<DrumBeat: November 13, 2006The Oil DrumTOD:UK to become TOD:Europe (and...anyone know anything about wikis?)>

Why We (Really) May Have Entered an Oil Production Plateau

Posted by Khebab on November 13, 2006 - 11:45am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: depletion, m. king hubbert, russia, saudi arabia, type ii, type iii, world production [list all tags]

We know that some countries (around 56) have seen their production peaked (also called type III depletion). The remaining group consists of 17 countries that have the potential to grow or maintain their current production (the type II group). I propose to apply the HL technique only on the total production from the the type III group and try to assess the future production decline coming from that group. My observations are the following:

  • The type III group (~56 countries) seems to have peaked around 1999 at 40 mbpd with an URR around 1.0Tb and a cumulative production of 600 Gb in 2005.
  • The decline rate in the group III is currently around 1% per year but will accelerate with time and possibility reach 2% after 2010
  • When a high case scenario for the production derived from the Canadian Tar Sands is included, the decline rate will be reduced around 0.5% per year until 2010.
  • In order to satisfy a relatively moderate demand growth at 1.5%/year, the supply coming from the type II group should be around 3.5-4.0%/year and reach a production level of 56-59 mbpd in 2010 (from 40 mbpd in 2005).
  • The total production from Russia and Saudi Arabia that are leading the type II group, is almost flat since mid-2004 despite record oil prices.


Production from the type II group added to the logistic curve modeling the production coming from the type III group. The dots represents the actual values for the world production of crude oil + NGL.

Cautionary note: In this story, I'm talking strictly about production of Crude Oil plus Condensate and NGPL (CO+NGL in short).

Notations:
  • mbpd= Millions of barrels per day
  • Gb= Billions of barrels (109)
  • Tb= Trillions of barrels (1012)
  • NGPL= Natural Gas Plant Liquids
  • NGL= Natural Gas Liquids (lease condensate + NGPL)
  • URR= Ultimate Recoverable Resource

Production per Countries

The production data for 73 countries are composed of the following datasets (Contribution of Jean Lahèrrere, Stuart Staniford and put together by Roberto Canogar):
  • 1857-1958: from "API Facts and Figures Centennial edition 1959" (thanks to Jean Lahèrrere and Stuart Staniford)
  • 1959-1964: from "Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics2004" of DeGolyer & MacNaughton.
  • 1965-2005: BP Statistical Review of World Energy.
The two figures below are giving different views on how each country is contributing to the world production of crude oil + NGL.


Fig. 1- World production of Crude oil plus NGL (CO+NGL). Color function of the cumulative production in Gb.


Fig. 2- World production of Crude oil plus NGL (CO+NGL). Color function of the 2005 production in % of the maximum production.

The Type III Group

The Type III depletion is when a country or region can no longer maintain or increase its total production, I quote Chris Skrebowski:

Type III depletion is when a country produces less oil in a year than it did in the previous year. This can be identified quite readily from public production databases (see Petroleum Review, August 2004 and August 2005). Type III depletion will increase as additional countries move into decline, but will reduce as the volumes produced by the countries in decline decreases. In 2003, Type III depletion was running at around 1.1mn b/d, but in 2004 it fell back to around 900,000 b/d (significant revisions to production data tend to confuse the picture). Over the next few years a number of countries are likely to move into decline - Denmark, China, Malaysia, Mexico, Brunei and India are the obvious candidates and account for over 12% of global production - so a reasonable working assumption is that Type III depletion will increase, although with something of a saw-tooth profile. Recent statements by oil companies (Petroleum Review, August 2005) have tended to indicate that overall depletion (Types I, II and III) is running at between 4% and 6%. Analysis of recent company production (see p24) tends to confirm that using a 5% figure is a reasonable approximation. Demand growth is subject to quite rapid swings, but appears to average around 2%/y.

I chose to include 56 countries (see Table I) that have peaked or that are believed to peak within the next two years (the ASPO Newsletter #59 contains also a table with the average decline per countries for regular oil).

Country2005 Prod. (mbpd)Peak Prod.Cumulative Prod. (Gb)P/Q (%)
US 6.83 ( 60.46%) 11.30 (1970)216.90 1.15
Venezuela 3.01 ( 80.10%) 3.75 (1970) 59.70 1.84
Mexico 3.76 ( 98.30%) 3.82 (2004) 37.51 3.66
Kuwait 2.64 ( 79.16%) 3.34 (1972) 37.23 2.59
China 3.63 (100.00%) 3.63 (2005) 33.06 4.00
Canada 3.05 ( 98.77%) 3.09 (2004) 32.22 3.45
UK 1.81 ( 62.15%) 2.91 (1999) 23.75 2.78
Indonesia 1.14 ( 67.42%) 1.69 (1977) 22.49 1.84
Norway 2.97 ( 86.86%) 3.42 (2001) 20.56 5.27
other Europe 0.46 ( 60.76%) 0.76 (1986) 10.10 1.67
Egypt 0.70 ( 74.00%) 0.94 (1993) 9.58 2.65
Argentina 0.72 ( 81.46%) 0.89 (1998) 9.51 2.78
Qatar 1.10 (100.00%) 1.10 (2005) 8.38 4.78
Oman 0.78 ( 81.17%) 0.96 (2001) 8.00 3.56
India 0.78 ( 96.07%) 0.82 (2004) 7.58 3.77
Australia 0.55 ( 68.48%) 0.81 (2000) 7.22 2.80
Colombia 0.55 ( 65.51%) 0.84 (1999) 6.47 3.10
Malaysia 0.83 ( 96.50%) 0.86 (2004) 6.41 4.71
Rumania 0.11 ( 36.31%) 0.31 (1976) 5.59 0.74
Syria 0.47 ( 78.63%) 0.60 (1995) 4.46 3.84
Ecuador 0.54 (100.00%) 0.54 (2005) 3.85 5.13
Trinidad 0.17 ( 74.35%) 0.23 (1978) 3.35 1.86
Brunei 0.21 ( 78.93%) 0.26 (1979) 3.35 2.24
Gabon 0.23 ( 64.29%) 0.36 (1996) 3.20 2.67
Peru 0.11 ( 56.63%) 0.20 (1980) 2.43 1.67
Yemen 0.43 ( 93.30%) 0.46 (2002) 2.20 7.07
other Asia 0.20 ( 71.97%) 0.28 (1993) 2.19 3.32
Rep. of Congo 0.25 ( 86.42%) 0.29 (1999) 1.83 5.06
Denmark 0.38 ( 96.67%) 0.39 (2004) 1.74 7.90
Other S. & Cent. America 0.14 ( 92.98%) 0.15 (2003) 1.52 3.41
Tunisia 0.07 ( 62.63%) 0.12 (1980) 1.32 2.05
Italy 0.12 (100.00%) 0.12 (2005) 1.04 4.12
Sudan 0.38 (100.00%) 0.38 (2005) 0.61 22.67
Germany 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.15 (1964) 0.56 0.00
Austria 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.07 (1955) 0.34 0.00
Bahrain 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.05 (1964) 0.31 0.00
Poland 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.04 (1909) 0.30 0.00
Hungary 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.04 (1964) 0.16 0.00
Netherlands 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.04 (1964) 0.16 0.00
France 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.06 (1964) 0.16 0.00
Japan 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.02 (1963) 0.14 0.00
Burma 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.02 (1939) 0.11 0.00
Chile 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.04 (1964) 0.08 0.00
Neutral Zone 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.08 (1958) 0.08 0.00
Yugoslavia 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.04 (1964) 0.07 0.00
Albania 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.01 (1962) 0.06 0.00
Bolivia 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.01 (1957) 0.04 0.00
Pakistan 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.01 (1964) 0.04 0.00
Turkey 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.02 (1964) 0.03 0.00
New Guinea 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.01 (1954) 0.02 0.00
Czechoslovakia 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.00 (1953) 0.02 0.00
Bulgeria 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.01 (1958) 0.02 0.00
Morocco 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.00 (1963) 0.01 0.00
Israel 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.00 (1964) 0.01 0.00
Cuba 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.00 (1956) 0.00 0.00
Formosa 0.00 ( 0.00%) 0.00 (1941) 0.00 0.00
Table I. Countries in the Type III group (the percentage number between parenthesis in the second column is the 2005 production in % of the maximum production).

The inclusion of some countries in this group can be questioned:

  1. Venezuela: regular oil production has peaked but an increase in the Orinoco oil sands production is not impossible.
  2. Canada: conventional production has peaked but syncrude production derived from tar sands is planned to reach almost 3.5+ mbpd in 2020. This point is further discussed in the section below.
  3. Kuwait has not peaked yet but his largest field (Burgan) is in decline and Kuwait has admited to have inflated its reserves.
  4. China: the ASPO is saying that this country is about to peak but it is not showing in the data yet.

I then perform a Hubbert Linearization on the total production from these 56 countries. We can see that the fit is quite good and gives an URR around 1.0 Tb with a logistic growth rate at 5.8%. The peak date is obtain by matching cumulative production values and gives 1999 as the peak year. Cumulative production for this group is about 600 Gb (60% of the URR).


Fig. 3- Hubbert linearization for the total production from the type III group.


Fig. 4- Corresponding logistic curve (or Hubbert curve) with a peak production in 1999.


Fig. 5- Logistic curve with production profiles from the countries in the type III group.

What About the Canadian Tar Sands?

Synthetic Crude Oil (SCO) production derived from the Canadian Tar Sands is projected to grow by 2.5+ mbpd in 2020 (see the Canadian Oil Sands Production Update for details). I added one the most optimistic forecast (from CERI) to the group III logistic model as shown on Figure 6 below. I assumed that the level of production post-2020 will stay constant. The strong increase in syncrude production could slow down the group III decline until 2012-2015.


Fig. 6- Logistic model for the group III on which a syncrude from the Canadian tar sands forecast has been added.

What's Left?

The remaining group of countries is what I call the type II group which are believed to be capable of increasing or at least maintaining production levels for the coming years (see table II). As we can see on Figure 7, this group is dominated by the FSU (Former Soviet Union which includes Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and Saudi Arabia. In particular, the FSU was the main source for the strong supply increase that has been observed since 2000.

Country2005 Prod. (mbpd)Peak Prod.Cumulative Prod. (Gb)P/Q (%)
FSU 11.84 ( 93.59%) 12.66 (1987)161.26 2.68
Saudi Arabia 11.04 (100.00%) 11.04 (2005)116.17 3.47
Iran 4.05 ( 66.82%) 6.06 (1974) 59.14 2.50
Iraq 1.82 ( 52.18%) 3.49 (1979) 29.89 2.22
UAE 2.75 (100.00%) 2.75 (2005) 26.88 3.74
Nigeria 2.58 (100.00%) 2.58 (2005) 25.69 3.67
Libya 1.70 ( 50.70%) 3.36 (1970) 25.07 2.48
Algeria 2.02 (100.00%) 2.02 (2005) 19.36 3.80
Brazil 1.72 (100.00%) 1.72 (2005) 8.84 7.09
Angola 1.24 (100.00%) 1.24 (2005) 5.78 7.85
Vietnam 0.39 ( 91.83%) 0.43 (2004) 1.41 10.16
Other ME 0.05 ( 61.18%) 0.08 (1970) 1.20 1.46
Cameroon 0.06 ( 32.17%) 0.18 (1985) 1.11 1.91
Tailand 0.28 (100.00%) 0.28 (2005) 0.91 11.06
Equatorial Guinea 0.35 (100.00%) 0.35 (2005) 0.62 20.92
other Africa 0.07 ( 96.87%) 0.07 (2004) 0.53 4.95
Chad 0.17 (100.00%) 0.17 (2005) 0.13 47.40

Table II. Countries in the Type II group.


Fig. 7- Production from the type II group. The red line is the projected production required to satisfy a world supply growth at 2%/year and a logistic decline for the type III group.

When the Hubbert Linearization is applied on the group II (Figure 8), we can see that the Logistic curve fit is not very good compared to the group II and cannot follow the recent production increase. One explanation is that the oil production from this group has been altered by many oil shocks and production quotas. In addition, the production is relatively immature with a cumulative production (484 Gb) only at 34.7% of the URR. For now, I choose not to retain this model.


Fig. 8- Hubbert linearization for the total production from the type II group and corresponding logistic curve (or Hubbert curve) with a peak production in 2019.


Fig. 9- Production from the type II group added to the logistic curve modeling the production coming from the type III group. The dots represents the actual values for the world production of crude oil + NGL.

How Challenging Will be Future Production Growth?

Figures 10 and 11 below are summarizing the challenges we are facing in the coming years:

  • The Type III group is pulling down world production by 0.4 mbpd/year but the production loss may reach 0.7 mbpd/year in 2012.
  • In order to maintain a world supply growth around 1.5%/year and compensate for the group III decline, production by the type II group has to grow by more than 2.0 mbpd per year (or 4%/year, i.e. doubling of the production every 17 years!).
  • In 2005, we lost nearly 0.6 mbpd from the group III and got only 1.5 mbpd of new supply from the type II group (see Figure 11 below).
  • In 2006, preliminary estimates are showing a weak growth for Russia (+0.94%) and a decline for Saudi Arabia (-2.0%). Most forecasts are predicting a flat production for Saudi Arabia around 10 mbpd. Russia will probably have a weak growth for the next few years (see Dave's excellent post and Ray Leonard's presentation).
  • A strong growth in the production of synthetic crude oil from the Canadian Tar sands may slow down the decline in the group III and create a kind of plateau until 2012-2015.
  • Future production from Iraq could be a key element but unfortunately this country will probably remains in turmoil for years.


Fig. 10- Production growth and decline within group II and III. The two dotted blue lines represents the new supply from the type II group that is required to meet the world demand growth.


Fig. 11- Yearly supply fluctuations in mbpd. The two dotted blue lines represents the new supply from the type II group that is necessary to meet the world demand growth.

19992005200620072010201220152020
Group III (Observed) 39.78 39.11
-2.20% -1.49%
Logistic Group III 40.32 39.12 38.70 38.23 36.48 35.10 32.76 28.43
+ 0.08% -0.91% -1.07% -1.23% -1.70% -1.99% -2.41% -3.04%
Logistic Group III+Canadian Tar Sands 40.32 39.17 38.97 38.73 38.31 37.76 35.93 32.07
+ 0.08% -0.80% -0.52% -0.61% -0.11% -0.80% -1.84% -2.29%
World CO + NGPL (Observed) 72.50 81.2581.20*
-1.68%+1.10%-0.06%*
CO + NGPL (1.5% Growth from 1999) 72.50 79.28 80.47 81.68 85.41 87.99 92.01 99.12
+1.50%+ 1.50%+1.50%+1.50%+1.50%+1.50%+ 1.50%
Group II (Observed) 32.72 42.13
-1.04%+3.63%
Group II (Requirement1) 32.18 40.15 41.76 43.45 48.92 52.89 59.25 70.69
+3.97%+4.01%+4.03%+4.02%+3.96%+3.80%+3.45%
Group II + Tar Sands (Requirement1) 32.18 40.11 41.50 42.95 47.10 50.23 56.08 67.05
+ 3.85%+3.47%+3.48%+ 2.85%+3.30%+3.76%+3.42%
Russia (Observed2) 6.31 9.50 9.59*
+2.59%+0.94%
Saudi Arabia (Observed2) 8.84 11.01 10.79*
+5.76% -2.02%

Table III - Observed and projected production values (in mbpd) for Crude Oil + NGL. The second row for each category gives the decline rate (or growth rate) in percent for the considered year.1in order to satisfy the target of 1.5% annual growth for the world production. 2Data taken from the last International Petroleum Monthly (EIA). *Early estimates (8 months).

Khebab
Khebab@theoildrum.com

194 comments on Why We (Really) May Have Entered an Oil Production Plateau

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Prof. Goose on November 12, 2006 - 10:05pm Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Folks, consider this a reminder to positively rate these articles (using the icons under the tags in the story title) at reddit, digg, and del.icio.us.  Also, don't forget to submit them to your favorite link farms, such as metafilter, stumbleupon, slashdot, fark, boingboing, furl, or any of the others.  These posts are a lot of work, and the authors appreciate your helping them get more readers for their work however you can--heck, even send this to politicians or other government officials!
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totoneila on November 13, 2006 - 2:18pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Hello Prof Goose and Khebab,

Yes, fellow TODers--Hit those tipjars please!!!

My Reddit post:

-----------------------------------
IF the world is in a plateau--How long can it be sustained?  Is world oil production like a cheetah with a high speed, but only a short plateaued burst?  Or is the plateau more like a giraffe with long legs and a lasting trot?  Khebab does an outstanding job and everyone needs to study these charts.
-----------------------------------

What I find disturbing is that many country charts have a late-date small hitch up attributed by many experts to Extreme Oil Recovery methods [EOR].  This has been discussed before by TODer DuncanK and notable others with the comparisons to the fast-collapse of the Yibal field in Oman, but it leads me to think the plateau will be more like a cheetah instead of the lasting plod of a giraffe.

Therefore, is there any way to characterwise what percentage of Type II production is EOR to help determine the possible duration period of the plateau?  In short Khebab: what is the confidence %'s going forward?  

Bob Shaw in Phx,Az  Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?

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totoneila on November 13, 2006 - 2:48pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Hello TODers,

Just to help prod this cheetah vs giraffe plateau comparison along, consider Leanan's Drumbeat toplink post today [as usual, kudos to Leanan!]: Peak oil on the agenda: Notes from the Australian Institute of Energy annual forum

-----------------------
James' report below contains some minor bombshells, for instance Lloyd Taylor, former Chairman of Shell NZ, claiming that even based on the USGS data, there is a 60% chance of peak oil by 2015.
----------------------

Don't most experts consider the USGS a bit optimistic?  Therefore, is a 7-9 year plateau  a pipedream?  The production treadmill the Type II Red Queen is pacing is not only going faster, but the ramp incline is jacking up, too.

Pemex has already admitted to a $2 billion shortfall, Gazprom is twiddling it's thumbs to extract the maximum Euro, and KSA is punching holes as fast as they can, wearing out the rigs faster than the industry can build replacements.

Bob Shaw in Phx,Az  Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?

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Khebab on November 13, 2006 - 3:18pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Therefore, is there any way to characterwise what percentage of Type II production is EOR to help determine the possible duration period of the plateau?
It's very difficult to know without detailed field-by-field data. If the logistic model holds for the group III and Canadian Tar Sands production double by 2010, the supply coming from group II has to increase by a minimum of 10 mbpd (+10%) by 2012. 10 mbpd is the equivalent of a new Saudi Arabia! and I was very pessimistic on future demand growth (+1.5%).
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Jason Bradford on November 13, 2006 - 4:37pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
What a fantastic post!

I have noticed the tendency of analyses like these to be "conservative" in the sense that the potentials for future projects to come online in time, depletion rates to remain low, etc. are given the benefit of the doubt.  

What I would like to see is a "conservative" analysis in the sense of "what if things don't go according to plan?"  What does it look like if "another Saudia Arabia" doesn't manifest from the Type II countries?  

How fast is the global depletion rate likely to be and when does it become very noticable?  

I don't believe total predictive ability, just want a set of scenarios we can consider realistic considering Murphy's Law.  What we have here is a kind of "best case" scenario, what would be a "not so great case," in other words?

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jim burke on November 13, 2006 - 9:59pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Mentioning Murphy's Law is spot on.

Khebab's excellent post demonstrates what we should consider a best case scenario. Political, military and environmental factors can do nothing but provide setbacks to production.  

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Khebab on November 13, 2006 - 10:46pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Thanks for the kind words!

It's hard to tell, There are so many things that can go wrong! The worst case scenario is SA or Russia going south. Another issue is the likely overestimation of Middle-East reserves. You have to read my post also in light of Stuart's analysis (Why peak oil is probably about now):

There is also the result of the HL on Saudi Arabia which is worriesome (Texas and US Lower 48 oil production as a model for Saudi Arabia and the world):

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fringy on November 13, 2006 - 7:22pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
"IF the world is in a plateau--How long can it be sustained?"

I think one thing we forget is the size of the curve.  The base could be said to start in 1930 (or even go back to spindletop) and end in 2070 (perhaps dragging on in small volumes further).  Given a base of 140 - 200 years, a 10 year plateau/peak does not seem unreasonable - even for a perfect Hubbert curve.

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Dragonfly41 on November 13, 2006 - 9:20pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
This is quite true, I think.  We may have just started along the Plateau and could hang there defying gravity for a decade or so.  Things may only speed up once there is general awareness of what this Plateau really is.  

At this point, we may speed up towards the end of the Plateau due mainly to protectionism (nationalist hording of resources - i.e. what I think Russia is currently doing).  If this gets out of hand, then this period of "suspended stability" could end sooner than later.

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PeakOilPete on November 14, 2006 - 4:19pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
additionally, while production/extraction may platea, demand will not.  exponential growth in emerging markets (as if china and india are merely emerging) will also shorten the plateau, or stated inversely, cause the inevitable decline to start sooner.
-PoP
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kunstler on November 14, 2006 - 10:11am Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Are we discounting or forgetting the destabilizing effects of the plateau itself?  And how those instabilities in complex systems such as financial markets and geo-political relations will affect oil production.  For instance, the extreme instability manifested in Iraq right now could easily lead to sabotage in the oil fields.  If Iraqi oil goes offline this coming year, oil will (at least) spike up to the $80-100 range.
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GreyZone on November 14, 2006 - 3:01pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
I think Khebab is using just the geology to define the upper bounds of the supply, which establishes why this may actually be the peak plateau and not another interlude. The effects that emanate out from that are not as amenable to pure statistical analysis. As you note, they have the potential to be massively disruptive also but one cannot make specific predictions about how the overall system will oscillate out of control. Instead Khebab is trying to show that we're at the point where this oscillation can occur. At least that is my understanding here.
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elwoodelmore on November 13, 2006 - 7:31pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
extreme oil recovery    roflmao   i think you mean enhanced oil recovery
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bradshaw on November 13, 2006 - 12:04pm Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
-- As always, Great job Khebab!  

This is the type of information that makes the TOD such a great place to visit.

Data, Analysis, Charts & Debate.

-C.

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oilmanbob on November 13, 2006 - 12:09pm Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Khebab, great post again. You always have the real goods.
One slight inaccuracy-Cuba now has some production.

Ouestion: What are Type 1 countries?

Also, why is bitumen production from tar sands included in oil rather than have a separate category? My personal definition of oil is that oil has to flow naturally at 70 degrees farenheight. Since tar has to be either heated ir hydrogenated to flow and costs so much more to produce and refine, shouldn't it be considered either alternative energy like syncrude from coal or perhaps have its own category or one including bitumen from shale too. I think its really just noise on your figures.  

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neuroil on November 13, 2006 - 12:23pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Type 1 depletion is defined in the Chris Sebrowski article.

I quote :


Type I depletion - is the normal loss of capacity in an oil field as production from wells in one field run down and are offset by new wells or increased production from other existing wells in the field.

I join everybody in the many thanks to Khebab for this data.

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Khebab on November 13, 2006 - 12:24pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
The production numbers are probably inaccurate for small countries.

Ouestion: What are Type 1 countries?

Type I is when an oil field is in decline so all the countries are in fact type I. Type II is when the decline is not showing up on the country total production.

About tar sands, I believe that it should be included (and modeled) as a separated category. Also, the syncrude production  figures should be used, not the raw bitumen which is not the final product (there is 10-20% loss in the upgrading process).

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oilmanbob on November 13, 2006 - 12:24pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Also, I've heard Aspect Petroleum has found an excellent field in Belieze,through industry sources. But both countries are I'm sure very minor additions to world production.
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plucky underdog on November 13, 2006 - 3:50pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
85 MMbd - (annual decline) + Excellent = ???

Excellent isn't a number.

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pickyreader on November 13, 2006 - 5:28pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
You need to use the da Vinci code.
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porsena on November 13, 2006 - 3:47pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Cuba: Some information here and here, with production apparently at 0.07 mbpd in 2004 and possibly growing.
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khaos3 on November 13, 2006 - 12:42pm Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
I was looking over the EIA's web site this morning and found a section on frequently asked questions When I clicked on the question "Do we have enough oil worldwide to meet future needs?" the answer came back - "Can't find this page"
How appropriate.
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khaos3 on November 13, 2006 - 12:46pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
You can get their answer by clicking on another question. A technological freudian slip to me.
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scandia on November 13, 2006 - 3:27pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Seems to be fixed now. Someone over at EIA reading TOD?
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Prof. Goose on November 13, 2006 - 4:11pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
heh.  I'll not offer my thoughts on that except to say, "yep!"
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totoneila on November 13, 2006 - 6:18pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Hey Prof Goose,

This latest by Khebab hopefully starts arguments among the staff, headed by ex-CEO Reilly, working on the Energy Report coming out soon.  It will be fascinating comparing their output to Khebab's.

Bob Shaw in Phx,Az  Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?

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Freddy Hutter on November 14, 2006 - 4:48pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
Whatever OilCEO comes up with, it will be relatively easy for him to dash the Khebab outlook.  CEO uses factual, reputable data whereas the fantasy we see above ignores the bottom up studies of Campbell, Skrebowski, CERA & Koppelaar.  And further, it ignores the new paradigm as discovered by Laherrere.

Spot oil has fallen twenty bucks.  Avg USA oil contracts are fifty bucks today. The Peakist scare campaign of a past peak or a plateau has again been exposed.  The genie is out-of-the-bottle.  The emperor has no clothes.  The media won't come near this issue any longer.  They have moved on to the global warming hoax.  When the scare tactics of that one are likewise released, they will move on again to the next story...

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Hellasious on November 13, 2006 - 12:51pm Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
Many thanks indeed for all the hard work.

Quick question: has anyone here at TOD or elsewhere done a similar comprehensive study on the consumption side?

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andyh on November 13, 2006 - 3:09pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
I have asked this question a couple of times, and judging by the lack of response, no.
The demand side of the equation is absolutely critical (I suggested a simplistic model which inputted for example the effects of various recessionary outcomes on oil demand etc), and I suspect we really need someone who is very hot on economics to look at this.
One could develop more complex models that allowed for demand destruction as prices went up etc.
The nearest we seem to have come to looking at this question relates to the posts made by westexas et al looking at how consumption in oil producers is rising and how this can put a dint in exports.
I believe it modelling the demand side which is the next 'jump' TOD has to make - it looks to me that the data accumulated on the supply side is looking more and more robust - is there that much more to add? No doubt about it though, the consumption/demand side will be far far harder to analyse - its worth having a go at IMO, as presently all we seem to have are IEA and EIA guestimates as to future consumption. Since as a community we seem to be better at assessing future supply side than them and see no reason why we cant make a fair go at assessing demand too.
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andyh on November 13, 2006 - 3:16pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
OOps, how rude of me - I meant to add thanks also to Khebab for his excellent work
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Hellasious on November 14, 2006 - 3:23am Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
It is apparent from what I have read on TOD that the emphasis is on production analyses. The problem with that is it masks the underlying dynamics of the oil market. Example: when production goes down many assume it is because we have reached a peak, or a plateau, etc - rarely, if ever, do they consider that demand may be lower, taking it for granted that demand always rises. That is, of course, not so.

And demand does not get "destroyed" by high prices alone: when we enter a recession demand drops for fundamental economic reasons (i.e. less output of goods and services requires less energy).

Anyway, what I was asking for was not so much econometric modeling of the future, which is very difficult to do, but past data on consumption presented and analyzed in the same way as Khebab has admirably done for production; i.e. on a country by country basis.

I have seen a study by Luis de Sousa here on TOD about the domestic consumption of oil exporters - could this be expanded to include all countries? I think it would be extremely valuable and the comparative study between production and consumption analyses even more so.

Many thanks

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Khebab on November 14, 2006 - 9:26am Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
You're right, the demand side has been neglected probably because it's vastly more complicated and it requires more data.
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garyp on November 13, 2006 - 1:08pm Permalink | Subthread | Comments top
A question regards the Canadian Tar Sands. It appears from fig 6 that your assumption is of a peak in syncrude in 2012 of ~5 mbpd, yet the text says an additional 2.5 mbpd by 2020.

Also the main graph seems not to include this expected contribution at all. Indeed the use of an idealised Type III curve, rather than the real data in your main graph serves to hide global effects on all producers.

It would be interesting to see a graph that included the expected paths of TypeII countries + canada tar sands, and put SA and FSU as the top layers of the curve cake. By eye it seems that increases here dominate your model - thus uncertainty in these two areas are key to assessing the production plateau hypothosis.

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Khebab on November 13, 2006 - 1:32pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Comments top
A question regards the Canadian Tar Sands. It appears from fig 6 that your assumption is of a peak in syncrude in 2012 of ~5 mbpd, yet the text says an additional 2.5 mbpd by 2020.

Be careful, the vertical scale is 5 mbpd (Click on the Figure to get a high resolution version). Here are the values I used for the read area on Fig. 6:
2012: +2.46 mbpd
>2020: +2.82 mbpd

However, I noticed an error in the application of my bitumen to syncrude loss factor (0.88). I divided the values instead of multiplying them by that factor! so the values should be:
2012: +1.9242 mbpd
>2020: +2.21 mbpd
Consequently, the red area is 30% too optimistic!

It would be interesting to see a graph that included the expected paths of TypeII countries + canada tar sands, and put SA and FSU as the top layers of the curve cake. By eye it seems that increases here dominate your model - thus uncertainty in these two areas are key to assessing the production plateau hypothosis.
This is a work in progress, I'm planning a follow-up on that post that will consider different forecasts for SA/FSU/Tar Sands.
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jkissing on November 13, 2006 - 4:22pm Permalink |