And how is Saudi Arabia getting on? (or more evidence of a deteriorating situation...)
Posted by Heading Out on January 3, 2007 - 12:21pm
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: CSIS, khurais, Khursaniyah, oil production, saudi arabia, shaybah [list all tags]
When I wrote about some of the stories that are likely to be discussed over the next year, one of those that I mentioned is the delay before we see further increases in production from KSA. In the piece I quoted from the Arab News about the latest projections of Aramco production increases over the next two years. While there has not been much change in the total projected production over the last eighteen months, there have been some, as the Kingdom has moved toward a goal of 130 rigs operating there by May of this year. Over the time we have posted here, we have quite often revisited the planned production increases from the Kingdom, and so I thought it worth having a quick look to see how things are going.
Note that in a June 2005 postthethe Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was quoted as suggesting the following for current and projected Saudi oil output by field.
Current plans to reach a 12.5 mbd goal call for the following production numbers (according to Cordesman and the CSIS)
Abqaiq - 400,000 bd
Ghawar - 5,500,000 bd
Berri - 400,000 bd
Safaniya - 1,500,000 bd
Abu Sa'fah - 300,000 bd
Zuluf - 800,000 bd
Marjan - 450,000 bd
Haradh - 170,000 bd
Shaybah - 500,000 bd
Munifa - 1,000,000 bdThis gives the 11 mbd that they claim to be able to currently produce - though it includes Munifa, of which we have commented negatively earlier.
To bring this up to 12.5 mbd they plan an additional
Haradh - 300,000 bd
Khursaniyah 500,000 bd
Shaybah - 500,000 bd
Khurais - 1,100,000 bdwhen you include an anticipated 800,000 bd loss due to old fields declining, the sum comes in just over the required number.
Now of these Aramco has already brought Haradh on line, ahead of schedule last March. In contrast Munifa is now (as I mentioned in the post) not going to be around until 2011 – so we need to scratch that from current availability.
Further if we look at the prediction in the Arab News we find that the list of fields where the production increase will come from has seen the addition of another field.
The Abu Hadriyah, Fadhili and Khursaniyah fields are being developed, with production of 500,000 bpd of Arabian Light crude oil, plus more than one billion standard cubic feet/day (scfd) of associated gas. This is forecast to come online in December next year.Located deep in the Rub Al-Khali, or Empty Quarter, the Shaybah field has been delivering 500,000 bpd of Arab Extra Light crude oil since its start-up in 1998. Plans call for increasing production capacity to one million bpd, with the first increment of 250,000 bpd under implementation and slated to come onstream by the end of 2008.
Two other major field development projects on track to meet the maximum production capacity target are the Khurais and Nuayyim fields. The Khurais project, which will also include production from the Abu Jifan and Mazalij fields, is projected to produce 1.2 million bpd of Arab Light crude oil in 2009. The Nuayyim project, a central Arabian field, is slated to add 100,000 bpd of Arabian Super Light crude oil by 2008.
The three-field development that is scheduled to come on line at the end of this year has not changed. Abu Hadriyah is not in itself new (the following picture of a Saudi team drilling there was taken in 1960 ).

Further when the CERA list on which it appears was reviewed here in Sept 05, Interloafer quoted Matt Simmons in expressing some cynicism about Aramco ability to sustain the higher levels of production projected for these fields. Peter Jackson, of CERA, disagrees (pdf file) The project currently appears to be on schedule.
Now it should be born in mind that the Saudi Strategic Energy Initiative is to have enough spare capacity to be able, by June of this year, to replace Iran’s production, should there be a problem. And, for this reason, it is perhaps a little presumptive to assume that they are currently producing at a maximum level. However, it should be noted that this also assumes that the three-field increased production will be on line by that time. As noted above, it now appears that it will be later in the year before this happens.
Musing about these numbers, what struck me was that we are now seeing increments in production coming from multiple fields rather than just further development of a single one. After the first new increment for Shaybah comes on line, work for which is now underway, (but which may now be only 200,000 bd by April of 2008, with another 300,000 bd being added by 2010) the next development, Khurais, is also going to be a three-field project . It will also include the Abu Jifan and Mazalij fields, and will need injection of an additional 4.5 mbd of treated water into those fields to achieve that production level.
And to achieve the target production Aramco has added another field, Nuayyim, which is anticipated to produce 100,000 bd by February 2009. This schedule has been accelerated over earlier projections.
The President of Aramco talked about the challenges in meeting these goals at a recent SPE meeting and said, among other things
Let me begin by first looking at hydrocarbon resources from the perspective of new petroleum technologies. In fact, I think that viewing high-potential hydrocarbon resource opportunities around the world as “technology targets” is a very useful approach, and yields four major, distinct areas of activities or strategies for the future. These are:• First, expanding the size of the oil-in-place pie by finding new oil fields;
• Second, increasing ultimate recovery from both the existing and yet-to-be discovered fields;
• Third, giving special attention to areas which are hard to explore and produce, thereby reducing costs and making uneconomic plays feasible, and finally;
• Exploiting the potential of unconventional oil resources.
From which he went on to say
at last summer’s OPEC Seminar I challenged explorationists around the world to find no less than eight trillion barrels of oil-in-place—the higher end of the current range of estimates. That should allow us to add roughly a trillion barrels of total proven oil reserves in the form of new discoveries: a massive target to which technological enhancements could be applied in order to achieve even higher recoveries. I would like to renew that challenge tonight through the SPE, and to urge exploration specialists and technology developers to draw upon their skills, knowledge and experience to meet that challenge.
In regard to point two he said the following:
Just think: increasing recovery by just one percent could add about 80 billion barrels of oil to global reserves—equivalent to nearly a quarter-century’s worth of Saudi Aramco’s current production. Once again, I look at past trends in recovery rates and the ingenuity of scientists, engineers and professionals like you, and I see no reason why we can’t increase the global average recovery rate to 50 percent in the next several decades. Frankly, I’m still not happy about leaving that other 50 percent to Mother Earth, but even hitting the halfway mark will allow us to add another trillion barrels to the world’s reserves base. I must add however that as Saudi Aramco, our target for recovery will be aimed at much higher recovery rates, in the range of 70 percent, and that is the grand challenge you will be engaged in for decades to come. There is no more efficient way to grow future reserves than to go after the resources we already know exist, and by identifying, developing and implementing technologies which will minimize the amount of these already discovered resources left behind.
In that regard I agree with his point, though do not see the investment being made that will meet his challenge.
For those that have those answers, I was initially led to write the post by an e-mail we received from Pilgrim, who suggested that we look to see what sort of folks Aramco were looking to hire. Their web site led me to the remarks I have quoted above. As with any company that is producing at the level, and with the challenges that Aramco face, the ageing of their workforce (which was recognized in the speech) and the loss of company knowledge that it will entail, gives them a challenge in turn that they might find it very hard to meet.



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I addressed the Ghawar Field over in the open thread, but IMO it is highly misleading for the Saudis to be talking about increased recovery factors in many of these fields because in a lot of cases, the oil left behind is largely immovable, after the oil/water contact rises.
For example, East Texas has a 99% water cut. Daqing has a 90% water cut. Prudhoe Bay has a 75% water cut. Cantarell is crashing, with up to a 40% annual decline rate ahead. As I noted over on the open thread, the best case for Ghawar is that it has a 35% water cut, after being redeveloped with horizontal wells.
After you redevelop with horizontal wells, and if you are still getting a one-third water cut in a rapidly thinning oil column, what else is left in the bag of tricks?
Convert to gas production.
WT, the only other possibilities I can think of-and they are unproven and possibly reckless to use on the worlds greatest oil field are some type of surficants to cut the immobile oil out of the reservoir rock or possibly microbiological enhancement, injecting bugs that will lower the viscosity of the crude.
But surely Allah isn't going to desert us now!
I wonder, if the source rock is some sort of carbonate, could you collapse the pores by flooding with some acid solution, maybe followed by a shock wave? The oil would be wrung out like water from a sponge.
The reservoir rock in Ghawar is a carbonate. A dose of acid serves to open up new paths for fluids [both water and oil] to the well bore. This is usually useful only when the permiability of the reservoir rock is low. If you only have the very top of the formation open either through a conventional completion, a horizontal bottle brush smart well, or whatever -- opening up the formation probably means opening it up vertically as well as horizontally. The result would in most instances be even more water.
In a test tube, you could disolve a chunk of the reservoir rock with acid, but you would also do bad things to the immobile contained hydrocarbons ... and even if the acid wouldn't digest the oil this approach would be completely uneconomic in a real world setting as the reservoir by volume is probably in excess of 85% rock; the contained water dilutes acid; a lot of the fluid you obtained would be water; and [if your theory actuall worked] "collapsed" pores would equate to zero permiablity / porosity in the vacinity of the well bore.
If you really wanted to try to improve the oil cut you could try a "polymer job", but that approach wouldn't get you a thousand barrel a day well water free well by any stretch of the imagination. BTW, my limited experience with polymer treatments has not been good, but they are in certain instances very useful in extending the economic life of a well.
As I also mentioned in the open thread, Ghawar has been running close to a 35% water cut since about 1999. So if in fact they are still at 35%, then that's a very good sign for them and indicates that no precipitous decline is in the works.
Which is exactly what Shell thought, as they were expanding their surface production facilities to handle an expected flood of new oil from the Yibal Field, when instead they got an unexpected flood of new water. Yibal, like Ghawar, was redeveloped with horizontal wells. Why? Because the vertical wells in both fields watered out.
Nope, nothing to worry about here. Go about your business. Go ahead and buy a new SUV to drive to and from your McMansion. I need still need to pay for this year's European vacation.
You make it sound like Shell invested millions of dollars in production capacity that never turn into fruition. This sure did not happen.
Shell's investments in the Yibal field did yield increase oil production, but as you pointed out, 90% water cut started showing up in some wells and Shell had to shelve any new investment to increase production capacity. They instead got stuck with ever higher production costs due to high levels of water.
The lesson here is that Shell's investment in enhanced recovery technology did not increase total ultimate recoverable oil, but instead speed up oil production for a short period before dropping. Yibal is a great example where new technology failed, but is not a good example of showing oil companies not meeting their short term projection as they sure did meet their short term capacity projections.
They aren't still at 35% water cut.. Its fallenby some 7-8% since 1997
"Leave No Resources Behind" Bush needs to jump on this quick before someone else takes it...
Hello HO,
Thxs for this keypost. My question is this phrase re-quoted below:
"...when you include an anticipated 800,000 bd loss due to old fields declining...."
Who gave this depletion amount? Is it accurate, or is it considered a lowball SWAG quantity? Did they explain how they derived this number?
Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?
Bob:
That has come from a number of sources, it is quoted in the September pdf on the Saudi Energy Initiative, for example. The concern that I have is that in that source they are projecting this as a total loss over several years, while other sources that give about the same number project it as an annual figure. The Saudi's spend about $2 billion a year in trying to offset depletion in their existing fields, and this would suggest that if the annual figure is held to the 2-300,000 bd range that they are fairly successful at it. However to sustain that figure requires that they bring new wells on line, and that requires drilling rigs, and as they try to ramp up production the question becomes how many wells, at what production rates can they drill each year. If, for example, it is taking 300 wells to increase Khurais by 1.2 mbd that suggests they are getting 4,000 bd/well.
HO,
Thxs for the reply. If 800,000 is the annual figure--without discovering big, new virgin oilfields to exploit--that seems like an impossible depletion amount to overcome by infield workovers [no matter what the extraction tech level applied].
If this number is true-- can it be reverse-engineered, or more accurately, reverse calculated back into a HL graph to show what reserves can be expected to be extracted at a meaningful production level? Khebab & WT?
I am predicting a long term net decline rate of about 4% per year for KSA, perhaps more sharply at first if Ghawar is crashing.
Hi WT/Jeffrey,
And an export decline rate of...?
The decline in net exports from 12/05 to 12/06 will be, IMO, at least 13%, perhaps as high as 15% (in one year).
westexas,
In regards to declining exports brought about by rising internal consumption, what are your thoughts on the possible chaotic influences brought about by those decreasing exports and actual geological peak? That is, as exports decline and more is consumed internally, the producing nation generates less revenue such that its citizens are less wealthy, thereby softening demand. Past peak, those nations are going to want to keep their citizens happy, thereby given them first rights to the oil and perhaps causing a rapid drop in exports - again less revenue generated by the producing nation and softening internal demand. This drop in wealth may also push those producing nations into modes of internal conservation to protect their exports, and bring their revenue back. Do you see these scenarios as a valid reasons why declining net exports may not wind up particularly dramatic?
Substrate,
I cannot speak for Westexas, but I do see one huge questionable premise in your question:
Just because the quantity of oil that an oil-exporting country exports is declining does NOT mean that the revenue from these exports declines.
For example, exports decline thirty percent in volume while oil prices double: Result, declining volume of oil exports combined with great increase in export revenue.
Because oil is highly price inelastic (especially in the short run) such a scenario of declining volumes with increasing revenues is highly plausible.
And there is another problem with Substrate's reasoning. Lost revenue from exports due to rising internal consumption does not necessarily mean less wealth. It depends on how the oil is used.
I don't hold out much hope that many, or any, of the principal exporters of oil will find productive domestic employment for the source of work they currently export in massive quantities, but it remains possible that they will do so.
I've noticed that the EIA has made three different forecasts for SA Productive Capacity (PC) according to three prices scenarios (data here):
The high price scenario is actually forecasting a much lower productive capacity. I don't know the exact reason but it's probably lower demand.
Just because the quantity of oil that an oil-exporting country exports is declining does NOT mean that the revenue from these exports declines.
shhhhh!!...you weren't supposed to notice that. If the price of oil got high enough though, it'd probably dampen/destruct the economies in the importing countries bringing the price back down again. Also inflation throughout the world might render the new money less valuable.
Bob, it is found here:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html
He makes it clear that this is an annual decline rate. The 8 percent is simply the midway point between 5 and 12, or very near so.
Ron Patterson
Thxs Ron,
Sure hate to read how the oilfields all seem to deplete at such high rates unless we go nuts with workovers, new tech, and infield drilling for the pockets left behind in an effort to stem the inevitable extraction decrease. The 'Red Queen' has got to be getting severely winded trying to keep up with this pace.
It all seems to be pointing to a 'geologic' Hubbert Global Downslope that will be pretty steep, unless demand can somehow be decreased for decades: so as to lessen supply extraction and lengthen [fatten] the postPeak tail.
Perhaps the only way this demand destruction can be accomplished is for the 'Boomers', the world over, to willingly fall upon the 'Peakoil Grenade', thereby changing the world demographic to a much younger skew. This will increase the survival odds for the future kids as it will take them time to want to increase FF's extraction to the maximum again.
Full disclosure: I am a tail-end Boomer at 51 years, but I have no idea how to conceive and implement a global plan along these thoughts. Generally, the older a person gets: the more reluctant they are to accepting massive change and writing off their lifelong investments in property, cultural values, lifestyle mode, etc, etc. My Mom would quickly die from 'culture shock' if I had to forcibly relocate her from the Asphalt Wonderland to some other location in an effort to protect her from TSHTF.
Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?
The fact that KSA is talking about recovery factors at all should be a alarming signal since these only become a issue after primary recovery operations are completed. Considering political factors long term recovery operations in KSA are not that important.
I'm certain that with KSA's resources they can manage 4-5 mbd for a long time.
But this is a vibrant oil producing nation far from peak ?
So starting into 2007 we have no clear proof that KSA has not peaked and we see projects that show that they are now basically fully exploiting all of their resources to maintain current production rates.
The question I have is does KSA have any more known fields which are not planned to be brought into production ?
One of the issues that came up over the past year in discussions on the size of reserves is the adjustment of recovery factors. For example IHS, which owns CERA, has projected increasing recovery factors for Saudi fields that generate an increase in their reserves, without the need to do any additional discovery work. The question then arises as to what technology they are projecting that will allow the increased recovery factors, and that cupboard is a bit bare, and not getting a whole lot of research funding support that I can see at the moment. Which begs the question as to the accuracy of the assumptions . . .
My point is who cares ?
These are URR increases that effect the tail end of production. Today they are important in places like the US which is or better was producing while overall world production was increasing.
For countries like KSA URR increases like this are irrelevant. If the oil is produced in the future which is doubtful the chances of the "Kingdom" being the producer are slim to none.
Once countries such as KSA/Russia are obviously in decline you can assume that above ground factors will have a large effect on how much of the remaining oil is produced. We cannot predict what will happen in the ME or Russia say five years after world oil has peaked but I think its a safe bet that what ever happens it won't be good and certainly won't allow the oil to be produced at a optimum rate.
The fact that the Kingdom touts these irrelevant issues is disturbing.
Why are they even talking about advanced recovery ???
The EIA now shows that the Saudis have "voluntarily" cut their production by 800,000 bpd from their 2005 peak to October, 2006.
Just another reminder that the Saudi stock market crash coincided with the start of "voluntary" production cuts. Odd that the Venezuelan stock market (where they have long life unconventional oil reserves) is booming.
It is odd, con sidering that venezuela is also cutting, in spite of these unconventional reserves, and meanwhile reducing incentives to foreign countries to develop these reserves. Markets discount everything over 1 year out...
I think it worth noting, that new capacity and existing KSA capacity is mainly "Arab Light" which is difficult to refine (despite the name "Light") With refining capacity at 98%, new KSA production -- if it occurs -- will not impact gasoline supply very much.
See EIA for the process of refining Arab Light http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/oil_m...
Refining capacity according to Apache Corporation: http://www.apachecorp.com/Explore/Explore_Features/200601/Topic_Report_I....
I think it takes about 4-5 years to upgrade as Marathon Oil started upgrading last year and expects to be complete by 2009 -- although I haven't analysed refinery capacity increases in detail http://www.marathon.com/content/includes/PF_News_Releases.asp?ReleaseID=...
Thanks for the comments. I was wondering where they were getting so much "light" oil.
Cheers, Dom
And I would add, KSA would really be shooting themselves in the foot if they increased production of Arab Light now -- the refineries can't handle it and it would make spreads even higher (huge) between heavy sour and light sweet.
memmel asks,
"The question I have is does KSA have any more known fields which are not planned to be brought into production ?"
That depends on what you mean by "brought into production".
The Khurais field, from which KSA not claims a possbile 1,100,000 bd (barrel per day) was actually "brought into production many years ago, (I think Matt Simmons gives it as the 1960's but I don't have my copy out to check) but at a very much smaller amount of production than 1.1 million per day, and then, either failed to produce or was laid aside (interestingly, about the time that oil prices collapsed in 1982, a whole slew of Saudi fields became "unable to deliver" or "unproductive"....and yet, that never makes anyone suspicious? amazing....
So yeah, I am sure that if oil prices continue to fall, we will hear an odd name of some field, and then it will prove "unable to deliver", and disappear from the press...to possibly return a decade or more later, when it is most needed....
Right now, the whole ballgame still seems to me to center around (a) can Ghawar hold (b) Can Khurais deliver what the Saudi's say it can (because if it can, it can replace the lost production from Cantarell in Mexico, and (c) Saudi offshore.
If we accept the argument that no one spends money drilling in the sea if they have easily found and extracted oil onshore, then we must accept that was true of Saudi Arabia, and that they are just now exploiting in a big way their offshore production possibilities (and yes, I know they have drilled offshore, but again, in that modest way, not really pushing it hard).
But of course the other side of that coin is that they are buying/renting offshore drilling facilities into the face of the highest prices ever for that type of machinery. Why? If the oil they wanted was still easily found and extracted onshore, why not wait until offshore equipment prices became a bit more sane? Could it be they really need the oil and need it bad, and it is not coming easily onshore?
It's anybody's guess, but at least we know the major factors to watch....and in the oil business the effort of finding information is more that finding a needle in a haystack....it can be considered a giant triumph just to find the haystack!
:-) Roger Conner known to you as ThatsItImout
Most of Saudi Arabia is still unexplored for oil reserves.
I am surprised with this PDF from the Saudi National Security Assesment Project. Is hosted at the Saudi-US Relation Information Service and it makes very clear points about what the saudis are doing:
Can we trust that? Is that the reason for the increasing rig count of KSA in spite of falling/levelling production? The geopolitical considerations seem to trump other considerations made public by saudi officials, like that the world demand is easing and that economic growth may slow so they embrace OPEC production counts. I am little puzzled with this coming out of the blue...
If this is true then it looks like KSA does the world a service, stretching out remaining oil supply for a few more years.
How noble of them to build spare capacity to promote stability.
In the 1980s they they used their spare capacity to 'reclaim market share' the bankrupting of developers of alternative energy and the collapse of the Soviet Union were just colateral damage.
Alan, in the 1980s then President Bush asked the Saudis to raise the ppb to help domestic producers in Texas.
If you think about it a bit.
Assume KSA cannot meet the production goals via increasing internal production. Another approach is to drop exports and watch the market to determine a level that will minimize the pain of disruptions.
Hey wait OPEC is doing this now :)
In light of this I'd suspect KSA has moved to plan B which is to decrease exports slowly to increase reserve production capacity to offset thei