Dr James Hansen: Can We Still Avoid Dangerous Human-Made Climate Change?
Posted by Chris Vernon on November 22, 2006 - 2:46pm in The Oil Drum: Europe
Topic: Environment/Sustainability
Tags: carbon dioxide, climate change, coal, global warming, james hansen [list all tags]
Hansen was speaking on climate change but I did have the opportunity to ask him about peak oil.
Dr James Hansen (image source NYT)
The world has experienced 0.8°C global average temperature rise over the last century with 0.6°C of that occurring over the last 30 years. Figure 1 illustrates the temperature anomalies of the 1st half decade of this century over the 1951-‘80 average.
Figure 1
It is exactly what one would expect from forced climate change, the increase is larger over the land due to the thermal inertia of the oceans and it is larger at higher latitudes than low latitudes due to positive feedbacks.
Forcings and the paleoclimate
Hansen’s expertise lies partially in radiative transfer in planetary atmospheres, a large part of his lecture addressed climatic forcing. Looking back at paleoclimatic data enables an understanding of climatic forcing to be developed. Figure 2 shows the familiar Vostok ice core temperature data, illustrating the variation between the last ice age and the start of the Holocene, two periods when the planet was in radiation balance.
Figure 2
The reason for the temperature difference during these two periods? The climate forcing, mainly of increased ice sheets and reduced greenhouse gas concentrations. Figure 3 calculates the global equilibrium climatic sensitivity to climate forcing producing a result of ~3/4°C per W/m2.
Figure 3
This result is easily checked back through time as we have pretty accurate (±12m on a variance of 100m) historic sea level data from which ice sheet area can be calculated and the ice cores provide historic greenhouse gas concentrations. He didn’t mention it but I gather it is trivial to work out the forcing (W/m2) from ice sheet area and greenhouse gas concentrations. Given these forcings and the previous results of 3/4°C per W/m2, global temperatures can be calculated. Comparing this calculation with the observed temperatures from ice cores shows how just these two forcings account remarkably well for the temperature changes.
Hansen made another point about the temperature changes and greenhouse gas concentration changes, specifically the temporal relationship between them. Data on both can be obtained from the same ice core with high relative temporal accuracy, with only a need to correct for the time it takes between fluffy snow falling and solid ice forming impervious bubbles (the air is younger than the ice, the temperature data comes from the ice and the gas data comes from the trapped air). Comparing the temperature change and gas concentrations Hansen said:
The correlation is maximum when there is a 700 year lag, the temperature leads the greenhouse gas change. So the greenhouse gas changes are a feedback of the climate change.That was news to me.
The conclusions from this part of the lecture were that greenhouse gases and ice area are the chief mechanisms for paleoclimatic changes, however they were “merely” feedbacks from the instigators of climate change which Hansen describes as orbital variations, other small forcings and chaos, stressing the fact that long term climate is very sensitive to very small forcings.
The system is different now though as humans have taken control of one of the main mechanisms through our emissions of greenhouse gases.
At this point Hansen criticised Al Gore’s presentation in An Inconvenient Truth of current greenhouse gas concentrations in comparison to paleo concentrations. Saying Gore was wrong to suggest the temperature change we are likely to experience from current concentrations is proportional to that seen in the paleoclimate. Those paleoclimate changes were predominately driven by ice cover, which as long as Greenland and Antarctica stay roughly the same size isn’t a major factor now and also aerosols which had scope to reduce their cooling contribution as climate changed from cold/dry=dusty to warm wet.
Dangerous Climate Change
So what is dangerous climate change? Surprisingly there doesn’t seem to be very much research on this. Hansen suggested the following metrics to characterise climate change:
- Extermination of animal and plant species, specifically polar and alpine species and those suffering unsustainable migration rates.
- Ice sheet disintegration, leading to long term deviations from paleoclimate data and sea level rise.
- Regional changes including droughts and floods.
For the last 30 years temperatures have risen by 0.2°C per decade. Over northern hemisphere land areas a given isotherm is moving forward at a rate of 50km per decade. A study of 1,700 species found that in the last half of the 20th century the average migration rate forward was about 6km per decade, much slower than the rate the isotherms were moving.Hansen suggested a 3°C warming from where we are now would result in a likely species extinction rate of 50%. 3°C was described as the business as usual scenario. The “Alternative” scenario with falling CO2 emissions and only 1°C temperature increase would result in a likely species extinction rate of 10%.
Greenland
Greenland received particular attention. Three points:
- The area of Greenland experiencing summer melting is increasing at around 0.7% per year with 2005 setting the record melt. This melt water serves as lubrication speeding up the transport of ice to the ocean.
- The GRACE satellite can measure the mass of Greenland ice sheet and is showing a reduction of 162±22km3/yr over recent years.
- The number of ice-quakes, similar to earthquakes and caused by ice sheets suddenly surging forward, has increased markedly. The seismic magnitudes are in the range 4.5 to 5.1 and they are located at the mouths of ice flows discharging ice into the ocean. See figure 4.
Figure 4Hansen believes the IPCC are conservative with their estimations for sea level rise as they only consider thermal expansion and alpine glacier melt, believing the major ice sheets to be in approximate mass equilibrium and taking millennia to respond. He suggested ice sheet disintegration may start slowly but multiple positive feedbacks can lead to rapid non-linear collapse, noting the equilibrium sea level rise for 3°C warming is 25±10m.
Fossil Fuel
The dominant forcing now at work is human CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. Figure 5 shows historic CO2 emissions from fossil fuels which we are familiar with.
Figure 5When looking forward things became interesting, Hansen suggesting it is feasible to contain CO2 emissions, chiefly because the reservoirs of oil and gas are limited. Figure 6 indicates the potential carbon contributions from oil and gas. This, coupled with the decay of CO2 emissions means that the combustion of remaining oil and gas aren’t critical to climate change.
Figure 6, Click to enlarge.The problem lies squarely with Coal. Hansen’s plan for dealing with coal?
- Sequester CO2 at new coal power plants after 2012/2022 in developed/developing countries
- Bulldoze Coal Power Plants without sequestration during 2025-2050
- Stretch oil/gas via slowly increasing carbon tax, avoiding use of non-conventional fossil fuels, permitting time to develop non-CO2 technologies
Figure 7 illustrates the source of future atmospheric CO2 under such a plan. Interestingly this seems to indicate oil and gas peak around 2030 (the point where the gradient of the oil and gas lines dips below 1, but it's not really clear) although it could be sooner that this if one considers falling EROI leading to increased CO2 per barrel post peak more than offsetting the reduced extraction.
Figure 7Contrast this with the business as usual (figure 8) scenario, noting the assumed 2% decline after 50% depletion.
Figure 8What Hansen is saying is that the remaining oil and gas can be burnt whilst limiting atmospheric CO2 to ~450ppm and incremental temperature increase to only 1°C, which really should be the limit unless we want to live on a very different planet. The challenge is that the oil and gas combustion use most of the 450ppm limit, the key therefore is CO2 sequestration or abstinence from coal and unconventional fossil fuels.
This was confirmed in the Q&A session. I asked Hansen his opinion on oil peak within a decade and impacts of peak oil on climate change. He replied that he expects to see oil peak within 20 years as we would have passed the 50% point by then adding, in that case we can probably live with the CO2 emissions from oil without hitting 450ppm. However he did stress the point that we have to start emphasising conservation and efficiency by taxing emissions otherwise we will start squeezing oil/gas from unconventional sources such as shale oil and tar sands. That is something we absolutely can not afford to do.
Someone else asked about aviation growth to which Hansen again replied the climate could probably afford a few more decades of aviation growth, given we address power plants and vehicles.
So where do these views leave us with respect to peak oil and climate change. Perhaps Hansen is right. We can (and I expect will) burn all the oil and gas we can get our hands on, as fast as possible without condemning ourselves to dangerous climate change, if and it’s an incredibly big if, we can get away from coal (and unconventional oil), or at least the CO2 emissions. In some ways this is encouraging as coal is used virtually exclusively for electricity and it is electricity where we have a wealth of potential alternatives: coal with sequestration, wind, hydro, wave, tidal, nuclear fission, solar etc. If we accept that it is physically impossible (maybe unconventional oil will never amount to more than 5mbpd?) to burn enough oil and gas to cause dangerous climate change then the climate change debate needs to be refocused away from SUVs and cheap flights and onto electricity demand, clean coal and other non-CO2 sources of electricity. Can we just let peak oil take care of oil and gas emissions and only pro-actively address coal?
Of course this is only emissions, there are other reasons to try as hard as we can to reduce our reliance on oil and gas. Chiefly due to peak oil and gas inevitably reducing supply and it being easier to choose reduced consumption than to be forced to consume less.
The slides (not for this specific lecture) but for virtually the same lecture given recently are available on Hansen's Columbia University page.
Additional
This view that there isn’t enough oil and gas to cause dangerous climate change is in line with what Anders Sivertsson, Kjell Aleklett and Colin Campbell of Uppsala University published in New Scientist (Oct 2003): ’Too little’ oil for global warmingAlthough estimates of oil and gas reserves vary widely, the researchers are part of a growing group of experts who believe that oil supplies will peak as soon as 2010, and gas soon after (New Scientist print edition, 2 August 2003).
Their analysis suggests that oil and gas reserves combined amount to the equivalent of about 3500 billion barrels of oil - considerably less than the 5000 billion barrels estimated in the most optimistic model envisaged by the IPCC.
The worst-case scenario sees 18,000 billion barrels of oil and gas being burnt - five times the amount the researchers believe is left. "That's completely unrealistic," says Aleklett. Even the average forecast of about 8000 billion barrels is more than twice the Swedish estimate of the world's remaining reserves.
Your conclusion is very inducive :
"Can we just let peak oil take care of oil and gas emissions and only pro-actively address coal? "
We cannot really. Climate change is not yet under control ; there are so many positive and negative feed-backs that we will not be sure of the final temperature until we reach it - a bit like modern weather reports.
That means we must address the issue asap, knowing that "asap" means one or two decades, because "modern" CO2 plants with CCS will not be built before another 7 years on a regular basis, and when they are available, some countries will not accept to pay the additional 30% to sequester.
You did point at an important issue : we do not know what will happen at + 3°C. We have to study our biosphere area by area, including zones where we know little (oceans). Some results do float to the surface, like the anopheles mosquito being accustomed to Central Europe, including the UK, but little is actually known. Few specialists will venture into the "50% biodiversity lost" hypothesis, for fear of too obvious results.
As a side note, it seems to me that the slides 7 and 8 show a very optimistic gas and oil trail post-2100.
There are a few issues to deal with:
1) Note on fig. 2, the temperature charts for the past several interglacials, that trough to peak involves temperature changes of 10 deg. C., or 18 F. Note also that in all but the Holocene there were immediate and progressive declines in warmth, as the interglacial slid inexorably back into the grinding ice age.
If not for anthropomorphic changes since the ancient Greeks, we would probably right now be sliding back into a world where ice sheets were grinding Canada and northern Europe back down to bedrock. As Greg Easterbrook noted in "A Moment on the Earth," an ice sheet is an environmental catastrophe in anyone's book.
If CO2 emissions do not continue to progressively expand after PO, we may actually arrive at a happy medium; no new ice age, and no run away greenhouse warming.
2) I really have to dispute Dr. Hanson's guesstimate about a "50% extinction rate" caused by a 3 deg. C. rise in temp. As noted above in fig 2, the world has periodically seen rapid temperature rises of three times that amount (admittedly from a lower threshold).
We know from the Younger Dryas, as well from earlier temperature shocks, that these changes have happened with startling rapidity, and yet the 17 or so interglacials saw few extinctions until the beginning of the Holocene, which saw an enormous die off of mega fauna, but few changes in micro fauna. (As Tim Flannery put it in "North America: The Eternal Frontier" -- 65 million years of ecological history -- the megafauna disappeared into a black hole; the black hole between the nose and chin of paleolithic hunters.)
3) Note in fig. 6; there is a 50% decline of CO2 levels (from emissions) in a mere 20 years. 66% reduction in a century, and 78% in 500 years. If an economic crash accompanies PO, GW gas emissions will decline markedly. CO2 levels will have more time to balance. Also, with a crash it will be far more difficult to come up with investment capital to figure out how to exploit shale oil and methane hydrates.
4)which brings us to coal. As Dr. Hanson shows, oil and gas aren't as likely to destroy the climate, but coal may. This suggests two very different objectives:
a) It is imperative that we funnel money and political power to those forces opposing mountain top removal, and which block greater coal exploitation. Further, we need to oppose switching transportation from oil to coal based electricity.
b) We need to be honest about the psychological division in each of our minds. On the one hand we are horrified by runaway climate warming, but we also are horrified by the prospect that PO may cause our global economy to collapse.
This isn't just on our site; it pervades institutional thinking, as typified by The Economist. The Economist has gotten the bug on stopping global warming, but they are not only in denial about PO, but they favor doing everything in their power to increase power supplies to increase the chances for exponential economic growth.
We can't have it both ways. If we demand exponential economic growth (and what other kind is there?) then we must accept all the consequences of global warming and the literal rape of the land from strip mining. But if we accept the limitations of both global warming and PO, then we must radically change our conception of what constitutes an acceptable economic model.
In spite of projections close to CERA's, it's getting harder and harder to sustain the CO2 concentration scenarios used by these people up to now.
Of course they still need to check their coal projections, peaking by the end of the century, almost 50 years later than technical projections.
Still, even if the Business-As-Usual scenario comes to be true for Coal, we'll pass the 500 ppm mark well in to the second half of the century. That leaves Peak Oil clearly as a much more pressing problem than CO2 emissions.
CO2 emissions is a problem now. Because the feedback effects could kill us. By the time we take action, the biosphere could already have lost its capacity to restore the damage.
And because it will take so long to deal with the CO2 emissions of very long lived equipment: power plants last 50 years, cars last 15 years, planes last 30+ years, etc. China has something like 100 coal plants under construction, and once built, carbon sequestration is that much harder to implement (to the point where it will probably never be implemented on those plants).
Peak oil? It's a big unknown. My own view is that we will hit PO (by the definition of an exhaustible resource) but more likely in 2020-30 than on Thanksgiving Day 2005 (Deffyes' date, I believe).
There are a *lot
of alternatives to conventionally produced oil out there: tar sands in Canada, heavy oil in Venezuala, the Fischer-Tropf coal-to-oil process, NGLs. All of these can, and will be scaled heavily (Canada alone will be 5 m b/d). And there is still Arctic oil, deep water oil, plus further exploration and production in Africa.But note the CO2 consequences of widespread coal-to-oil projects.
The state-owned oil companies that control most of the world's oil resources are underinvested and undermanaged. Saudi Aramco is perhaps the best, but in Mexico, Russia, Iran, Venezuala etc, there are serious issues. So there is likely to be more oil squeezed out there.
* peak gas, or at least accessible peak gas, worries me more, oddly. We can substitute gas for oil in a lot of applications, but we don't have ready substitutes for gas (except more coal!). And from Simmons gas graphs at least, 'old gas fields don't fade away, they just die'. We don't readily have the transport infrastructure to get the gas from where it is, to where it is needed, even if we do have that gas.
Your view is not supported either by data or mathematics. There's presently no information to counter the reasoning that we've passed the midpoint of depletion for Convencional Oil in 2005.
You should also explain that increase in Unconventional Oil production if you're aware of the Gas constraints in America.
Oil demand has risen since then. Inventories haven't fallen, as far as I am aware.
Prices have fallen.
If you have rising demand, and stable inventories, then supply has risen.
There is enough gas in Canada for tar sands needs, especially if you count in the Mackenzie Delta and Arctic gas reserves. There might not be enough gas to keep Ontario's lights on, but there is enough gas for tar sands.
Totale is looking at building a nuclear reactor in the tar sands to supply steam.
Luis is talking about conventional oil.
How long tar sands production/unconventional sources can keep up with a 4-5% decline rate in conventional oil production is the big question.
Sorry folks, but it looks like basic supply and demand laws are functioning... and will be at least for the observable future.
LOL - I missed this gem.
Please set the scene for us at the Empire Club as the PM of Canada attempts to explain to his audience that in order for tar sand ops to continue, they must freeze!
NRCAN pegs a 'possible' tripling of production to 3mmbbl/d by 2020 but I highly doubt that as water and NatGas usage rates (let alone the fact that we are using gold to make lead) are completely unsustainable.
The GHG impact of the whole affair accounts for 1/3 of total Canadian inputs - 1/3!
Suffice to say there are already calls for a moratorium on expansion by the city, native groups, greens and opposition parties alike.
I agree by 2020 3m b/d is pushing the infrastructure to its limits. But by 2040 or so, 5m b/d seems very possible.
On the natural gas question, what I have is the data point that 0.8 mcf is needed to produce one barrel of oil from tar sands. (that was in the fact sheet for one of the income trusts).
5m b/d is 1.825bn b/d pa, which is therefore 1.46bn mcf. I haven't done the reserves comparison (which would have to include the Mackenzie Delta and offshore Arctic Reserves) but this doesn't seem to be impossible. And there is the possibility of using 'mini nuke' nuclear reactors as steam sources.
Water is tricky, but again not impossible. 1. better recycling of water 2. pipe it from further away.
I suspect carbon sequestration will be used for the later plants, to reduce CO2 emissions.
At some price for oil, the political constraints can be bought off. As Alberta's population rises, it will get more and more difficult for a Federal Government to ignore that electoral impact, and Alberta itself needs that development and investment. When the Feds and the Provinces get aligned, things happen (think the reforms to the Canada Pension Plan).
This statement is nonsensical, moreover, you completely hand wave the moratorium calls away.
Meanwhile, the Mackenzie Delta pipeline is already held up by the D'nay nation nor have we covered how said pipeline is going to traverse a tundra of buckling permafrost.
At the current slope of the CO2 line, we will pass 500 ppm in 85 years.
But at the rate at which CO2 emissions are increasing, (the second derivative), it will be less than 50 years-- the rate of CO2 emissions is accelerating.
Assuming world GDP grows in the next 44 years as it has since 1950 (2.2% pa real) then world GDP will be 2.7 times what it is now in 2050. At the post 1990 rate (2.9%) it will be something like 3.7 times.
That would imply a CO2 growth pa of something like 4-5ppm (ie rising less quickly than GDP).
What the Stern Review says is that scientists think 450ppm is probably the safe level, beyond which we should not go.
It then says that is no longer practicable or achievable, so it assumes 550ppm is what we should aim for.
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/999/76/CLOSED_SHORT_executive_summary.pdf
If we hit Peak Oil, my suspicion is that CO2 emissions will accelerate because the only practical substitute with current technology is coal.
You should read a bit more of the information here at TOD to understand how unlikely that is.
The structural danger is global warming (because of the uncertainty of a planet with a radically destabilised climate).
Peak Oil? Some day. When I don't think anyone knows.
* remembering what compound growth does. a 1% change pa, sustained, has huge consequences
Matt Simmons once said: "I'm sixty, I've never needed medical care; can I say that I'll never need to go to the doctor?"
Of course he can't, at least with the pathologist he has an appointment.
I'm getting weary of this cornucopian discourse. I'd recommend the reading of prof. Ayres' work or of prof. Charlie Hall.
At least you seem to know that it won't be in the next decade (contrary to maths).
It will come (definition of an exhaustible resource). At which point we will be forced onto backstop technologies (whose primary danger is that they produce CO2 in massive quantities). The Chinese are already going down this route.*
What I do know is that many of the world's oil fields are currently exploited with bad technology. There is no way that the kind of intense effort that has been brought to the North American market has been brought to Russia, the Middle East and Africa or even parts of Latin America.
How much there is out there I don't think anyone knows. I don't buy 'cornucopian' arguments but I don't buy doomsayer ones either.
* as I said previously, peak gas worries me a bit more. Because the underlying hypothesis, that we have 20 years more gas than oil might be wrong, and (anecdotally from Simmons) gas production falls off much faster than oil production. And the world's gas is not as easily accessible because of the infrastructure issues. And gas is the clean fuel-- the alternatives are all dirtier.
PO is threatening us to lose some quality of life (good bye SUVs), being of suspicios value anyway. GW is threatening the very ecosystem we live in. And yes, I'm also worried, actually horrified by people thinking that the natural constraints on production will "do the job for us" as long as handling GW.
Left unchecked the immediate answer to PO will be coal and tar sands. Statements like "we will never reach 5 mln.bpd from tar sand" are naive, even more - they are close to irresponsible. Never? Do you have any idea how our spoiled society will react to $200/barrel and gasoline rationing? If we dare to face it, the really "incovenient truth" is that we have 40,000 billion boe of fossil fuels, readily accessible in the ground. Some time in future we will add oil shales and gas hydrates to this, likely rounding that to 100,000 bboe. We've burnt just 2,000 or just 2% so far, burning the rest 98%, or converting one form to another is just a matter of scale and economic incentative which will certainly appear. We know how to do it, what on earth do you think will stop us from doing it?
As I understand it, the reactors in question are RBMK designs? ie graphite core? But with a different cooling system than Chernobyl? That's an argument for close monitoring (as you said: 1 bn euros already spent on additional safety features) not for shutdown.
Whilst you and I have argued the toss on new nukes, I am the first to admit that existing plants should be run for as long as feasible, as the alternatives are entirely unpalatable (bunker oil, lignite, etc.) especially given the looming Sibero-European gas shortage.
If you live in Atlanta now you might find the chapter on the Southern Company quite interesting in the book below-- it's a good light read, well written if layman-oriented (paperback out soon). I would be the first to admit that persuading them to build new nukes, in place of old coal, is a good idea!
http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.com/catalog/titledetail.cfm?titleNumber=688428
http://www.amazon.com/Big-Coal-Behind-Americas-Future/dp/0618319409
http://www.globalpublicmedia.com/interviews/709
Nope. No RBMK reactors were built outside former USSR. The reactors in question are of the VVER-440 type, a predaccessor of VVER-1000, which is currently the standart of the Russian nuclear industry.
RBMK is a dual-purpose fast neutron reactor and therefore the soviets were not interested in exporting the technology. How close were the relations with the former socialist block, USSR wanted to keep a monopoly on the nuclear weapons and did not want other countries to get the ability to produce plutonium.
AFAIK the only functional RBMK reactor outside Russia now is in Ignalina, Lithuania due to be closed down in 2009 (the first unit was closed in 2005, and the last reactor from the Chernobyl plant was closed down recently).
The Balkan situation for this winter is quite worrisome indeed, but probably will be alleviated to some extent next year after Romania starts its reactor in Cherna Voda. My relatives are reporting for electricity price hikes which are hitting the lower and middle class quite badly (the average income stands at ~200 euro/month, while electricity rates have gone up to euro 0.11c/kwth recently). The problem promises to be excaberated by the problems with import of coal from Russia and Ukraine. The whole region lacks NG and oil reservs, while coal is small and of poor quality.
OTOH the question is a little bit overblown by the bulgarian authorities, which hope to achieve some renegotiation of the agreements with EU, or at least to postpone the closure of the 2 units. I have to scoff at this, because the reality is that they missed the train by some 10 years for this; trying to catch it now is not improving a lot our image within the EU.
The good news is that the 2 1000MW units in Belene are in an advanced preparation stage and will most likely be built withing 5 to 7 years.
Nothing wrong with the basic design (a friend of mine works for NASA: the Russians are good at big technology like rockets, better rocket boosters in some ways than the Americans-- they don't take huge leaps, do everything by increments)
but
the Soviets (better word) let themselves down on maintenance, operation, safety.
And there was an arrogance re design, eg in the absence of a proper containment building.
In Eastern Europe there is really no easy alternative to nuclear. There is coal, but we all know the problems with that. And there is Russian gas, which the Russians themselves don't have enough of (and are prepared to play politics with Ukraine about).
Wind is pretty much a nonstarter, I think (memories of the European wind atlas, the wind resource is at the fringes of the European continent, not at its heart). Ditto solar (except for water heating, where Bulgaria should be in a good position?).
Hydro the problem is the snow melt is not reliable-- I know this is the problem in Greece. So the Greeks use lignite -- ugh.
Crete and some of the islands are good for wind. Although there are migratory bird routes. When I was in Crete I noticed that there main power plant is an oil fired thing-- you can see the layer of haze across Heraklion Bay. It is a natural for more wind and for pumped storage, and helpfully, the locals don't think windmills are a blot.
true enough. I can argue though that Chernobyl was such a huge hit to their self-esteem they are still trying to recover. It is of course a bare statement but according to some sources I've read the current state of the Russian nuclear industry (in terms of safety and maintainance) is at least equal to its western competitors. Unfortunatley much of the evolution in thinking comes after a crisis has been reached...
There is coal
Coal and hydro are pretty much utilised. Some excess of coal is left in Poland and Ukraine, but is not that much. NG fortunately is used only for heating and industrial applications.
except for water heating, where Bulgaria should be in a good position?
Hmmmm could be valid for Greece, but hardly Bg. The country is too far from the Gulf Stream and the climate is typical continental - hot summers, cold winters. The average sunshine is not that good. There has been a shift of the climate recently to more tropical - with longer rainy summers, but the winters seem to be getting colder and drier. The wonders of climate change.
Wind is pretty much a nonstarter
In theory we can build some wind, but in practice it is hardly an option. It is too expensive energy source for short of cash countries to choose (after you count all costs) and the only significant resources are offshore - not an option for Hungary or Chech Republic of course.
Overall we don't really have much choices other than nuclear (or building some additional coal). The region is hoping for a healthy economic growth and the energy problems need to be addressed sooner rather than later.
It's obvious from your post that you have absolutely no knowledge on the subject.
Natural Resources Canada predicts that maybe, tar sand production will hit 3mmbbl/d by 2020 - maybe. An assertion from the Federal 06' Energy Outlook based entirely on below ground assumptions of existing ops.
Water, Nat/Gas decline, infrastructure, labor, cost, EROEI, GW and public sentiment as far as GHG emmissions are concerned are just some of the factors NOT considered in this outlook.
The city of Fort McMurray wants a moratorium, the native peoples want a moratorium, the NDP want a moratorium, environmental groups want a moratorium, all want a moratorium until such time as the stated factors above can be addressed.
And you call my statement (which didn't include the word 'never') naive and irresponsible?
If you just allow a friendly advice - be careful when you base your long term predictions on circumstances which may turn out rather short-lived.
As soon as domestic sources are maxed out, it's going to lose a large part of its appeal (especially for electricity generation) and of course its respective domestic lobby, so this would be the best opportunity for carbon free alternatives to substantially gain ground. Many European countries are already on that trajectory.
As soon as the Chinese coal production tops off, the world coal peak is probably not too far off. Maybe not if the US as the country with the largest coal reserves goes coal to liquids in a really major way. But i suspect they will be simply too broke at that point in time to be able to afford that on a scale that would make a difference even if the political class really wanted to go for it (after all ctl technology isn't cheap, and the amounts needed would be humongous).
Kazakhstan is next to China. It's moot whether you produce coal in Wyoming, and ship it to Georgia (domestic production) or in Saskatchewan and ship it to Alabama (foreign trade). Kazakhstan-China is the same.
(for that matter India, the world's 3rd largest coal reserves, is next door to China albeit with a mountain range in the way!-- but I think there is a railway through Assam).
Most of the coal burnt in the UK comes in by ship from Columbia and Australia, you could ship Indian coal to the Chinese power plants that way.
Coal is a global commodity. One of the most global commodities. It was called 'sea coal' in British history not because it came from the sea, but because it was shipped by sea from Newcastle (hence 'shipping coal to Newcastle') to London.
You might see 'peak coal' on anthracite for steel making. Metallurgical coal is a relatively rare beast.
But ordinary coal? Not this side of 2100 I don't think.
* caveat: there's no such thing as infinite exponential growth. But the problem of coal burning is one of CO2 emitted now, that will change the climate for the next few centuries. If we get to 2100, and we haven't destroyed the planet, then we will be using some form of solar power to run our civilisation ('solar' broadly defined: ie wind, wave, geothermal, solar power satellites, controlled nuclear fusion etc.)
.*
actually we use 'solar' power now, it just happens to be the solar rays of the Carboniferous period.