Peak Oil Salvation?

As we start off 2007, it seemed helpful to list the oil producing countries that Oil Drum readers might keep an eye on, both in this and future years. Often, the global production curve is presented in an undifferentiated way or is divided between OPEC and non-OPEC countries (as with the EIA). Other standard data sources such as the IEA, BP, Oil & Gas Journal, etc. usually break out production by region.

Taking a different approach, I decided to single out those countries that have made significant production increases in recent years — defined as any producer nation that has contributed an additional 0.5% to the current global liquids supply from fossil fuels (crude oil, condensates + natural gas liquids) since the year 2000. The result is shown in Figure 1.


Countries contributing at least a 0.5% increase since 2000 in world production of liquids fromfossil fuels (grey) versus the rest of world (blue). Does not include CTL or GTL. Data from BP — Figure 1

Will these difference makers deliver us from the turbulence & chaos of economic contraction and provide peak oil salvation?

Figure 2 shows the countries and their contributions individually, while Figure 3 shows the 10-year data trend plus an estimate for 2006.


The 9 significant producing countries.
Figure 2 — Click to Enlarge


The 10-Year Data Trend — 2006 is an estimate
based on EIA and Oil & Gas Journal data
Figure 3 — Click to Enlarge

A cursory analysis reveals that there have been two plateaus in oil production (as defined here) during the last 10 years, aside from the current one that began in 2005, the last year for which officially compiled data is shown. The first plateau was from 1997 — 1999 (percent change = +0.0018) and the second one was from 2000 — 2002 (percent change = -0.0075). What is striking in Figure 3 is that the world total follows the tally for the "Big 9" producers, whereas the Rest of World is almost perfectly flat since 1997.

What is the significance of this? You got me! Eyeballing the BP data, the criterion used for differentiating the "Big 9" was the first one I tried — it is completely arbitrary. Other countries, such as Libya, the UAE and Azerbaijan, have raised production but did not make the cut. However, I do believe we're on to something.

The metric used does confirm what we should already know at The Oil Drum. First, the largest contributions come from the deepwater producers (Brazil, Angola, Nigeria), the Middle East/North Africa countries (MENA — Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia), the Former Soviet Union (FSU — Russia, Kazakhstan) and — no surprise here! — China. Second, the list contains the two usual suspects, Russia & Saudi Arabia. Figure 2 clearly demonstrates the role both countries played in increased global production over the last 10 years and, especially, the more recent rise in the 2002 — 2005 period.

Here are some brief notes on the "Big 9" producers to guide us as we go forward into 2007 & beyond — perhaps to boldly go where mankind has been before.


Man #1: Who's that then?
Man #2: I dunno know. Must be a king.
Man #1: Why?
Man #2: He hasn't got shit all over him.

  • Brazil — Petrobras continues to pursue an aggressive offshore E&P program in the Campos and Santos Basins. However, older deepwater fields have peaked quickly and Brazil faces a decline rate of around 9% in existing production. According to What Can We Learn From Petrobras? (subscription required), Brazil must add 1.11 mbd by 2011 to simply maintain their August, 2006 production of 1.88 mbd.

  • Kazakhstan — Jerome á Paris provides an excellent overview of Kazakhtan in A primer on Caspian Oil. However, until Kashagan comes on-stream , which has been repeatedly delayed — now scheduled for 2010 — Kazakhstan's additional incremental production will have to come from its Tengiz, Kurmangazy and Karachaganak (gas condensate) fields. I expect new contributions to the world oil supply to remain small.

  • Saudi Arabia — See HO's latest summary And How is Saudi Arabia getting on?

  • Russia — Unfortunately, this is too large a subject to cover here. However, we are now witnessing the slowing of their expansion as this EIA graph makes clear. Recently, Russia announced a 2.1% production increase for January — November of 2006. This amounts to annualized production of 9.505 mbd for the year, a figure that excludes natural gas liquids. For background, see Uncertainties About Russian Reserves and Future Production.

  • Algeria — This country is thought to be on track to continue its production expansion. Algeria's oil sector continues to be dominated by state-owned Sonatrach but their liberalization program has attracted a large amount of foreign investment. Their largest fields by far are in the Hassi Messaoud basin (1956). However, discoveries continue there and elsewhere in the desert — for example, the Berkine basin. I expect production growth to slow there, nonetheless. Stay tuned.

  • Angola — see my summary in Angola Joins OPEC.

  • Kuwait — One of the "bigger" news items of 2005 was that the greater Burgan Complex was exhausted. What this meant was that under ideal conditions, Kuwait could not lift more than 1.7 mbd out of the ground there — the field had plateaued. Therefore, in order to substantially increase production, Kuwait will have to expand production from its older northern fields (Sabiriyah, Raubhatain, Abdali and Ratqa) near the Iraq border. This requires that Project Kuwait must go forward but not everyone is keen on reopening national interests to outsiders in Kuwait — the project has been continually delayed. Kuwait's expansion appears to be at an end.

  • Nigeria — continued expansion depends on these guys.


    Welcome to Our World

    They always let the hostages go except when some of them are inadvertently killed as a result of some bungled operation by the Nigerian military.

  • China — For obvious reasons, these guys can't extract oil from the ground fast enough. Hence, China pushes domestic upstream development (OGJ, subscription) —
    China’s national and international oil companies are actively involved in exploration and development projects on and offshore China.

    Commentaries attribute China’s quest for overseas petroleum to its lack of domestic oil and gas resources. But according to production figures from the US Energy Information Administration, China in 1998-2005 produced more oil than any OPEC country, except Iran and Saudi Arabia, more oil than Canada, the UK, or any Latin American or European country....

    Ismail Tiliwaldi, chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur region, said in mid-June that he expects it to become China’s largest oil-producing area in the next few years. Currently third in oil production, behind Daqing and Shengli, Xinjiang produced 22 million tons last year. Tiliwaldi said there are plans to increase production to 50 million tons/year and there is potential for 100 million, since Xinjiang has 30% of the country’s oil reserves and 34% of its natural gas....

    China’s offshore resources include the fields in the South China Sea (Tables 2 and 3); East China Sea (Xihu Trough and Chunxiao gas field); and Bohai Bay. Exploration and development in the South China and East China Seas have been hampered by territorial disputes. Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is disputed by China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, and Viet Nam. Recently, China, the Philippines, and Viet Nam have reportedly agreed to limited joint exploration. CNOOC, Philippine National Oil Co., and Vietnam Oil and Gas Corp. signed an agreement in March 2005 to jointly explore the oil potential of the islands and atolls in a 3-year seismic survey.

    Here's a nice overview of E&P from their primary onshore operator China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). At Daqing, where there has been very large water cut (80 to 90%), they are successfully using polymer flooding EOR (OGJ, subscription) to increase their recovery factors there. China's production will continue to expand for a while — the only question is how much.

Now, unlike some others around here, I do not like to predict the future. Unfortunately, being worried about peak oil, I am forced to be in the forecasting business. Therefore, consulting my chrystal ball, I will go out on a limb and make three bold predictions:

  1. The Sun will rise tomorrow.

  2. My beloved, but doomed, Denver Nuggets (with both Allen Iverson and Carmelo Anthony) will get to the NBA Western Conference finals in the Spring of 2007, where they will lose.

  3. The net increase in Angola's oil production as measured in barrels per day from this month — January of 2007 — forward until January of 2010, will exceed the net increases of both Russia and Saudi Arabia — each taken separately — in that 3-year period over their 2006 averages as compiled in the BP data when all is said & done.
How's that?

Dave Cohen
Senior Contributor
The Oil Drum
davec @ linkvoyager.com

Happy New Year!

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The net increase in Angola's oil production as measured in barrels per day from this month — January of 2007 — forward until January of 2010, will exceed the net increases of both Russia and Saudi Arabia — each taken separately — in that 3-year period over their 2006 averages as compiled in the BP data when all is said & done.

The most recent EIA crude + condensate numbers (average 2005; average 2006 through October 2006, mbpd):

Saudi Arabia: 9.6; 9.2

Russia: 9.0; 9.2

Angola: 1.3; 1.4

From peak to most recently monthly number, Saudi production is down--as the HL model predicted--"voluntarily" by 800,000 bpd.

Russia's post-50% of Qt cumulative production, through 2004, was 95% of what the HL model predicted it would be. Based on the HL model, we should be seeing a production decline in 2007.

My prediction: we will will continue to see Saudi production declines in 2007, and Russsia will join Saudi Arabia in showing lower production. Both countries are already reporting--as I predicted in January, 2006--lower net oil exports.

and what does HL say for Angola?

Angola is in the "Too early to say" group as defined by Roberto Canogar:

About China: Chris Skrebowski and the ASPO is saying that China will probably peak in 2005-2006.

Russia production growth rate has slow down by almost 50% since mid-2004:

SA is really the big unknown and the interpretation of the recent drop in production is controversial:

Another country that may enter the "Big 9" is Iraq if the situation can get stable one day.

The weight of the "Rest of the world" is becoming increasingly heavy:

Hi everybody and happy new year

following my guest post hosted by Khebab, I showed that EIA predictions started dropping in August, 05. It seems interesting thus to compare the current EIA figures for 2006 with those in July 05 STO report :

2006 predictions... July 2005 /Dec 2006

US 9.0 ; 8.4;
Canada 3.2; 3.3;
Mexico 3.8 ; 3.7
North Sea 5.1; 4.7
other OECD 1.5;1.5
Total OECD 22.6; 21.7

OPEC 35.4;33.9
FSU 12.3;12
China 3.7;3.8
Other non OECD 13.1;13.3
Total world 87;84.7

Clearly, the failure to produce as much as was expected one year ago comes mainly from OPEC (most probably KSA, but I don't have the details of STO computations) , North sea, US and FSU. Mexico is still close to the roadmap, but for how long?

About China: Chris Skrebowski and the ASPO is saying that China will probably peak in 2005-2006.

Do you know what Hubbert Linearization tells us about China's peak?

China's HL plot based on data since 1949 points to about 72 GB URR, so 2006 production brought it to about 48% Qt. It will pass 50% Qt sometime late this year or early next year. The prediction of 2005-06 was probably only slightly premature. 2006 production (with data through November) is likely to reach 184 million tonnes (3.68 mmbd), up 1.6%, and next year is likely to be only a bit higher. Daqing's decline is now accelerating, from 2.5% to 3.5% a year, even with recent efforts to increase recovery. It is, however, only 25% of Chinese production now, down from 40% in 1990.

Thank you for this.

Well, three things come to mind. First of all the title would be better called "Peak Oil Delayed." Salvation means saved and our goose is still cooked (absent mitigation and preparation) whether the peak would have happened in 2000, today or in 2012.

Second, we ought to be out thank our Russian and Saudi suppliers for really stepping up the last few years. We couldnt have done it (business as usual) without you guys! Keep up the good work (if you still physically can) and nevermind what our politicians and econonomic talking heads say about your regimes and (national) oil companies. You keep suburbia humming!

Third, what about Iraq? Yes, I know its a tattered mess but the oil ain't goin' anywhere. Isn't that country the only one left on earth that can truly boost its production levels (again disregarding the civil war--err, sectarian conflict) to fill the void caused by depletion and our tapped out Russian and Saudi friends?

What did you think America invaded Iraq to spread democracy ?

If anything confirms peak oil its the obvious decision to not only invade Iraq but the fact that our elected leaders regardless of party are willing to stay.

Historians will not realize that at the time the majority of the world did not get it.

What is the significance of this? You got me!

Dave my face is pretty blue today - not sure if that is Pictish genes or the fact that I woke last night with a pair of hands clenched round my throat.

I just want to plant a radical idea here and that is that historic production data = demand
When we are past peak, production will = supply

So do you think it is possible that the "plateaus" are demand related?

(this must be about the 100th time I've suggested this and so imagine that I will soon be ejected as a Troll)

So do you think it is possible that the "plateaus" are demand related?

Very good question! in particular if you look at Saudi Arabia, is the recent drop demand related (not enough demand + high inventories) or a supply problem?

In order to answer you need side information about reserves, new projects, depletion, etc.. In case of KSA, we have only very partial information.

IMO, the only way to decide between a demand or a supply plateau, is:
1. High prices for a long period
2. Steady oil demand (no economic recession)
3. Lower inventories
4. Drilling frenzy

Regarding KSA projects, I note that the new Khursaniyah development (claimed 500,000 bpd Arab Light) has been brought forward by 6 months from Dec 2007 to June 2007.

On the face of it this seems odd considering the Saudis already supposedly have ample spare capacity and they've been voluntarily cutting back on production. However, the decision regarding this may have been taken at a time when the global demand/supply balance looked somewhat different, and there were concerns regarding supply disruption from Iran, hurricanes etc.

One to watch out for later this year.

Perhaps Khursaniyah provides better economics? - allowing the Saudis to rest tired reservoirs?

Good point, Euan. Mind you, if Simmons is right about Khursaniyah that doesn't say much for the rest of their fields :-)

IMO the litmus test will be falling production correlated with rising price

And I'm not convinced that oil prices are actually that high yet - oil is probably still cheaper than bottled water.

I just want to plant a radical idea here and that is that historic production data = demand. When we are past peak, production will = supply

This is where the historical models come in--especially the Lower 48 and Texas. Nothing has reversed the long term declines. And nothing has reversed the long term North Sea decline after it crossed the 50% of Qt (C+C) mark.

The world and Saudi Arabia, in 2006, were at the same stage of depletion at which the Lower 48 (also the North Sea) and Texas started their long term declines, and by most measures (all but total liquids for the world), world and Saudi production are declining as expected.

Hello WT, It also seems that we are entering uncharted territory with respect to increased drilling costs. After the 50% mark for the Lower 48, we were able to continue to drill as much as we wanted to because our drilling costs were supported by imported cheap oil. The market was unable to increase the price of oil in the US to reflect the decline in US production. After we hit worldwide PO (which I believe has already occurred) there will be no cheap outside supply of crude to keep drilling prices down (or the price of crude, either).

So, higher drilling prices after PO will cause many feasible drilling projects to be abandoned, even though we may know the oil is there. This is happening now. The US is reducing its GOM drilling and the rigs are going to the Middle East. We are even sealing GOM wells that we can't afford to restart (after the hurricane damage).

This will steepen the downside slope of PO. We can't determine how much the slope will increase, but it could be substantial, as the limited exploration funding appears to be being eaten up by deep offshore drilling costs. We could find the world giving up on the search for new oil quite quickly, no matter the price.

There is just a slight problem with a "demand" plateau : for 2006 and 2007 EIA forecasts that demand will exceed supply, and that stocks should diminish. For me it is not compatible with a "pure demand destruction" hypothesis.

Nevertheless demand destruction must play a role in the peak date. The cornucopian argument that the higher the prices, the more investment are possible, and so more production will follow, is not totally stupid - but there is a point where high prices destruct so much demand that investments are simply useless, and this point is not very far from the geological limit of "easy oil". So IMHO there is not much difference between demand destruction and supply disruption.

The cornucopian argument that the higher the prices, the more investment are possible, and so more production will follow, is not totally stupid

If you look at the IEA forecasts (International Energy Outlook, 2006), they considered three cases: low prices, high prices and the reference case. The production forecast is much more lower for the high price case (see charts in my comment above).

It seems that there are two main feedback mechanisms:
1. High prices => lower demand => lower supply
2. High prices => more investment => more spare capacity or more supply

The second mechanism is probably a long term feedback (> 2-3 years).

of course the price measures only the balance between demand and supply - it doesn't say anything about the reason why each of them is high or low. IEA cases are thus ambiguous!

I just wanted to stress that if the main reason of price climbing is the decline of easy oil production, high prices would indeed help finding new resources, but also destroy demand, and that's the combination of these two factors that will eventually determine the peak value. After all, conventional oil has most probably already peaked, and cheap oil is really over. Now we are just at the point where we can produce a little bit more-but at which cost and who will buy it ?

-duplicate post-

Also, in the longer term, the product mix fundamentally changes in the EIA's high-price case.

In 2030:

Reference case = 90.2% conventional, 9.8% unconventional
High-price case = 79.3% conventional, 20.7% unconventional

Much less is expected of KSA under the high-price case.

Hi Gilles, Hi khebab.

Your assertions that higher prices ultimately lead to greater production is surprising: Has not the rate of discovery been declining since the early 1960's? Colin Campbeel, IIRC, has shown that the rate of discovery, and real petrotroleum prices are uncorrelated. He has also demonstrated the "creaming curve" (essentially an assymtotic limit) in the world discovery rate.

What sort of data makes you think-

"High prices => more investment => more spare capacity or more supply"

is a real relationship?

What sort of data makes you think-

"High prices => more investment => more spare capacity or more supply"

is a real relationship?

I have no data but it's a frequent claim in the mainstream media: "we have maybe run out of $20 oil but not of $70 oil". I know also that small fields judged uneconomical a few decades ago are being reopen now.

Except for unusual circumstances large fields would be brought online almost regardless of the price of oil as long as they can make money.

So the high price increasing demand is a bit of a red herring since your talking about fields that are small/marginal brought online. It takes a huge number of these fields to create 1mbpd of production. And of course they need to compete with work overs of larger fields for equipment.

I would say that low prices does suppress work overs of larger fields and production plans for a few large producers such as KSA that have or probably had a large number of undeveloped fields. So as far as overall production goes its really the ability of a few countries that have known underdeveloped reserves to bring them online during high price regimes.

Other development that may be lucrative financially probably does not have a significant effect on either prices our overall production.

A measure of the production from small fields over time would be interesting to verify how much of a effect they have.

What sort of data makes you think-

"High prices => more investment => more spare capacity or more supply"

Centuries of economic research provide evidence that higher prices will lead to increased profits, assuming inelastic demand. Current market participants earning those higher profits will look to invest their increased profits where they will get the greatest return on their investment. In many cases, this will lead to existing participants using their increased profits to invest in new production in order to try and grab more market share. According to standard theory higher than average profits will also encourage new players to enter the market.

I believe this is exactly what we are currently seeing. There is major investment by existing market participants and new entrants offering substitutes (i.e. Tar Sands, Biodisel, Ethanol, etc.)

Whether or not this actually leads to increased spare capacity or supply is a whole other matter, of course.

Euan Means: historic production data = demand
When we are past peak, production will = supply

This looks like a theory of pricing: What is the difference between your statement and the paradox of value, proposed by Adam Smith: Why is water, which is needed for life, inexpensive while diamonds, which are frivolous, very expensive. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_value Adam Smith could not solve this problem, but later economists used it to come up with the marginal utlity theory of pricing.

Oil is an inelastic good like water -- perhaps not as inelastic as water but close.

Actually, Adam Smith did resolve the paradox of diamonds and water. He did not use the term "marginal utility," because it had not yet been invented.

Little known fact: Adam Smith was a professor of Moral Philosophy and taught logic (among other subjects) for many years. I have yet to find anybody who has found a lapse in logic (a fallacy) in either of Smith's two great works--"Theory of Moral Sentiment" and its sequel, "Wealth of Nations."

Smith had an answer (see the Wikipedia article above), but it's a different one, not just the absence of the term "marginal utility." He ascribed it to the difference in difficulty to acquire, a labor theory of value.

When I sell something to you, I am sure you don't care whether I worked a little or a lot, whether it was difficult or easy, but only whether you want it enough to meet my price. Roughly speaking.

Similarly, society is willing, at present, to pay higher prices for oil, not because it's harder to acquire, but because they want it (inelastic demand) and insufficient alternatives. Oh, well.

Ok -- also I think what's getting some people is that the demand for oil only goes up by 2.2% or a year and the price goes from $30 to $60. "Demand and supply are only different by a few percent, and therefore it is ridiculous the price changes so much"

Well think of it in terms of economic growth -- econ growth of 1.5% (as in the US last quarter) is not "2.0% lower" than 3.5% economic growth -- it's 57% lower (3.5%/(3.5%-1.5%)

Euan, we don't have to look back that far for a demand driven plateau brought on by an aisan flu hangover and clinton's recession:

1999 74.5
Y2k 77.1
2001 77.3
2002 77.0
2003 79.8

Eh! what about Canada? what are we chopped liver?

Probably because Canada has not entered the "Big 9 club" yet has defined by Dave (production growth > 0.5% between 2000 and 2005).

BTW, is the upgraded crude oil from bitumen counted as C+C production for Canada?

In the BP review (EIA also), syncrude is included in the total production. It's difficult to keep track of the numbers for syncrude.

Re: what are we chopped liver?

Canada showed a 0.4% increase between 2000 and 2005. Close, but no cigar. Keep rooting for those tar sands! Still, I should have mentioned them. Sorry.

Canadian oil sands production up only 5.8% in 2006 from 0.91 mbpd in 05 to 1.05 mbpd in 06 http://canada.theoildrum.com/story/2006/10/20/142436/03. Would have thought higher increase in oil sand production. I don't have data for 2006 but 2005 conventional Candian oil production down 3.0% http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/060816/d060816e.htm