The Top Twenty Fields: Are They in Decline?
Posted by Prof. Goose on April 17, 2006 - 11:01am
Taking the lead from this thread over at peakoil.com, I thought a discussion of whether or not the top 20 fields were in decline, and then consolidating that into a reference resource would be a good idea. Under the fold is the list they put together.
(click here to see the peakoil.com thread for the resources they have used to this point. I will update as we make progress in the comment threads.)
13b. Kashagan Unknown
1. Ghawar Unknown
2a. Burgan CONFIRMED DECLINE ~14%
2b. Cantarell CONFIRMED DECLINE ~14%
- Bolivar Coastal Unknown
- Safaniya-Khafji Unknown
- Rumaila Unknown
- Tengiz Unknown
- Ahwaz Unknown
- Kirkuk Decline - (smiley)
- Marun Unknown
- Gachsaran Unknown
- Aghajari Unknown
- Samotlor CONFIRMED DECLINE ~ 9%
13b. Kashagan Unknown
- Abqaiq I don't know, but have you seen the cross section? It's all water!
- Romashkino Unknown
- Chicontepec Unknown
- Berri Unknown
- Zakum Unknown
- Manifa Unknown
- Faroozan-Marjan Unknown
- Marlim, Campos Unknown
“What gets us into trouble is not what we don't know, it's what we know for sure that just ain't so.”
—Mark Twain
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But maybe, the inattention is ultimately due to the fact that the National Oil Companies in so many countries are being so tight-lipped with regard to this date. I guess this is exactly what Matt Simmons is talking about in his well-known crusade for data-transparency.
I think the issue is we don't have the data, which points out the problem.
http://www.peakoil.net/AIMseminar/UU_AIM_Robelius.pdf
Similar but not the same as in the intro.
Simmon's "Twilight" book has a list of top 33 fields in the world and their production in 1971 and 2000 (when available). I put a # by the ones showing a decrease using his table, or that show a decrease from 1970s to 2000 by comparing 2 tables in his book. Most don't have data at both time points to compare.
I put a star by the fields we know are peaking now, a question by ones we think are peaking:
Top 18 Giant Fields
Field Name Country Discovery year Range of URR [GB]
Ghawar Saudi Arabia 1948 66-100 ?
Burgan Greater Kuwait 1938 32-60 *
Safaniya Saudi Arabia 1951 21-36 #
Bolivar Coastal Venezuela 1917 14-36
Berri Saudi Arabia 1964 10-25 #
Rumalia N&S Iraq 1953 22
Zakum Abu Dhabi 1964 17-21
Cantarell Mexico 1976 11-20 *
Manifa Saudi Arabia 1957 17
Kirkuk Iraq 1927 16 #
Gashsaran Iran 1928 12-15
Abqaiq Saudi Arabia 1941 10-15 #
Ahwaz Iran 1958 13-15
Marun Iran 1963 12-14
Samotlor Russia 1961 6-14 *
Agha Jari Iran 1937 6-14
Zuluf Saudi Arabia 1965 12-14
Prudhoe Bay Alaska 1969 13 *
Other than what I've noted, after much searching (mostl Google), it seems very difficult to get specific production rates, esp from Iran. However, just glancing down the list it is clear that declining fields are not an exception in this group.
http://cnn.netscape.cnn.com/news/story.jsp?idq=/ff/story/0002/20060417/0347311525.htm
Excerpt:
"Oil prices have risen more than 20 percent since mid-February, despite sizable U.S. crude inventories, as geo-political fears compounded fundamental worries that refiners might struggle to make enough gasoline for the summer driving season."
Guess what else happened in mid-February? Total net US imports started falling. The following numbers are weekly, not four week running averages. The week ending 2/10/06 showed average daily net oil imports of 13,396,000 bpd. Seven of the subsequent weeks have shown declines. The most current weekly data show 11,634,000 bpd. This is a decline of 13.2%. (The same period last year showed about a 3.7% decline.)
Looking at a slightly bigger picture, 12/30/05 to 4/7/06 (four week running average) we saw a decline of 8.7% (versus an increase in imports for the same time period last year).
Note that we don't know what percentage of crude oil inventories consists of heavy, sour crude. Also, total product inventories are only up 2.9% year over year. But fundamentally, what do you expect to see at peak production? I expect to see peak everything, followed by a permanent and irreversible decline in conventional oil production. Note that the EIA data show that world crude + condensate production was down by close to 500,000 bpd from 12/05 to 1/06 (versus an increase last year), following the all time record high number in December. What did Deffeyes have to say about December?
If refiners don't need the imports, why are they bidding up the price?
Might imports be falling because inventories are high?
Seems like the price is whatever the market will bear.
This makes sense to me. However, I would think that you would see a price difference between the different grades of oil. Light, sweet should be priced much higher than historic norms when looking at the difference in price between light, sweet and heavy, sour.
So, I downloaded oil price data on SA light and SA heavy between 1978 and April 2006.
Year LIGHT OIL HEAVY OIL Diff % Diff
1978-Jan 12.70 12.02 0.68 5.6572
1989-Jan 13.15 11.90 1.25 10.5042
1990-Jan 18.40 17.15 1.25 7.2886
1991-Jan 24.00 20.00 4.00 20.0000
1992-Jan 15.90 13.15 2.75 20.9125
1993-Jan 16.80 14.40 2.40 16.6667
1994-Jan 12.40 10.10 2.30 22.7723
1995-Jan 16.63 15.13 1.50 9.9141
1996-Jan 18.20 17.05 1.15 6.7449
1997-Jan 22.98 21.08 1.90 9.0133
1997-Feb 21.55 19.65 1.90 9.6692
1997-Mar 18.65 16.75 1.90 11.3433
1997-Apr 18.33 16.48 1.85 11.2257
1997-May 18.25 16.40 1.85 11.2805
1997-Jun 18.92 17.17 1.75 10.1922
1997-Jul 18.15 16.40 1.75 10.6707
1997-Aug 18.27 16.67 1.60 9.5981
1997-Sep 17.88 16.77 1.11 6.6190
1997-Oct 19.13 18.03 1.10 6.1009
1997-Nov 19.13 18.23 0.90 4.9369
1997-Dec 17.65 16.15 1.50 9.2879
1998-Jan 15.50 14.00 1.50 10.7143
1998-Feb 13.40 11.70 1.70 14.5299
1998-Mar 11.95 10.05 1.90 18.9055
1998-Apr 12.60 10.70 1.90 17.7570
1998-May 12.48 10.83 1.65 15.2355
1998-Jun 12.68 11.28 1.40 12.4113
1998-Jul 11.75 10.35 1.40 13.5266
1998-Aug 12.55 11.65 0.90 7.7253
1998-Sep 12.55 11.55 1.00 8.6580
1998-Oct 14.03 13.03 1.00 7.6746
1998-Nov 12.45 11.60 0.85 7.3276
1998-Dec 9.95 9.20 0.75 8.1522
1999-Jan 10.03 9.28 0.75 8.0819
1999-Feb 10.53 9.68 0.85 8.7810
1999-Mar 10.18 9.38 0.80 8.5288
1999-Apr 13.83 13.03 0.80 6.1397
1999-May 16.53 15.53 1.00 6.4392
1999-Jun 14.40 13.50 0.90 6.6667
1999-Jul 16.10 15.20 0.90 5.9211
1999-Aug 18.58 17.43 1.15 6.5978
1999-Sep 20.38 19.33 1.05 5.4320
1999-Oct 23.00 21.95 1.05 4.7836
1999-Nov 21.93 21.08 0.85 4.0323
1999-Dec 24.23 23.38 0.85 3.6356
2000-Jan 23.45 22.10 1.35 6.1086
2000-Feb 25.28 23.43 1.85 7.8959
2000-Mar 25.30 23.45 1.85 7.8891
2000-Apr 23.88 22.93 0.95 4.1430
2000-May 24.20 23.20 1.00 4.3103
2000-Jun 27.10 26.10 1.00 3.8314
2000-Jul 28.13 26.93 1.20 4.4560
2000-Aug 24.88 23.28 1.60 6.8729
2000-Sep 0.00
2000-Oct 29.15 27.05 2.10 7.7634
2000-Nov 29.68 27.58 2.10 7.6142
2000-Dec 29.08 27.33 1.75 6.4032
2001-Jan 20.90 19.40 1.50 7.7320
2001-Feb 23.48 21.98 1.50 6.8244
2001-Mar 23.83 22.33 1.50 6.7174
2001-Apr 23.20 22.15 1.05 4.7404
2001-May 25.35 24.15 1.20 4.9689
2001-Jun 27.55 26.35 1.20 4.5541
2001-Jul 24.23 22.63 1.60 7.0703
2001-Aug 24.33 22.73 1.60 7.0392
2001-Sep 24.70 23.60 1.10 4.6610
2001-Oct 20.83 20.08 0.75 3.7351
2001-Nov 19.08 18.33 0.75 4.0917
2001-Dec 18.33 17.58 0.75 4.2662
2002-Jan 18.90 18.15 0.75 4.1322
2002-Feb 17.39 16.54 0.85 5.1391
2002-Mar 18.86 18.01 0.85 4.7196
2002-Apr 24.58 24.08 0.50 2.0764
2002-May 23.35 22.35 1.00 4.4743
2002-Jun 21.57 20.82 0.75 3.6023
2002-Jul 22.62 21.97 0.65 2.9586
2002-Aug 23.02 22.07 0.95 4.3045
2002-Sep 24.96 23.96 1.00 4.1736
2002-Oct 26.63 25.63 1.00 3.9017
2002-Nov 23.36 22.36 1.00 4.4723
2002-Dec 23.19 21.89 1.30 5.9388
2003-Jan 27.39 25.69 1.70 6.6174
2003-Feb 28.73 27.03 1.70 6.2893
2003-Mar 31.72 29.92 1.80 6.0160
2003-Apr 24.50 21.25 3.25 15.2941
2003-May 20.27 18.32 1.95 10.6441
2003-Jun 23.52 22.27 1.25 5.6129
2003-Jul 25.39 24.34 1.05 4.3139
2003-Aug 25.58 24.83 0.75 3.0205
2003-Sep 26.31 25.31 1.00 3.9510
2003-Oct 25.54 24.14 1.40 5.7995
2003-Nov 25.75 24.40 1.35 5.5328
2003-Dec 26.17 24.47 1.70 6.9473
2004-Jan 27.08 25.38 1.70 6.6982
2004-Feb 26.31 23.36 2.95 12.6284
2004-Mar 29.55 26.80 2.75 10.2612
2004-Apr 28.68 26.23 2.45 9.3404
2004-May 32.51 29.66 2.85 9.6089
2004-Jun 33.77 30.62 3.15 10.2874
2004-Jul 31.72 28.02 3.70 13.2049
2004-Aug 36.17 32.67 3.50 10.7132
2004-Sep 37.68 33.48 4.20 12.5448
2004-Oct 40.84 36.39 4.45 12.2286
2004-Nov 41.23 35.48 5.75 16.2063
2004-Dec 36.87 30.12 6.75 22.4104
2005-Jan 34.05 27.95 6.10 21.8247
2005-Feb 38.05 33.35 4.70 14.0930
2005-Mar 44.70 39.55 5.15 13.0215
2005-Apr 48.20 42.80 5.40 12.6168
2005-May 44.48 38.98 5.50 14.1098
2005-Jun 45.96 41.16 4.80 11.6618
2005-Jul 52.77 48.02 4.75 9.8917
2005-Aug 54.32 48.87 5.45 11.1520
2005-Sep 62.10 56.75 5.35 9.4273
2005-Oct 54.71 48.51 6.20 12.7809
2005-Nov 52.31 46.06 6.25 13.5693
2005-Dec 49.00 43.15 5.85 13.5574
2006-Jan 55.01 50.41 4.60 9.1252
2006-Feb 59.56 54.31 5.25 9.6667
2006-Mar 56.71 51.76 4.95 9.5634
2006-Apr 61.04 56.29 4.75 8.4384
The first two columns are light and heavy prices, respectively. The next two are the difference and % difference. This data shows that, since 1978 we have had quite a bit of fluctuation in price. The price difference between heavy and light has grown recently, but it looks like we had similar price differences back in 1998 without an imminent oil peak.
So, I'm not sure why the price of oil is going up based on this data. Comments?
http://www.chinagate.com.cn/english/208.htm
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/06/content_296195.htm
It looks like they left off Daqing, which is a confirmed decline.
As I understand it, there are four fields that are currently producing about one mbpd or more: Ghawar; Cantarell; Burgan and Daqing. We know that three of the four are declining, and it is very likely that Ghawar is now declining.
Note that it takes lots of smaller fields to make up for declines in fields producing about 10 mbpd.
The Lower 48 peaked at slightly less than 50% (at 49%) and the North Sea peaked at slightly over 50% (52%). In other words, slightly less than 50% to slightly more than 50%. These were both for crude + condensate Deffeyes estimated that we hit the crude + condensate 50% of Qt mark worldwide in mid-December. The highest crude + condensate EIA number on record was for December, followed promptly by about a 500,000 bpd drop in January.
In the article that Khebab and I coauthored that was published on March 6, 2006, we had following statement:
"A critical point to keep in mind is that an exporter can only export what is left after domestic consumption is satisfied. Consider a simple example, a country producing 2.0 mbpd, consuming 1.0 mbpd and therefore exporting 1.0 mbpd. Let's assume a 25% drop in production over a six year period (which we have seen in the North Sea, which by the way peaked at 52% of Qt) and let's assume a 10% increase in domestic consumption. Production would be 1.5 mbpd. Consumption would be 1.1 mbpd. Net exports would be production (1.5 mbpd) less consumption (1.1 mbpd) = 0.4 mbpd. Therefore, because of a 25% drop in production and because of a 10% increase in domestic consumption, net oil exports from our hypothetical net exporter dropped by 60%, from 1.0 mbpd to 0.4 mbpd, over a six year period.
We are deeply concerned that the world is probably facing an imminent and catastrophic collapse in net oil export capacity because of declining production and increasing domestic consumption in the top exporting countries."
From 2/10/06 to 4/7/06, total net oil imports into the US dropped 13.2%, which corresponded to a 20% increase in oil prices.
Consider the simple math. If Deffeyes is correct, at current rates of consumption, by the time that a first grader, entering the first grade this September, 2006, is ready for the fifth grade in September, 2010, we will have used more than 10% of all remaining conventional crude + condensate reserves.
Are you saying that the S has HTF?
Having said that, IMO the SHTF.
I think that we should all practice ELF.
Economize--try to reduce your spending to 50% of current income. Assume that you just got a 50% pay cut. What actions would you then take?
Localize--try to reduce the distance between home and work to as close to zero as possible. Assume that gasoline costs about the same as Norway, $7 per gallon or more. What actions would you then take?
Produce--look into becoming or affiliating yourself with a net food producer or net energy producer. Or at least try to work with a company that provides basic needs, instead of "wants." Today, the majority of Americans live off the discretionary income of other Americans. Assume that our discretionary income drops by 50%, what industries would you want to be in?
We need to radically rethink the kinds of careers that young people should go into, and parents need to think very hard about going into debt to unleash yet another law school graduate on the country.
More than anything else I worry about the same things as many of my generation: how will society in general react/respond, and how will my childrens' future look.
It's fascinating to map some of the indicators chronicled by you and others here to occurrances in the world. I accept the risk of beating the dead horse when I say, "we live in interesting times."
Let's assume that 100% of crude oil stocks consist of heavy, sour crude--which cannot be run though a refinery that will handle only light, sweet crude. Would we then have a problem?
My point is that we have no idea what percentage of current crude inventories consists of heavy, sour. No one tracks it.
When the government is not putting oil in the SPR, there is only one market for light, sweet crude oil: refineries.
If refineries did not need the oil, why would they have bid up the price by 20% since mid-February?
Look at the trends in the past two months: total petroleum imports down by 13%, light, sweet crude oil prices up by 20%. This suggests to me that we have only begun to see the price increases.
Iranian leaders find the confrontation usefully rallies the population to their side; nevertheless, if they agreed to allow russia to enrich their fuel, crude would fall, maybe back to the opec floor of around 55-60.
It is true that commercial stocks would be 15mmb lower if loans from teh spr were repaid, and gasoline stocks would be around 2mmb lower if loans from europe were repaid.
What I'd prefer to see is the top twenty fields in terms of daily production with an analysis of depletion. That's obviously not the same list.
In any case, just for our amusement, I refer you to Qatar sees no OPEC ouput cut in '06 if demand holds in which we learn
But here's the kicker Laugh or cry? Perhaps Abdullah al-Attiyah was making a joke?He looks like the kind of guy who has a good sense of humor.
However, he did promise increased production in a few years, from new projects/infrastructure.
src: http://www.its.com.ve/publications/Estimation_Peak_Production.pdf
But to really do a comprehensive job, one would have to take into account much more than the top 20 fields. Probably a comprehensive treatment that is adequate to complement Skrebowski's "Megaproject" studies in order to make it a somewhat accurate instrument of prediction would be the top 200 fields or so. (Does that sound about right? How many "unknowns" would there be in that expanded list?)
[Mr Skrebowski: If you're a TOD reader, sorry to tear into you like this. Please know that I personally do value your work very highly - as I'm sure most if not all TOD participants and readers do.]
http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/4/6/4461/28812
According to Simmons:
The analysis should look at fields with production > 100 kbpd (116 fields) which are producing almost half of the world production.
However when was it made 2002 or 2003?
Probably necessary to do an update with 2005 figures.
Could reduce the number of fields.
$72 a barrel, owning any oil well
has probably never been more lucrative.
And $70+ is just the start.
http://www.peakoil.net/AIMseminar/UU_AIM_Robelius.pdf
Anyway, quite limited production to date from reserves of 11 Gb. Not one going into decline soon ! A major uptick if Saudis build refinery (classical fractional distillation ?) to process Manifa crude.