The Oil Drum

I expect something half-assed to start, but hope that it will be forced toward the smart by hard reality, and that will be enough.

But I wouldn't worry about being able to adopt.  There's always lots of unclaimed children around during any time of hardship and disaster.

On the issue of children, please do not succomb to fatalism. Even in the worst of times there are joys in being alive. Having children is one of those joys. My wife and I started a little late (in our forties), but recently adopted a little boy and have started paperwork on a second adoption. I know that they will not have the physical comforts in their adulthood that I had in mine. But that is not necessarily a bad thing. They will have opportunities to build a new world, if I can encourage them to gain the skills needed in a changed world. It is those who are most attached to our materialistic values who will have the hardest time surviving, them and the billions of very poor.
(Trying hard there to recognize my privelage in being born when and where I was.)

Thanks for the counter argument Westexas, I actually had read that post some time ago, but the reminder is good. to do a bit of review.

The most compelling link is probably
http://www.energybulletin.net/13575.html
with it's excellent explanation of HL as applied to the top 4 world producers, Saudi, Russia, Norway, Iran.  It is to be admitted that grouping these 4, of which real reliable information about 3 of which  (Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran) is almost impossable  to obtain is interesting, in that it makes a bit of guesswork as to actually who's on first!  It is to be noticed that a considerable amount of creaming has to be done to make the nice red bell curve fit!  However, i don not argue with the chart, that is not my strong area

http://static.flickr.com/39/108519699_68c06e7df5_o.png

Also compelling is the recent work of Jean Laherre and the discussion of all liquids:

http://www.hubbertpeak.com/laherrere/EGUVienna2006.pdf

My contention is that "conventional crude oil" could well peak before 2020 (it could already be peaked, there is absolutely no way to know), but that "conventional crude" and in particular, conventional light sweet crude is becoming less of the energy picture anyway.  All liquids is to me of more extreme importance, in particular as the grid and natural gas becomes a bigger part of the transportation enerrgy picture in the future (in my view, now due much sooner than previously expected)

  The other issue is what can be called "data shift" due to extremely unreliable data.  Even Colin Campbell himself expresses reverservations, as he shifts peak date further out in front:

From ASPO Newsletter, Sept 2005

"It is a summary of a depletion model and database that have been maintained for about 15 years, being subject to continual revision and refinement. It will be readily understood that public reserve and production data are grossly unreliable, and that even the industry databases show widely different estimates. Accordingly, it is necessary to look for trends and relationships, as well as apply common sense and geological knowledge, to try to come up with realistic assessments.

"Much interest devolves on the date of peak, but this really misses the point. It is not an isolated or high peak, merely the indicated maximum on a fairly gentle production curve."

But this in no way reduces the magnitude of the problem, Campbell's words again:

However, the importance is not so much in the date of peak itself but in recognition of the long, remorseless decline that follows."

Mitagating factors in my view
-Despite the recent  concern about "plateau" by  statistical  experts such as Stuart Staniford and others, the "plateau" is  almost at  new highs, and not indicative of peak in and of itself.  It is also not at all a new feature of the Saudi production history, as Saudi Arabia has been at "plateau" throughout the 1990's.
-Despite repeated and ongoing predictions of Saudi peak, the dates keep getting pushed further forward.  The peak may, as I have said, already occured, (we know in fact that until 2003, the peak had indeed occured in 1981,  however, through two decades no one noticed!
-The possibly false assumption that OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and in particular, Ghawar are being pumped flat out.  Evidence indicates that since a period around 2001, when the 9/11 attack reduced consumption, that several large producers reduced production even more, to assure avoidence of complete price collapse.  I am gaining in my belief that Saudi Arabia, while often talking a big game, has NOT raised production back to their capability, instead prefering a higher price lower production regime.  
Some ask why they would not have done this in the 1990's.  My assertion:  That Saudi Arabia could not be sure that large producers Britain, Norway, and Canada could come in and fill the gap.  They now seem more confident that these nations cannot.
-The fact that even with constant world emergencies, it has been almost impossible to get oil prices above $75 dollars per barrel.  My assertion:  That although that price may be painful, the great bulk of it can be accounted for by
inflation from the prior record lows of the 1990's, the need for infrastructure investment, geo-political interruptions, weather events, and demand increases from China and India.  Despite a half decade of rumors and worry, at this moment, production has not seemed unable to meet a very high level of demand.
-The discovery peak. While the discovry rate did in fact peak in 1962 approx., this does not mean that discovery has ceased, and the decline from that old peak, when viewed in context, is not nearly as great as some would make it out. (indicated in the Vienna presentation by Laharre on page 3) and that the most profound collapse came after 1982, when the price of oil collapsed, thus collapsing expenditure on discovery efforts.  There was a sizable recovery of discovery in 1995, but then a decline after 2001 and 9/11 back to the 1995 levels.  
Willingness of the oil and gas industry to engage in discovery efforts is questionable, as companies like BP and others wish to pacify shareholders with large returns after the long drought of the 1990's, and whether they are open when they do make a discovery is questionable.  Taxation and legal issues still impinge on discovery, for example, the often talked about Russian frontier which was once presumed to have large promise has been delayed in E/P by the turmoil in the Russian industry.  Likewise, exploration off the coast of Greenland, Iceland, and Australia has been delayed by an array of economic and environmental concerns.
-Where efforts have been undertaken, the results have been fruitful, in particular in Brazil, which has for the time being essentially removed itself from the world competition for oil, in a very great success offshore.
There is promise in other areas along the coast of South America, the Pacific, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Outer Continental Shelf.  At this moment, it is political/economic factors and not geological concerns that are keeping the world from E/P in these areas.
-Deep offshore oil E/P is much more promising than originally thought, mirroring the possibility of the "North Sea Miracle of the 1970's and 1980's.  People forget that the bets were against the success of these ventures in the early days, and it completely altered the world oil markets.
-The fact that the oil and gas industry repeatedly seem to fear a price collapse much more than a supply shortfall.  This creates a resistance to E/P that is badly needed ONLY IF the goal is to reduce price, which, as stated above, is not that high anyway (and shown virtually no real demand destruction due to price) when viewed from the priorities of the oil companies/producing nations.  As in any business, the producer will charge what the market can bear as long is it does not destroy sales.

At this moment, we see depletion in the North Sea, (well known now for a half decade), and depletion in Mexico (expected by those in the industry).  We some depletion in all the aging fields in OPEC, but none of these a surprise except possibly Bergen, which seemed to impact the oil markets very little.
Ghawar is unknown, but pre-remediation depletion is relatively certain.  The effect of the remediation is important.  Given that Saudi Arabian production has been flat throughout the 1990's, the Saudi fields cannot be viewed as overstressed, and in fact the production in Saudi Arabia has been turned up in volume, interrestingly, only when the need is present (and they have been making it quite clear that THEY will decide when the need is present.)

Conclusion:  It is my conclusion, for purposes of my own planning, that there can be no real certainty of "peak" in the near future, although due to complete lack of information, no insurance against it, and no way to know that it has not already occurred.  Thus, the complete onset of hysteria and panic we have seen in the last few monthes in some quarters is completely unwarrented.  The need for mitagation  by way of conservation, design, technology, and planning for fuel diversity and strategic emergency storage is ABSOLUTELY MANDATORY given the lack of information we have.   The conclusion that there is going to be such a fantastic drop in oil/gas production that it renders the world too short of fuel to make remediation/restructering possible is overreaction to the wildest extreme, and frankly cannot be accepted as any type of logically supportable conclsuion given current evidence.

Just as production drops may surprise many, the drop in consumption through restructuring could be extremely great, and occur much sooner than expected, with no damage to the economy, if the consumption drops are done through efficient restructuring.  The challenge to get people to break current habits will be great, but as oil and gas prices remain high, incentives for making needed changes will be apparent, and new, efficient technology will be coming into the market as old inefficient technology ages out.

Roger Conner  known to you as ThatsItImout

We're not at worldwide geological peak (i.e. the peak as imposed strictly by geological factors) quite yet.  So I really think that our best bet is to hope for lots of logistical/geopolitical/weather impacts.  It means more pain sooner, which will hopefully translate into less pain later.  The danger, of course, is that too much stress could shatter the economy and the production systems that we need to use to build the transition infrastructure.  But so far the economy has been more resilient against high oil/gas prices than I would have expected.

Historical Production
     Production from the Prudhoe Bay field began on June 19, 1977, with the completion of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. As of December 31, 2005 there were about 1,111 active producing oil wells, 33 gas reinjection wells, 82 water injection wells and 136 water and miscible gas injection wells in the Prudhoe Bay field. Production from the Prudhoe Bay field has declined over the past five years. The average well production rate was about 546 barrels of oil per day in 2001, 375 barrels per day in 2002, 350 barrels per day in 2003, 317 barrels per day in 2004 and 293 barrels per day in 2005.

Triff ..