predicated on things turning out perhaps unreasonably sunny - like jaggedben I shudder to think of how US citizens would react to fuel shortages brought on by geologic decline.

Fun to read some of Jay Hanson's latest dispatches, too - it's like one of those Invasion of the Body Snatchers pods got to him, all that ridiculous talk of bottom up change. What happened to imminent ICBM launch, Jay? I'm completely ignoring any nuance in what he had to say for a cheap laugh, nb.

My understanding is this site uses a no-follow attribute, in other words it is telling Google NOT to index the text in searches. Instead they want you to use the Google search (site only) button in the upper left corner above. Big Google doesn't have it. If you had a problem with the upper left search, that's a different issue.

If that were true why did this story show up on Google when we searched?

The story or the comments? My apologies if I wasn't clear. Your first post seemed to indicate you couldn't use Google to find another poster's comment. The /comments/ are kept from the webcrawlers indirectly with nofollow attributes, which a quick read of the page source just now showed me is present on this site.

We were both able to find "That said, the real-world impact of EVs is this: not much" on the comment a few posts up, but not on the original. The text was identical.

What we need to do is change our “Operation System” with a newer version that uses all that we have learned to date.

Terrence McKenna has a wonderful short explanation showing how might be able to accomplish such a task.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVp66ssADxs&videos=J6cd-kyrFnQ

Ok, I see your Terrence McKenna's Operating System and I raise you one Lambros Malafouris' Neuroarchaeology... Let's see your cards.

http://revminds.seedmagazine.com/revminds/member/lambros_malafouris/

The mainstream approach to cognition holds that it happens in the mind and that material culture is nothing more than an outgrowth of our mental capacities. Archaeologist Lambros Malafouris is challenging this deep-seated idea with a radical new notion: the hypothesis of extended mind, which posits that material culture is not a reflection of the human mind but an actual part of it. Take, for instance, a blind man's stick. "Where does the blind man end and the rest of the world begin?" he says. "You might see the stick as something external, but it plays a very important role in the perceptual system of this person. It extends the boundaries of this human—the stick becomes an integral part of the cognitive architecture."

If material culture is an extension of human cognition, our engagement with it has actively shaped the evolution of human intelligence, Malafouris argues. For example, ancient clay tablets that allowed people to actually write down records were not mere objects, he says. Instead, they became integral adjuncts of the human memory system. The invention of such a technology "changes the structure of the human mind," says Malafouris, a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge. Rather than happening wholly in the head, he argues, cognition develops and evolves through the interplay between intelligence and material culture.

PSYCHEDELICS

Give me a button of wild peyote
To munch in my den at night,
That I may set my id afloat
In the country of queer delight.

So ho! it's off to the land of dreams
With never a stop or stay,
Where psychiatrists meet with fairy queens
To sing a roundelay.

Give me a flagon of mescaline
To wash o'er my mundane mind,
That I may feel like a schizophrene
Of the catatonic kind.

So hey! let in the visions of light
To banish banality,
Then will I surely catch a sight
Of the Real Reality.

Give me a chalice of lysergic
To quaff when day is done,
That I may get a perceptual kick
From my diencephalon.

So ho! let all resistance down
For a transcendental glance
Past the superego's frosty frown
At the cosmic underpants.

Give me a pinch of psilocybin
To sprinkle in my beer,
That my psychopathic next-of-kin
May not seem quite so queer.

So hey! it's off for the visions bizarre,
Past the ego boundary,
For a snort at the psychedelic bar
Of the new Psychiatry.

1812-4th St. S.W.,
Calgary, Alta.
F. W. HANLEY, M.D

Now take millions of these minds and give them computers and cars and jet planes and unlimited amounts of fuel and see what their culture does to the planet... Well, here we are, FUBAR!

FMagyar

Thank you for the link, but my cards have been blown away in the wind.

I never had a winning hand to begin with and the joker seems to the only card I remember.

Actually I liked your opening statement and happen to agree with it.

What we need to do is change our “Operation System” with a newer version that uses all that we have learned to date.

Shamans and primitives are part of the fabric of our knowledge and I see nothing wrong with a pinch of psilocybin in my beer if it helps me better understand my fellow man. And we most certainly need a completely new paradigm... So your cards, while not quite a royal flush, weren't all that bad.

Huge efficiencies could be realized...with the proper price signals.

Amen to that!

We just returned from my sister's wedding in Italy and got to see, once again, how people can lead very enviable lifestyles on a fraction of the energy consumed by the typical American.

Given our current infrastructure, the transition to a lower energy lifestyle will involve hard choices and economic setbacks for some. But there is no question that we can still lead a first world lifestyle on half the Joules we presently consume. Just look to the apartment dwelling 30-somethings of Seattle and Portland for a sense of the generational shift that is coming.

Best Hopes for an improved lifestyle that involves less consumption.

Jon

Just look to the apartment dwelling 30-somethings of Seattle and Portland for a sense of the generational shift that is coming.

As an apartment dwelling 40 something living in Seattle I can report first hand:

The only "generational shift" I see is more people driving more cars than ever before.

Seattle's reputation as a so-called "green" city is wholly unearned. The biggest debate in the city right now? Who is going to pay the inevitable cost overruns when we replace an aging and earthquake damaged viaduct with a deep bore tunnel right under the entire length of the downtown core.

Absolutely no mention whatsoever of -gasp!- PEOPLE NOT DRIVING CARS.

As for living like Italians, sure, sounds good to me, but it begs the same painfully obvious question that all energy schemes do: If it were really so cheap and easy then why in the world are we not doing it now?

  • Why send billions of dollars every year to people who spend no small part of their lives chanting "death to America"?

  • Why send thousands of our best and brightest to spill their blood in god-forsaken deserts on the other side of the world?

  • Why foul hundreds of square miles of North Americas greatest wetlands with toxic waste spewing from a very, VERY expensive hole a mile under the GOM?

Need a hint? The answer is not "the vast right-wing conspiracy to make oil and auto companies wealthy"

And don't forget the most important question of all, one which is sure to be plastered on billboards from sea to shining sea the moment anyone suggests we -gasp!- MAKE DO WITH LESS:

Who is going to be first in line to sacrifice their hard-won (or god-given, take your pick), non-negotiable, freedom-loving standard of living for your liberal, tree-hugging, American-hating, communist ideals?

Cheers,
Jerry

Who is going to be first in line to sacrifice their hard-won (or god-given, take your pick), non-negotiable, freedom-loving standard of living for your liberal, tree-hugging, American-hating, communist ideals?

I imagine those first in line would be the "liberal, tree-hugging, America-hating communists". (Guilty on at least two accounts.) ;-)

Nice to have a counterpoint view in the same town.

Best Regards,
Jon

... best and brightest ...

I liked that. Perhaps a bit of Gerald Celente http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdOwjNamJJQ (skip first 25 minutes) would do you some good. :)

I think the point was that (by comparison with Europe) you can make do with less and not have a much lower standard of living. I've traveled very widely through both Europe and the US and it seems to me that Europeans are not noticeably unhappier than Americans (perhaps the opposite...), and do not have lives that are much worse than americans (variations exist through countries as well as social classes, of course) while using much fewer resources than americans.

Much of Southern Europe has been living beyond its means for some years. I would expect Italy to go the way of Greece and Spain very soon. The Italians might not have such an envious lifestyle within a couple of years as austerity measures are surely on the cards.

Many people could buy a Prius or Volt or a new Ford Fiesta or other similar cars over the next 10 years and we could cut our oil consumption for driving in half or likely more.

You really got to do the number crunching right. You can't get more than around 20% by 2020:

19/6/2010
Primary Energy Dilemma for cars
http://www.crudeoilpeak.com/?p=1631

Interesting film on Lithium in Bolivia:

http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2010/s2965757.htm

They say "Lithium is the next oil" (!!!)

Salar de Uyuni
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salar_de_Uyuni

6/1/2010
Diminishing Returns of Fossil Fuel Energy Invested
http://www.crudeoilpeak.com/?p=909

If anyone thinks there will be enough money for car loans, read this interview with Joseph Stiglitz

Troubles ahead for world economy
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s2965891.htm#

Jevon's paradox applies on a global scale...increased fuel efficiency in the OECD will only drive increased car sales in places like China and India...

Many people could buy a Prius or Volt or a new Ford Fiesta or other similar cars over the next 10 years and we could cut our oil consumption for driving in half or likely more.

Well no doubt car efficiencies WILL have to improve. Very doubtful about the accuracy of that particular projection - we have a Prius and thereby went from maybe 28 mpg American to around 42. Hardly cutting consumption in half. Also never understand how electric cars are calculated to be so much more efficient since the efficiency of generation-distribution-transforming-charging-discharging-electric motor efficiency appears to be considerably less than the efficiency of a modern internal combustion engine.
A lot of the increasing efficiency of cars is due to lighter weight - that does not apply to trucks, what proportion of transportation energy do they represent ?

We should certainly look for a lot of the decreased consumption in settlement patterns and cultural shifts. More transit, less single person commuting. I have the impression that a high proportion of foreclosures are in the further flung suburbs with less services, but that may be just my prejudiced lens.

xxx

If shale oil kicks in as forecast in case 3, we have another 100 years to solve the oil problem.

The thought, of another 100 years of FF based economic and human population growth, with all the negative environmental feedback loops that that would entail, is not something that cheers me up!

Humans are dumber than yeast!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wErpJRY-VRc&feature=player_embedded

Thanks for an interesting thesis!

One of the things that fascinates me about these analyses is the assumptions that one needs to have to make them work. For example, if natural gas works longer than all of the fossil fuels, we have to be able to assume that we will be able to run society pretty much strictly on natural gas. Furthermore, we somehow have to have foresight, to make the changeover to an all natural gas infrastructure, in advance.

Changing over to natural gas infrastructure would require a lot of time (at least 40 years based on Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, and Prospects by Vaclav Smil). People would have to see the need, and be willing to make the change--not too different from today's peak oil discussion. Somehow, I have difficulty seeing it all happening.

A similar argument could be made for shifting off oil to coal and natural gas, in the very near future. Somehow, we would have to foresee the need, and shift infrastructure to use the coal and natural gas instead. We would also need to have a financial system that could withstand the strains, and somehow keep world trade working at close to its current levels, despite defaulting debtors, and reduced availability of fossil fuels. And political systems would need to be not too disrupted.

Because of these concerns, I wonder whether forecasts such as those made by Steve Mohr might better be thought of as upper bounds for future fossil fuel production, rather than firm estimates. It is comforting to think that oil and natural gas and coal will "only" decrease by XX% per year, but I don't think we really know that. All we know is if we can keep BAU going, then production might look like the graphs. Without BAU, I am somewhat doubtful.

"Without bau,I an somewhat doubtful."

Right on, Gail!

We have an amazing capacity to do the wrong thing.

Somebody said once that we have only two response modes in modern societies;complacency and panic.

The odds of modern societies being able to pull through and survive ff depletion issues would be pretty good, except that complacency will almost certainly prevent our really doing very much until it is too late, and the following panic may result, probably will result, in our making lots of bad decisions.

These decisions are actually already being made-witness corn ethanol, fusion reactor research,wars intended to secure oil and gas supplies, and so forth.

Incidentally , I don't approve of our current middle eastern adventures as a matter of morality or very long term real politics.

But I do believe that were we not "over there" for the last few decades the world would be unrecognizable, and we wouldn't like it at all, compared to the status quo.
(This comment predicated on the assumption that we would not have had a made a war time type effort to develop renewables.)

You gotta play the cards in your hand; nature and history don't do redeals.

If we hadn't been there, somebody else would have;the Germans, the Russians, the Japanese,the Chinese, or some combination of lesser powers.

Or the locals might have developed some muscles of thier own;they are great fighters and would be serious contenders if well organized and equipped.

"We have only two modes - complacency and panic." — James R. Schlesinger, the first U.S. Dept. of Energy secretary

Thanks for the source;the argument I make holds water but the assumption of another hundred years of bau is a bit shaky to say the least.

But if the fuel crisis arrives in slow motion, rather than abruptly, as I fear it will, there is a good possibility that effective remedial measures could be put into effect in many if not most countries.

Somewhere up or down thread, Aangel argues that the maximum nunber of electric cars on the road by 2020 will be too small to make a real difference.I believe he is right.

But other things requiring only political will could make a huge difference.If there is a severe fuel crunch in say 2014, a president capable of a "Nixon to China" initiative could probably push thru a big tax on midsize and larger cars, a purchasers subsidy for very small cars, and maybe an increase in the fuel taxes too.

Or a fuel rationing scheme could be put in place combined with a high tax;maybe the first five gallons per week would be market price, the next five a dollar plus,the next five two dollars plus;such a scheme would have many advantages, including allowing people who don't need to drive much to own a cheap second hand car traded in by somebody buying one much easier on gas.

We for instance own a large late nineties Buick that is only moderately fuel efficient, but we seldom drive it except when we need to take along a crowd;most months we put less than half a tank of gas in it.Lots of people who live close to work could afford to drive it until it is worn out even if gas were eight bucks a gallon, considering the cost of owning of a new car.

There is no need to destroy valuable machinery that can still be put to good use as in the last give away.

Detroit would scream bloody murder of course, but at some point the public is going to get tired of hearing it.

Or a populist candidate might be able to force thru leglislation taxing aviation fuel heavily , by labeling air travel as a luxury of the rich.

And the basis for such a comment?

"the peak of US oil production will soon be passed-possibly within 3 years"

David White, USGS Chief Geologist, 1919

People have been in a panic before, and James knew it, even if we would like to think our most recent panic is the real one...versus all the other ones...

2 - Ole David was almost correct. Had Pop Joiner not drilled on a lease he didn't own and discover the East Texas Oil Field (which no one had ever hypothesized existed) we might all be speaking German today. Many historians offer that the Allied forces would have never defeated Nazi Germany had we not discovered that field just before we entered WWII. But the great oil fields of coastal Texas came along in the late 40's just when others might have predicted that PO. Of course the problem today is that another East Texas Oil Field discovery next year wouldn't have anything close to the impact as the original. And then the ME oil fields developed in the 50's certainly delayed the effects of a global PO. That seems to be the history of PO predictions: the doom and gloom leads to more drilling which adds to the production rate. And maybe the new DW discoveries will have an impact to some degree. But we're still left with an ever expanding growth in consumption. Until recently the US was the largest consumer of oil amongst the nations of the world. I've read recently that China has taken that title away. Between fewer places to drill and greater consumption potential seems sooner or later we won't have that next great oil play to save us from a terminal PO spiral down.

Ole David was almost correct.

Peak oil has been around the corner for a long time. Funny how that has worked.

And it wasn't East Texas which saved us from that particular peak Rock, more like demand destruction as the war ended and more production from Texas in general. East Texas was a 1930 discovery, if recollection serves.

Peak oil has been around the corner for a long time. Funny how that has worked.

HAHAHAHAHAhahahahahahahahahahahahaha!

Rockman,
To put some numbers to the growth of cars, the chinese could have as many cars as the US within 5-10 years according to the third BRIC report. The Chinese currently have 60m cars and are producing them at a rate of 14m per year. Their brand new highway system covers the entire country. Recently they have been adding 1m per year to their production rate. How long before US drivers are bidding for gasoline against chinese drivers. Guess who the winner will be?

The US needs to plan to survive on the oil that can be secured from North and South America - eg can be militarily dominated. Keeping control of anything else should be considered to be a bonus, and not to be planned on.

Realistically that means 10Mbpd; halving of current consumption in less than a decade.

The alternative, and one I expect is getting close consideration, is collapsing China and India.

eg can be militarily dominated.

Not that again!
You Yanks!
We love you dearly, but you are not soldiers.

What do you mean? They beat Grenada, hands down! ;-)

It is funny and sad how few Americans consider how easily America could be militarily dominated - by its own military. The 'banana republic' option for energy demand re-balancing is the fastest, simplest, and most efficient.

So much of public spending has already been cut that defense is the only big piece left. How would the generals react to a 50% budget cut? a) start another unaffordable overseas conflict and hope it justifies more spending, b) bully Canada and Venezuela while hoping the BRICs do nothing, c) re-deploy at home and assist all the poor, struggling communities that can't afford to pay their police officers, d) retire and find another job (oh... there aren't any).

Option c doesn't seem any less likely than the rest to me, or the worst that could happen. OTOH a prompt transition to solar/wind economy would reduce the importance of overseas resources, create jobs and money, utilize technology, and otherwise cushion the effects of military downsizing. One more reason to think about starting now, IMO.

"Where ideas are concerned, America can be counted on to do one of two things: take a good idea and run it completely into the ground, or take a bad idea and run it completely into the ground." — George Carlin

Taken right from TOD itself.

"complacency and panic" sounds a lot like the 2 modes of markets: "greed and panic".

I thought about this for a while and then I thought about Tainter`s book and I decided that civilizations have two modes: growth mode, where they have enough energy and are building up complexity (this corresponds to greed and complacency) and the collapse mode where they are sliding down into the mire (this is where they don`t have enough energy to maintain BAU anymore---this is of course, panic mode).

It isn`t our fault. We evolved to locate gradients and reduce them. We locate a gradient, such as a stream with trout or an oak tree or an oil field, Then we go after the energy we can get (complacency, greed). Then we have a problem when it is gone (panic)!

Religions have tried to steer us away from these 2 modes, neither one of which is stable-- for exampe Buddhism tries to teach that appearances are not a good indicator of what is really going on, that all is suffering (even an oak tree which looks like it will help is just another form of suffering, of course, that is true, if it is gone and you were relying on that firewood, then you will suffer).

All we can do is hope that in the future our swings between greed and panic won`t be so huge and long. The oil gradient causing the oil greed-complacency (boom) and then the oil panic (bust) is just another repeat of our long history of greeting new gradients, making short work of them, and looking for the next one. But it`s such a long cycle this time, such an extreme one, such a destructive one, a dirty one, a dangerous one, a dramatic one, yes, a depressing one. But we have done our best!

I find myself looking at FF with askance now. Avoiding cars, feeling icky about even the bus. Roads, cement buildings---they all feel wrong and like yesterday`s news.

Perhaps we should start to acknowledge that there is nothing stable inherently about our ways of life, we cycle between extremes, we suffer on the way up and the way down. That is why I follow Buddhism now; it and only it could help me with this problem, a problem inherent with our nature.

"All we can do is hope that in the future our swings between greed and panic won`t be so huge and long. The oil gradient causing the oil greed-complacency (boom) and then the oil panic (bust) is just another repeat of our long history of greeting new gradients, making short work of them, and looking for the next one. But it`s such a long cycle this time, such an extreme one, such a destructive one, a dirty one, a dangerous one, a dramatic one, yes, a depressing one. But we have done our best!"

Future societies powered by solar and wind cannot achieve the extream occilations that we see today with fossil fuels. That doesn't mean there wont be problems though. Medieval Europe was 'full', that is it supported the most amount of people possible, living at the margin of existance, supported by the available energy inputs. Many people were malnurished and famines common but large overshoots of carrying capacity were not possible. Colonization and industrialization altered the situation.

That is why I follow Buddhism now; it and only it could help me with this problem, a problem inherent with our nature.

"Let's Go After the Buddhists" by Roy Zimmerman

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dtMpjeAMtk

To paraphrase an old Zen saying ‘if you see a proclaimed Buddha, kill him or her”; or as Alan Watts quoted another Zen saying: “birds in the sky leave no tracks”. (wink)

Speaking of Mr. Watts, his son has made a weekly podcast that's quite excellent:
http://www.alanwattspodcast.com

Thank you for the link aangel!

We have an amazing capacity to do the wrong thing.

Donella Meadows (LTG) gives quite a lot of insight how humans have the capacity to push things the wrong way under stress, BAU mode.
http://www.sustainer.org/pubs/Leverage_Points.pdf

Humans struggle in systems thinking. We think we’re intuitive but under a lot of conditions we're not, anything with latency, hysteresis and delayed feedback. Why so many economists are crap at forecasting.
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-le...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dddFfRaBPqg

Gail gets criticised a lot because she generally a systems thinker and has the capacity to see that the finance system is immediate hurdle, our predominanting economics view is inconsistent with reality.

our predominanting economics view is inconsistent with reality

Thanks for the YouTube link.

I'm not sure if the framed model of "intuitive" thinking (a.k.a. Blink) is a correct way of viewing "reality". There are many things in neuro-science which we still do not understand and thus we engage in alchemy.

Switching to a natural gas infrastructure would be far easier than any of the other possibilities generally mentioned (solar, wind, nuclear) and would take less than 40 years. There is already a massive natural gas infrastructure. So what we need to do is 1.Replace electrical generating plants with natural gas ones--very easy to do. 2. Transition to a natural gas automotive structure. For manufacturers this is mostly retooling (not a question of manufacturing millions of batteries). We need to add natural gas options to service stations along with gasoline/diesel.

Nuclear has the problem of waste and the huge cost to build each plant. Solar and wind major problems with intermittency of power. Electric vehicles with long distance travel. Solar would require substantial expenditures for each household (solar PV, solar hot water heating...)

Is T. Boone Pickens still alive? It appears his plan still is. What happened? I swear it seemed like the price of oil was dropped to kill his idea.

I hope you are including the cost of running all those new natural gas pipes. Gas service is not available to my home. The existing gas lines don't have the capacity to supply what you intend to use. And you can't ship it by tank truck, unless it's cryogenic, and that's not easy either.

Now, it you process the gas into propane. then liquid transport and small tank storage get easier. If you look in the antique tractor web sites, there used to be a significant number of LPG tractors.

Or you could convert the gas to methanol. That would also work.

Switching to a natural gas infrastructure would be far easier than any of the other possibilities generally mentioned (solar, wind, nuclear) and would take less than 40 years.

Maybe you should watch the movie 'Gasland' before jumping to that conclusion. Even though it's a documentary, it feels like a sci-fi B type movie of people getting sick and some dying from tainted water from fracking to get more natural gas out of the ground. Faucets that light up to a match. Rivers of death for the animals. Is BAU really worth ruining fresh water sources?

Gasland is a mockumentary, not a documentary. Unless you also believe the Michael Moore "documentaries" are real too. Let me guess, you probably do.

If I had a water well in my backyard that was producing natural gas, I'd PRODUCE NATURAL GAS from it!

Of course I also wouldn't be surprised to find some bad plumbing someplace, or worse. I personally looked into a situation where someone was claiming the power lines overhead were "electrifying" their water. A short investigation and (literally) a little digging showed they had totally miswired their pump. Problem solved and of course it had NOTHING to do with the overhead lines.

If I had a water well in my backyard that was producing natural gas, I'd PRODUCE NATURAL GAS from it!

I've known people to do that. In some shallow gas areas you're much more likely to hit natural gas than water. So, the people would hook up their furnaces to their water well, and truck in water for their cisterns.

These weren't big gas wells, or they'd sell it to a gas company, but they did provide a nice source of free heating and cooking gas for a long, long period of time.

Gasland is a mockumentary, not a documentary.

Waiting for Guffman is a mockmentary. So are most Christopher Guest movies. (Spinal Tap, Best in Show...) "The Office" is a mockumentary. Mockumentaries are fictional.

You may find Gasland (which I haven't seen, btw) and Moore's movies polemical, or otherwise not credible, but that doesn't make them not 'real,' or not documentaries.

> Nuclear has the problem of waste

Seriously? Compared to what? Coal/oil/gas? How many poeple did spent fuel killed over 50 years or so we produce it? None. Carbon fuel wastes are ventilated to the shared atmosphere via the convenient feature of "smokestacks". They kill somewhere between 1-2 million people a year, according to WHO.

Nuclear power is the only exajoule scale energy source which actually can & does isolate its wastes.

The upper bounds of coal use are set by atmospheric laws

8/3/2010
NASA climatologist James Hansen at Sydney Uni: "Australia doesn't agree now that they got to stop their coal, but they are going to agree. I can guarantee you that within a decade or so because the climate change will become so strongly apparent that's going to become imperative"
http://www.usyd.edu.au/sydney_ideas/lectures/2010/professor_james_hansen...

Ice extent remained lower than normal in all regions of the Arctic, with open water developing along the coasts of northwest Canada, Alaska and Siberia.
http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/

(Reuters) - Moscow sweltered on Monday through its hottest day since records began 130 years ago, as temperatures hit 37.4 degrees Celsius (99.3 degrees Farenheit) sparking peat fires that blanketed the city in smog.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66P1RW20100726

The upper bounds of coal use are set by atmospheric laws

I only wish that were true. But the only atmospheric law limiting FF use is oxygen content, which is more than enough to burn all the FF (Unless we figure out how to mine&oxidize the Iron in the earths core). Now the consequences of burning too much may be severe, but they are deniable. So the only constrainsts (other than geological) will have to be imposed by human political action.

Your statement could be recast as "the only SANE bounds on coal use...".

Not deniable:

Severe Storms Strike U.S. East Coast
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=44772&src=eorss-iotd

8/12/2009
James Hansen: Storms of My Grandchildren
http://www.crudeoilpeak.com/?p=767

Why would a far gone drunk with enough money to stay drunk and happy( or at least numb) quit drinking simply because his liver is shot, in order to live a hard miserable life , short of money, probably in pain, perhaps even cold and hungry?(Or in Australia, hot and thirsty?)

In such circumstances I would almost certainly opt to keep on drinking, live on the proceeds of my excess hooch, and take my chances on dying sooner.

Australia may opt to keep on burning and selling coal;certainly there will be buyers in desperate enough straits to keep on buying it.

If you don't survive next year, you can't survive the decade that follows.

People and countries may do anything within thier power when pushed hard enough by circumstances.

While you are at it, why not mention the following:

1- Europe had the coldest winter since 1964 in 2009/10 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-06/coal-discount-to-winter-u-k-...

2- South America is experiencing the coldest winter in many decades http://theweatherspace.com/article/Weather_News/Worldwide_Weather/Danger...

Here is some more:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/7908604/...

Moscow had its coldest winter for decades.

Yes - we in Scotland had the first cold winter for decades; the dying Scottish skiing industry briefly revived. One winter in 20 as cold as this last one is not what we used to get - more like one every 2 to 5 years. In those days we always needed a 2 week supply of food in case we were cut off by snow - now a distant memory for my grown children.
Look at the average figures and the trends. Even though Moscow just had their highest temperature ever recorded (2 days ago?), this would be meaningless without the trend figures collected across decades for the whole hemisphere and at each latitude.

The fundamental questions not answered are whether it is actually CO2 that is driving this or whether it is part of a naturally occurring cycle. We DO know that the medieval warming period was clearly hotter than today, and we know that the time of the Romans was clearly hotter. We also know there has been near term cooling that we are coming out of (a little ice age). Therefore we need to change these anecdotal views to something on a geologic time scale. Is our current climate truly the "norm"? Geologic history has a resounding NO to that question.

One thing that has not been answered to my satisfaction anywhere is the lifespan of CO2 in the atmosphere. In a previous post I showed that it can't be more than 20 years, yet AGW claims 100 years. My method has a simple proof, theirs doesn't. Occam wins.

Do we know those things you claim?

The peak temperatures of the Medieval Warm Period were certainly warmer than the 1970's, but so is now. Can you show that the average temperature of a 10 year period then was warmer than the average temperature of the past decade? If not, then it is clearly not "known".

As far as CO2 residence in the atmosphere: your simple question does not take into account the fact that the natural CO2 cycle adds and removes CO2 continuously, so while the lifespan of a particular group of CO2 molecules might be on the order of a few years in the atmosphere, they get replaced at the same time as they are taken out.

This means that tracking emissions of a particular isotopic composition doesn't work because they quickly become diluted between atmospheric, oceanic, and biological CO2 pools.

In a word. Yes. We know because of the historical record, because of wine grapes cultivated in the far north where they can't grow today, and even from the Roman historians for the earlier period. That obviates a greater than decade timescale. The fact that Hansen sought to hide the MWP did not bolster his scientific credentials.

And yet that is NOT what the AGW crowd says. They say, "CO2 remains resident in the atmosphere for 100 years". My molecule, your molecule, it doesn't matter. If they wanted to say something different, they should have. The REASON they say what they do is to further support their other hypotheses. Without the long residence times, the rest of their house of cards falls apart. I began as a pro AGW person, until I started to examine their logic, their methods and their ethics. Then I switched to the "denier" camp. They have a highly political and suspect agenda, which is too bad because my business interests would be better off if they were right. I can't condone dishonesty ESPECIALLY in science. They've polluted the waters more than BP as far as scientific integrity is concerned.

On wine:
http://blog.norway.com/2009/01/15/gard-vintners-an-up-and-coming-winery-...

Love those Norwegian wines.

I've been drinking Minnesota wine for many years, too.

Do not make arguments that you cannot support.

Apparently you are a moron. From your OWN LINK:

Gård Vintners is no exception. This new up-and-coming winery in Washington’s Columbia Valley is the product of the Lawrence Cellars, which strives to capture the quality of their estate vineyard in the glass.

I have HAD this wine, grown in WASHINGTON STATE NOT IN NORWAY!!!! I have drunk it with my good friend in Seattle who is FROM NORWAY. They CANNOT GROW WINE ON HIS FAMILY FARM, IT DIES. Minnesota is NOT NORWAY, not as cold, not as far north.

DO not be a moron and you can possibly make arguments that are supportable.

Nonetheless, I did also mention our fine Minnesota wineries. (Well, adequate for table wine, but real wineries with real vines just the same.)

Are you going to tell me that the coldest state in the continental USA is a better wine growing region than England (the source of the whole wine story) or southern Norway? It is not unusual for Minneapolis to be colder than a large portion of Alaska in winter.

Norwegian climate:
http://www.visitnorway.com/en/Articles/Theme/About-Norway/Seasons-and-cl...
Oslo ranges from an average of -2.3C to +19.9C according to that.

Climate chart for Minneapolis:
http://www.crh.noaa.gov/mpx/Climate/MSPClimate.php
Minneapolis ranges from ~15F to ~75F (~-4C to ~23C), much more extreme variation due to our distance from the sea.

Minnesota wineries (locally grown):
http://www.weekendwinery.com/Wineries/Wineries_MN.htm

Imagine my shock that the Norwegians, with their nice moderate climate, aren't growing their own wine. If Minnesota isn't too cold then Norway definitely isn't too cold, and the reason has to be to do with something other than climate.

With wine it matters more how hot and dry is the summer than how cold is winter. Grapevine survives in zone 4, so Ontario, Minnesota and Norway are in, but the problem is with summers. Ontario and Minnesota have real summers, but if you hit 70 and sun in Norway, you are talking heat wave. Ontario wines are quite decent, thank you.

Most of the varieties being grown in Minnesota are recent hybrids between European and American grapes. Very few pure European vinifera varieties are grown, although some vineyards do grow Marechal Foch and Seyval Blanc. Some vinyards also blend in juice imported from other areas to get a better taste.

So the northern boder of the wine growing region has been extended by plant science more than due to global warming in the case of Minnesota.

Note that native American grapes grow in colder climate than European grapes. Only recently have New York Finger Lakes wineries suceeded with consistent harvests of vinefera wines.

I began as a pro AGW person, until I started to examine their logic, their methods and their ethics. Then I switched to the "denier" camp.

Do you even know what logic is, let alone what it is good for?

The concentration of a greenhouse gas in the atmosphere depends on the competition between the rates of emission of the gas into the atmosphere and the rates of processes that remove it from the atmosphere. For example, carbon dioxide (CO2) is exchanged between the atmosphere, the ocean and the land through processes
such as atmosphere-ocean gas transfer and chemical (e.g., weathering) and biological (e.g., photosynthesis) processes. While more than half of the CO2 emitted is currently removed from the atmosphere within a century, some fraction (about 20%) of emitted CO2 remains in the atmosphere for many millennia. Because of slow removal processes, atmospheric CO2 will continue to increase in the long term even if its emission is substantially reduced from present levels. Methane (CH4) is removed by chemical processes in the atmosphere, while nitrous oxide (N2O) and some halocarbons are destroyed in the upper atmosphere by solar radiation. These processes each operate at different time scales ranging from years to millennia. A measure for this is the lifetime of a gas in the atmosphere, defined as the time it takes for a perturbation to be reduced to 37% of its initial amount. While for CH4, N2O, and other trace gases such as hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22), a refrigerant fluid, such lifetimes can be reasonably determined (for CH4 it is about 12 yr, for N2O about 110 yr and for HCFC-22 about 12 yr), a lifetime for CO2 cannot be defined.

Sorry, the above excerpt is from a tainted source, the IPCC.

http://www.co2now.org/Know-GHGs/Emissions/ipcc-faq-emissions-reductions-...

And yet, for all the billions they've spent on it, I came up with a method that quite accurately does JUST THAT, merely following the radioactive tracer. I can also point to hundreds of quotes from the same climate scientists who contributed to that IPCC report who continually claim a CO2 lifetime IN THE ATMOSPHERE of 100 years. Here's one example from Realclimate.org:
The relative lifetimes of CO2 and aerosol in the atmosphere result in the expectation that reducing fossil fuel use will accelerate warming. A CO2 molecule has a lifetime of about 100 years in the atmosphere, while an aerosol particle has an average life expectancy of only about 10 days. Therefore, if we instantaneously ceased using combustion engines, the (cooling) fossil fuel-related aerosols would be cleaned out of the atmosphere within weeks, while the (warming) CO2 would remain much longer, leaving a net positive forcing from the reduction in emissions for a century or more.

Realize you're quoting from the latest IPCC assessment report, the previous ones ALL pointed to a lifetime of a hundred years or more. Look it up, the First Assessment report said 50-200 yrs, the 2nd said 5-200 yrs and now they claim unknown. Methinks they suspected they were way off, but better to hide it in obfuscation.

Of course realclimate.org is so sure of their science that they've deleted EVERY post I've made pointing them to radiactive tracing of CO2 via carbon 14 from atmospheric nuclear testing. This meme has managed to escape censoring, so I note that even on wikipedia they've changed the discussion from just month's ago to drop the point about atmospheric lifetime and conflate it into something new, apparently because they can't ignore the blatant facts staring them in the face.

After all, when your whole thesis is that increased CO2 is DRIVING temperature increases, you can't very well have increased TEMPERATURE driving increased CO2 instead. The ocean is key, this is a water planet, not a land planet. Hiding data, censoring dissent, manipulating statistics and data, eliminating "inconvenient" data points from the record, fighting freedom of information requests and so on does not lend much credence to the AGW camp's scientific ethics. If they were simply correct, they wouldn't need to keep stacking the deck. IMHO

I'd like the work to show the world what is possible (not what will happen - God only knows that) and hope for society to realise the need to shift in a different direction (well I can dream). I don't think a shift to a natural gas society would be feasible, I'd say it would be more that easier things to convert (e.g. coal fired power station converted to Gas etc) may happen. The depression that is probably about to occur will make Case 3 unrealistic.

"Without BAU, I am somewhat doubtful." Posted by Gail

I expect that we will go off the edge of Hubbert's Plateau in a year or so. A year or so after that, the shortages will have created such economic chaos, that BAU on any large scale will totally collapse, sometime in the 2013-2018 timeframe. A graph completed say, in 2020 will show essentially a vertical drop in energy production/consumption to someplace not too far above the x-axis, from which it will take a more horizontal direction.

After there is some limited "recovery" we will find that most of the remaining, relatively hard-to-get-at resources will still be out of the range of our economic or technical ability to extract if any attempt to resurrect BAU is attempted. The production line of the fossil fuel graph as time goes on will continue in a mostly horizontal direction, with an also continuous downward drift.

And no combination of alternate or renewable energies will ever meaningfully scale up in this time-frame; after the BAU collapse, there will be few economic resources to invest in this stuff, and there isn't enough time to scale up the alternatives before the BAU collapse, even if everyone started taking all this seriously right now, which, of course, most aren't.

Can't say for sure that things will pan out in just this way in this exact timeframe, but it seems plausible enough to me.

Antoinetta III

I'm right there with you on that post, Antoinetta the third. Not sure of the timing either, but certainly see that once

A year or so after that, the shortages will have created such economic chaos, that BAU on any large scale will totally collapse.

Once a certain degree of collapse has occurred, the integration of civilizations complexity will have suffered such an infrastructural, distributional, foreclosureal, loss of credit, debt boom and unemployment blow, that no flim-flam attempt at borrowing trillions will resurrect BAU. Essentially the broken system will reach a point of failure to feed the masses and that will end the age of oil.

All this conjecture of NG replacing oil is wishful thinking at best. The dip from plateau will occur long before any concerted effort to switch the whole thing over from oil based transport can occur. Society will in hindsight pay an enormous price for failing to heed the warnings of a peak in oil production and its predicted consequences on the economy.

Gail, I think you're quite right that a forecast like this one needs to be qualified by some such label as "absent other interfering factors." The gap between what's technically possible and what economic and political realities will allow is one of the things that too often gets ignored in questions of this kind.

Gail, i think Steves forecasts are useful in that they provide a good baseline for seeing that this stuff is not going to last forever. One way or another the world is going to have to use less of it. Steves forecasts don't say nything about having to use more gas just becasue it is availbale and can be produced. It will probably stay in the ground if it can't be used profitably in the case of economic depression. But it will still be there for future generations who may use it quite differently to the way we do in this era. Same goes for coal and oil and uranium for that matter.

I am becoming more convinced each day that the coming depression is actually a necessary clean broom to sweep away the unsustainable aspects of BAU. What emerges from the other side of that may be quite different than what any of us can predict. Gas may well be the crucial catalyst to get out of the depression but I doubt it will be used for providing a persoanlconveyance device to everyone who wants one. We are likely tofind much more imaginateive solutions to solve that problem. There is also no gurantee that the countries that prospered in the oil age will do so in the new post-depression era. The developing world may be much more adept at seizing new opportunites. Intersting times indeed.

This is a quite interesting report.

Who is that guy that talks about running cars on natural gas? He might have a point in that NG could be used to assist transportation.

Boone Pickens based half of his plan on converting the car fleet to natural gas and the electric grid to a wind based system. Maybe that's what you're thinking of?

Simmonds Ocean Energy has a take on it too (pdf) adds offshore wind, a solar electric belt, heat pumps, electric vehicles and algal biofuels.

Cars powered by natural gas are somewhat common on Brazil. They are mostly taxis, that never need to go much away from the cities where natural gas is available, and have a much lower tolerance for hight fuel prices.

Another 11 years of FF will ensure we are underwater and dislocated as the coastal populations are submerged.

As a forecast of energy use and supply, it is unrealistic to assume it is possible except in a thesis.

Respectfully....Paul

correction on time

Another 1oo years of FF will ensure we are underwater and dislocated as the coastal populations are submerged.

As a forecast of energy use and supply, it is unrealistic to assume it is possible except in a thesis.

Respectfully....Paul

Depends. History says the cities will move to accommodate the new levels or new ones will spring up. Beats having to scuba dive to get into your house. You also cannot launch your boat 1 mile inland. Water level changes can go the other way, especially locally. The rate of sea level change occurs is critical. I read somewhere the Aral Sea is actually growing again.
TinFoil.

Paulo, if no one has yet responded to your comment you can use "Edit" to change your post instead of posting a correction.

It strikes me that the difference between low case and high case is too low. If you are trying to represent the full range of possibilities, that range tends to indicate that you are concentrated more in a thin band of possibilities rather than a more open range of outcomes.

It appears to be driven in part by your certainty about coal and gas volumes. It would seem that shale gas uncertainty alone would drive a much larger band of uncertainty into the gas category all by itself.

I have taken the low and high ranges from the known recent (last decade) literature. I have not found higher or lower values if I did I would have used them instead (so long as they are either peer reviewed or well cited). Shale Gas in the USA has greatly changed from when I had to stop looking and start running the model (an amendment is coming soon to the OGJ).

Are you familiar with numbers published by Rogner, 1997 or 1998 if I recall correctly? I can find the reference if you aren't familiar with it.

I tried to skim the thesis, but the font's too small, I can't save it to my computer, and it's very long. Because I don't have the ability to read it, then it's hard to say much. However, I believe that, no matter what method is used, the lack of information makes the result suspect. In other words, it takes too much information to make a model like this work. And this goes way beyond the guess at ultimate reserves - because ultimate reserves depend on technology, real costs, and government take and regulations. And none of these can be sorted out. Like they said in Star Trek, "Surrender, we are the Borg"

Like they said in Star Trek, "Surrender, we are the Borg"

Resistance is futile.

I'm going through Steven Gorelicks book this morning, "Oil Panic and the Global Crisis", and I'm reading through his thoughts on the Club of Rome forecasts and claims. It seems to me that their model, which by its nature was designed to cause global collapse under all scenario's because it underestimates the same things Malthus did (Steven's claim, not mine, but I haven't anything to dispute his idea with), makes the same point you just did. Its bad enough that there exists only 1 all encompassing work done on global resources, but it is flawed, and certainly doesn't appear to have been used anyway, otherwise Mohr could have locked down the resource issue and built his scenario's around the technology and economics to utilize a little, or a lot, of that resource.

Have you read any of the Limits to Growth books? Just asking because you seem to be repeating some common misconceptions. Perhaps you have just read the critiques and not the original source?

Have you read any of the Limits to Growth books? Just asking because you seem to be repeating some common misconceptions. Perhaps you have just read the critiques and not the original source?

I haven't been through Limits to Growth yet. Its at the library and I just haven't picked it up. However, you are suggesting that Gorelick basically lied in his interpretation of a reference, which might be acceptable on the web, but its a major no-no in science, you don't get to just make stuff up and assign it to a reference. Now, I'm not saying I consider this book a science work quite yet, but it is well documented and I am already familiar with more than half the references it lists, and he has portrayed those accurately, so I have no reason to discount his comments on the Club of Rome.

Let me provide you with more of a conclusion which you can feel free to refute. In Gorelicks book, page 60, Figure 3.1 , he lists business as usual models listed by Limits to Growth. His statement on the next page, first full paragraph, is as follows:

"The Club of Romes dire prediction of a world system near collapse failed to materialize. No fundamental scarcity of any global non-renewable resource, including oil, has occurred, and the forecasting approach of the world model was vitally flawed." He credits them with being wrong for the same reason Malthus was wrong, human ingenuity.

Gorelick is focusing on the key components of rising living standards and quality of life for humans with respect to time, unlike those who focus on only a single symptom of that success, like oil utilization, Gorelick appears to understand that there is a greater force at work.

Well, that quote from Gorelick is ridiculous in the context of what the Limits to Growth folks actually published. Makes me think he never read the original either.

A specific reference would be nice. Based on the general level of mythology within this debate, it is usually best to stick to specifics, lest the mythology get in the way.

For example, is Figure 3.1 on page 60 of Gorelicks book not an accurate reprint of the Club of Rome work? It is the basis for the comment I quoted, in particular the resources line. If Gorelick didn't accurately cite the figure, that is Gorelicks fault. If he did accurately cite the figure, his statement is quite reasonable based on THEIR work and you do not have the option of calling it ridiculous without that comment extending back to the Limits to Growth graph itself.

How about we start with his claim that all Limits to Growth scenarios were designed to cause collapse? Some did no such thing. That right there demonstrates that Gorelick is, to put it mildly, ignorant of the subject matter. I've not read Gorelick but if he does claim that all Limits scenarios ended in collapse then he could not possibly have actually read it. And the only way you can verify what I said is to actually read Limits to Growth since I'm not aware that it's linked anywhere on the web. So go read it. There was at least one scenario for long term sustainability that I recall and it's been a good while. The problem is that the scenario that most closely mirrors what we've done since Limits to Growth was published DOES end in collapse. Limits had numerous scenarios and collapse was the diagnosis in many, but not all.

But just like the 3 pack a day smoker, our culture continues to deny that its current behaviors could ever have any bad consequences. Sad.

P.S. The collapse in the Club of Rome report for the scenario that most closely matches our own doesn't happen until about 2070. So why is the fact that it has not happened yet trumpeted as some sort of claim of failure of the model? Again, this demonstrates that Gorelick is full of crap.

How about we start with his claim that all Limits to Growth scenarios were designed to cause collapse? Some did no such thing.

Gorelick mentions those as well, and specifically lists the conditions required. Did you forget this detail, would you like the page reference so that you can refresh your memory?

So go read it.

Excellent advice, and its about time I do.

I've not read Gorelick but if he does claim that all Limits scenarios ended in collapse then he could not possibly have actually read it.

My recommendation is to actually read Gorelicks work before deciding what he did, or did not, say about the Club of Rome work.

How about we go back to your own words here, huh?

I'm going through Steven Gorelicks book this morning, "Oil Panic and the Global Crisis", and I'm reading through his thoughts on the Club of Rome forecasts and claims. It seems to me that their model, which by its nature was designed to cause global collapse under all scenario's because it underestimates the same things Malthus did (Steven's claim, not mine, but I haven't anything to dispute his idea with), makes the same point you just did. Its bad enough that there exists only 1 all encompassing work done on global resources, but it is flawed, and certainly doesn't appear to have been used anyway, otherwise Mohr could have locked down the resource issue and built his scenario's around the technology and economics to utilize a little, or a lot, of that resource.

Now let's look at that highlighted part that you wrote. So either you misstated Gorelick's position or Gorelick is wrong based on your assertion from reading him. Which is it? You wrote that ALL scenarios lead to collapse, either as your own conclusion or as inferred from Gorelick. I refuted that silly statement and then you suggest that I am engaging in mythology when you are the one that posted crap? In either case, you are wrong and demonstrate that error and ignorance by your own post, which I just quoted.

And no, I am not going to go read Gorelick. I have read numerous critiques of Limits to Growth and they all rely on business as usual coupled with a never ending stream of ever higher complexity technical advances. Never, ever do these critiques suggest that there may be an upper limit to such advances. Never, ever have I seen these critiques admit to physical limits to critical resources other than to suggest that any such limit must be "centuries" away.

So no, I am not going to waste my time reading yet another cornucopian "critique" of Limits by someone who, from your own accounts, appears to be making the same mistakes that have been refuted numerous times over the last 40 years.

By the way, as I pointed out the collapse in the reference scenario from Limits is not due for another 60 years, yet you blithely ignored the absurdity of concluding that Limits had failed because we had not collapsed yet and went ahead and wrote exactly that sort of conclusion. You seem to be grasping at people like Gorelick not because they present rational arguments but because they bolster your basic faith in business as usual.

You are probably also not too fond of Tainter, either, I bet? Yet Tainter's work helps to explain the collapse of numerous civilizations throughout human history. To suggest that we are somehow immune to collapse, that we will always make all the right choices, find all the right solutions, every single time, is an example of hubris that I cannot even fathom. It's attitudes like that which led to the BP disaster, ever so sure of themselves and believing that nothing can go wrong. I see these attitudes every day, yet we have failures around the world on the small scale every day. What happens if we ever have a major failure instead of a minor one?

I will leave you with one other thought - a number of decades ago I took part in a classified study that concluded that about 50 men could destroy the basic technological fabric of the United States in a 48 hour period and that the destruction so done could not be recovered from in less than 18 months minimum, meaning civilian casualties could be in the tens of millions. I've not seen anything in the ensuing 25+ years that leads me to believe that this fundamental conclusion is in any way altered significantly based on where we stand today. And yet this conclusion was not based on WMDs at all, just a detailed examination of specific weaknesses within our technological society. If such havoc could be done so easily by humans acting deliberately, then could the entire system collapse from accidental incidents as well? And the answer to that is yes.

I view people like yourself as larger obstacles to avoiding collapse than the core technical issues around collapse. People like you who seem to refuse to consider changes that do not fit their preconceived notions present more resistance to sustainable change than the actual technical problems themselves. This is why people here at TOD will tell you that I have said for over 5 years here that the real problem we have is one of political will, not technical capability. Failure to actually achieve recognition of the chance of collapse will prevent what work could be done to prevent it and thus ensures it, just like Chaco Canyon, the Mayans, the Assyrians, Easter Island, and numerous other civilizations that no longer exist.

So either you misstated Gorelick's position or Gorelick is wrong based on your assertion from reading him. Which is it?

I stand corrected. In my initial characterization I did use the word all. I should not have characterized it that way, because Gorelick does not. I did not consider the circumstances necessary to NOT cause collapse under the COR scenario's to be worthy of discussion, but that is my mis-characterization, and I apologize for misrepresenting Gorelicks work.

You are probably also not too fond of Tainter, either, I bet? Yet Tainter's work helps to explain the collapse of numerous civilizations throughout human history.

I have listened to Tainter on more than one occasion. I have not decided the value of his work at this time. If memory serves, I remained unconvinced after listening to his explanations.

If such havoc could be done so easily by humans acting deliberately, then could the entire system collapse from accidental incidents as well? And the answer to that is yes.

I don't believe that anyone would dispute that some catastrophic incident could do untold damage to the fabric of any particular society. Be it the 50 targeted people you mention or a meteor impact. In that context, peak oil would not be particularly high on that list.

If memory serves, I remained unconvinced after listening to his explanations.

That's where you should go to work, then, because by sorting through his logic you'll start to see what many of us here see.

As I mentioned here previously, I was personally instructed about "Limits to Growth" in 1972 by a professor from MIT who actually assisted in the programming of the LTG model.

In the many years since then, I have reviewed various interpretations of LTG with some amusement, and I find what RGR has to say about LTG very amusing. That is because most interpretations are attributing conclusions about LTG that were not actually claimed by the Club of Rome. LTG was only intended be an estimation of what could happen. Some simplications of the LTG model were made that now, due to the advance state of computing, would not have to be made.

LTG changed my view of the future, a darkened vision from which I have never recovered. After nearly 40 years I am still not quite sure what is the best way to personally adapt to a future of declining resources. Do we go somewhere to escape the coming collapse of life as we know it disappears, or do we work with others to bring about some level of sustainability?

And no, I am not going to go read Gorelick, it would be a waste of time because he is also inferring things about LTG that were not part of the assumptions that went into their model.

And no, I am not going to go read Gorelick, it would be a waste of time because he is also inferring things about LTG that were not part of the assumptions that went into their model.

Doesn't seem very fair. Its like me refusing to recognize all analysis which flows from a study of discovery graphs because the people building them can't be bothered to actually count all the discovered oil. Even in censored form, there is some value to the thing (not that Gorelick censors anything, the fault with the word "all" was mine, not his).

On a related topic, I found some nice and interesting Tainter pubs today, and scoured the local library for the COR report. Its in the big library, but apparently not the little one. So maybe I'll hunt it down later in the week.

Is coal oil? You've implied that it was in the past (counting CTL in with oil).
What about corn?

It seems to me that someone around here is confused about what oil is and is not, and I don't think it's me, or Charles, or GreyZone.

Though really, talking about reserves, resources, flow rates, and all that really misses the elephant in the room: cost.

It doesn't matter if we can produce a billion barrels a day in theory if nobody can afford to actually do so.

Is coal oil? You've implied that it was in the past (counting CTL in with oil).
What about corn?

Last I looked, no one defines coal as oil, so I certainly won't. Are you claiming that someone makes this obvious a mistake on, say, a discovery chart of oil? It strikes me that discovery charts as referenced most times exclude everything they can find rather than making up new things to include. "Discovered" corn....I like that....

t seems to me that someone around here is confused about what oil is and is not, and I don't think it's me, or Charles, or GreyZone.

Apparently its whoever cuts loose a discovery graph which is labeled as "Oil Discoveries" and doesn't count all the oil obviously. Those who use the conventional/unconventional label to divide oil into multiple categories as a means to exclude as much as possible at are least being honest on the topic.

Though really, talking about reserves, resources, flow rates, and all that really misses the elephant in the room: cost.

Angel has claimed that everyone here knows the difference between reserves and resources. So they should also already know that cost is calculated into the mix when the reserve number is created. I don't agree with him that everyone is aware of the distinction of course. For example, if he was correct, you wouldn't have to even mention that cost is part of the difference, everyone would already know it the instant you divided the world into reserves and resources.

I am not an oil pro, but I do know that reserves is "that portion of the resource that we think we can get out of the ground" and that cost is a factor in that calculation. I also know that it isn't the only factor, since some resources are not extractable at any cost with current technology.

Yes, I'm sure that there are a lot of people who don't know the difference, but you can't read this site for very long and remain ignorant of it unless you don't want to know.

Costs have sure gone up a lot lately, have reserves gone up in linear proportion?

Yes, I'm sure that there are a lot of people who don't know the difference, but you can't read this site for very long and remain ignorant of it unless you don't want to know.

A reasonable statement, and certainly applicable considering the audience (I'm speaking generally here of course, not site specific).

Costs have sure gone up a lot lately, have reserves gone up in linear proportion?

Costs have certainly gone up, and I don't know why anyone would assume that there is a linear relationship between costs and reserves? Certainly I am not aware of one, but it has been awhile since I was directly involved in doing SEC reserves for public companies.

Charles Hall had an excellent critique of the critiques of Limits to Growth (and then some) in American Scientist last year, "Revisiting the Limits to Growth After Peak Oil" - well worth a read, especially for those who have "read all the critiques" but not the book itself.

Jason, perhaps I can save you the time and exasperation of attempting to have a meaningfull rational exchange with Reservegrowthrulz2, he has lambasted me in the past for pointing him to views contrary to his own, specifically he doesn't accept "Peak Oil" and considers it to be pure propaganda. I'm afraid he has a very cognitively compartmentalized and dissonant perception of many of the issues routinely discussed here at TOD. It seems he either has some agenda to push, or just enjoys trolling, I haven't quite figured out which it is.

"The Club of Romes dire prediction of a world system near collapse failed to materialize. No fundamental scarcity of any global non-renewable resource, including oil, has occurred, and the forecasting approach of the world model was vitally flawed." He credits them with being wrong for the same reason Malthus was wrong, human ingenuity.

Yeah, right, human ingenuity trumps natural laws ad infinitum...

Then again maybe it is a question of historical time scale and resolution, in my personal view if Mathus's predictions are off by a few centuries I'd still consider them to be quite accurate from the perspective of natural history or even the history of human civilizations.

Perhaps I'm the one who suffers from cognitive dissonance but I can't wrap my mind around people not accepting limits. Do they think they would float if they stepped off the top of a skyscraper, limits are just as real as gravity.

Ah, but subjectivists have an out for that. They will claim you don't float since you know you have to fall. I guess you also know to splatter on the ground below. LOL.

Subjectivism is a serious psychological disorder. But instead of people with this disease being treated they somehow work their way into top positions and make decisions for everyone. Rove's famous bleatings about the "reality based community" come to mind.

Rove's famous bleatings about the "reality based community" come to mind.

Reservegrowth... Kaaaarl? is that you?! Nah, can't be. You sound more like Rumsfeld, all those unknown oil reserves we don't know we don't know about! All those geologists, caught between a rock and a hard place... they will surely apply human ingenuity and squeeze oil out of all those deposits that are still unknown unknowns.

Matt Simmons also had a very good review of both Limits to Growth and its critiques. You can find it here, it is very informative.

http://greatchange.org/ov-simmons,club_of_rome_revisted.html

"(...)
WHAT THE LIMITS TO GROWTH ACTUALLY SAID

After reading The Limits to Growth, I was amazed. Nowhere in the book was there any mention about running out of anything by 2000. Instead, the book's concern was entirely focused on what the world might look like 100 years later. There was not one sentence or even a single word written about an oil shortage, or limit to any specific resource, by the year 2000.

The members of the "Club or Rome" were also not a mysterious, sinister, anonymous group of doomsayers. Rather, they were a group of 30 thoughtful, public spirited-intellects from ten different countries. The group included scientists, economists, educators, and industrialists. They met at the instigation of Dr. Aurelia Peccei, an Italian industrialist affiliated with Fiat and Olivetti.

The group all shared a common concern that mankind faced a future predicament of grave complexity, caused by a series of interrelated problems that traditional institutions and policy would not be able to cope with the issues, let alone come to grips with their full context. A core thesis of their work was that long term exponential growth was easy to overlook. Human nature leads people to innocently presume growth rates are linear. The book then postulated that if a continuation of the exponential growth of the seventies began in the world's population, its industrial output, agricultural and natural resource consumption and the pollution produced by all of the above, would result in severe constraints on all known global resources by 2050 to 2070.

The genesis of this book was a series of early meetings being held by The Club of Rome in 1968. These meetings culminated in a decision to initiate a remarkably ambitious undertaking. The task was to examine the complex problems troubling "men of all nations; poverty in the midst of plenty, degradation of the environment, loss of faith in institutions, uncontrolled urban spread, etc."

"Phase One" of the project of the predicament of mankind took shape in 1970. The group commissioned a team of Economic Modelers at MIT to forecast, in approximate terms, what pressures the globe would undergo if the current growth trends continued for another 100 years. This research was financed by the Volkswagen Foundation.

At the time, the technique of conducting computer based integrated modeling was quite new. The technique was called "System Dynamics", where various inter-related elements and positive and negative feedback loops influence the various ingredients and outputs of the model.

The initial results of this modeling work were sufficiently alarming that Club of Rome participants decided to publish them, and call the book The Limits to Growth. The book was published by Potomac Associates, a non-partisan research and analysis organization seeking to encourage lively inquiry into critical issues of public policy.

The book painstakingly acknowledged that the model's work was still "preliminary." Much more detailed analysis was needed to hone in on the issues this model raised. The decision to publish the results, as rough as they were, was driven by a desire to quickly get the issues into the public domain. This would hopefully command critical attention to the work and spark debate in all societies about the changes needed to avoid the catastrophic elements that the model indicated would occur by 2070, absent any changes.

While many readers concocted various "imaginary" assumptions, the book's conclusions were quite simple. The first conclusion was a view that if present growth trends continued unchanged, a limit to the growth that our planet has enjoyed would be reached sometime within the next 100 years. This would then result in a sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.

The second key conclusion was that these growth trends could be altered. Moreover, if proper alterations were made, the world could establish a condition of "ecological stability" that would be sustainable far into the future.

The third conclusion was a view that the world could embark on this second path, but the sooner this effort started, the greater the chance would be of achieving this "ecologically stable" success.

The book, in its entirety, is beautifully written. It takes only a few hours to read. I would highly recommend it to anyone. It is an interesting mixture of simple, tried and true economic laws, combined with a terrific dose of logic. Without a doubt, there are some serious doomsday elements laid out which our world would face if the conclusions of this modeling work were ignored, and key trends continue to rise at exponential vs. linear rates. But, the book essentially lays out an optimistic outlook on how easily these limits to growth can be altered if a real effort to accomplish this is made at an early stage, rather than attempting such changes too late.

The most amazing aspect of the book is how accurate many of the basic trend extrapolation worries which ultimately give raise to the limits this book expresses still are, some 30 years later. In fact, for a work that has been derisively attacked by so many energy economists, a group whose own forecasting record has not stood the test of time very well, there was nothing that I could find in the book which has so far been even vaguely invalidated. To the contrary, the chilling warnings of how powerful exponential growth rate can be are right on track. The thesis that it is easy to misjudge this type of growth has also been proven by the volumes of misguided criticism that the report engendered.

The world is now 30 years into this 100-year view. It did grow as fast as the book warned. The gap between rich and poor never narrowed. Instead, the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots" grew by a significant measure. It is interesting to contemplate how horrified the book's authors would be today, given the population trends that happened post 1972. The current strain on many of our precious resources is already becoming serious. It would have been far worse by 2000, given the rate of expansion which happened to the world's poor population, had these people also begun to significantly improve their standard of living at the same time. An accidental safety valve for many potentially scarce resources turned out to be the widening of the rich/poor gap.

(...)"

Matt Simmons also had a very good review of both Limits to Growth and its critiques. You can find it here, it is very informative.

Now that, I have read before. But Simmons is untrustworthy on any technical topic, so his opinion doesn't carry any weight. I think its best just to stick with the original work and see what there is to see.

I won't go into the merits or demerits of either the book or Matt's criticism, then. but I reald Limits to Growth (and reread it recently) and it doesn't have any of the hyperbolic claims that its critics claim, ie. that all scenarios are doomer, etc.... Matt's echoes my own reading pretty well.

But I can't claim too much on the technical parts, I'm not an "expert" (I say this with a certain sardonic accent).

Again, having personally worked with one of the MIT professors who actually programmed the LTG model, Matt Simmons' review is a fair assessment of the LTG book.

As to whether he is an expert in all subjects, probably not, but neither is RGR nor most everyone else here - although Greer somehow seems to correctly understand the important parts of very many complex subjects.

The problems with academics is that they follow strictly numbers without considering those that are nonsensical. I know this since I made similar 'mistakes' when I was a young academic.

Consider the present thesis, quote:
Gas: For CASE 2 (URR best guess), peak production year varied from 2028, 2047 and 3034 for......
To give a precise years such as 3034 leads to discrediting the analysis. It is as if someone in the year 1024 predicted that in 2010 we would run out of candle wax for lightning our homes.
Does the author think that in 1000 years people worry about the shortage of oil as we are supposed to worry about the shortage of candle wax? The thesis lacks a disregard of future innovations.

I learned fast that nonsensical numbers must be discarded to strenghten the believability in the results.

I'm pretty sure the 3034 number is a typo, the author probably meant 2034, which is in line with the charts.

Shoot - that makes 3 typos found since printing it.

Out of curiosity, what might the technical review procedure for a thesis look like nowadays? I'm familiar with a pretty severe review process for publications myself and it tends to catch most of these types of errors, but my experience is limited to peer reviewed journals rather than thesis type work.

This paper is based on some pretty sketchy basic assumption, that the field model(HL and others) is correct based on the North Sea which peaked in 2000 and the USA which peaked in 1970 as well as the usual curve fitting obsession. The precise shape of field output is only guessed at.
The plain fact is we have not positively peaked yet for oil, gas and certainly not for coal, so plotting huge increases and declines after 2010 seems
very speculative.

A lot of the assumptions seem silly, like
Russia producing about as much coal as China or India producing as much as the USA. I think both of them are
producing at their limit now.

He's VERY high on the amount of natural gas at 17651 XJ or about 17,000 Tcf URR mostly conventional whereas USGS 2000 gives a total resource URR of 12,000 Tcf(1928 x 6000).
Similarly on oil,
he gives a best guess of 23,804 XJ or 4.1 trillion barrels of oil as URR.
In other words, he's incredibly bullish on oil and gas and ho-hum on coal reserves.
His low HL estimate is also quite high at 2.8 trillion barrels(versus ++699 Gb consumed in 2000 per USGS).
So I guess there's a great future in the oil industry for ChemEs.;->

http://energy.cr.usgs.gov/WEcont/chaps/RV.pdf

Less mathematics and more geology is called for.

Mohr includes unconventional resources, and the USGS study did not. It is therefore reasonable that his numbers should be higher, until someone quantifies the world unconventionals with the same level of detail and geologic involvement that the USGS did for conventionals.

Mohr's mean still higher than USGS 2000 at 2.35 trillion barrels(13412 XJ/5.7 GJ per barrel) of conventional oil versus 2.273 trillion by USGS.

USGS 2000 is considered quite high by many at TOD for conventional oil.
Really we shouldn't see a peak until past 2030 with that much oil.

Mohr thinks we will develop a lot of unconventional oil under his 'middle' scenario.

I think the USGS is due with a new assessment this year--should be interesting.
This will also be interesting as it will show how many G tons of CO2 will result from burning all that lovely fuel.
It would total to over 4000 Gt of CO2 but today we only put 30 Gt CO2 into the atmosphere per year.
The atmosphere today holds 3000 Gt of CO2 so emitting all that carbon should put us uncomfortably above 750 ppm CO2(we are at 380 ppm now).

It's an amazing amount of hydrocarbons.

Peak Oil?
Fuggetaboutit!

USGS 2000 mean estimate was 3 trillion.

And did not include the Orinoco heavy oils, that assessment came out only this year. Which means it is directly additive to the old total. So the new mean estimate would be in the vicinity of 3.5 trillion, and there are undoubtedly others which weren't counted as well.

.

390 ppm, 390 !!!

It is clear that he does a very intense effort for not being pessimist. Sometimes, it doesn't pay up (as is the case of oil), but other times, there is too much uncertainty out there to make the best case depressing.

Less mathematics and more geology is called for.

I don't know what this statement means.

I certainly do, and he is dead bang on right.

The problem is that no one has ever tried to do proper probability-based math in this area. Name some research not based on heuristics.

Name the practical value of ignoring the data in favor of "making it up as you go along" and I'll consider activating a statistician.

Oh...and to answer your question, I went into the office today, opened up the current issue of mathematical geology, and I think I found exactly what you asked for. If you want the reference let me know.

Mathematical Geology is now called Mathematical Geosciences. No sign of a relevant topic.

I know, but I've spent more time with it under the old name and like it better. Interested in the title and abstract just to see if it meets your requirements for research? The author of the article doesn't like actual data any better than you do, for a second I thought maybe you were out moonlighting.

The basic assumptions behind this thesis could be and most probably is way off the mark. Future world energy consumption will be dominated by a single country: China. The Chinese way of thinking about energy will be unpredictable when viewed from any past western perspectives and experience.

China will call the energy production and consumption tune this century. Their thumb is heavy on the world energy scale. The Chinese will conserve more energy then past western experience might project and have higher utilization efficiencies. They will displace coal use with nuclear power in a major way because they will not be affected by anti-nuclear propaganda and fear. The degree of renewable power production and usage will also be surprising to western analytical mentality. The author of this theses needs to go back to his drawing board and factor in recent Chinese energy consumption and production trends and directions as they are being currently portrayed, and become familiar with the plans and projections of the current Chinese leadership. Therein lays the path to accurate analysis.

China is merely the last great industrial power, crowded, polluted, and on severe overshoot.
It will probably be on the quick list to collapse, after Pakistan, India and Indonesia.

Would it be possible to post the graphs for total fossil fuel energy as well? I'm curious how much the "lumpy-ness" smooths out when all the sources are aggregated.

Thanks

There is a old thread Olduvai revisited 2008 which shows all fossil fuels

I was struck by how similar, with the exception of unconventional gas, the peaks of these models were to the ones developed by de Sousa and Mearns in Olduvai Revisited.

I am increasingly convinced that the past holds the keys out of our trap.
Since O'Neil worked out the business plan for colonisation of L5, we have discovered significant water on the moon. This makes the business plan even more viable.

An inexhaustible supply of non polluting energy would improve our prospects.
This is what O'Neil's plan offers.

Is it not worth another look?
It is my impression that the major powers are quietly moving in that direction, regardless.
It is so obvious.

An inexhaustible supply of non-polluting energy that we had better have the wisdom not to use on earth.

we had better have the wisdom not to use on earth.

The choices we have are not between good and evil but between evil and worse evil.
Between a trajectory that may lead to the extermination of all life on earth and one that may lead to banishment into deep space.

If we are lethally toxic to life on our mother planet, is it not our moral responsibility to remove ourselves?
I suspect that this is the choice of every nascent intelligence on all the 100 million life giving planets extrapolated from recent data from the Kepler space telescope.

If we have the answer and refuse to implement it, then we have to ask hard questions of our motivations.
Why do we insist on death?

It is too late to put the gene back into the bottle.
We may yearn for the innocence of our childhood, but the days when Mommy Nature fed our mouths and wiped our bottoms are over.

I have an even better idea: How about we send up into space all the robots, and all the machines, and all the pollution, and all the manufacturing, and all of the Ray Kurzweil types who want to download their brains into computers. Then leave those of us alone who are quite content to be human and to live with the human bodies and the natural environment that we evolved in and are adapted to.

A-freakin'-men!

You sound like a potential convert to the plain life. Come to Lancaster County PA and live in the 19th century. Farm land is expensive when you can buy it so bring lots of money. Nothing good comes cheap.

Ray Kurzweil types

Sitting on our hands and waiting for Kurzweiller's Singularity is not wise.
Hope is not a Battle Plan.

As far as downloading our brains into a computer, isn't that we are doing now, using a keyboard and clumsy English?

By the way, a potential solution to the interface problem is demonstrated here.

But we are wondering off topic.
What I see in the graphs are peaks, not solutions.

The problems have received plenty of air, what we need are solutions.
And so I offer O'Neils plan as the best candidate.

I have an even better idea: How about we send up into space all the robots, and all the machines, and all the pollution, and all the manufacturing, and all of the Ray Kurzweil types who want to download their brains into computers. Then leave those of us alone who are quite content to be human and to live with the human bodies and the natural environment that we evolved in and are adapted to.

We are in agreement.
Can We trust you with the stewardship of the planet?

Thanks Steve, interesting but very complicated. I'd also quite like to see the stacks for oil, gas and coal for cases 1, 2 and 3. It would also be nice to see all this in mmtoe - I'm afraid very few readers here will be able to provide criticism since EJ just don't mean that much - to me at any rate. One final request, can you give us a table 8.2 in bbls, BCM and tonnes and or in mmtoe so we can see what URR numbers you are using.

I'm a bit skeptical about the huge volumes of shale oil you have in your case 2 and 3 scenarios - especially case 3. You have an unconventional peak / volume that seems to match the conventional. Much easier to stick holes in Ghawar and let the oil flow than to mine and retort the stuff.

I was going to suggest restating in quads of BTU, but since 1 quad = 1.055 EJ, it isn't going to be all that different, really.

I've had this argument with Euan & others here more than once - and I will bang the table once again for a standardization of units!

In private correspondence with me last month, Yooon actually argued for EJs:
"I think to be correct we should use EJs - based on energy required to move given mass given distance. BTUs / quads is thermal based and difficult to relate to any standard."

Which is a good point. In any case, I don't like volumetric or weight measurements. I think ideally it would be a heat unit. However, with the push toward RE and PHEVs and so on, perhaps Wh is the best unit. We have to get away from MPG measures in vehicles. Wh seems the most universal & appropriate unit going forward.

But for now, I say stick with EJs (or quads) and wait for the geology fuddy-duddies with their old mtoe units to catch up. ;-)

To end on a more helpful note, here's a good bookmark: an Energy Conversion Calculator from Hess. Probably the most useful and comprehensive such online tool I've seen.

This is funny: I tried that energy conversion calculator. The very first thing I typed in was how much is 1 cf of natural gas in therms. It said 10,000,000 therms. I thought, that can't be right, so I turned it around and asked how much is 1 therm in cf. It said 100 cf. I have a bad first impression of this calculator!

Bleh! Well, so much for that. The search continues...

Bill Gates, Vinod Khosla Back Efficient Engine Startup EcoMotors

the company has been working to deliver a diesel engine by 2011 that can deliver 100 MPG for highway driving in a 5-passenger car.

http://earth2tech.com/2010/07/12/bill-gates-vinod-khosla-back-efficient-...

http://www.ecomotors.com/

If it has Bill Gates involved, a Blue Screen of Death is sure to be present--
Don't know if I would want to one of those 5 passengers---

Will there be a Start button to shut down the engine then? :-)

Interesting analysis. It does demonstrate quite convincingly that while the "invisible hand" of the marketplace makes a bit of a difference, it doesn't make that much of a difference. Finite resources are still finite.

And so much for coal lasting for centuries.

Just one nit-pick/request:

It would be less confusing if the same color code was used consistently for nations across all the graphs - at least for the countries that show up most consistently on most of the graphs.

Mmm, I know, I'm trying my best to destroy that particular bug - but its a tricky one (having to rewrite my post processor to do it :S).

The writer's alma mater is the University of Newcastle which is the centre for a large coal mining region,both for export and domestic power generation and chemical engineering is his forte.
That doesn't seem to be a very good starting point for an unbiased assessment of fossil fuels.

Regardless of all the pretty graphs,gas,like coal and oil,is a finite resource and the sooner we take meaningful and timely action to replace them with nonpolluting energy sources the better.

Perhaps Mr Mohr could apply his talent in that area.

Ouch. I did this PhD without any coal funding, my supervisor was kind enough to find a funding body (based in Perth) that was kind enough to support me (without any influence on my research topic or results). I refute any allegation of bias most strongly.

I chose this PhD because I believed it was the most important issue that I could make a contribution to with limited funds and time.

SMohr,I wasn't referring to the source of funding.I was referring to the culture which probably exists in your university,to some extent,at least.And that sort of BAU,growth at any cost culture exists in a lot of academia right across Australia.You may have come across it.So I am not especially singling out Newcastle or you although my comment may have read like that.

My apologies if you took my comments personally.Best wishes for future (unbiased) investigations.

I refute any allegation of bias most strongly.

Good for you. But don't worry about this crowd too much, there are those here who would accuse the Pope himself of being a satanist if he didn't instantly agree with whatever todays groupthink might be.

I always consider this a richly diverse topical area for thesis work. The amount of original research that I have worked out could conservatively fill out several dissertations. Bully on the thesie advisor at Newcastle for supporting Mohr's work.

Web, it appears Dr. Mohr already has a nice body of work, judging by the list of peer review articles from ASPO.

http://www.peakoil.net/publications/peer-reviewed-articles

I really miss living near Regenstein library in Chicago or U of M's in Minneapolis to be able to do research.

Is that the same Newcastle as in the famous ale?

Nah, he's 'University of Newcastle in Australia'. Neecassel Broone* is from Newcastle upon Tyne UK, Geordie Land (do not confuse with Newcastle-under-Lyme or Newcastle Emlyn) .

NAOM

*Newcastle Brown Ale For English speakers.

Oh for heaven's sake. Thirra, I'd encourage you to look up "ad hominem attack" in a good book on logic sometime, and note the reasons why it's considered a rhetorical cheap shot rather than a valid argument. If you want to counter Mohr's facts, please address them; don't simply use innuendo.

UK energy secretary Huhne: UK very likely to face oil shock before 2020. Only way out: invest heavily in efficiency + renewables: http://bit.ly/UKoilshk

Steve, thank you for a nicely done thesis! In case the fact's of interest, I'll be citing it as a source in my forthcoming book on the economics of peak oil.

cool! and here I was fearing no one would read it :p

This is certainly an interesting topic and thesis. However for global planning purposes it's important to get your URR right.

So I'm surprised that at least for your case 3, you have such low numbers for unconventional gas. It didn't take long to find this paper from the US National Petroleum Council.

http://www.npc.org/Study_Topic_Papers/29-TTG-Unconventional-Gas.pdf

After rounding to one significant figure, they predict world reserves for:

CBM: ~ 10000 EJ
Shale gas: ~ 20000 EJ
Tight Gas: ~ 8000 EH

Total 38000 EJ

As opposed to your case 3 numbers of:

CBM: 5000 EJ
Shale Gas: 3000 EJ
Tight Gas: 2000 EJ

Total 10000 EJ

So this paper predicts unconventional gas reserves to be 4 times greater than your numbers and over twice as much as conventional gas. I've found other believable documents with similar numbers for unconventional gas.

The link goes to an article that reiterates Rogners resource numbers (those numbers are widely quoted on the web but somewhere along the way people tend to state them as a reserve, rather than resource). (a 15% recovery factor was used - from memory - in the thesis)

Hi Steve,

I didn't realize that there is a recovery factor which needs to be applied to those numbers. Thanks for the clarification.

Most people aren't familiar with the difference. So the fundamental source for your numbers is Rogners work then?

Most people aren't familiar with the difference.

Here on TOD you can safely assume virtually everyone will be familiar with that distinction.

Oh I certainly don't think so. Its already been demonstrated that people around here don't even necessarily know what oil is, the probabilistic distinctions, let alone their deterministic cousins, for reserve and resource determinations certainly isn't something you can just safely say "virtually everyone will be familiar with that distinction".

To metaphorically throw some more fuel on the fire, there is a paper in Energy 35 (2010) 3109-3122 by Patzek and Croft "A global coal production forecast with multi-Hubbert cycle analysis" (behind pay-wall at http://tinyurl.com/24g9gel ) which predicts Peak Coal as "close to 2011".

The Limits To Growth authors were only modeling the modality (general trends) of resource and population factors, and yet if you use their base case scenario as an actual prediction, Peak Resources works out to be 2010. (see http://www.peakoil.org.au/limits.htm ) So there is no way their work has already been disproved by history, despite what the BAU people would like you to think.

Dave,
I suffer confirmation bias with your post.

What exactly is the term GERMAN EMPIRE in the first 4 graphs under COAL? I could understand this term, if applied to the late 1930's up to 1945. But the COAL graphs seem to show this entry extending well beyond 1945, up to nearly the year 2000 (or up to 1990 at a minimum). What can this possibly mean? Have I bumped into an alternate dimension or universe, where the outcome of WWII was quite different from the one I remember? Do such things get toggled when passing below the equator?

Have I bumped into an alternate dimension or universe

It happens to me all the time.
It can be confusing, but it is quite normal.

Perhaps he meant EU. It's a de facto German Empire variant. ;-)

1 Allianz Worldwide Insurance
2 DaimlerChrysler Consumer Durables
3 Deutsche Bank Group Banking
4 Deutsche Telekom Telecommunications Services
5 E.ON Utilities
6 Siemens Group Conglomerates
7 Munich Re Insurance
8 RWE Group Utilities
9 Deutsche Post Transportation
10 BMW Group Consumer Durables
11 Volkswagen Group Consumer Durables
12 BASF Group Chemicals
13 Commerzbank Banking
14 Bayer Group Chemicals
15 Metro AG Retailing
16 HVB Group Banking
17 ThyssenKrupp Group Conglomerates
18 Eurohypo Banking
19 SAP Software & Services
20 Continental Consumer Durables

Need I go on?

BTW, a sibling of mine is Director of Corporate Communications at one of the corporations on that list and tells me the Deutsche Empire is doing quite well, Danke!, It seems even the Greeks will have to agree, whether they like it or not...

In order to apply the model, I need production statistics for a region to be accurate. In particular I needed a geographic region to stay in the one location. Europe was tricky with numerous border changes. The German Empire is geographic region of modern Germany and Poland, the problem is that coal production statistics that should be grouped with Poland are grouped into Germany in pre 1914 statistics. I could not find statistics that could enable the Polish component to be separated from the Germany statistics. The amount of production is significant, so I was forced to combine the countries together. Similarly with Korean Peninsula, Austro-Hungarian Empire (Austria+Hungary+Czech rep.+Slovakia) and FSU. Appendix A in the thesis (which shows each individual country) explains this better.

The German Empire is geographic region of modern Germany and Poland, the problem is that coal production statistics that should be grouped with Poland are grouped into Germany in pre 1914 statistics.

Hmmm...

I gather you did enough research to get this right, but...

You do know that almost half of Poland today was part of Germany until 1945?
And, perhaps more importantly, that the portion of Lorraine controlled by the German Empire from 1871 to 1914 was annexed because of its coal?

Antarctica: Fact Sheet

The call for an environmental protocol to the Antarctic Treaty came after scientists discovered large deposits of natural resources such as coal, natural gas and offshore oil reserves in the early 1980s. Antarctica is considered to be part of the theoretical super-continent known as Gondwanaland, which separated near the end of the Paleozoic era and consisted of South America, Africa and Australia. And, because it once was completely covered in vegetation, many scientists believe it may hold one of the last supergiant oil fields yet to be discovered. The continental shelf of Antarctica is considered to hold the region's greatest potential for oil exploration projects, and although estimates vary as to the abundance of oil in Antarctica, the Weddell and Ross Sea areas alone are expected to possess 50 billion barrels of oil - an amount roughly equivalent to that of Alaska's estimated reserves. However, Antarctica's extreme conditions make oil field accessibility in many areas economically problematic.

Although it is locked up by treaty for 50 years, if the world becomes really short of hydrocarbons this is another reserve.

You mean as a temperate locale to live in after have the 'runaway train' of greenhouse gases has finally reached the 'tipping point?' Do you have any penguin recipes? I call beach front, although it could keep moving.

Antarctica is considered to be part of the theoretical super-continent known as Gondwanaland, which separated near the end of the Paleozoic era and consisted of South America, Africa and Australia.

The areas of South America, Africa, and Australia which were adjacent to Antarctica during its time in Gondwanaland are distinctly unproductive as far as oil is concerned. Why would anyone think Antarctica would be any better?

the Weddell and Ross Sea areas alone are expected to possess 50 billion barrels of oil - an amount roughly equivalent to that of Alaska's estimated reserves.

That is based on no geological evidence whatsoever. No one has ever found any oil or gas in Antarctica, nor has anyone ever done a survey to identify the potential, so how could anyone be able to estimate its reserves? The first oil discoveries in all other continents (and Alaska) were a result of oil seeps, and nobody has ever found an oil seep in Antarctica, so the initial signs are inauspicious.

98% of Antarctica is covered with ice, and nobody has the capability of drilling an oil well through a glacier (the ice movement would sheer off the pipe), so the onshore potential is zero. The Weddell and Ross Sea areas are the only areas where you might consider drilling a well, and even then the costs would be several times as high as other offshore areas.

Deepwater offshore, oil sands, and oil shales are in much less hostile areas, and while they are expensive, they wouldn't be nearly as expensive as Antarctic oil, if there is any. That's why the oil companies have never given Antarctica a second thought.

I guess you could dig a tunnel down the ice, into the rock surface, then make yourself a cave underneath the ice. As long as melt water doesn't get to you, then the problem is simpler, all you have to do is drill oil wells from inside this cave, separate the oil, re-inject the gas and water...and work hard to keep the shaft open. Which I guess eventually would become something like a long crack, with the older tip closing off due to the stress. Once the oil gets to the surface, you can pour it in a mold and make bricks, which can be flown out. Take the bricks to Chile, melt them, and pour oil into tiny 1 oz bottles, and then sell those as souvenirs - "Oil from Antarctica". Now all we need is some sort of tax subsidy to make it work.