A Debate on the Substance and Timing of the Peak of Oil Production and Consumption, Part I

This is a guest post by westexas.

Resolved: World Net Oil Export Capacity is Now Declining Because of Involuntary Reductions in Production and/or Because of Increases in Domestic Consumption in Major Oil Exporting Countries

Robert Rapier suggested that we debate this topic, and I agreed. In reality, there are only shades of gray difference between us regarding the timing of Peak Oil and Peak Exports. I believe that the crisis has hit, while Robert believes that the worst won't be upon us until some time shortly after 2010. Robert will file his rejoinder about a week from today.

In any case, in a guest post on The Oil Drum (TOD) in January 2006, I predicted, based on graphs primarily done by Khebab that the world would see declining net oil exports this year.

I focused on the top three net oil exporters--Saudi Arabia (KSA); Russia and Norway--which together accounted for 48% of the (total liquids) exports by the top net oil exporters in 2004 (all production data based on EIA numbers, unless noted otherwise). Top exporters are defined as those exporting one mbpd or more.

In his most recent book, "Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert's Peak," Kenneth Deffeyes outlined a simplified version of the mathematical techniques that M. King Hubbert used to accurately pick the time frame for the peak of Lower 48 oil production. The method, named "Hubbert Linearization" (HL) by Stuart Staniford on TOD, is outlined in the article "Texas and US Lower 48 oil production as a model for Saudi Arabia and the World".

Deffeyes defines Qt as a mathematical estimate of the ultimate recoverable reserves for a region. Regions tend to peak, and start declining when they are about 50% depleted, i.e., the 50% of Qt mark.

The following regions have now shown lower production after crossing the 50% of Qt mark: Texas; Lower 48; Total US (which had a secondary, but still lower peak, after the North Slope production came on line); Russia; North Sea; KSA and Mexico.

In the January article, I outlined my "Export Land" model, which was inspired by work done earlier by Matt Simmons. I stipulated that we had a country producing 20 mbpd and consuming 10 mbpd.

I then stipulated Export Land hits the 50% of Qt mark, and over a five year period, production declines by 25% and consumption increases by 20%. Because of these two factors--falling production and rising domestic consumption--the net oil exports from out hypothetical exporter decline by 70%, from 10 mbpd to 3 mbpd.

Note that the underlying assumption, which I think is generally true, is that domestic demand is generally satisfied before oil is exported. We have a real life example of the Export Land model in the UK, which has gone from exporting one mbpd in 1999 to being a net importer in 2005.

Also note that I expect domestic consumption in the exporting countries to go up quite rapidly, at least initially, as oil prices rise faster than their production is falling.

What I found deeply troubling in January was that the top three net oil exporters were all past their respective 50% of Qt marks. In January, KSA was showing stable production, Russia was showing a slow rate of growth and Norway was in decline. I predicted, based on the HL method and based on the Export Land model, that we would see lower exports from these three countries in 2006.

2006 Data

The EIA has now released a table showing the estimated production and exports from the top net exporters for 2005 (again all total liquids), and the data are very interesting, since we can compare the 2005 production, consumption and exports for various countries to the 2004 numbers.

KSA, Russia and Norway collectively have shown a 13% increase in domestic consumption from 2004 to 2005. Even Norway, which I expected to be flat, showed an 11% increase in consumption.

It appears that the only readily available current production data are for crude + condensate (C+C), but the EIA shows that these three countries are down, in September, 2006 by 3.7% from their December, 2005 production levels (KSA and Norway are down; Russia is basically flat). These data are subject to revision, but Khebab has demonstrated that the revisions tend to be downward with time.

In any case, if we assume that Total Liquids behave similarly to C+C, and if we use the same rate of increase in domestic consumption as 2004 to 2005 (which may be conservative given the rapidly escalating demand in KSA and Russia), this suggests that the top three net oil exporters are experiencing about an 8% decline (1.5 mbpd) in net oil exports in 2006 versus 2005 (based on data through September, 2006).

The EIA tracks C+C for 11 of the other 12 largest exporters. Their combined C+C production is up just barely (by 0.6% or 0.16 mbpd) from 12/05 to 9/06, which almost certainly translates to a decline in net exports, given the increasing consumption in most exporting countries.

Saudi Arabia: Why is their production falling?

No one, as far as I know, now disputes that KSA's production is falling. The question is why.

KSA is now at about the same stage of depletion that the prior swing producer, Texas, started declining.

In the spring, the Saudis announced that they could not find buyers for all of their oil, "Even their light, sweet oil," when light, sweet oil was going for about $70 per barrel in the US.

At the same time that the Saudis were announcing that they could not find buyers for all of their oil, and that they were "voluntarily" reducing their production, they were vastly expanding their drilling program.

Their largest field, Ghawar, which at one time accounted for more than 50% of their production, is now at about the same stage of depletion that an analogue field, Yibal, started declining. The best case for Ghawar is that they are producing one-third water, after the field was redeveloped with horizontal wells.

At the same time that the Saudis announced their "voluntary" production cutbacks in the spring, their stock market started crashing. Interesting enough, Venezuela, which has long life unconventional oil reserves, has a booming stock market.

In my opinion, Saudi Arabia, like Texas in 1973, is at the start of a long term and irreversible decline in conventional oil production, with a long-term decline rate in the 4% to 5% range, perhaps sharper at first if Ghawar is crashing.

Russia: What next?

Mathematically, Khebab has demonstrated that the recent rebound in Russian production was just making up for what was not produced following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In my opinion, Russia will join Saudi Arabia in showing a long term and irreversible decline in conventional oil production next year.

The "Bidding Cycle" Theory

Given the reports of lower production by the top three exporters, and one can assume increased consumption, someone must be conserving.

The Wall Street Journal recently ran a story, which profiled an African country, Guinea, which has been forced to conserve, "As fuel prices soar, a country unravels."

An excerpt from the article:

"The impact of today's energy crunch on the poor is plain in rich nations such as America: Expensive gasoline and soaring heating bills make a hard life harder. In impoverished countries such as Guinea, where per capita income is just $370 a year and surging gasoline prices have helped spark bloody riots, the energy shock has become a matter of life and death."

I believe that we are going to see rounds of bidding cycles with available exports going to the winning bidders, e.g., the US so far this year, and with the losing bidders being forced to conserve, e.g., Guinea so far this year.

However, I predict that the next round of bidding (which I believe that we are currently in), against regions like Europe and China, instead of Africa, will be much tougher for the US.

The Expectation of an Infinite Exponential Growth Rate Versus
The Reality of Exponential Decline

Because of a steady increase in US petroleum consumption and because of a steady decline in US oil production, total US petroleum (crude oil + product) imports have been increasing at an annual rate of about 4% per year since 2001. This is one reason that assertions that year over year US petroleum imports may be flat is not much of a comfort.

In most of the US, it is simply a given that the "American Way of Life" is non-negotiable and that we can continue to increase our petroleum imports year after year.

Unfortunately, I predict that Americans are going to realize that the reality of exponential decline is going to trump expectations of an infinite growth rate.

While there are many suggestions for alternative energy sources and for the expanded use of other fossil fuel sources and the expanded use of nuclear energy, the reality in my opinion, is that the Net Oil Export Crisis is hitting so hard and so fast that our only recourse is to effectively implement a triage operation, where large portions of American suburbia are effectively abandoned.

I do strongly support a proposal to tax energy consumption to fund Social Security and Medicare, offset by eliminating or reducing the Payroll Tax, combined with a major push to implement Alan Drake's Proposal for Electrification of Transportation.

I am primarily supporting Alan's proposal because he is advocating proven technology that we essentially perfected more than 100 years ago. Furthermore, he documents how the Swiss were able to survive-- by electrifying their transportation system and by restricting oil supplies to emergency uses--an oil supply cutoff in the Second World War.

The average American today uses about as much oil as 400 Swiss citizens used in the Second World War.

Folks, consider this a reminder to positively rate these articles (using the icons under the tags in the story title) at reddit, digg, and del.icio.us if you are so inclined.  Also, don't forget to submit them to your favorite link farms, such as metafilter, stumbleupon, slashdot, fark, boingboing, furl, or any of the others.  

These posts are a lot of work, and the authors appreciate your helping them get more readers for their work however you can.

Robert and I agreed to limit our comments on this topic to our posts.  

However, I think that we should respond to questions regarding data sources, methodology and math.    I would especially invite scrutiny of my math.  I tried to double check everything, but there is always a good chance that I made a mistake somewhere.

However, I think that we should respond to questions regarding data sources, methodology and math.    I would especially invite scrutiny of my math.  I tried to double check everything, but there is always a good chance that I made a mistake somewhere.

Yes, I agree with that. In fact, I have no problem with you answering any questions here. But I won't respond until I put my essay up. That way the discussion between us isn't smeared all over the place. I want to have one location where the main arguments reside.

As you say, I will work on my response and I should have it up a week from now, presuming someone doesn't claim priority next Monday.

Given the lack of data transparency for Russian and KSA production data, what, briefly, is the basis for the assertion that they have passed 50% Qt?
Russian and KSA production are easily available. The transparency issue is not about production but about reserves, technical field conditions, etc., that make judging future production problematic. And that is where the HL method fits in. It doesn't need that other data. It uses historical production data to help you draw a conclusion.
The world essentially hasn't broken 85 mbpd production for the last year and a half.  I would have thought the debate would be plateau vs broken elevator cable, CERA notwithstanding.
The world has gone through short-term (3-4 years) plateaus and declines in production before.  The early 80s, for instance.  That oil production has declined for a year and a half so far does not in and of itself tell us that we've reached the ultimate peak.

We need to consider the other facts at hand, such as the world's major oilfields reaching 50% of Qt, the lack of large new projects coming online, etc.  Without this, it's easy for people to just say "oh, it's another temporary plateau--no big deal".

"The world has gone through short-term (3-4 years) plateaus and declines in production before.  The early 80s, for instance."

Iran went off-line in the early 1980s.  Nothing comparable has happened the past couple years that I'm aware of.

I think people say "oh, it's another temporary plateau - no big deal" because they have no idea what caused the past plateaus and how it differs to the past year with OPEC at maxed out production (they admitted it several times this summer).

Because of a steady increase in US petroleum consumption and because of a steady decline in US oil production, total US petroleum (crude oil + product) imports have been increasing at an annual rate of about 4% per year since 2001. This is one reason that assertions that year over year US petroleum imports may be flat is not much of a comfort.

I'm confused by the last sentence.  Aren't these assertions just plain wrong?  Great article, and I heartily aree with your sentiment regarding consumer attitudes.
This link takes you to a wealth of data:  http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_sndw_dcus_nus_4.htm

Regarding imports, I have been focusing on the four week running average of Total Petroleum Imports, including SPR (at the top of the page you can select weekly or four week running average).    I think that there were some minor SPR imports, I think around 2002, but I don't believe that they had a material impact.

To get the long term increase in total imports since 2001 (around 4% per year), I roughly averaged the rate of increase through 2004 and through 2006 (relative to 2001).   I excluded 2005 because of the hurricane effects.

BTW, if anyone would like to volunteer, I think that it would be very, very interesting to see a chart of Total Petroleum Imports (four week running average)  from 2001 through the end of November, 2006.

Can do
To simplify the chart, I would just show the last weekly number for each month, 1/01 to 11/06, inclusive (four week running average).

If you are so inclined you might add the monthly spot oil price (for WTI, Cushing):  http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_m.htm

check email
Thanks for the link, I've added it to my essential PO links list!  I can see now why the assertion might be made.
I made a a few charts on the EIA import  numbers. The methodology is described here and consists in correcting for the trend first and then look at the residual patterns.

original data:

The linear model has a slope value equals to 0.3993. Once corrected for this linear model, I can observe residuals (i.e. seasonal fluctuations) around the trend:

The gray level image in the background is the observed seasonal fluctuations derived form the residuals shown on Fig. 3 (darker areas mean more frequent values). The red curve is the observed data for 2006. The * means that the data for the year 2005 and 2004 have been adjusted to match the increase for 2006 predicted by the linear model. The dark dotted line is the seasonal  average fluctuation.

Smoothed data (4 weeks):

Same as before: The linear model has a slope value equals to 0.3991. Once corrected for this linear model, I can observe residuals (i.e. seasonal fluctuations) around the trend:

Conclusion: The recent Total Petroleum product import fluctuations are in the lower range but are still within the domain of past fluctuation history.

Khebab is my hero.  

What is the long term annual rate of increase in total imports?

Could you show 2001 to 2006 (inclusive) total imports versus monthly spot oil prices?

As I pointed out in the article, the key question is that happens when an expectation of exponentially rising imports collides with the reality of exponentially declining exports.

Also,

The absolutely critical point that we need to keep in mind is that we require ever greater total imports every year--as long as either our consumption is increasing or our production is falling.  

The only reason that we would not need more total imports year over year would be if the rate of decline of consumption equaled the rate of decline of production.  The reality is that consumption is increasing, while production is falling.

My point is that the top three exporters, in aggregate, are showing exactly the same pattern--rising consumption and falling production.

Which brings me back to my original point--a collision between expectations of exponentially rising imports against the developing reality of exponentially falling exports.

and it would follow that the internal consumption would need to be somewhat self supporting - in that they don't need to sell oil to help fund thier social programs etc.  
A catch 22,  the need to have cheap oil for domestic use yet wanting to sell it to te higest bidder for cash flow.  
Re: What is the long term annual rate of increase in total imports?

The value of the linear slope is 0.3993 mbpd per year which means an increase of +4.0 mbpd in imports in ten years (~30% increase).

Re: Could you show 2001 to 2006 (inclusive) total imports versus monthly spot oil prices?

I can't right now but I could look at it maybe tonight.

I don't have my scientific calculator, but it looks like the trend line doubled, from about 6 mbpd to 12 mbpd, in the 15 years from 1990 to 2005, which suggests a long term exponential growth rate of about 4.8% per year.  

(Rule of 72, divide 72 by the interest rate, in percentage terms, to get the number of years required for a doubling).

72/4.8 = 15 years

Note that we are drawing down crude oil + product inventories as imports are now falling below the trend line.

Just for the fun it, the same chart with a 3 months moving average:


The above graphs show a drop in imports for last 90 days of 2006 compared to previous years and the average for 3 years.  Note that this drop started when gasoline and oil prices peaked at the begining of August.  I believe this is the effect of some short term conservation and some demand destruction.  The first few percent of conservation is easy - maybe everyone conserves 3 or 4 percent to save some money, especially lower income people.  

The real test comes next year when world exports drop and the asian economies are still growing.  US economy heading for the trash can in 2007 could dampen oil prices, but a  still growing US economy could send oil prices higher and produce a world wide recession.  US still loses in the long run as our production falls during a tightening market for oil.  

A while ago I made a graph of US market share of total production.  As other importing economies grow, the US market share will decline, on top of the decline in total production.As your graph shows, we are consuming less now than in 2004, while total production is higher.

Essentially, we are getting 'crowded out' of the oil. We will continue along this path since the transitiion economies are able to devalue the dollar with their large dollar assets and therefore make oil imports more expensive for us....while they have plenty of dollars to spend.  They will do this in order to ensure that they have enough energy to maintain their growth.

If the CIA isn't paying attention to this, they are fools.

"A while ago I made a graph of US market share of total production.  As other importing economies grow, the US market share will decline, on top of the decline in total production.  As your graph shows, we are consuming less now than in 2004, while total production is higher."

Could you clarify what you mean?  All of the above graphs refer to Total US Petroleum (crude + product) imports, and we are showing close to a long term growth rate of about 5% per year in total imports.

I think he is talking about share of the pie.  Our share of the overall pie has evidently decreased while the pie has gotten larger.
high growth economies crowd out low and medium growth economies. Nothing new here. The us used to be high growth compared with the rest of the world, and to an extent it still is. However, the asian dragons are higher growth, and naturally will receive a growing fraction of the pie.  Naturally we support this because the dragons have become our manufacturers, busting their butts 7/24 to ship us anything and everything we desire.
I see what you have done by "adjusting the data" for 2005 and 2004, however by doing this have you not distorted your final results? Essentially what I am asking is this not a circular arguement.
The goal for the adjustment is simply to try to visualize how 2006 would have look like if we had the same monthly fluctuations around the trend as 2005 and 2006. The goal of the above charts is to decorrelate multi-year trend from seasonal fluctuations and better pinpoint significant outliers.

Note that 2006 is an exceptional year because of the nasty hurricane season that caused a large rise in imports.

The comparison should be done between the red curve (2006) and the dotted black line (average residual) and also the gray level background that is representing residuals history.

Note that 2006 is an exceptional year because of the nasty hurricane season that caused a large rise in imports.

I think you meant 2005.

Correct :)
WT and RR thanks again for sharing your thinking and data on the export situation.  I found the WSJ journal article that ran a couple of weeks ago to be spot on with other worldwide info of strikes, protests, and riots in the 3rd World in reference to the rationing going on. This is a big surprise to the MSM myopic Americans that don't even appear to be aware (clueless and proud of it) of these situations.
I also find it fascinating that given the weak dollar and high demand in the U.S. that prices continue to remain well below the peaks of last summer.  Obviously the ignorance is bliss stance has some value as the market suppliers continue to be price takers rather than price makers for the most part.  This to seems to be ready to evolve but the market is convinced that the economic conditions in the OPEC countries create more cheaters than compliers.
One question I have for you is that you continue to advocate increasing gas taxes and offsetting it with a reduction in the payroll tax.  As one quite aware of the retirement dynamics and the aging boomers what are your thoughts on how to offset the fact that they won't be paying any payroll taxes?  How about state employees that don't pay them either?  Tuff shat or do you have another relief mechanism in mind?
As one quite aware of the retirement dynamics and the aging boomers what are your thoughts on how to offset the fact that they won't be paying any payroll taxes?  How about state employees that don't pay them either?  Tuff shat or do you have another relief mechanism in mind?

The devil is always in the details, but the bigger hurdle is to persuade people that we have a problem.

WT and RR;
  I think this debate is a great way to focus the thinking you both are putting into these analyses, and I really look forward to learning from this comparison of counterpoints as it develops.  Thanks.

  I did want to make a distinction on one of WT's points near the end..

"In most of the US, it is simply a given that the "American Way of Life" is non-negotiable and that we can continue to increase our petroleum imports year after year."

  I agree with the first half, but I don't think most Americans really have considered how many aspects of our 'Way of Life' are dependent upon oil imports, so I don't see the mass of consumers putting them into the same statement like that.  I think conservation and reduced dependency on foreign oil (or foreign 'anything') falls into a 'yeah, that would be nice, maybe I'll make a NewYears' Resolution to try and 'cut back' category for many people, who are overworked and overtired from the very overcommuting and overconsuming that starts the vicious cycle of rank-consumerism..  I don't think it's quite as consciously created as the 'company store' model, but it's not that far off from it, either.

Talk Hard!

bob

Bob, I doubt that American consumers will conserve for any reason other than price. If the price of NG skyrockets, people will turn down the thermostat. If the price of gas does the same, consumers will respond as they did in the late '70s, by switching to fuel efficient cars.

Speaking of prices, WesTexas, I am curious as to why you think the price of gas is so low right now?

Total petroleum product inventories, divided by product supplied are below the average of the past few years, and gasoline inventories especially are dropping at a pretty good clip.  

Gasoline prices are on an upward trend, up more than 10% locally since 11/1.   IMO, we are going to be on an upward trend for quite a while.

My basic premise is that we are going to have to bid the price up, if we want to continue consuming petroleum products at our current rate.

>>>If the price of NG skyrockets, people will turn down the thermostat.<<<

If this were mostly true. Unfortunately I think that what is likely to happen is that many Americans will just keep the thermostat at what is comfortable for them and then express shock and outrage at the bill. The media will play it up and demand heating subsidies for the "poor and needy".

In most cities utilities cannot cut of supply for non-payment of bills during the heating season.

If there is a cold season the NG in the pipes and underground will be burned regardless of price until the pressure in the supply line is 0 psig.

"I doubt that American consumers will conserve for any reason other than price."

Sure, Some do.  Most don't,  which is why I characterised it as a hopeful, New Year's resolution kind of thing.  I think people 'would like' to change it, but for the most part feel about as powerful in that goal as they do in 'ending world hunger' or even in 'really quitting smoking this time'..

 I do think there are a few other factors that can push people along..  Threats of climate change has sold more than a few priuses, and the people I know who have them are not just rich and tossing a few bucks at it to 'feel good'.  It was definitely a costly investment and a vote of support for moving in a better direction.  We ourselves buy a lot of our food from local sources, and know that it's costing us more than getting jugs of soda and generic heads of iceberg lettuce from 'Macro-Ag in Salinas'.  We're not rich, but we put money in to things we believe are smart investments, either in our own health or to help benefit the local economy, small farms, overall soil and water and fuel consumption, helping spread more knowledge about diet as it affects both personal health and local economic security.

You can say we are the extreme exceptions, but there are other exceptions out there.  I met a family on Long Island, years ago.. very mainstream, very suburban, traditional religious, millions of Poreclain Figurines.. etc.. but they had adopted and raised this string of kids, one after another from all over the world, kids who otherwise wouldn't have been able to expect such a full family experience.. They were awesome.. even when I balked at the statement that EVERY vacation they took was to Disneyworld.  Yikes!  But they were 'extreme exceptions' too, in another way than Leslie and I are..  it does add up.  And it makes it really hard to have any statement about 'The American Consumer' really get that far on its own.

  And I think prices will go up, and a lot more changes will happen then.  But there are a lot of seeds out there, already germinating.

I'm speaking, of course, of the aggregate. My wife and I have reduced our consumption (already low) dramatically. However, I don't see any movement amongst our friends and neighbors to do the same. People marvel at our "desert hobbit" home,  which require no cooling and minimal heating, and our minimalist lifestyle, and tend to say "oh, but I couldn't live like that."

Well, we're happy. Lifestyle changes for most people are pretty slow, until there is a crisis.

Speaking of which, I recently saw "memoirs of a Geisha," and would like to point to the dramatic lifestyle change everyone went through when their decadent lifestyles were obliterated by strategic bombing. They survived, and found strenth and new directions they wouldn't have guessed they had.