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4. If you have come here to vet your plan to kill the well, understand that you will be queried on whether or not you have read the other 10 previous comment threads and all the myriad plans that have already been run by the kind folks in this room; if you have actually read all 10 comment threads and still think your plan has legs, well, then maybe yours really is the one that will save the Gulf of Mexico.

This is not to say that well considered questions about current attempts and modifications to those attempts are not welcome; they are. But try to place them in context and in what's actually going on, as opposed to your MacGyver dream solution where you have a 10 megaton bomb, an ice pick, and Commander Spock at your side.

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6. Do not be afraid to go back and read the last couple of open threads yesterday and today before you start on this thread. They are really good, and will likely catch you up if you have been out of the loop for a while. We shut down threads when we get to 300-400 comments, as it's really unmanageable. Lots of good stuff in there though.

[Carrying on from conversation started in last thread where I proposed wiggling remaining riser up and down until it breaks, leaving an easier job for saw or spanner.
And in reply to newdood who warned that this might weaken the BOP, which is a valid fear.]
Thanks newdood.
Yeah I thought that too. That's why I said GENTLY. I also think it should be carefully monitored and stopped if the BOP looked like breaking. (I don't suppose there'd be any way of stabilising the BOP first? For example pushing on its opposite side with the ROVs to oppose the force being applied.) But when you consider what a lot of stress the whole assembly has survived so far...just a teeny bit more.
Also, the kinked area could be weakened further beforehand by e.g. "nibbling" at each of the squashed sides with the end of the shear tool.

Is anyone watching the video from http://mfile.akamai.com/97892/live/reflector:46245.asx I think it has the best quality. It appears they are currently showing the release of dispersant underwater. I came up with that conclusion by the screen that says "Dispersant Ops." First time I've noticed that.

http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/377/DeepSpill%20Final%20Report.pdf

Link cited by NYT(http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/evidence-of-undersea-oil-plume...)

159 pages so it takes a while to read, but excellent study of deep blowouts and underwater plumes in which MMS and BP(allegedly) participated.

MMS certainly had a number of studies warning of the hazards of deepwater drilling.

One of the regular questions, okay, complaints, is BP should be telling us more about what is going on. Especially with regard to the ROV work at the BOP. The problem is simply it is illegal for them to do that. All public corporations are required by law to disclose information, that might affect their share price, in a manner which allows everyone access to that information in a format that is easily accessible and widely distributed. Typically a news conference or press release covered by the major media outlets.

The information also has to be understandable to those who might want to buy or sell BP stock. As many of you have seen, what is going on at the BOP is anything but easily understandable. That's why there is no running commentary coupled with the ROV video. It would be illegal. Instead, you get one or two press conferences a day that are general updates, and they don't go into a lot of detail about the odds.

At least that's how I understand it. We have several good lawyers who contribute to TOD. They can expand on this if they like or correct me where I'm wrong.

Somewhere near the end of the last thread someone posted what seemed to me to be a really good solution to the current problem of not being able to get a 'clean cut' on the riser pipe. This is important for the cap to seal against. His suggestion had to do with mating to the flange OD rather than unbolt the flange (which we've all heard those ideas and the reasons why it wouldn't be a good idea)... it went on to talk about square pegs which lost me but I thought it was such a good thought I fired up the CAD station and came up with this...
http://picasaweb.google.com/KWoodME/OilCap#5478339901873726402
Its like the second cap BP plans to use after they bring down a new manifold to process the oil captured up to the suface, the one that will slip OVER the riser pipe rather than seal on top of it. The thought is for those who don't venture to the link of the image is shear the riser pipe at the kink, slip cap over riser AND flanges the cap will seal at the OD of the flanges and could seal against the remaining riser pipe, similar to the second cap. Use a split flange to mate the flange on bottom of the cap which should create a pretty good seal, seamingly as good or better than what is currently being attempted?

UPDATE 5 : "The technician said bla bla bla ..."

What? you mean "The engineer said bla bla bla ..."
Is it suppose to be reassuring that a tech (no offense) is in charge of this whole operation ? It sounds like my corner garage mech talking about changing my brake lines.

No wonder that all attempts to fix it failed.

Near the bottom of the last thread there was an important post:
"Stvrob_63 on June 3, 2010 - 12:02am

I have an idea There is a halfway decent mating surface for the collector device that we have been staring at for hours. The OD of the flanges just below the saw cut. A coupling could be made uop that slightly exceeds this OD and be attached to the fitted to the base of the riser they were going to use. Then use the "claw" to cut the riser off just below the crinp.

If you made this couple device with six or eight square windows cut around its base, then have the rovers hammer in large square tapered pegs to catch the bottom edge of the flange to keep it halway secure. A lip on the inside with a big squishy gasket would help make a halfway decent seal with the top flange

If they overpumped this riser from the drillship and monitored the pressure inside the couple they could try to find the pumping rate that more or less exactly neutralizes the pressure differential until they get these square tapered pegs hammered in place. Then when they stopped pumpimg the higher pressure inside the riser, plus the bouyancey of the new riser, would keep it pretty secure.

It will leak some, but you can control the differential pressure (and hence the leakage) by pumping the riser at the surface."
---

stvrob_63's idea is a good engineering alternative if (as now seems likely) a clean saw cut of the riser pipe cannot be achieved. It's fairly similar to a garden hose connector. I think it could be done in three stages:

Stage 1: Cut riser pipe a few feet above the BOP using the Shears, leaving a rough cut end

Stage 2: Lower a new module over the whole thing (broken rise pipe + flange) and clamp it on to the flange. The top of the module would be open, for now

Stage 3: Connect LMRP to top of the new module as per existing BP plans

The 'module' is basically a cylinder with sufficient diameter to fit over the flange (I guess 30" approx) and sufficient height (I guess 8' approx) that when in place, the top of it will not be fouled by any remaining part of the riser pipe. Inside the base of it there is a gasket or O-ring designed to make a good seal either with the top surface of the flange (if there is space enough on the outer side of all those bolts) or with the circumference of the flange. The base of the module has a simple clamping system so that it can be clamped onto the underside of the flange once in position, so as to compress the gasket - it could be tapreed pegs that can be tapped in horizontally, or if the height of the flange is known precisely, it could be pivoting, gravity driven latches, initially held "open" with a rope which can easily be cut by a ROV, these latches would have a simple lever mechanism so they can be opened up again if the first attempt to put the module in place is not successful. The top of the cylinder will have a hole with the same dimensions as the riser pipe, such that the existing LMRP can make a perfect coupling to it.

Hopefully, because of the small height and the large diameter hole in the top, this cylinder will not add any significant resistance and so it will not have the hydrate formation problem while it is being manoeuvred into position - if there might be hydrates, then the same solution can be used as for the LMRP itself, i.e. methanol lines.

Note that the existing design of the LMRP seems to incorporate some of these design elements already, at least there is a cylindrical base designed to fit over the flange and possibly also therefore a clamping system which is not drawn on BP's slide:
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/in...

The essence of stvrob_63's idea is to put the gasket against the flange and not against the riser pipe, therefore there is no requirement for a clean-cut surface of the riser pipe to put it against. A simple but good idea - even obvious with hindsight. BP should have thought of this!

It would be wonderful if some skilled person who likes the idea could make a drawing - a picture speaks 1000 words...

When I saw where they were making the initial cut of the riser with the shears, I was concerned about the weight of the remaining pipe creating a situation where the wire saw would be pinched. As an analogy, when one cuts down a tree with a chain saw, one makes a wedge cut part way through the tree and then completes the cut from the other side, so that the chain won't get pinched by the weight of the tree (and the tree will fall the right way). Further, when felling a difficult tree under tension (not to be used for lumber), a tree guy will remove sections so as to reduce the weight on the final cut. It seems these guys didn't anticipate this senario well enough.

One of the main challenges of this latest attempt was to get a clean cut so that they could get as good a seal as possible. The shears will deform the top of the BOP and limit their ability to seal this thing. Why don't they resume cutting from another side with the wire saw or the rotary saw?

Whatever technical skills these people have seem to be exclusive of common sense.

Earlier I posted the following:

To those who wonder why it might not be prudent to try to shut in the well (like by crimping the riser pipe), it's not an issue with the BOP integrity or wellhead, but because of the likelihood that isolation between the 9-5/8' x 13-5/8" casing annulus has been compromised, either because of a wellhead seal failure or because of a collapse. The problem is that the 13-5/8" casing (and of course all of the larger strings) were not designed for the same burst pressure as the 9-5/8" x 7" production string.

If you could shut-in the well now at the BOP, there would be a mixed oil/gas column from the reservoir up to the seabed. I'm guessing that BP is esimating that the resulting shut-in pressure is greater than the burst pressure of the 13-5/8". If you look at http://www.ussteel.com/corp/tubular/documents/USS%202010%20Casing%20Prod... you can see that the burst pressure of 13-5/8 casing having a drift larger than the 12-1/4" bit needed for the next hole section is in the 5,000 - 8,000 psi range (w/o any safety factor).

Because of drill pipe wear when you drill the next hole section below the 13-3/8" shoe, it's likely to have thin spots up near the seafloor, so I'd guess that nobody feels good about subjecting it to differential shut-in pressures that could exceed 8,000 psi.

I think that BP expects that the delta p at the seabed would be dangerous to the integrity of the 13-5/8' casing. If that rupured, then all of the remaining outer stings would then rupture, which means that it's game over until a relief well could be drilled. Containment would no longer be an option.

Then again, I could be wrong :-)

The link to the initial finding document that someone posted later (thanks BTW), indicates that the next casing string inside the wellhead is 16", not 13-5/8' (that was a liner, not a full string). However, my point is the same.

I'm at the BP page and all I can see is a sleeping robot.
Where are you guys getting your live feed action.
jal

It looks like they are on the sea bed now. Is it possible they are pumping dispersant up the damaged riser?

Ideas on how to stop the spill are still being offered by posters on TOD. I'd like to let those with suggestions know there is a formal way to get them to the Deepwater Horizon Response Team.

Deepwater Horizon Reponse Suggestions

If you feel your idea has real merit, it is up to you to forward it to the response team. It won't see the light of day here. Even if your idea got little support here, you still might send it off anyway. Problem solving sometimes gets inspiration from just a small piece of an impossible idea.

Just a reminder, this is a place to discuss your ideas only if you have taken the time to think it through and searched through the previous weeks' posts for similar ideas. Almost all the good ones have been already taken ;-) For example, if your idea has to do with a balloon, just open up the post and do a command F search on a Mac or a control F search on a PC to find all the comments with the word balloon.

And please, if you are replying to a comment that contains a suggestion, I don't care how poor you feel the suggestion is, a courteous response is the only acceptable response, IMHO.

Thanks!

is there any person here who has an idea how the spill is going to be affected by hurricanes......someone knowledgeable in these things

1- far as i understand ....the temperature of the water has a big effect on hurricane intensity so I'm guessing oil s black it might absorb more heat .....or when we talk in terms of hurricanes the spill and whatever little heating effect is negligible.....

2- if the hurricane picks up water are we likely to see any oily rain or is the hurriace liable to pick up the oil and spray it onland ??? --this might be stupid but reason i'm asking is ....i've seen water spouts (i dunno if its the technical term..cud be just a rig-hand term) over in Timbalier Bay, LA pick up many fishes 50 ft and move them along fair distances [i heard an old wireline guy working for Wood Group, Houma, LA say he seen small porpoise pickup up by big water spouts ; but then wireline guys are wireline guys :) ]

any body knowledgable here about this stuff

News reporting that BP will not use diamond saw..per Allen

Some questions: It appears that the LMRP has no pressure relief other than up the riser. Would this mean that the entire pressure of the well would be directed to the drill ship the moment the LMRP is sealed to the BOP? Would this cause any backpressure on the well that could risk well integrity? Does the drill ship have the capacity to receive the entire unrestricted flow from the well? Will attachment of the LMRP cause a rapid and extreme increase in pressure in surface equipment that could endanger the equipment and, more importantly, the crew of the drill ship?

I've been keeping up with prior posts as best I can and have read some of the previous LMRP discussions, but can't say I've read it all so regret if these questions have already been asked and answered.

FOR ALL NEWBIES

05 (question from previous thread) – For your benefit and that of other newbies showing up daily I’ll offer you my very biased conclusion of the primary cause of the blow out. The regulars can skip the rest of the story…they’ve heard already. I’ll make just one qualification and it’s a big one: IF THE INITIAL REPORTS ARE CORRECT. It will likely be at least 6 months but more likely a year before there’s official confirmation. The following are just my suppositions. But suppositions gleamed from 35 years as a petroleum geologist with a strong background in well site operations. That experience includes working on site on DW GOM wells as a pore pressure analyst. As a PPA I assisted the drillers in determining the magnitude of the rock pressure they had to deal with.

BP drilled thru an oil reservoir at about 13,000’ below the sea floor. The pressure in the reservoir was around 14,000 psi (an educated guess). They ran steel pipe (casing) from the bottom of the hole back up to the wellhead at the sea floor. They then ran the drill pipe to the bottom of this csg string and pumped wet cement up between the csg and the rock. The purpose of the cement isn’t to hold the csg in place…it isn’t going anywhere. The purpose is to isolate the oil reservoir and keep it from flowing along the outside of the csg in either direction…up or down. It appears the cmt job failed to provide this isolation. Opinions vary but IMHO this is not the BIG SMOKING GUN. Cmt jobs fail all the time. You assume that during the course of drilling a well that you’ll have get a bad cmt job or two. That’s why you routinely test the cmt after a period of 18 to 36 hours. The primary and best cmt test is to apply pressure to it. The cmt has to hold a pressure greater than the reservoir pressure. If it doesn’t then you do a “squeeze job”: pump more cmt behind the csg and then test again. There is some question regarding the validity of the pressure tests BP conducted. Opinions vary but the cmt did fail…that’s why the well blew out.

After BP decided the cmt job was sufficient they had to set cmt plugs inside the csg string as required by MMS regs. But before setting the upper cmt plug they began removing the heavy drilling mud (14.5 pounds per gallon) from the csg and the riser (the 20” tube that connected the wellhead to the drill rig 5,000’ above. They did this by going down into the csg with drill pipe and pumping seawater down. The seawater pushed the drill mud back up to the rig. The seawater weighs about 7.5 pounds per gallons. That means the pressure exerted at the bottom of the well was reduced considerably. So low this pressure wasn’t sufficient to keep the oil reservoir from flowing up. This is a normal procedure. Had the cmt job held all would have been fine. The bad cmt job allowed the oil reservoir to flow up the csg. Had they set the top cmt plug first the well would not have blown out when they displace the mud. Even with a bad cmt job a proper upper plug would have held the flow back.

There are any number of circumstances when there’s a valid concern that some reservoir is flowing into a well that’s cased or still drilling. There’s a very basic protocol for checking to see if the well is “kicking (flowing upwards): you turn the mud pumps off and determine if there’s any drilling mud still flowing out of the well. There are some exceptions but in general a reservoir can’t flow up the well unless it pushes the mud out ahead of it. No flow returns and the well is static. Mud flowing out of the well when the mud pumps are off = something pushing it out. This is not an uncommon event. The drill crew has practiced “killing” the flow (stopping it) many times. First all the return lines are closed (shut the well in). Even if this doesn’t prevent the oil/NG from flowing all the way up to the rig it does prevent it from breaching the drill floor (this is the definition of a blow out). Once the well is shut in they can pump a “kill pill” (heavy drilling mud) down the well and put enough back pressure to stop the well flow. I could be wrong but the evidence seems to indicate that the hands on the rig weren’t monitoring the mud returns when they were displacing the mud. They didn’t see the well coming in (flowing) until it was too late and the oil/NG breached the drill floor and exploded. Why weren’t they closely watching the mud returns? I’ll skip that part of my already long store.

When the well blew out every hand on the drill floor knew exactly what was happening at that point. They knew what was likely to happen. Every hand on the rig knows. The hands had two simple choices. Run and give up any chance of killing the well. Or stay in there and try to execute the kill procedure. The 11 hands that died took the second option. They were obviously “top hands”. That’s the highest title you can earn on a drill rig. Doesn’t seem like a very impressive title to most but in the oil patch it says everything you need to know about the guy working next to you.

I’ll pass on the BOP failure. That’s a critical but separate issue. Just as the efforts to stop the flow since the rig sunk. Lot’s of folks on TOD better qualified to handle those discussions. Likewise other knowledgeable TOD folks have other interpretations of what caused the blow out. Listen to them all and you can come up with your own conclusions

I watched earlier today as they took the saw and shear topside. I see how the video feeds read "Dispersant Ops". I say they are done.

Couldn't they just use a thick rubber bladder and shove it ,deflated, into the pipe, then fill the bladder with water making it expand against the sides? I know they use this process for creating pressure inside a sewer pipe to de-clog. When the bladder is filled nothing can get passed it.

Can someone please comment (every so often) about what is going on in the video stream? (BTW, the "drivers" of the ROVs are amazing. They control the arms and move the vehicles with fantastic precision.)

I've got a question about the oily water that the skimmers are working on. Is there information/estimates/guesses on the percentage of oil in various parts of the slick? I understand that there's lots of variability, but in the center of the slick is it 3% oil, 1% oil, 0.1% oil or 0.01% oil for example? Is there information on the vertical gradient - does the percentage oil decline rapidly below 1 cm, 10 cm, 1 m? I ask because the size of skimmers that would be needed to handle to 3000 or so tonnes/day of oil presumably depends on the percentage of oil.

Well our friends at BP are giving us the "Dispersant Ops" feed. Apparently, the comments about the mistake of starting the diamond saw on the side of the riser instead of opposite to the bend which many of us here recognize as being the wise choice may have caused BP to give us the cartoon channel.

Lord only knows what goofy things they are up to now.

The previous now closed thread talked about a rupture disk. I was going to paste a picture of a casing rupture disk here, but not sure how to do that. Yes, rupture disks are used in casing (I think BP were the the ones who first started using them). I also heard the comment that a rupture disk in the 16" casing may have blown. The purpose for these disks are to prevent casing failure when temperature expansion in a trapped annulus occurs. For shallow On subsea wells or liners there is now ay to bleed or monitor the annulus. As the well is drilled and especially when producing the upper casings and the fluid in thier annuli heat up and try to expand. However, they can't since the annuli are sealed at the bottom by cement and at the top by a liner hanger packer or wellhead seal assembly. One mitigation is to install a burst disk in a specific location such that it will rupture and releave the trapped pressure before one of the casings fail in an undesirable way.

There are other mitigations for trapped annulus pressure and this is just one. Maybe it's use is someting that will have to be looked at closely in the future.

Woods27 and Eggtimer1

My thoughts have been moving in a similar direction to yours regarding the potential use of the Big Flange as an anchor point. My concept centered around a design similiar to a Prop Puller, which as you may know is 3 arms that swing in to seize the base of a boat propeller as it is tightened against the shaft. Seemed to me that up to eight adustable arms could be attached to a cap with feet that would swing in and extend under the big flange and tighten the cap against the top of the existing flange. It is this ability to easily and instantly anchor the cap and then to tighten at will as required to seal that is so important, and with the proper adjust able arms could be made to instantly release if required.

This idea seemed to address the concerns regarding the uncontrolled release of pressure if the existing riser is cut and would only need to contain the existing release pressure and regarding the holding down of the drill pipe if the riser is cut since the riser could be sheared or crimped beyond its existing leaks and contained within the cap. It also offered a larger mateing surface to spread the internal pressure and the ability to fit the cap over the existing structure and contain it rather than cutting off the existing structure in order to fit (thread the needle) within the pipe.

Your similar ideas and drawings have given this concept life and I have submitted this thread on an Alternative Technology Response form as referenced above. Hopefully it will rceive a reasoned response.

NOTE: the following are not personal beliefs or images that i created or whatever. i just wanted to share some things ive been seeing about public perception towards BP. as i understand the sitaution, cost estimates range up to 20 Bn and their stock value has already dropped 50 Bn. this is before legal proceedings and does not factor in US perception of BP is now dismal. for example:

This is not a photoshop, but rather what someone DID to a BP station in NYC

there are literally hundreds of these sorts of things popping up everywhere. from my limited understanding of the refining proccess all the major players share the same pipelines so it really doesnt matter whose name is on the sign you're getting something pumped by an oil company that may not be the "brand" you're looking at. that in mind, does this public outlash at BP have any potential for signifigant impact on their business? i mean, boycotting BP stations for example wouldnt keep them from selling fuel.

No offense to the 11 dead workers, but it was just as likely they were trying to escape and were blown away by the explosion.

Initial Exploration Plan Mississippi Canyon Block 252 OSS-G 32306

http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PI/PDFImages/PLANS/29/29977.pdf

On 03122009 some one wrote "noted Schexnaldre". One year to the day, permission to cap was requested.

For those who want graphics of the bathymetrics, this is a good document.

Now up to six different feeds on same page (Flash and Windows Media)

link

I think what we are seeing with the 'Dispersant Cam' is actually them trying to gauge the flow rate,and is NOT dispersant.

CNN reporting the LMRP is being dropped for the tophat instead due to the ditching of the diamond saw which in turn will lead to less of a seal and more of a flow. CNN is the only agency I see reporting this, does it have factual basis?

Edit Link: http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/02/oil.spill.cut/

That new slit seems to have greatly increased the flow rate, at least to these untrained eyes.

1) Nibble away at bend area of riser to find DP, bent or fractured?

2) If DP is bent cut it, if fractured/severed continue with DSAW around circumference base of riser

3) Riser comes off… cut job complete !

Some things i learned from the BP “leak”?
1. mud should never come up out of the well without being gaged and alarmed for imbalance.
2. the method of setting plugs may not strong enough, not reliable enough
3. the current test procedures are not long lasting enough nor rigorous enough to detect pending failures
4. backup plugs are not being put at bottom such that a failure of the first will be caught by the second
5. the kill and choke lines are not large enough in diameter to beat a blow out with pill
6. the BOP is not protected structurally from a riser collapse.
7. the shear in the BOP is not strong enough and not reliable enough to cut a drill string joint
8. the rig detachment system, LMRP, totally failed to do its job (and it isn't even in deep water)
9. the platforms need safety chutes to get personnel down to the water and life boats in less than 10sec
10. doors were exploding off and crushing people. Alter the layouts to prevent this.
11. only certain rooms were explosion-proof (non-spark). Looks like ALL rooms must be spark-proof.
13. hot surfaces (engine exhaust manifolds) need to be water cooled to prevent gaseous ignition.
14. engine governors failed when natural gas got into the intakes. Must have auto intake close-offs.
15. BOP test and rebuild procedures got to be way sloppy. Leaky fittings and test jaws were left in.
16. management was allowed to over-ride safety. Always a really stupid temptation to fall into.
17. the BOP is not easily replaceable. Provide tracks below and above, so a second BOP could slide in, (needs sq flanges).
18. provisions for drill string section to be sheared out and dropped into side pocket to allow clear space for valve shut downs.
19. provisions for dealing with high velocity drill strings in blow out ejections. Need brakes before shear engages.
20. annular rubber was chewed apart, yet management said “So what!” Really a criminal act.
21. violation of safe procedure by filling with seawater rather than balancing mud. Criminal act.
22. totally missing: containment funnel from seabed to surface. 100' diameter at bottom. 1000' at top.
23. totally missing Stainless Steel floating ring (pool wall) at surface. Jointed, with positioner/tentionlines to 6 ships outside circle.
24. failed to take into account sand erosion of metal containment tubes (use AR plate abrasion resistant, or keep blow outs short)
25. no velocity detectors in BOP for auto-kill function when ever oil or gas moves through it too fast.
26. no gas-lift detection, which would be a huge indicator of pending blowout. (use tiny doppler LEDs)
27. no pause in capping procedure to measure stability of all components. (Hurry perturbs system and masks the small stuff.)
28. no permanent downhole sensors that would detect motion, pressure bumps, slipping plugs?
29. no containment corral for floating oil that actually works in calm weather, let alone storms.
30. no reserve of tankers and centrifuge ships for cleanup, adequate to the well production rates
31. no safe way of navigating fuel-laden, explosive risk, fire risk, waters. Need un-manned ships.
32. no certification process to guarantee the BOP was up to the task across new materials & pressures
33. both in and out mud crews should have flow meters and a kill switch in their grasp at all times.
34. improved gas kick detection and venting systems are needed.
35. emergency crimps, like the big claw shear, but to crush the riser flat , hold press to stop the flow.
36. A structural tripod to 20' over the BOP can protect it from bending, leaning, collapsing risers.
37. cement structural integrity tests and monitors that distinguish between plug and liner fails
39. improved pontoon protection to avoid sinkings via penetrations by fire or falling objects.
40. the riser did not fail gracefully. It needs breakaways, floatation, and reuse plans.
41. replacement riser with valves needs to be deployable within 24 hours, not one month!
42. the BOP must be designed so that a proper junk shot really does a “stop leak”.
43. the junk shot needs some scientific development until it relly works, else quit it all together.
43. need emergency water spray at the deck to quench any explosive atmosphere there, spray to lift blowout flame up another 100'.
44. eventually the 11 man deck crew will be replaced by robots
45. to keep generators running in a methane atmosphere might require cutover to oxygen bottles. Else just go to batteries.
46. need to have more life boats because people will not always wait to fill the boat when panicked
47. if the ocean is going to catch on fire, then life boats need to be submarines, 3' under with O2 tanks.
48. BOP must have better external access to forced completion of the shears. Allow direct mechanical squeeze.
49. need new ideas on velocity limiters near well bottom. Velocity must be kept below erosion speeds.
50. may need to allow ballistic ejection of the drill string just to let all the valves close tight.
51. need sufficient sensors and safety computer to choose the best lock down procedure, to take ~2 sec
52. killing off large swaths of flora and fauna at some point must be treated as equivalent to murder
53. damaging other people's livelihood is a civil matter, but deserves an escrow account for instant use, like unemployment insurance.
54. putting a cap on economic damage is like putting a cap on how much a bank robber must return
54. it must be made a felony to kidnap employees (so as to force them to sign claims waivers)
55. methane is a very bad green house gas. Every cubic foot of gas released must somehow be recovered! How?

It seems that the ONLY way they can now capture the oil flow is with a tight, high pressure seal to the BOP collet connector top flange. Since they are not doing it, having decided to mangle the pipe above it with their claw, this approach will shortly become another failure - that's the best scenario. And, by the way, since they thoughtfully started then abandoned a cut right above the flange, they will always have a nice leak path right there, which will not be addressed by the "cap".

Since they are now going to claw real close to the BOP, unless the claw is balanced during the cutting just so, they risk putting all manner of uncontrolled loads into the BOP and upper wellhead pipe. Though I have written previously that the BOP external structure seems to have survived fine the total plastic hinging of the riser pipe with the drill pipe inside, I am much less sure of its integrity from the clawing maneuver. I am pretty sure the riser collapse is a BOP load case for the design team, while the claw loads is probably not. The worst scenario is structural failure of the BOP and or upper wellhead.

CUT the BOLTS! CUT the BOLTS! CUT the BOLTS!

Rockman I read your posting about how the well was drilled. Right on. I worked in the oilfields for over 50 years helped drill a well at Pt Sulphur La in 1954 to 22570. Deepest well in world at that time Old inland barge steam power. Same plan then as now. Pressure Test bottom of casing or liner. If liner pressure test top of liner. The more things change---The company I worked for believed that if the BOPs were to be tested to 5000 lbs for 30 minutes that did not mean 4900 for 29 minutes. Took bad kicks but never had to leave rig with shirt tail on fire Worked on some of the early day “OffShore rigs” 1950 vintage Some of ODECO’s very first. Worked in 30feet WOW Old jackups and platforms with Converted LST as tenders. Worked for years for a wire line service company and did pioneer work on running conductor lines under pressure. The old original “Injector, Grease seal lubricator.” CBL? I have seen CBLs interpreted as “Possible partial cement bond”. What does that mean? Had to work with several “Company men” on Hi Pressure jobs that didn’t want to follow all my companies safety rules. My company all ways backed me up when I told Company man “Sorry but it our way or rig down” I understand from one report on this job that Stumberger told them that and even called in their own helicopter “When told none were available” to bring their hands in. Insult to memory of hands killed in explosion to say “Might have been running” Old time Tool Pusher saying “Wells don’t blow out. “People let wells blow out”

Whoa.

BP has changed their former spillcam page and is now offering feeds from twelve -- 12 -- different ROVs attached to six different ships:

http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9033572&contentId=7062605

Why no attempts to use explosives yet ?

They could have tried a number of approaches up pipe if you will and determined what worked.
Also fairly easy to test some approaches on shore or elsewhere.

Also looking forward explosive bolts might be useful. None of these problems seem much harder than your typical large rocket engine. By that I mean it should be considered rocket science and treated as such. But we have solved engineering problems which have similar severe constraints. And judicious use of explosives are a common solution for similar classes of problems in aerospace.

I just don't see any hope until they get a reasonably clean cut made. A rough cut followed by a diamond say cleanup is fine etc. But get the dang riser cut.

Anyone know the diameter of the bolts on that flange? I’ve read elsewhere on TOD the pipe itself is ~ 22 inches (OD). If true, that would make those bolt diameters ~ several inches? http://a662.l9789246661.c97892.g.lm.akamaistream.net/D/662/97892/v0001/r...

The feed from Skandi looks like they maybe clawed off the riser stub. It looks like a piece of DP has come out or perhaps a new pipe is in the way. The whole thing is swaying with the flow, which looks massive.

CUT the BOLTS!

Bedtime thought:

And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.
— Matthew Arnold, Dover Beach

I cannot believe BP is giving up on the diamond saw after one feeble and poorly situated attempt. Surely they have a spare blade if that is the concern, but trying to use a bandsaw to cut into compressed pipe will pinch the saw every time.

Now that they should have a better appreciation of where to start the cut, I.E. at the point of minimal compression (opposite the bend in the riser) they might actually realize some success.

To throw in the towel so easily with so much at stake is beyond belief. I had given BP the benefit of doubt up to this point but now it appears that whoever is calling the shots needs to be replaced.

Looks like a large leak below the flange ... what is that ?

I found this site while looking for information on BP's blowout in the GoM.

I am appreciative that there exists a site that espouses the desire to help break our western civilization of the hydrocarbon habit. If we as a society don't recognize the coming limitations, little effort will be placed on managing our current resource, nor developing suitable alternatives. I've found a few sites that don't venture to complete doomsaying, sites like this that promote sensible solutions and allow those with vision to plan for the future. This site has similarities to Whiskey and Gunpowder without the additional dark forecasting. Rather it brings a more focused realism.

That said, some background on me. I'm an accountant by day, shadetree mechanic on weekends with experience in mining, logging and pulp and paper (working across silos from management, engineering, accounting and operations).

I know from experience that large industrial companies get locked into bureaucratic niceties not afforded to smaller firms (tongue firmly planted in cheek). I also know that engineers are guided by management and corporate structure and that every task in crisis tends to be micro managed.

My thoughts on the topic at hand and the various attempts put forward for public consumption are from this perspective.

BP has every interest in seeing the well killed, however their various approaches and attempts are being put together 'on the fly' and that brings with it an inherent 'maverick' style that we, as outsiders can analyze second by second and second guess and suggest alternatives that may or may not prove workable. I can't imagine working under this pressure while live feeds broadcast every move to the world. I have to believe it must make working conditions that much more difficult.

And how it can it be otherwise? I've been involved in several crisis where teams are assembled to to rectify issues ranging from the extremely complex to the mundane. Rarely is there a perfect solution, nor is it accomplished quickly enough for management, shareholders, employees & other stakeholders. And occasionally there have been missteps that required stoppages, new analysis, novel approaches and implementation of unproven procedures.

Sitting on the outside is far different that being 'in the arena' with the lion ready to take your arm out of it's socket. We have the luxury of saying 'cut the riser here, cut the NUTS off the flange, do this. Guys like ROCKMAN, Gail, Heading Out, Prof Goose, et al. know this all too well. ROCKMAN is absolutely right that this blowout will be contained, the question that remains to be answered is when: 3 months? 6 months?

This problem in the Gulf won't be the last 'unintended hydrocarbon excursion' either, but my hope is through the efforts of those who belong to this site will help open the public's collective eye to the absolute need to cut our dependence on oil. Not foreign oil, but oil - ours and theirs.

Unfortunately, I don't see an easy transition. I can't see our North American population wanting to live more simply, advocating restraint in wants over needs.

This blown out well on block #252 Mississippi Canyon is a rude awakening for the masses, foreshadowing a microcosm of a future with dwindling, inexpensive hydrocarbons. Dirty, fouled and filled with failure.

Paul

would it be impossible to believe that all if not most of these ROVs are being driven by computers or a computer instead of human pilots ? I continuously read that people have never seen ROVs operated this well..

So, the plan now (according to the CNN article referenced above) is to use the same top hat that's been "resting on the bottom" since May 12. But that was presumably designed for less of a flow (the number usually tossed around here for a while is a presumable 20% increase with the riser cut) than there is with chopping the riser - what kind of a problem does that present? They haven't been working on a different sized 'hat' for the greater flow while cutting..?! This was Plan B for post-riser-cut, and the capture structure for Plan B is the same one that you designed weeks ago..? This doesn't strike me as promising on the face of it... we've increased the flow 20% and we're going to use the same tool that captured 20% of the smaller flow to rein the larger amount in..?

The top hat weighs two tons (referencing same article) and has presumably a 4' diameter footprint, and has not apparently disappeared into the mud. I should think that gives some data that would be helpful in designing a larger capture structure that rests on the bottom, weighs about that per unit of footprint area, and doesn't rely on a tight seal over the equivalent of a jet engine to capture the muck. Couldn't a much, much larger dome than the top hat be put over the area to disperse pressure and heat of some sort be pumped in to help inhibit crystal formation? Not killing the well obviously but just something to keep most of it from spilling all over creation.

I thought the LMRP was a top hat it is marked TH5-LMRP thought th5 meant top hat 5

edit
at least one cam from each ship is working....except the q4000

I put all the links from the BP ROV feeds into a simple table. You can open the link below in a separate window (right click the link) and just make it small.

These links open directly in Windows Media Player so you can adjust size etc.

http://www.troutbugs.com/rovs.html

Note: Skandi ROV 1 and ROV 2 has the same link. BP screwup I guess.

At about 0130 EDT, it appears that power supplies to the shear are set, and the shear is tested. You can see it on the ROV cams from Viking Poseidon, and they are now lowering it - the are at about 1000' depth. I am not sure how long it takes them to get it set in place for the cutting, but it could be early morning excitement for you in the Eastern time zone.

I am putting this up for information, I don't take a position for or against.

It is a letter issued by NOIA (National Ocean Industries Association today.

I'm not sure about the nomenclature as they refer to platforms and it was my impression that only deepwater drilling rigs were shut down, not any platforms.

Thousands of Jobs and Billions of Dollars in Government Revenue at Risk
From Six-month Gulf Drilling Halt Says National Ocean Industries Association Chairman

Washington – Preliminary estimates show crippling job loss and significant economic impacts will result from the President’s recent order to halt work on 33 exploratory wells in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico and institute a six-month moratorium on all drilling in water depths greater than 500 feet.

“The immediate impacts of the order will be felt by the families of tens of thousands of offshore workers who will be unemployed,” said Burt Adams, Chairman of the National Ocean Industries Association.

For each platform idled by the work stoppage, up to 1,400 jobs are at risk, and lost wages could reach $10 million per month per platform and up to $330 million per month for all 33 platforms, preliminary estimates from the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association (LMOGA) show.

“At a time when the spill is already causing economic stress for key industries in the region, the president’s action will make things much worse by putting more Gulf citizens out of work,” said Adams.

The LMOGA estimates show the six-month halt would defer four percent of anticipated 2011 deepwater Gulf of Mexico production (80,000 barrels per day), and likely render seven current discoveries sub-economic, putting $7.6 billion in future government revenues at risk. Additionally, drilling rigs idled by the order will be contracted overseas, and will not be available to work in the Gulf once the halt is lifted, making the U.S. even more dependent on foreign oil. “Other countries are apparently more confident in the overall safety of the oil and gas industry and will no doubt fill the potential void created by less domestic production,” said Adams.

“The need to act in the face of the ongoing crisis in the Gulf of Mexico is understandable, but the 33 rigs affected by the presidential order are the very ones successfully inspected in early May at the order of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar,” Adams said. “Nobody wants to just rush into deepwater drilling during this ongoing crisis, but it appears that less draconian and potentially less harmful solutions such as increased inspection and recertification of equipment would be an acceptable compromise.”

“Considering that the deepwater regions generate 80 percent of the Gulf’s oil production and 45 percent of its natural gas production, a six-month work stoppage will have severe and perhaps long lasting impacts on our domestic energy supply and economic security,” said Adams. “When you couple this ‘no less than six-month’ moratorium with the cancelled Western Gulf lease sale, the potential for long term job loss and economic hardship for the Gulf of Mexico looms even greater.”

The offshore industry is responsible for nearly 200,000 jobs in the Gulf of Mexico alone, and provides 30 percent of our nation’s domestic oil production and 11 percent of our domestic gas production. Offshore oil and gas production accounts for an average $13 billion a year in non-tax revenues to states and the Federal government and has made over $24 billion available to the Land and Water Conservation Fund over the last 28 years.

With as many teams of so-called ‘professionals’ dealing with capturing/sealing this blowout, I’d think they would always be one step ahead of the game. That is NOT the case here.

Millions of gallons of raw crude continue spilling into one of our most valuable resources and the clock is ticking. What actions have I witnessed to counter this flow? Nothing I would be proud of here.

I’m beginning to think this whole event was intentional, being International Terrorism.

2010-06-02 11:51:58 CDT The Skandi Neptune Subsea 7 ROV is spraying dispersant onto the vertical portion of the riser above the BOP.

Last thought:

Cut the bolts now! Don't mangle the pipe!

June 3, 2010
02:10 CDT Enterprise ROV 2 is manipulating straps on a yellow and white cylindrical device marked "4" that is dangling above the mud mats.

4:04 am CST update

Shear hanging out around 4800 feet. Viking Poseidon 1

On Enterprise #1:
Discoverer Enterprise has hooked up to LMRP cap #2 (side #4),
but the locking plate was giving them trouble - the locking pin just would NOT go in.

The ROV dropped the locking pin, and after looking around for a bit, went up to its cage and looked in the side tool boxes. Found a piece of thin tubing about 6-8' long, stuck it in a hole in the box and bent it 90 degrees, and appears set to try to use that as the lock pin that keeps the LMRP cap on the pipe extending down from the riser.

They just lifted the LMRP cap off the sea-floor, then stabbed the tubing into the lock hole from underneath (there's a cross fitting on the cap's just above the lock plate - could have used a design with less interference).
Finally got this tube wrapped around the lock plate,
I guess next step is to hookup the methanol lines.

There are two input fittings, and 4 valves with T handles on top, I guess to vent things as needed.

Tired of the erratic video - g'nite.

how many skilled ROV operators are there available for this job?

what sort of shifts will they be pulling?

The claw is moving into position for cutting the riser LIVE

http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/in...

as you can see oil is billowing out from the 1/2 cut made earlier when the saw became stuck and vision is becoming a problem for the operators

I know a lot of people have been taking sh*t for second-guessing what BP/contractors are doing, but why the heck did they bring the shear in on the side where the saw perforated the riser? It seems pretty obvious to me that would cause problems with visibility. I really have no idea how they can tell what is going on in that cloud. It looked to me like that ended up placing one side of the shear on the flange instead of the riser.

Now it looks like they damaged the choke or kill connection (stab?) below the flange.

Thanks for being the place to get answers. As a long time member of TOD I've read much that was over my head. But as the blowout problem developed and I became more and more hooked on watching the disaster in progress, some practical questions came to mind. I've worked in heavy construction, as an Ironworker, and some things I've seen in the last couple of days don't make much sense.

When cutting the bent riser pipe below the bend, why did they start the cut from the under side, the side underneath the bend? AS the cut proceeded, it was bound to get more pressure from the weight of bent section bearing on the diamond wire. (Like cutting a tree limb from the underside.)

I presume the "yellow can" is the top hat. Why isn't this fitting an open cylinder with a closable valve at the top? It could be installed in the open position, letting the venting oil escape while installation is in progress, then closed once the fitting was in place.

Thanks for all your great work here.

BM

The quotation in the upper right hand corner of this page:

“Data always beats theories. 'Look at data three times and then come to a conclusion,' versus 'coming to a conclusion and searching for some data.' The former will win every time.”
—Matthew Simmons, ASPO-USA conference, Boston, MA, October 26, 2006

Not, I repeat NOT, in an election year.

New York's got your problem solved:
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/leak_solution_Zw3RdLcmYcdsA4UAz6WM...

<Sarc>
if y'all weren't just a bunch of inbred redneck illiterate hicks, you would bow and scrape before her and sing her praises!
</SARC>

NB - I see that the HTML tags aren't working properly above. Maybe you could have Noo Jork come and fix that for y'all as well?
}:-]

Again speculation...

I think what everyone is watching now is the Claw lined up making a nice level clean-cut after the riser debris was cleared away. It's been hard following this event with all the oil cloud blowouts shifting this way and that. But for a few moments it appeared the BOP was cleared of the broken riser.....can anyone else verify this?

I think the battleship just got displaced from the cover of that bad ideas book.

poseidon ROV 1 - getting shear in place

whoever posted the link to all the rovs --- thanks!!

did the claw just lose power? Ocean I ROV2 just found a mangled power (?) line - outer cover stripped off

Yeah, looked like Ocean I ROV2 suddenly started to search around for the reason why the claw didn't close when it should have done, and found a damaged line on the right hand side. If that's correct then it's going to be back up to the surface for repairs (assuming the claw can be opened enough to disengage) before anything significant now happens.

Meanwhile, Poseidon ROV1 giving great views of the flange at the top of the BOP, which makes it clear that there are plenty of obstructions to the underside of that flange.

BP said you can watch all 12 ROV cams now, there site is here

http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9033572&contentId=7062605

riser is separated now

Are the following assumptions useful?
(1) the likelihood of getting clean cuts or a clean removal of fittings would seem to be small given the stresses on the fittings caused by the damage and the novelty of this situation, so any effort should plan for dealing with worse case removal, that is the top of the BOP being deformed and connected to jagged, twisted metal, meaning that none of the surfaces of the BOP or existing fittings are regularly shaped, precise, clean, or even to the point where they can serve to form part of a mechanical seal given the pressures involved.
(2) the force of the leaking oil combined with the likelihood of accidentally damaging fittings and/or changing stresses on fittings means that there is a likelihood of increased spill rates, new spill locations, and decreasing structural integrity.
(3) removal of the riser will likely result in increased flows that will increase the difficulty of operating the ROVs and other equipment due to turbulence and reduced visibility.
(4) any attachment to the top of the BOP should be made so that an attachment/seal can be made before any pressure is put on connections; once a new connection fitting is attached to the BOP, the next step is dealing with the pressure of the oil and gas, otherwise the connection will need to deal simultaneously with a connection to an irregular surface and pressue, which are difficult to address in combination.
(5) the situation will deteriorate such that solutions must anticipate worse conditions than currently exist. Therefore, solutions should anticipate continued deterioration of the fittings at the top of the BOP and the BOP itself.

Is BP engineering solutions behind the situational curve? Are the engineers using fabrication techniques that are appropriate for normal underwater operations but not well-suited to this situation? Are they trying to use only mechanical connections when instead they should be using a combination of glue (cement) and mechanical connections?

I think many of us want to opine about all of this because we feel powerless and frustrated in the face of a great tragedy and it is very difficult to just sit by and do nothing. No doubt some want everybody who isn't an expert to just shut up. Perhaps thoughts from nonexperts are a waste of time, but perhaps theoildrum is a place where nonexperts can learn how to engage more effectively and constructively in processes that have dramatic impacts on their lives.

While I understand that BP and the industry have very talented and smart experts, sometimes smart people make horrible mistakes. Also, sometimes those who are very good at dealing with normal challenges using normal responses are bad at dealing with abnormal situations that require innovative response. Not everybody is equally adaptive and creative. Some managers, experts and engineers have limited abilities to adapt to the abnormal. In thinking about BP's responses so far, as an institution it seems to be stuck in conventional thinking. Industry personnel might have much better ideas for how to respond, but this doesn't mean that the individuals at BP who are making response decisions are adopting them. I expect BP's command structure is full of conventional thinkers. Large corporations tend to drive away the unconventional.

This is not on the theme of the shear or the ROV operations.

I've read most of the threads on the blowout and do not recall anything on the cleanup microbes that are available. there is a pretty interesting video of the effectiveness of them on "normal" oil spills and wonder if they have been employed here. It could be pretty interesting if they could be added to the initial plume. I do not know if they are effective at the pressure and temperature environment but possibly they would travel with the small oil bubbles. The experiment and results are darned impressive. Maybe someone here has some real experience with these special bugs.

Oil Eating Microbes
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VfypUzx1tI&feature=youtube_gdata

Did anyone catch this? I just snapped an image from the Viking ROV1 feed that seems (to me at least) to show two pipes inside the riser.

In an article in the FT times this morning at http://tinyurl.com/2afrnnk the CEO of BP is quoted as follows:

Speaking in Houston at BP’s leak control base, Mr Hayward argued that the industry could cut the risk of serious accidents in deep-water drilling to “one in a billion or one in a trillion”, but it might mean changing the way the drilling industry works.

One in a Billion? One in a Trillion? I don't think so.

Listen up . . . I used to do this stuff for a living. There is NO FRICKING WAY they could drive the probabilities this low . . . the hazards from natural phenomena would overwhelm that.

Let's do a bit of a back of the envelope calculation - In a table was recently published by the EIA, they listed 463 production wells and 193 exploratory wells as being drilled between 2004 and 2008 in the GOM. So we have 463 + 193 = 656 wells drilled over the last 4 years, or 164 wells per year. We have had 1 major blowout (Deepwater Horizon) since the last major blowout (Ixtoc in 1979), so the industry experience is 1 blowout per 31 years, or approximately 1 in 31 * 164 wells, or 1 in 5084. Now Tony thinks we can drive this to 1 in a billion or 1 in a trillion?

Consider the hazards from meteorite impacts. From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_event

Small objects frequently collide with the Earth. There is an inverse relationship between the size of the object and the frequency that such objects hit the earth. Asteroids with a 1 km (0.62 mi) diameter strike the Earth every 500,000 years on average.[2] Large collisions – with 5 km (3 mi) objects – happen approximately once every ten million years. The last known impact of an object of 10 km (6 mi) or more in diameter was at the Cretaceous-Tertiary extinction event 65 million years ago.

Asteroids with diameters of 5 to 10 m (16 to 33 ft) enter the Earth's atmosphere approximately once per year, with as much energy as Little Boy, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, approximately 15 kilotonnes of TNT. These ordinarily explode in the upper atmosphere, and most or all of the solids are vaporized.[3] Objects with diameters over 50 m (164 ft) strike the Earth approximately once every thousand years, producing explosions comparable to the one known to have detonated above Tunguska in 1908.[4] At least one known asteroid with a diameter of over 1 km (0.62 mi), (29075) 1950 DA, has a possibility of colliding with Earth in March 2880, with a Torino Scale rating of two.

The hazard from natural phenomena of meteorite impacts would be greater than 1 in a billion . . . no way to get it down to 1 in a billion or trillion.

There are other hazards from natural events as well, including massive hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, planes crashing into the rigs, and so on.

Probably an acceptable goal would be to drive down the frequency of a blowout of all drilling activity in the GOM to on the order of 1 in 1000 years which would mean that for drilling 164 wells a year, we would need to drive the frequency of an individual well from the current 1 in 5000 to 1 in 200,000. In other words, they need to be about 40 times safer. I think that is doable.

There is a well developed methodology methodology to evaluate risks associated with a complex engineered technological entity such as offshore drilling, nuclear power plants, or airliners -- probabilistic risk assessment. It isn't easy or cheap, but it will tell you how you can most cost-effectively lower your risk.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_Safety_Assessment

Ultimately, however, the question of 'how safe is safe enough?' is a political question, and is very difficult to grapple with.