Refining the Plateau
Posted by Stuart Staniford on January 5, 2006 - 7:07am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: hubbert peak, oil prices, peak oil, plateau, refinery capacity [list all tags]

Year-on-year change in refinery capacity 1965-2005 by two different estimates. Click to enlarge. Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, and EIA Crude Oil Distillation Capacity (Table 36).

Average monthly oil production from various estimates. Click to enlarge. Believed to be all liquids. Graph is not zero-scaled. Source: IEA, and EIA. The IEA raw line is what they initially state each month. The IEA corrected line is calculated from the month-on-month production change quoted the following month.
Note the leveling off that began last summer. Our task is to understand why that occurred in the face of a rapidly growing world economy and ever higher prices for several years, which our economist friends would tell us should be calling forth more and more supply. Are we at, or almost at, the peak, is there some more innocent explanation?
The ever-optimistic Freddy Hutter suggested that
Peaksters can get excited all they want watching the mid 2005 plateau and read into it what they want but the rest of us know it was hurricane and refinery related and the trendline will continue into 2010 amid the gnashing of teeth.Now yesterday, I think we put the hurricane explanation out of it's misery. So that leaves the refinery capacity idea. Of course Freddy is not alone in proposing that story. As Alexander's Oil and Gas Connections reported
Saudi Arabia's Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali al-Naimi blamed lack of refining capacity to handle sour and heavy crude for the spiralling global prices. "What the global oil industry confronts today is a challenge of deliverability," said al-Naimi addressing a packed session [...] "This is because there is a major constraint in the refining system. There is a mismatch between the configuration of refineries and availability of sour and heavy crude," he pointed out.Firstly, let's orient ourselves to the overall history of refinery capacity. Alas, I was not able to find a monthly series for global refinery capacity, but I found two annual series, and I think they definitely shed some interesting light on the question. One is from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, and the other is from the EIA. As usual in this game, the data from different sources agree in the big picture, but not on the details. Here's the story on capacity:

Refinery capacity 1965-2005 by two different estimates. Click to enlarge. Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, and EIA Crude Oil Distillation Capacity (Table 36).
Before we compare capacity to production, I would just like you to note how rapidly capacity grow in the late sixties and seventies. I would also draw your attention to the difference in slope between the late nineties, and the anemic climb of the last few years. We will return to these points in a few graphs. First though, how much of this capacity was being utilized?
It turns out not to be easy to compare EIA production numbers with their refinery capacity, so I stuck to the BP numbers for this next bit. Here's a graph showing how much of refinery capacity each year was actually taken up with production.

Refinery production and spare capacity 1965-2004. Click to enlarge. Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005.
We can see that things are starting to get a bit tight at the end there. However, if we look at the ratio of production as a proportion of refinery capacity, we see that it's no tighter in recent years than it was in the 1960s, when neither oil nor gasoline were particularly expensive.

Refinery utilization 1965-2004. Click to enlarge. Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005.
So we might wonder why the big fuss now? To me, the most revealing graph is this one. This shows the year-on-year growth rate in refinery capacity.

Year-on-year change in refinery capacity 1965-2005 by two different estimates. Click to enlarge. Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, and EIA Crude Oil Distillation Capacity (Table 36).
Points to note:
- In the late sixties and seventies, we knew how to grow global refinery capacity by 6%-10% annually.
- As recently as the late nineties, we were growing global refinery capacity at 2% a year.
- On several occasions, we have increased the growth rate in refinery capacity by one or two percentage points within the space of a year or two. Eg in the late eighties, and again around 1993-1994.
- The only period of near-constant very slow, nay positively anemic, only 1/2%, growth in refinery capacity is the period 2001-2004.
- If we had grown refinery capacity at 1%-2% from 2002 on, there would have been no problem with refinery capacity. The problem was not just that demand grew, it was also that refinery capacity growth was very minimal during that period.

Year-on-year change in monthly EIA oil production Jan 2002-October 2005. The dark green line is the data, and the plum curve is a quadratic fit to the data to illustrate the smooth trend. Click to enlarge. Source: EIA.
So demand growth certainly became respectable -- getting up to about 4% in the smoothed trend -- but nothing out of the historical norm, and generally inline with GDP growth in a healthy economic recovery. Given all this, I cannot believe that we just couldn't increase refining capacity in time to avoid the bottleneck this year. On the historical record, we certainly should have been able to get it up to 2% annually, or even a little better, by now, and that would have been enough to avoid the bottleneck. No, it's not that we couldn't, it's that we didn't. We chose not to.
I can think of only two reasons why we might not have chosen to increase refinery capacity in the way that we obviously could. One is a secret refining cartel. The other is peak oil. I think Calculated Risk made the key argument back in the summer. If the problem was just a refinery cartel, crude oil, or at the very least heavy grades of crude oil, would be selling for $10/barrel. It's not - even the heavy stuff is $50/barrel. That implies there's very little of it to spare, not that there's quite a bit but it's not making it through the refining cartel.
What it looks to me like is the refinery market, explicitly or implicitly, understands that ramping up to compete for market share on CERA's 100mbpd+ of production in the near future would be a very dumb business move. Instead, it looks like they are inching their capacity up in the most gingerly manner possible. They're acting like their big fear is getting caught with too much capacity.
So I call bullshit on this refinery explanation.
Anybody got any other ideas for why this plateau might have happened besides imminent peak oil?



I really do think we are presently at Peak Oil, and this may be reflected in the refinery market where PO has been anticipated by not expanding capacity.
If the above is true, your analysis raises another important question. How long will we be able to maintain the plateau, especially in the light of heavier crude entering the market?
The spread between light and heavy oils has been growing though. While I think this is primarily because of decreases in available light sweet crudes, refinery configuration and capacity do play a complementary role.
These factors are better explained by measures of complexity and conversion, which refer to the ability of a given facility to produce valuable products. Complexity describes the stages of refining that occur after distillation, primarily cracking. These stages are capital intense, actually transform the molecular structure of crude and significantly alter the output of a facility.
If you were to measure the amount of gasoline produced and/or the dollar value of investment in the sector, you would get a completely different result. It is inaccurate to claim that refinery development ground to a stop in the 1990s.
The main reasons why new capacity did not come on line in the recent past are:
- Adequate crude intake capacity
- Ability to produce more product from other investments in the facility
- Regulations that made new facility development difficult, and most importantly,
- Refining was not a profitable industry and did not proivide acceptable returns on investment.
I have been in discussions with bankers and refining executives and seen huge amounts of analysis. If fear peak oil is a signficant factor limiting development, it is the world's best kept secret. Additionally, there several huge new investments in additional refining capacity taking place in India and China, partially funded through int'l investment. Surely the same logic has to apply there.It do think fear of peak oil could be an issue in the future, but see little evidence it has in the past.
Bangchak Petroleum is a simple refinery in Thailand that currently consist of distillation and some basic postdistillation treatment (incl. noncatalytic cracking). This configuration is a standard simple refinery like that found in the US in the past.
The plan to invest $250 million to become a complex refinery. There will be no increase in "capacity", but the new facility will produce much more valuable product (gasoline and diesel) and much less low value product (fuel oil).
This is a very good example of how the modern refining sector is investing and developing. The presentation is fairly clear and provides a great insight into why refining is not as clear as it appears.
If you don't want a lot of (mostly useful) background, skip to slide 25 which describes the upgrade calling it a Product Quality Improvement Project.
http://www.bangchak.co.th/download/analystMeeting15_analystMeeting%2002-12-05.pdf
From my admittedly ignorant perspective, I find it hard to swallow that refineries were not already pretty good at making diesel and gasoline. What kinds of throughput improvements are possible for these outputs? And if the investments are to make other more profitable but lower volume distillates, then does it really matter?
Diesel and heating oil are basically the same until the very end of the refining proces where they are treated differently. Fuel oil is a far lower quality product and is the only significant output that is worth less than crude (see Bangchak slide #12).
A complex refinery does produce a lot more gasoline and diesel from the same barrel of oil. Slide 25 of the Bangchak presentation shows that the refinery currently produces 37% fuel oil, 37% diesel and 15% gasoline. The addition of a $250 -350 million dollar hydrocracker and other equipment changes this significantly. Afterwards it would produce 9% fuel oil, 52% diesel and 25% gasoline from roughly the same crude input.
Refineries have always been good at making gasoline and diesel, they just made less of it from the same input
According to the American Petroleum Association, the typical US refiner produced the following products from a typical barrel of oil.
Distillate: 9.7 gallons
Kerosene-type jet fuel: 4.3
Fuel oil: 2.0
Liquefied gases: 1.9
Still gas: 1.9
Coke: 1.9
Asphalt: 1.4
Petrochemical feedstock: 1.1
Lubricants: 0.5
Kerosene: 0.2
Other: 0.4
"...the refinery currently produces 37% fuel oil, 37% diesel and 15% gasoline." should read 31% fuel oil, not 37%.
1 It is true that no US refineries have been built in 25 years, but this is very misleading - US refinery output, measured in barrels input, has increased around 30% in the period, albeit almost nil since 2000.
2 Refinery profit is dependent on cost of crude less price of product. If crude is rising faster than product prices, as has been true for most of the period from 1998, refinery profits are declining, reducing interest in new investments. (European supplies of product post K/R has naturally cut product prices and refinery profits.) The only company significantly expanding capacity in the US is Valero, which buys up old, antiquated refineries, adds substantial new equipment designed to handle cheap sour/heavy crudes, and ends up with higher output. So, most integrated oils are not interested in expanding because their profits are anemic, but Valero is happily exploiting its niche. Eventually, if refinery capacity is a true bottleneck, crude stocks will continue to rise (as they have been for the last year) while product prices rise, increasing refinery profits and renewing interest in expansion. OTOH, OPEC may defend $55 NYMEX, restricting crude to match refinery capacity.
I grew up in Newfoundland, Canada, and we were very aware of the status of the "Come By Chance" oil refinery, completed in 1974/1975, and then mothballed after about a year of unprofitable operation. It was started up again in 1987 and is fully operational now, but anybody aware of the history would be very reluctant to build a new refinery without being certain we won't get a repeat.
So the particular reason for the decline in refinery capacity additions in the last few years could be expectation of near-term oil price spikes; given that the recent flatness (2001-2004) is coincident with the Bush administration's tenure, maybe oil industry executives knew to expect something... But we wouldn't want to get into conspiracy theories...
For many years after, it was easier an more effective to add capacity further along the process than distillation, this is called debottlenecking. For this reason there have been no greenfield projects in the US. I understand that most opportunities have been exhausted.
But there has been a lot of capital invested in refining and the current infrastructure is not the same as 30 years ago. Demand growth has been for highly refined products such as gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and heating oil. This has been met by additions of crackers and other equipment that create more of these products from the same distillation capacity.
A new era in gas storage is dawning in 2006. The passage of the Energy Act of 2005 has provided FERC with broad new powers to drive storage expansion. They have responded by proposing new rules for market-rates for interstate gas storage to spur the development of storage capacity. Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma also demonstrated the value of gas storage facilities, and have caused many players in the gas market to step up their efforts to develop or acquire more storage capacity. High gas prices, increasing volatility, and increasing liquidity of gas markets have increased the intrinsic value of storage facilities to both active market participants and investors, driving an unprecedented round of acquisition and aggregation plays. Likewise, the introduction of new LNG and pipeline sources is likely to change the potential value of existing assets and drive the development of new storage facilities. Gas storage operators, pipeline operators, gas customers, and storage investors must examine the changes in the regulatory and market landscapes to form effective strategies to profit from opportunities in 2006 and beyond.
It seems that the natural gas industry is not running scared to make investments because of potential supply constraints.
The general thrust of the argument about (non peak oil) refining capacity is this:
Margins were very bad in the 80s & 90s, therefore no capacity was added. In fact in the USA around 0.9mbpd was closed down.
The oil industry/markets were complacent about demand growth.
Complex refineries are far less than simple refineries in number; hence discounted OPEC heavy/sour crudes.
Now a lot of refineries are being built in the middle east, nigeria, indonesia and china to refine product.
In addition Valero, Conoco & others (i dont have my notes!) are building additional capacity in the USA and europe in existing refinery complexes.
The catch up will come with the next recession, by 2010 when some years of slow demand will allow complex refineries to be built to handle heavier grades.
That's the argument, i'm not saying its mine so dont flame me!!
Here's a recent piece I did: Refinery capacity to test crude price in 2006 http://www.resourceinvestor.com/pebble.asp?relid=15460
all the best
adam
If there is problem with refinery capacity,then oil will be cheap ( who needs it if it cannot be refined ) and gazoline expensive. We have seen this situation after harricanes. Extra oil from SPR was not sold, becuase refineries were unable to process it. As result gazoline was at $3 per gallon, while oil was at $65, normally for gozoline to be at $3, oil should be at least $85 per barrel.
There is lack of refineries for heavy crude and we see the it is sold at discount ( $10 to $13 per barrel discount for heavy crude ). Once new refineries of heavy crude is build, then the price of heavy crude will go up, there will be more demand for it.
Basically if gasoline is $3 there is a need to get more crude through the complex to lower the price.
That drives up crude prices, that is caused by the `bottleneck` and is analagous to the discounted heavy crude no one wants...
If there were lots of complex refineries it could go either way, too far and prices would fall (spare capacity) and too little and the same problem remains...
Adam,
I believe your argument is unsound, and the problem with it can be illustrated by the extreme case. Suppose there is hypothetical disaster that removes all petroleum product refineries except one on the U.S. Gulf Coast, whose entire capacity can be satisfied from current Gulf of Mexico production. Would not the world gasoline price be astronomical and would not Saudi Arabian crude oil for export would be worthless?
Yes like i said it does sound a bit odd. But if the case arose as you put it the world would be screaming for gasoline and you need crude to make it. But i think your case is a bit extreme to make a really definitive prediction.
The prices of nat gas, crude, gasoline, heating oil and even emissions credits in the EU tend to drag each other around quite a bit.
The markets see that simple (light sweet) refineries can't cope (if the price of gasoline is high) so this forces up the price of light crudes. At the same time, analagously, heavy crude is sold cheap because there are not enough refineries to put it through the system to make the products the market wants.
I'm not putting it forward as my argument btw, thats just the way the market reacts.
If your case arose it would be very very extreme, you could see all sorts of trades going on like huge longs and shorts on products and on their crack spreads.
At the moment that's kind of the way the market gets it, why refinery bottlenecks affect price, why they are building so many new refineries now (in the m/east)..
Right. A lot of this has already happened with the driver in the past being demand for products rather than need to process lower quality crudes. It may be hard to distinguish between the two investments. The most useful statistics may be refinery capacity, capacity utilization, complexity and conversion by country. Complexity and conversion are measures of the ability of a refinery to produce better products from worse inputs - creating higher refining margins.
I think this is the right question and you would find that in the US much of the potential upgrading has been done. The US does not have any major simple refineries and has been doing more sophisticated debottlenecking. I think there is more low hanging fruit in other countries.
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntn44964.htm
http://wyden.senate.gov/leg_issues/reports/wyden_oil_report.pdf
That last bit rings true. Here's the industry spokesman in September 05:
http://www.thehill.com/thehill/export/TheHill/Business/091405.html
So that's another idea: The industry is waiting for a government handout.
Another view:
http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/2356.html
According to Wyden's newer 2004 Report: No new refineries have been built in this country since 1976. The number of refineries dropped from 282 to 153 between 1977 and 2002. Refining capacity has increased 2.4% [by expanding existing refineries] while gasoline demand has lunged ahead 27%, over this time period. Internal documents from Chevron and Texaco in the mid-1990's said that they needed to decrease gasoline supplies and refining capacity in order to increase profit margins.
Whether you examine the BP data as Stuart has, or the EIA data (Wyden's numbers are from the EIA, considering the US only), the general glut in refinining capacity during the late 70's and 80's is evident. it was this spare capacity that the major refiners wished to clamp down on, purely for profit considerations.
Dubai (heavy, sour) and WTI (light, sweet)
Here's his observation. Now, as CalculatedRisk argued where we have this situation--
Raw Material --->> bottleneck --->> Finished Good
raising the production of raw material (heavy, sour crude) in this case could only lower its price because demand is constant--it is set by the bottleneck. The only way for heavy, sour prices to go up is to up the refinery capacity for these grades of oil and loosen the bottleneck.
Which is why Saudi Arabia is now in the refining business. Interestingly, these investments are in Asia. From OPEC tries to compete with Russia over China's oil needs: Saudi Arabia is also ramping up to build refining capacity to process their own output. (Sorry, no link on this). When the beloved and esteemed Ali Al-Naimi blames price hikes on refinery capacity, we can translate that as "we want to get as much money for our heavy, sour crude as you other guys are getting for that good light sweet stuff".
As for the US, from Exxon, BP Rebuff Pleas to Boost Exploration as Oil Demand Soars I have no way of evaluating any of these statements but confusion reigns. Gratuitous Photo Opportunity.
Deep in thought...
In my mind, one is left with only two scenarios that make sense of the price and capacity history: 1) OPEC is getting better and more disciplined at price support on crude and decided to raise the price while claiming they weren't. 2) OPEC can't readily pump much more because they it's getting harder to overcome depletion in their fields, and no-one else can increase production quickly enough either.
I don't find 1) very plausible - what has changed to suddenly make OPEC more disciplined? 2) says imminent peak oil.