When Is "Global Peak Energy?" According to Publicly Available Data, Probably Sooner Than You Think

This is a guest post by Chris Clugston. Chris has spent over 30 years working with information technology sector companies in marketing, sales, finance, M&A, and general management—the last twenty as a corporate chief executive and management consultant. Chris received an AB/Political Science, Magna Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Penn State University, and an MBA/Finance with High Distinction from Temple University in Philadelphia, PA.

Energy is the “enabling” resource; most, if not all other natural and manmade resources and their capacities to sustain human life are derived from or dependent upon one or more sources of primary energy. The fact that the amount of energy available to human beings is subject to a limit—global peak energy—has profound implications for future human population levels and living standards.

Given humanity’s unquestioned dependence upon energy for survival, answers to the following questions are critical to our long term success as a species:

  • When and at what level will global energy “peak”?
  • What are the implications of global peak energy for the world’s human population?

The following analysis represents my initial attempt to answer these questions; the primary conclusions are unsettling, but clear: Based on publicly available data, global peak energy will probably occur between the years 2025 and 2030; total available energy will decline continuously thereafter.


Global peak energy is the point at which the total amount of useable energy available to the worldwide human population from currently known primary energy sources reaches its maximum.

Global peak energy will be delayed only in the event of:

  • The discovery of one or more major new primary energy sources comparable in quantity, quality, and versatility to fossil fuels;
  • Significant breakthroughs in the quantity, quality, and/or versatility associated with one or more existing primary energy sources; and/or
  • Drastic and sustained reductions in the level of human energy consumption.

The maximum supportable worldwide human population level will peak between the years 2025 and 2030 as well, and decline continuously thereafter—assuming the continuation following global peak energy of the historic relationship between the total amount of energy consumed by human populations and corresponding population levels and material living standards.

If this relationship holds, the maximum supportable worldwide human population at today’s average global living standard will decline from a peak ranging from 7.2 billion to 8.9 billion people, to between 2.0 billion and 5.0 billion people by the year 2100, and between 1.3 billion and 3.3 billion people by the year 2200.

The analysis contains the assumptions, projections, and findings that support these conclusions.

Contents

  • Why This Study
  • Historic Global Energy Consumption and Population Growth
  • Current Global Energy Availability and Population Estimates
  • Future Global Energy Availability Projections
  • Implications of Global Peak Energy for Worldwide Population
  • Conclusions
  • Limitations
  • Data Sources
  • Author and Acknowledgements

Why This Study

Much excellent research has been conducted into the projected “peaking” of energy produced from hydrocarbon-based primary energy sources (fossil fuels)—oil, natural gas, and coal. With few exceptions, however, existing research on peaking has failed to capture the attention of policy makers or the mainstream populace. This may be due in part to the lack of tangible—specific and measurable—implications for current and future human populations associated with some existing research.

The following analysis seeks to address this situation by extending into the future the historically established relationship that exists between the total amount of energy available to human populations, and corresponding population levels and average material living standards. The analysis offers tangible conclusions that can be readily understood by both policy makers and the general populace.

The analysis is a synthesis of historic population and energy consumption data, current population and energy availability/consumption estimates, and future energy availability projections, associated with all existing nonrenewable and renewable primary energy sources. Supporting data for the current version of the analysis were obtained and derived from free publicly available sources including the EIA, IEA, HYDE Worldwide Population Database, US Census Bureau, and various organizations and individuals involved with monitoring the national and worldwide energy sectors.

What follows is a “first pass” effort based on personally developed assumptions, estimates, and projections—avowedly not the “best currently available information”. My objective in publishing the analysis in its current form is to seek input from those who have access to the best currently available information in order to improve upon its content.

In its final form, I envision the analysis as a tool for creating awareness among both policy makers and the general populace—especially populations within “consuming nations” such as the United States—regarding the specific consequences associated with our current and projected energy consumption behavior—devastating reductions in human population levels and living standards. It is my hope that the quantified conclusions will instill a sense of urgency on the part of “excessively consuming” populations to alter our dysfunctional behavior voluntarily, before it is altered for us.

Historic Global Energy Consumption and Population Growth

Cottrell, Tainter, and Catton are among the many scholars who have argued compellingly that the maximum supportable human population at any point in time is dependent upon the total amount of energy available to the population at that time. Historic evidence supports this contention.

Historic Global Energy Consumption and
Worldwide Population Growth

Data sources: US Census Bureau, HYDE database, EIA, Kremer (1993)

It is also clear that the significant improvements in material living standards realized by many of the earth’s human inhabitants over time are largely attributable to ever-increasing amounts of total available energy. Dramatic increases in both worldwide human population and living standards are especially evident during the past several hundred years, coincident with the availability of hydrocarbon-based primary energy sources (fossil fuels).

Current Global Energy Availability and Population Estimates

During the year 2007, an estimated 532 quadrillion BTUs of energy will be produced globally from currently known primary energy sources, and consumed by a worldwide human population that is expected to exceed 6.64 billion by year end.

Estimated 2007 Global Energy Availability


Data sources: EIA, IEA, US Census Bureau, HYDE database, various industry sources

Future Global Energy Availability Projections

Underlying Assumptions

Projections regarding the total amount of energy available globally between the year 2007 and the year 2200 are derived from the following assumptions regarding the amounts of energy to be produced from each currently known primary energy source. Two sets of assumptions were developed: a Conservative Scenario and an Optimistic Scenario.

Assumptions Regarding Global Energy Availability per Primary Source
(Conservative Scenario)

Primary Energy Source Annual Growth Rate: 2007 to Peak Peak Year Annual Decline Rate: Post-peak
Nonrenewable Energy Sources
Conventional Oil N/A 2007 2% until 2025
4% thereafter
Oil Sands 4.7% 2025 0% until 2050
1% thereafter
Heavy Oil 4.2% 2025 0% until 2050
1% thereafter
Coal to Liquids 13.1% 2025 0% until 2050
3% thereafter
Natural Gas to Liquids 5.5% 2025 0% until 2050
5% thereafter
Natural Gas 1.5% 2015 3% until 2025
6% thereafter
Coal 2.2% 2025 2% until 2050
4% thereafter
Nuclear 1.4% 2025 0% until 2050
2% thereafter
       
Renewable Energy Sources
Traditional Biomass (wood, waste) 1% 2050 0%
Hydro 1.8% 2025 0% until 2050
1% thereafter
Biofuels 5.8% 2015 2%
Solar 6% 2030 0% until 2050
1% thereafter
Geothermal 5% 2030 0% until 2050
1% thereafter
Wind 5% 2030 0% until 2050
1% thereafter
Waves and Tides 5% 2030 0% until 2050
1% thereafter

Data sources: EIA, IEA, Deutsche Shell, synthesis of various industry sources

Assumptions Regarding Global Energy Availability per Primary Source
(Optimistic Scenario)

Primary Energy Source Annual Growth Rate: 2007 to Peak Peak Year Annual Decline Rate: Post-peak
Nonrenewable Energy Sources
Conventional Oil 1.1% 2020 2%
Oil Sands 4.7% until 2025
2.35% 2025 until 2050
2050 1%
Heavy Oil 4.2% until 2025
2.1% 2025 until 2050
2050 1%
Coal to Liquids 13.1% until 2025
4% 2025 until 2050
2050 1.5%
Natural Gas to Liquids 5.5% until 2025
2% 2025 until 2050
2050 2.5%
Natural Gas 1.5% until 2030 2030 3%
Coal 2.2% until 2025
1.1% 2025 until 2040
2040 0% until 2050
2% thereafter
Nuclear 1.4% 2040 0%
       
Renewable Energy Sources
Traditional Biomass (wood, waste) 1.5% 2050 0%
Hydro 1.8% until 2025
.9% 2025 until 2050
2050 0%
Biofuels 5.8% until 2025
2.9% 2025 until 2050
2050 0%
Solar 6% 2050 0%
Geothermal 5% until 2025
2.5% 2025 until 2050
2050 0%
Wind 5% until 2025
2.5% 2025 until 2050
2050 0%
Waves and Tides 5% until 2025
2.5% 2025 until 2050
2050 0%

Data sources: EIA, IEA, Deutsche Shell, synthesis of various industry sources

Global Peak Energy

Applying the assumptions regarding future global energy availability to year 2007 global energy availability estimates yields the following global peak energy projections.

Projected Total Global Energy Availability (Quadrillion BTUs)
Conservative Scenario

Primary Energy Source Peak Year
2007 2025 2050 2100 2150 2200
Nonrenewable Sources
Conventional Oil & Condensates 170.0 118.0 15.0 2.0 0.3 0.0
Oil Sands 2.6 6.0 6.0 3.6 2.2 1.3
Heavy Oil 1.3 2.7 2.7 1.6 1.0 0.6
Coal to Liquids 0.6 5.5 5.5 1.2 0.3 0.1
Gas to Liquids 0.7 1.8 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0
Natural Gas 112.0 93.0 20.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
Coal 127.0 188.0 113.0 15.0 2.0 0.3
Nuclear 28.5 37.0 37.0 13.0 5.0 2.0
Subtotal Nonrenewables 442.7 452.0 201.0 37.4 10.8 4.3
Renewable Sources
Traditional Biomass 53.0 65.0 83.0 83.0 83.0 83.0
Hydro 28.1 39.0 39.0 23.6 14.3 8.7
Biofuels 1.8 2.3 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.1
Solar 0.6 1.7 2.3 1.4 0.9 0.5
Geothermal 3.7 8.9 12.5 7.6 4.6 2.8
Wind 1.6 3.9 5.4 3.3 2.0 1.2
Waves and Tides 0.5 1.2 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.4
Subtotal Renewables 89.3 122.0 145.3 120.4 105.6 96.7
Total Available Energy 532.0 574.0 346.3 157.9 116.4 100.9

Projected Total Global Energy Availability (Quadrillion BTUs)
Optimistic Scenario

Primary Energy Source Peak Year
2007 2030 2050 2100 2150 2200
Nonrenewable Sources
Conventional Oil & Condensates 170.0 157.3 105.0 38.0 13.8 5.0
Oil Sands 2.6 6.6 18.2 11.0 6.7 4.1
Heavy Oil 1.3 3.0 4.5 2.7 1.6 1.0
Coal to Liquids 0.6 6.7 14.7 6.9 3.2 1.5
Gas to Liquids 0.7 2.1 3.1 0.9 0.3 0.1
Natural Gas 112.0 158.0 85.9 18.7 4.1 0.9
Coal 127.0 198.8 222.0 82.5 30.7 11.4
Nuclear 28.5 39.2 45.1 45.1 45.1 45.1
Subtotal Nonrenewables 442.7 571.6 498.5 205.8 105.5 69.1
Renewable Sources
Traditional Biomass 53.0 74.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Hydro 28.1 39.7 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0
Biofuels 1.8 5.8 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2
Solar 0.6 2.3 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4
Geothermal 3.7 10.1 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5
Wind 1.6 4.4 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2
Waves and Tides 0.5 1.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
Subtotal Renewables 89.3 138.0 191.5 191.5 191.5 191.5
Total Available Energy 532.0 709.6 690.0 397.3 297.0 260.6

Global Peak Energy


Source: Wake Up Amerika!

In the Conservative Scenario, “global peak energy”—the point at which the total amount of energy available to the worldwide human population from currently known primary energy sources reaches its maximum—occurs in the year 2025, at 574 quadrillion BTUs (Quads). In the Optimistic Scenario, global peak energy occurs only 5 years later in the year 2030, at 710 Quads.

In the Conservative Scenario the total amount of energy available globally declines to 158 Quads by the year 2100, and further declines to 101 Quads by the year 2200. In the Optimistic Scenario, the total amount of energy available globally declines to 397 Quads by the year 2100, and further declines to 261 Quads by the year 2200.


Note that by calculating “total available energy” as the simple sum of the energy produced by each existing primary energy source, the analysis implies infinite substitutability among primary energy types—that is, every energy source is equally capable of producing energy for every energy-consuming application. Since this is obviously not the case (You can’t run millions of cars on wind or hydro…), the analysis may overstate the total amount of “useable” energy available at any given time, which may optimistically bias the projected timing and level of global peak energy. That is, global peak energy could occur sooner and at a lower level than the analysis indicates.

Implications of Global Peak Energy for Worldwide Population

Worldwide Peak Population

Worldwide peak population is determined by dividing the total amount of energy expected to be available during the global peak energy year by the average amount of energy expected to be consumed per capita during that year.

Worldwide Peak Population
Conservative Scenario

Source: Wake Up Amerika!

In the Conservative Scenario, the maximum supportable worldwide population at today’s average global living standard reaches a year 2025 peak of 7.2 billion people, who consume the projected 574 Quads of total energy available that year at today’s average annual rate of 80 million BTUs per capita.

Worldwide Peak Population
Optimistic Scenario

Source: Wake Up Amerika!

In the Optimistic Scenario, the maximum supportable worldwide population at today’s average global living standard reaches a year 2030 peak of 8.9 billion people, who consume the projected 710 Quads of total energy available that year at today’s average annual rate of 80 million BTUs per capita.

The “Population versus Living Standard” Tradeoff

At any level of total available energy, the maximum supportable human population and the maximum attainable average human living standard are a “tradeoff”. That is, a higher average living standard necessitates a lower population level; a lower average living standard enables a higher population level.

The analysis examines the ranges of supportable worldwide population for the years 2007, 2100, and 2200, by considering three increasingly affluent “material” living standards, each of which is characterized by the annual per capita energy consumption level associated with its respective population:

  1. Today’s Subsistence Living Standard: 20 million BTUs of per capita energy consumption annually, which is 25% of the 2007 global average, was about the average global per capita energy consumption level at the time of Christ, and is exemplified by the living standard associated with today’s residents of Zimbabwe, India, and Angola.
  2. Today’s Average Global Living Standard: 80 million BTUs of per capita energy consumption annually, which is the 2007 global average and is exemplified by the living standard associated with today’s residents of Panama, Romania, and Serbia.
  3. Today’s Average US Living Standard: 400 million BTUs of per capita energy consumption annually, which is 5 times the 2007 global average and is exemplified by the living standard associated with today’s American middle class.

The following graphs depict the range of tradeoffs between the “maximum supportable population level” and the “maximum attainable ‘material’ living standard”—as defined by per capita annual energy consumption—for the years 2007, 2100, and 2200, given the total amount of available energy projected for each of those three years.

Population versus Living Standard Tradeoff
Conservative Scenario

Source: Wake Up Amerika!

In the Conservative Scenario, the maximum supportable worldwide population at today’s (2007) total available energy level of 532 Quads ranges from a theoretical high of 26.6 billion at today’s subsistence living standard, to 6.6 billion at today’s global average living standard, to 1.3 billion at America’s current average living standard.

By the year 2100, the maximum supportable worldwide population at the projected total available energy level of 158 Quads ranges from 7.9 billion at today’s subsistence living standard, to 2.0 billion at today’s global average living standard, to 400 million at America’s current average living standard.

By the year 2200, the maximum supportable worldwide population at the projected total available energy level of 101 Quads ranges from 5.0 billion at today’s subsistence living standard, to 1.3 billion at today’s global average living standard, to 300 million at America’s current average living standard.

Population versus Living Standard Tradeoff
Optimistic Scenario

Source: Wake Up Amerika!

In the Optimistic Scenario, the year 2007 “population versus living standard” tradeoff function is identical to the year 2007 Conservative Scenario function.

By the year 2100, the maximum supportable worldwide population at the projected total available energy level of 397 Quads ranges from a theoretical level of 19.9 billion at today’s subsistence living standard, to 5.0 billion at today’s global average living standard, to 1 billion at America’s current average living standard.

By the year 2200, the maximum supportable worldwide population at the projected total available energy level of 261 Quads ranges from a theoretical level of 13.0 billion at today’s subsistence living standard, to 3.3 billion at today’s global average living standard, to 700 million at America’s current average living standard.

Supportable Worldwide Population

If the post-peak average living standard were to be held constant at today’s global average, maximum supportable worldwide human population levels would decline continuously and irreversibly from the time of global peak energy until well past the year 2200. The analysis projects future maximum supportable worldwide population levels at today’s (2007) average global living standard—the living standard typical of existing populations in Panama, Romania, and Serbia.

Supportable Worldwide Population at Today’s Global Average Living Standard
Conservative Scenario

Source: Wake Up Amerika!

In the Conservative Scenario, the maximum worldwide human population supportable at today’s global average living standard reaches a peak of 7.2 billion in the year 2025, declines to 2.0 billion by the year 2100, and declines further to 1.3 billion by the year 2200.

Supportable Worldwide Population at Today’s Global Average Living Standard
Optimistic Scenario

Source: Wake Up Amerika!

In the Optimistic Scenario, the maximum worldwide human population supportable at today’s global average living standard reaches a peak of 8.9 billion in 2030, declines to 5.0 billion by the year 2100, and declines further to 3.3 billion by the year 2200.

Conclusions

Pre-peak

  • If the energy availability assumptions outlined in the preceding analysis hold true, the total amount of energy available globally will continue to increase for the next 20-25 years, implying additional capacity for increasing human population during that time. At issue, however, is whether the “energy mix” going forward will support existing population levels, much less population growth; and whether other resources critical to human survival, such as water and food, will be available in sufficient quantities to support existing population levels, much less population growth. (Liebig’s Law of the Minimum)

Peak

  • In the absence of 1) the discovery of one or more major new primary energy sources comparable in quantity, quality, and versatility to fossil fuels, 2) significant breakthroughs in the quantity, quality, and/or versatility associated with one or more existing primary energy sources, and/or 3) immediate and drastic reductions in the level of human energy consumption; global peak energy will probably occur between the years 2025 and 2030.
  • While the amount of energy produced from energy sources such as the sun, wind, falling water, waves, tides, and the earth’s core is phenomenal, the percentage of such energy that is realistically accessible to human beings is very small, and is likely to remain so in the future due to low or negative returns, ROI and ERoEI, associated with attempting to harness such energy on a practical scale. Additional energy from these sources and from other “alternative” energy sources such as biofuels will certainly be produced in the future, but, barring one or more major breakthroughs, the total contribution from all existing alternative energy sources combined will never come close to offsetting the declining energy production associated with fossil fuels.
  • Maximum supportable worldwide population will also quite probably peak between the years 2025 and 2030.

Post-peak

  • Following the occurrence of global peak energy and worldwide peak population, the total amount of energy available to human beings will decline continuously and irreversibly, as will some combination of worldwide human population and human living standards.
  • Worldwide population and/or living standards will continue to decline as the total amount of energy available globally declines until “equilibrium” is achieved. Equilibrium will be achieved when total human energy consumption reaches a level that is consistent with global biocapacity; that is, when the total amount of energy consumed by human beings is derived entirely from renewable primary energy sources.
  • To the extent that the decline in energy available from fossil fuels negatively impacts the amount of energy available from “alternative” energy sources, due to the loss of “fossil fuel subsidies”, the total amount of energy available globally and the maximum supportable worldwide population level could decline at rates exceeding those projected in the Conservative Scenario.
  • The goal of achieving an “American standard of living” for all or even a majority of the world’s current population is preposterous. The “optimistic peak” worldwide human population supportable at America’s current average living standard is less than 1.8 billion. Ironically, the maximum worldwide human population supportable at America’s current average living standard by the year 2200, even in the Optimistic Scenario, is only 300 million—today’s US population.
  • Humanity has never experienced a trip down the post-peak (decline) side of the Total Available Energy Curve—facing continuous and irreversible declines in the resource that serves as the basis for our very existence; we have only traveled up the pre-peak (growth) side. There has always been “more”, and an expectation of “more”—never “less”. The psychological implications associated with an “inverted expectation paradigm”, in which things always get worse instead of always getting better, are unprecedented.

The methods by which human populations react to these circumstances—especially populations in developed countries who will feel the impact of global peak energy most severely, and especially reactions as they relate to “forced” or “involuntary” population level reductions—will be pivotal in determining not only whether we survive as a species, but whether we survive as a civilized species.

Limitations

The existing analysis suffers from several limitations, some of which result from its incipient stage of development, others from scope limitations, methodology limitations, uncertainties regarding supporting data, and my inexperience in the energy sector:

  • The underlying data upon which the analysis is based is subject to uncertainty, and may be inaccurate. Publicly accessible information sources may be wrong, outdated, or incomplete; I undoubtedly missed the “best available” data in some instances; data sources vary, sometimes widely-errors and bias result from the specific data set selected; and some of the “best” data is not available to the general public. Input from additional sources will mitigate this limitation, but it can never be totally eliminated.

  • The assumption of “infinite substitutability” among all energy types noted in the report probably serves to bias the results in an “optimistic” direction, by implying the existence of more “useable” energy than may actually be the case at any point in time. (Optimally, “total available energy” would consider the specific applications for which each primary energy type is suitable, and depict the actual “useable available energy total”. Such complexity was beyond the scope of this analysis, and would not, in any case, result in delaying the projected timing of global peak energy.)
  • The analysis focuses specifically on the relationship between total available energy and supportable human population levels and living standards. Other factors, such as the availability of food, clean water, and breathable air also certainly impact supportable human population levels and living standards. Energy is considered exclusively in my analysis because the historic relationship between energy availability and human population levels and living standards is well documented-and because global peak energy appears to be imminent. The analytical focus is not meant to detract from the gravity associated with potential shortages associated with food, water, air, or any other resource critical to human survival.
  • The analysis assumes implicitly that the historic “pre-peak” relationship between total available energy and supportable human population levels and material living standards will hold true in a “post-peak” environment. While this assumption cannot be tested until the occurrence of peak global energy, it is intuitively obvious that, while the specific “decline functions” associated with available energy, human population levels, or human living standards may not be known with certainty, supportable human population levels and/or material living standards will certainly decline in some manner and to some degree as a result of continuously declining energy availability.

    Despite these limitations, which I expect to be mitigated by input from industry experts and yet-to-be-tapped information sources, I believe that the current version of the analysis is “close enough” regarding its assumptions, projections, and findings to evoke concern on the part of rational human beings, and to warrant the effort to improve upon its existing contents. I expect the final version of the analysis to yield similar conclusions regarding global peak energy and its implications for human populations-based upon more credible underlying assumptions and associated projections.

    Data Sources

    The data and information upon which my analysis is based-historic population and energy consumption data, current population and energy availability/consumption estimates, and future energy availability projections-were obtained and derived from free publicly available sources including the EIA, IEA, HYDE Worldwide Population Database, US Census Bureau, and various organizations and individuals involved with monitoring the national and worldwide energy sectors.

    My underlying assumptions and projections regarding future energy availability associated with each nonrenewable and renewable primary energy source represent a synthesis of the information obtained from the above mentioned sources. The specific projections associated with the two scenarios presented in the analysis, Conservative and Optimistic, are derived from assumption sets regarding future energy availability believed by me to be “conservative” and “optimistic”.

    (Note that in the final version of the analysis, the Conservative Scenario will depict the global peak energy/population scenario that lies approximately one standard deviation to the “conservative side” of expected peak scenario; and the Optimistic Scenario will depict the global peak energy/population scenario that lies approximately one standard deviation to the “optimistic side” of expected peak scenario.)

    Population Data Sources

    Energy Data Sources

    Historic global energy consumption

  • Post-1800: I used a synthesis of HYDE data http://www.mnp.nl/hyde/Images/total_energy_cons_tcm63-23030.xls;
    EIA data http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/table29.xls;
    and a diagram created by Deutsche Shell: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,grossbild-685811-429968,00.html

    2007 total global energy consumption estimates

    I used the EIA 2007 International Energy Outlook as the basis for my estimates: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/excel/figure_11data.xls, 482 Quads for 2007.

    I cross-referenced against similar IEA estimates, http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/key2006.pdf, which were close in most respects, with the exception of hydro and “traditional biomass”.

    The primary reason for the biomass discrepancy is that the EIA considers only “marketable” energy in their data. Since much of the wood and waste used for cooking and heating globally is simply gathered and burned, it is never actually “marketed” and does not appear in EIA data. I therefore assumed that the EIA understates actual traditional biomass use.

    Data from the IEA, the Shell diagram referenced above, and from the Bioenergy Feedstock Information Network http://bioenergy.ornl.gov/faqs/index.html suggested use of traditional biomass in excess of 50 Quads/year in 2004, so I increased the EIA 2007 estimate of 482 Quads to the 2007 Clugston estimate of 532 Quads.

    (I never did determine the reason for the EIA/IEA discrepancy in hydro energy consumption. I used the EIA estimate because other sources that I spot checked pegged hydro energy consumption/availability to be on par with nuclear, as did the EIA.)

    2007 energy consumption per primary energy source estimates

    Again, I used EIA data from their 2007 International Energy Outlook as the basis for my projections. The EIA provides a comprehensive breakdown of estimated nonrenewable energy consumption by source; however, they present only an aggregated total for renewables energy source, as far as I was able to determine: http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/table29.xls and http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/excel/figure_32data.xls.

    The EIA does provide detail on estimated US consumption of energy per renewable source http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/excel/aeotab_17.xls, and Wikipedia offered a comprehensive article on worldwide energy consumption by primary source that drew upon sources including the IEA, DOE, BP, and various energy related industry associations: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_energy_resources_and_consumption.

    Based upon data obtained from these sites and from “confirmation spot checks” to websites associated with renewable energy sources, I derived the 2007 Clugston estimates for energy availability per primary energy source.

    Future total available energy projections

    I used the near-term growth rates contained in the above referenced EIA documents as the basis for my projections regarding both nonrenewable and renewable primary energy sources. I spot checked against IEA growth projections, which were very similar: http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/key2006.pdf.

    Longer term “pre-peak” growth rate projections (beyond 2030), “peak” projections, and “post-peak” decline rate projections associated with both the Conservative Scenario and Optimistic Scenario are simply syntheses of the scores of studies, reports, websites, and interviews that I have read and heard over the past year and a half.

    (Note that energy derived from each nonrenewable primary energy source is assumed to peak at some point, and then decline thereafter. Energy derived from each renewable primary energy source is assumed to reach a “practical limit” [peak] at some point, and then to decline or plateau thereafter.)

    Author and Acknowledgements

    Chris Clugston launched Wake Up Amerika! (www.wakeupamerika.com) in 2006 to investigate the nature and causes associated with the impending ecological and economic disasters currently confronting the United States, and to define timely and meaningful actions to mitigate the severity and duration associated with the lifestyle disruptions that will inevitably result.

    Prior to founding Wake Up Amerika! he spent over 30 years working with information technology sector companies in marketing, sales, finance, M&A, and general management—the last twenty as a corporate chief executive and management consultant.

    He received an AB/Political Science, Magna Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Penn State University, and an MBA/Finance with High Distinction from Temple University in Philadelphia, PA.

    Below is a partial list of authors and researchers that Chris Clugston would like to acknowledge as important influences in his work:

    James Barrett (RP) Bart Anderson (EB) Professor Goose
    (Oil Drum)
    Al Bartlett
    Colin Campbell (APSO) William Catton Joseph Tainter Fred Cottrell
    M. K. Hubbert Julian Darley Ken Deffeyes Richard Duncan
    Chris Flavin (Worldwatch) David Goodstein Richard Heinberg Robert Hirsch
    Jim Kunstler Jean Laherrere Dennis Meadows Dale Allen Pfeiffer
    Jim Puplava William Rees Thomas Seltman Matt Simmons
    Chris Skrebowski Matt Wackernagel (GFN) David Walker (GAO) Tom Whipple
    Matt Savinar (LATOC) David Pimentel Paul Ehrlich

    This article was edited by Bart Anderson, co-editor of Energy Bulletin.


  • http://science.reddit.com/info/2nqbv/comments

    thank you for spreading The Oil Drum around if you are so inclined!

    Wow. Major props for the most academic way of saying "we're all gonna fuckin die!!!" I've ever seen.

    Seriously, you could present this to bunch of uber-puckered academics or business people and they'd all come away thinking the same thing.

    Is it possible to consolidate the above article into something that can be fitted to a sandwich board? Just asking . . .

    What about any International events that would throw all this into a whack?

    http://usa-2012.blogspot.com/

    Sorry, I don't dig this one. The analysis is completely unrealistic - solar and wind energy usage DECLINING post-peak. We need better posts to reach the general audience, with this one THEOILDRUM would be considered just another Doomer's Lair.

    Solar warm water and wind energy are proven to have EROEI much greater than 1 and can be produced locally and low tech. There is no reason to assume that usage would go down after fossil energy peaks.

    The other flaws of the article are more complex, hope they will be discussed further down. No time now, got to work.

    Reallistically, solar and wind will continue to increase for a very long time at their present very high growth rates, and these growth rates will increase from their very high levels if the price of the fossil fuels continues to increase from their present very high levels.
    We are not going to die due to lack of energy. We may die from fighting over the last barrel of oil, though, if we continue to elect idiots and ideologues.

    " We may die from fighting over the last" windmill and solar panel.

    Hi,

    I hope solar, wind and water are able to continue increasing.

    If you get a chance, track down David Brin's short story The Postman. One of the interesting speculations of the short story was what would happen to all the little survivalist refuges outfitted with windmills and solar panels during a major collapse of civilization. Brin suggested that they will be fought over until they are all smashed in a desparate chance to control them. It's not a pretty prediction.

    While some may criticize his predictions as mere speculation, look at what happens to property during civil wars when order breaks down and KAOS reigns. Look at the pictures of the former Yugoslavia from the 1990's with it's burnt out buildings, smashed and wrecked cars, downed powerlines, ripped up roads and railroads, hungry dogs and mass grave sites. In combat situation, property a shield. At -40 below, fine chippendale furniture and ancient tomes burn all so toasty for keeping one warm. And when folks are hungry, men and women both will kill and women become prostitutes. And speaking of sex, are people in poverty able to afford/find/use condoms. NO! Do I need to go into what is happening with AIDS infection rates in war torn subsaharan Africa?

    My hope is that the people will be rational enough to allow first rationing and then mobilization at the early stages, and finally wholesale lifestyle changes at the later stages to get through this crisis. We have had a history of rationing and mobilization. I think we can change our lifestyles but it will take time and leadership. And as this is America, if the lifestyle shift occurs, it will be with a lot of grousing, complaining, carping, whining, stamping of feet, redbaiting, threats and scenes of violence.

    The alternatives is letting lose the 4 horsemen.

    Projections regarding the total amount of energy available globally between the year 2007 and the year 2200

    If this projects until 2200 why isn't fusion power included at least as a plausible estimate. And how exactly does solar power peak and decline? In 2030? What exactly happens to the Sun in that year that suddenly drops off the power output? Does this refer to the ability to manufacture panels? Because we certainly aren't going to run out of mirrors and salt.

    It wouldn't take that much to do all of this with solar already.

    Honest questions. Not trolling. Just not getting the peak in solar.

    If this projects until 2200 why isn't fusion power included at least as a plausible estimate. And how exactly does solar power peak and decline?

    That's the Uncertainty.

    Nassim Taleb has made a recent career highlighting this kind of thing, but uncertainty was also the theme of the GAO peak oil report.

    For what it's worth, Taleb observes that you can't make a projection to a year like 2030 (or 2200!) without knowing all the inventions between now and then. You'd really have to sit with a blank piece of paper, invent everything, and then stitch it together into a future-history.

    You ask about fusion and solar. Those might break through, or not. And so might some inventions that reduce our need for energy. Or not.

    The GAO's conclusion was that uncertainty argued for action, insurance against possible negative events.

    I think that's rational. A "pick" for a far future peak ... IMO less so.

    One could ask basically the same question about the entire renewables category--no growth at all from 2050 to 2200 for solar, wind, wave, tidal, and geothermal? I could (almost) buy hydro, biomass, and biofuels topping out, for the commonly cited reasons, but not the others.

    Actually, in 2200, we'll have almost no fossil fuel at all: probably just a little dirty, expensive coal. Producing all kind of metals (steel, copper), silicon, concrete will be much more expensive than now. I suspect that windmills will again be made of wood, and produce mainly mechanical work to grind corn and pump water. We have really no good alternative to fossil fuels for some key usages !

    With all due respect. No one knows anything about what life will be like in 2200.

    We have really no good alternative to fossil fuels for some key usages !

    What? Really? The coal we burn now is burned to make electricity, which you can get from solar power; a great alternative to coal.

    "Solar power systems installed in the areas defined by the dark disks could provide a little more than the world's current total primary energy demand (assuming a conversion efficiency of 8%). That is, all energy currently consumed, including heat, electricity, fossil fuels, etc., would be produced in the form of electricity by solar cells. The colors in the map show the local solar irradiance averaged over three years from 1991 to 1993 (24 hours a day) taking into account the cloud coverage available from weather satellites." Note that current solar panels have an efficiency higher than 8% (more than double that, in many cases). For more info and details on the sources, see http://www.ez2c.de/ml/solar_land_area/

    So what?

    If you put together all oil and NG wells, coal mines, hydro and nuclear power stations in the world they will result in a dot which will not be even visible on this map. Yet these provide 99% of the energy we use in this planet.

    You're not thinking? Oil and NG are FFs, non-renewable. Used once, they're gone. The energy's in the bond. We break the bond to get the energy. All the king's horses and all the king's men won't put hydrocarbons back together again.

    So are there renewable sources of energy on order of what we are using today? Yes, and the chart gives an estimate of what area it would take. Can we do it?

    We'll see.

    Don't preach on me please.

    I just pointed out that this picture proves nothing. It does not prove that solar power world can be done, even less that it will be done. There are many technical, economical and infrastructural problems of doing it - even more than against fusion.

    Painting a picture with dots on it makes it look way too easy. Humans are not some kind of gods, painting black dots on Earth from space.

    duplicate

    Sorry I won't preach.

    More problems than fusion? okay, if you say so. Gotta go to a meeting.

    There are many technical, economical and infrastructural problems of doing it - even more than against fusion.

    Oh yes, they're very comparible...

    Solar technical: Available off the shelf today. Basic electrician stuff to put some on your roof.
    Fusion technical: They've been promising break-even, in the lab, for decades. It's way past rocket science.

    Solar economics: 2-3x too expensive roughly. Predicted to reach equivalence with retail electric rates by 2015.
    Fusion economics: You can't buy it today at any price.

    Solar infrastructure: Distributed power actually simplifies infrastructure. Fewer cross country high voltage lines needed because the power is produced closer to the usage.
    Fusion infrastructure: Besides the continuing need for the HV lines, the rest is truly unknown: waste disposal, security concerns, economics, scaleability,...

    Don't preach on me please.
    ...
    Painting a picture with dots on it makes it look way too easy. Humans are not some kind of gods, painting black dots on Earth from space.

    Kind of cranky, aren't we? He answered your question and last I knew, dots on a map had no particular theological connotation.

    So hypothetically, if crude oil were to completely disappear off the energy map in 2020, what's your answer to filling that energy void? Surely someone who has such strong anti-this and anti-that points of view must be pro-something?

    So far noone has explained how we are going to run a solar society at night or shall we say after 6 pm. Large scale and efficient energy storage is the major bottleneck of both solar and wind.

    The bottlenecks of fusion are mostly economical (cost-related). There are some technical problems but nothing that would stop it from working. Hell, there are working fusion reactors now. If they pour several trillions in it we could have it in a decade or two... but I don't recommend this. Fission and solar energy would be cheaper and are more promising at this stage IMO.

    Fission & solar: That seems like a reasonable medium term approach.

    Working fusion reactors: That's true, but nothing break-even, as far as I've heard.

    Solar at night: off-grid systems manage that now with batteries. Of course then that makes the costs higher than grid-tie systems. I'd hope there'd be a better storage solution if we went much more heavily into solar.

    Interesting to note, by the way-- solar and fission have similar problems with regard to needing a good storage solution. Fission is good for base load, but if fission were to provide more than base load, we'd need storage. I don't know if fusion will have that (hard to quickly ramp-up and ramp-down) characteristic or not.

    The problem with all alternative energy sources is that their costs will creep up as the higher cost of fossil fuels makes its way through the economy - which makes EROI the most important factor. Nevertheless, solar, wind, and thorium breeder fission reactors may be the only realistic alternatives we have for the medium term (20 to 100 years out).

    "The problem with all alternative energy sources is that their costs will creep up as the higher cost of fossil fuels makes its way through the economy "

    "Report to Congress on Assessment of Potential Impact of Concentrating Solar Power for Electricity Generation"

    http://www.nrel.gov/csp/troughnet/pubs_research_development.html

    Excerpt:
    "The cost of electricity from CSP was currently in the range of 10 to 12.6 cents/kWh, and costs could be reduced to 3.5 to 6.2 cents/kWh by 2020 without new research breakthroughs."

    Duplicate

    So far noone has explained how we are going to run a solar society at night or shall we say after 6 pm.

    We have been spoiled by having all of the energy we want available 24 hrs/day. As solar becomes the main thing available, we are going to have to adjust our lifestyles and our economy around its availability.

    First and most importantly, we are going to have to adjust our lives to accomplish as much as we can during daylight hours. (Daylight is one form of energy not included in the above analysis, by the way. It won't be depleted, either.) Except for hospitals and emergency services, it just might not be possible to provide much artificial light after dark. Forget about shopping after dark. Industry will have to go back to a single daytime shift unless it is a continuous process that is so expensive and infeasible to shut down that the cost of nighttime lighting is worth it. Much industry will convert to daytime batch processing, though, powered by concentrating solar reflectors.

    Households could use those wind-up lanterns to provide a minimal amount of interior lighting during the early evening hours, and people could use those wind-up flashlights if they have to be outside after dark.

    We are also going to have to match a whole range of other tasks to available sunlight. Laundry and dishwashing and bathing will have to be done in late afternoon or early evening after solar water heaters have warmed the day's batch of water. The main hot meal of the day will be ready at the end of the day, after it has been cooking in the solar oven all day; we'll mostly be eating soups and stews and casseroles, too, because that is what works in solar ovens.

    Rail transport will run during daylight hours and be idle at nights. If you are traveling a long distance, your trip will be a series of daily hops, staying each night in the "station hotel".

    There will be rechargeable batteries to allow operation of electrical devices after dark, but these will tend to be device specific, just as they are now: radios, laptop computers, shavers, cordless power tools, etc. PV panels will supply the power to recharge the battery packs each day, and then battery packs are swapped out each night. The cost of a battery bank to keep an entire house running all night will be prohibitively high for most people. Maybe a small battery pack to keep the refrigerator running would be affordable; or maybe people will just have to adjust to keeping the refrigerator door closed after dark.

    (What about wind, hydro, tidal, geothermal, biomass, etc.? I am assuming that they will be needed for all the other essential things not mentioned above, plus to provide backup on cloudy days.)

    Obviously, what I am describing is a less prosperous society with a much lower per-capita GDP. At this point, I take that as an inescapable given for our future. The above is probably as good a way to cope with that fact as we are likely to get.

    I suppose people could just go on a rampage and kill each other instead. The above seems to me to be a more reasonable and desirable alternative, though. . .

    And we might find living with nature is okay, and we may in fact be happy...

    Below quote from the excellent Mother Jones article Reversal of Fortune yields a clue:

    "A sampling of Forbes magazine's "richest Americans" have identical happiness scores with Pennsylvania Amish.

    LevinK, you might give it a look.

    It's practical to heat a house with solar thermal in today's world. It's cheaper than using oil or electricity. Of course, that's a fact which is not widely known, but which will become much more obvious as the oil runs out. If humanity were to stop wasting oil running around in big gas guzzlers, we could easily make use of the oil which is left to build solar systems. You are correct, however, that the main reason this is not being done is economics. There are so many subsidies toward continued use of oil and other FF's that the advantages of solar thermal remain hidden to the average guy--including you.

    E. Swanson

    My question is how do you chage people's behavior to stop using non-renewables before peak production? This is one qustion that I can't figure out and everyone here seems to have an answer soooo...

    Sorry to be redundant, but if the energy is not exported, it can't get to importing countries. I think that this is the fundamental mistake that most energy analysts are making.

    Following is a copy of a post on the Drumbeat thread, showing the ELM versus a real life case history.

    Export Land Model (ELM) Versus the Indonesia Case History

    Indonesia was very similar to my ELM, since Indonesian consumption was about 50% of production, at peak production.

    From peak production to the final year of net exports, the ELM shows a decline rate of 28% per year, although the year over year decline rate accelerates with time.

    The decline rate in Indonesian net exports from 1996 to 2003 was about 30% per year, but as the ELM suggested, the decline rate in net exports accelerated with time, although they did show a one year increase from 1997 to 1998, because of a slight increase in production and a decline in consumption.

    The ELM assumes a 5% decline rate in production and a 2.5% rate of increase in consumption.

    From 1996 to 2003, Indonesia showed a 4% decline rate in production and a 4.1% rate of increase in consumption. From 1999 to 2005, Indonesia showed increasing consumption. I believe that their consumption declined in 2006.

    The year over year changes in net exports were as follows ELM/Indonesia:

    1996: Peak Production
    1997: -13%/-16%
    1998: -14%/+7%
    1999: -17%/-16%
    2000: -19%/-20%
    2001: -23%/-32%
    2002: -30%/-50%
    2003: -39%/-73%
    2004: -65%/Net Importer
    2005: Net Importer/Net Importer

    This is what my simplistic ELM suggested, to-wit, that the decline rate in net exports will accelerate with time.

    IMO, the problem that exporters will have, in trying to curtail domestic consumption, is that cash flows from export sales will, at least initially, be increasing even as exports decline--because of rising oil prices.

    Export Land Model:
    http://static.flickr.com/97/240076673_494160e1a0_o.png

    BTW, the reason that I chose a relatively high production decline rate for the ELM (5%) is that so many of the top net exporters are, based on the Hubbert Linearization (HL) models, at relatively advanced stages of depletion--especially the top 5 (accounting for about half of total world net oil exports).

    Arkansawyer

    Worldwide peak population scenarios will all end up below
    the Original Point of Takeoff.

    Every parabolic curve hitting asymptote and rolling over
    does so.

    I agree that it is more likely that we will end up below the Original Point of Takeoff. The question is when?

    There is a long term trend line which is defined by any data set. We are well above that trend for all energy products, and certainly for human population, easily beyond three standard deviations from the mean (trend). The trend line will always be close to the Original Point of Takeoff, so it is almost axiomatic that we will fall below the trend line, and in a much shorter time frame than it took to travel from the Takeoff Point to the peak.

    My own view is that Clugston, while providing a strong overall framework, is overly optimistic. Forget the math; when does a system disintegrate as smoothly as it integrated? Once a critical part of the system fails, smooth is out the window, and crash is what you have. (Think of some of the air crashes caused by the failure of just one subsystem; the rest of the plane functioned properly, but it still crashed.) Without sufficient oil, can we extract coal at the levels Clugston calculates? What about other resources that are reaching problem levels?

    The fundamental issue is the industrial age and the population it supports is not a sustainable system. The industrial age could disappear in just a a few decades, not a few centuries, with the end result of a lot of the energy Clugston is counting being left in the ground and human population rapidly crashing, much earlier than most would be prone to imagine.

    Yes, you raise a good point.

    Much like Climate Change, the feedback loops in our society that will (and are) start(ing) with the decline in our primary energy source may well override all current predictions, and we might see things spiral out of control much faster than we hope.

    "You can never solve a problem on the level on which it was created."
    Albert Einstein

    Henry wrote:
    Forget the math; when does a system disintegrate as smoothly as it integrated?

    Historians and archaeologists often downplay the suddenness of historical changes like the Fall of Rome, which occurred over hundreds of years. (Doesn't Tainter say something like this?)

    But previous civilizations were based on agriculture and not as tightly integrated as we are. So, I think I agree with you Henry, that we subject to low-probability high-impact events.

    I just don't see how one can model these for a complex systems.

    In the interest of sanity, I think it's important to begin with a conservative base case, using reasonable assumptions. Get some consensus behind that, then begin talking about tipping points, runaway feedback loops, etc. This seems to be what the climate change scientists are doing - a similarly complex problem.

    Bart

    I believe that is important to limit assumptions, particularly the level or depth of assumptions.

    It is a foible of the human brain that while a scenario wrapped around a probability does not change the probability, but it does change our perception of it. It makes the probability more believable.

    If we don't want to trick ourselves like that, we have to stand back. We have to stop when we hit a solid uncertainty, and not use a 'plausible' assumption to break through it.

    Now, is "ultimately recoverable oil" a solid uncertainty?

    And to what degree do all of the dire scenarios in this thread break through that uncertainty by making assumptions?

    PS - Note that if you do take "ultimately recoverable oil" as a solid uncertainty, it takes all the fun out of peak oil. It becomes kind of meaningless to go to peak oil sites every day to read new scenarios, "refined" with more layered assumptions.

    Actually, ultimately recoverable oil only makes a small difference to PO in the short to medium term, since PO is concerned primary with flow rates/extraction rates. If there were 2 or 3 times the oil out there beyond what we know about, that would change nothing in the next 10 years, little in the next 20, but things to a greater extent in the long term (assuming we could find it all fairly quickly).

    "You can never solve a problem on the level on which it was created."
    Albert Einstein

    Can you see where you made assumptions, to work your way past "ultimately recoverable oil?"

    To be precise, certain mathematical models hold that "If there were 2 or 3 times the oil out there beyond what we know about [...]"

    Now, those models (especially the traditional Hubbert models) have been tested and have worked in the past. There have also been occasions (for nations or regions) where they did not succeed.

    But I think this proves my point pretty well. The way to make our way past an uncertainty is to make assumptions about that uncertainty. If you don't want to do that, the "peak oil" movement is probably not for you.

    (FWIW, I understand that Hubbert's methods have worked and that is a very real possibility that they will work again, on a global scale. But the difference between a possibility and well-understood probability blocks me from continuing on, using Hubbert's method (or similar) as a foundation.)

    odograph writes:
    the difference between a possibility and well-understood probability blocks me from continuing on...

    Problem is, odograph, we have to make decisions in a world in which most of the important stuff consists of possibilities rather than well-understood probabilities.

    Door number 1 or door number 2? The Lady or the Tiger?

    Policy makers have to act under certain assumptions about oil and energy supplies.

    Fortunately, I think we understand much more about things like peak oil than is apparent at first. For example, that there will be a peak in conventional oil production in the next 0-25 years. Both peak oilers and the skeptics in the oil industry seem to agree on that. That is already a significant understanding, even if there is uncertainty and debate about the exact date, numbers and shape of the curve.

    We also know, for example, that changes to the energy infrastructure will be difficult and expensive. By accumulating these bits of information, I feel a consistent picture emerges with a high probability.

    I agree that not everyone wants to deal with the web of probabilities involved in thinking about the future. On another post, you say that even without having recourse to a crystal ball, you advocate energy efficiency and conservation for other reasons. That's an important point. Politically, what counts is to find agreement on a common program. Whether we agree on the underlying reasons is less important.

    Bart

    Surely you can see the difference between looking at the 'uncertainty' in future oil supplies, and a line graph of future oil supply (or population!) out to the year 2200.

    Put another way, does the Tiger/Lady story usually resolve the issue by assuming a tiger at that door, and the next, and the next, and producing a fine plot of the results?

    Hello odograph,

    General comments about your skepticism towards long-term forecasts.

    1. Human beings have to make forecasts - maps in our head of what the future will be.

    2. You too have a map in your head. You too make assumptions. It's just that your assumptions are perhaps not explicit, and more in line with the conventional worldview.

    A metaphor. You are driving next week to a conference in Atlanta, Georgia. Although you've never seen the place, you consult maps and make assumptions that there will be restaurants and places to stay. There will be gas stations and streets will correspond to the map.

    As long as conditions are stable, then it's business-as-usual and your assumptions are well founded.

    In contrast, imagine yourself going to a business trip across Europe to Berlin in 1938. If you have been following the news, you know that conditions are more uncertain and dangerous than usual. If you are wise, you question your business-as-usual assumptions and take precautions. You don't waste time trying to specify exactly what will happen with a high degree of probability.

    In retrospect, we think that anyone would have seen what was coming in Germany. But that is not at all the case. There were the signs then as there are now. However the signs were ambiguous and humans are creatures of habit and inertia. Besides, most of the time, things don't change that much.

    The big problem comes when we pass from one era into another: from stability to uncertainty/change. What makes sense in one era is suicidal in another.

    The key message of Chris's post and many other thinkers is that the next few decades are a crunch time.

    On the one hand, rising population and consumption. On the other hand, a peak in oil and energy resources coupled with a degradation of natural ecosystems.

    Looks to me like a period of instability ahead.

    Bart

    I say:

    "Surely you can see the difference between looking at the 'uncertainty' in future oil supplies, and a line graph of future oil supply (or population!) out to the year 2200."

    And you reply that everyone makes forecasts?

    Yes, everyone makes forecasts, but not everyone makes them correctly, and certainly not everyone attempts them for decades or centuries hence.

    Note that good old Nassim Taleb's 'The Black Swan' has a 52 on Amazon book rank. It could be that 'limits to prediction' are gaining visibility.

    Though, even so, it is possible that people with a strong belief in 'far predictions' could flock together, and reinforce each other's assumptions.

    People who don't buy into that will probably by and large leave them alone [as I start creeping for the door].

    Enjoy discussing "Mexico: A Nation-State Dissolves?" or whatever, but I'd say catch yourselves as you say it's "denial" that is blocking acceptance of those predictions.

    odograph,

    Yes, I understand very well the difference between "difference between looking at the 'uncertainty' in future oil supplies, and a line graph of future oil supply (or population!) out to the year 2200."

    I think this is beside the point. You have mounted an attack on the idea of predictions as a whole, which I am addressing. I don't believe that you have responded thoughtfully to my arguments.

    You are questioning not only me and others on the thread, but the whole idea of thinking about the future. On this, you are on very weak ground. Corporations, military organizations, governments all do long-range forecasting.

    If you are going to question the practice, at least read Paul Saffo's Six Rules for Effective Forecasting (Harvard Business Review):

    The goal of forecasting is not to predict the future but to tell you what you need to know to take meaningful action in the present.

    The most perfidious form of forecasting is maintaining that one does not do it. One accepts conventional assumptions, conventional attitudes, without questioning them.

    Are you able to list your assumptions and ideas about the future? If not, your actions reveal them. For example, do you save money or invest in things? (shows your predictions about inflation). Do you advise people to invest in more energy-efficient appliances, transportation and housing (shows your feelings about future fuel prices/availability). Do you have a large number of children? (shows your faith in government and private provisions for the aged).

    The only thing more error-prone than making predictions is thinking that you are not making any predictions at all.

    Bart

    It is not strictly correct to say that I am attacking forecasting. I can accept scientific forecasting. That is, data driven analysis that (huge indicator) produces finite probabilities and error bars.

    Do you have that, for your solar energy in 2050?

    Or is that prediction built upon deep assumptions? It would be fairer to say that deep assumptions are what I am attacking, the deeper they are, the more I find them to be (as I say) deeply irrational.

    The rest of your post is best answered by a read of The Black Swan. I read 50 to 100 books a year but I seldom find one that click with what I am experiencing so well.

    In that book, you'll learn that corporations and the military are not using forecasting with quite the same expectations you imply ... especially the military. Late in the book Taleb shares his surprise that the military, who [he] expected to be wedded to convention, were with him on the pervasiveness of unpredictability.

    odograph:

    It is not strictly correct to say that I am attacking forecasting. I can accept scientific forecasting. That is, data driven analysis that (huge indicator) produces finite probabilities and error bars.

    Thanks for the nuanced remarks, odograph. I can agree with much of what you say, or at least I can understand it. I have heard about The Black Swan and will look into it.

    My outlook is shaped by decades of reading history and science fiction. One justification for science fiction had been that it teaches you mental flexibility - an ability to adapt to change. You get used to seeing multiple possibilities, alternate universes, without necessarily being wedded strongly to any one of them. P.K. Dick is my hero, if that means anything.

    History shows how dramatically societies do change, and (at times) how quickly. In history, you will not find data driven analyses with error bars.

    If I remember, your background is in science or engineering? In those fields, that sort of forecasting makes sense. But for social change and complex systems? I don't think so. If you are arguing against a false certainty in those fields, then I would agree with you. And I would especially go along with the idea that deep psychological and social factors distort our thinking about the future. But I would argue that we have no choice but to think about the future, all the while being subject to wishful thinking and errors.

    Anyway, maybe this is a good place to stop. This is a fascinating subject for discussion, but perhaps we've said all we can say in this setting.

    Bart

    OK, but don't forget Gilbert. He makes a bit in his introduction about us, as humans with our frontal lobes, being separate and apart from other animals in our ability to think about the future ... our fascination with the future.

    Note that I didn't say our accurate abilities to predict the future ;-). We may have a partial ability, and we may be overplaying it at times.

    Since I'm off again (maybe I'll be back in another six months or a year), I should leave a note for clarity.

    When I said "deep assumptions" I was really using shorthand for deeply-nested assumptions (though deeply held assumptions also are a factor).

    I think it is really important to see the decision tree behind a far future prediction. A Hubbart-style graph (core "Peak Oil") only tells us production, and not how markets or societies respond to it. To get from there, through responses in conservation or alternate energy, one must make assumptions, deeper and deeper, until you arrive at your 100-year future outcome.

    That's why it's easy to pick out the "solar output" from the article above as an illustration. There is no calculation one can do today, based just on solar output or investment, to tell you the result then. You have to make assumptions. Not one, but many: from the future advancement of technology to the future levels of investment or regulation.

    Happy trails all ... I'm going to get out and paddle a kayak.

    BTW, I found strange resonances between 'The Black Swan' and Gilbert's 'Stumbling on Happiness.'

    In the latter Gilbert makes the case that we constantly make small (and sometimes large) predictions to please our 'future selves.' And I'll quickly note, the book is principally about how we so often get these predictions wrong.

    Anyway, presented with a lunch menu we make a small prediction about what will make us happy 5 minutes from now (balancing perhaps with our waistline a month from now) and order the Tuna. It isn't a huge prediction, we make it on seat of our pants. Five or ten minutes later our 'future self' receives the tuna and is either happy or sad.

    Gilbert has a lot to share about things like that, predictions like that, but interestingly he does not come down from his perspective on the side of prediction!

    He basically says, if you want to know how happy you'll be with the tuna (or the job, or the retirement plan) don't try to "predict" it. Instead, he says, ask someone who's doing it. Their experience will be better than your prediction.

    Humans, he says and not me, are lousy at prediction.

    duplicate deleted. -B

    Westexas,
    I think your Export Land Model is very significant and predicts a strong influence that (unfortunately) we in the U.S. (and elsewhere) will be feeling (to some degree) in the ?near? future. However, based on the level of discussion of the ELM, I get a feeling that it hasn't sunk in in many people's minds yet.
    Perhaps if someone can present this in terms of an Import Land Model (i.e., how bad would things get if we had to function with only (say) 30% of today's oil usage levels? Would we all have to make do with only 30%?.. or will (say) the Midwest be "cut loose" so that the rest can function with 55%?).
    I apologize for the overly depressing subject. I too am trying to deal with it.

    I get a feeling that it hasn't sunk in in many people's minds yet.

    I agree, and I think that is is partly because the ELM concept--even in Peak Oil circles--is so scary that people inevitably go into denial mode (even to some extent, yours truly).

    Consider two recent case histories, the UK and Indonesia. The crash from peak production and peak exports to net importer status, seven years and eight years respectively, actually occurred faster than the ELM, which was nine years.

    We are going to do a preview of our Net Exports article in late September, with the final report delivered at ASPO-USA. Based on Khebab's preliminary model runs, it will not be a pretty picture.

    Up until last weekend I used to get almost all denials whenever I brought up Peak Oil. Then (on Labor Day weekend) I mentioned it to a few people I know who are historical re-enactors who really get into their historical research. It surprised me that they didn't go into denial. I asked a bit and their reply as to why they weren't in denial went along the lines of, "heck, I spend half of my life in the 19th (or 18th) century right now; no big deal if the other half was there too." So now I have (a lot more) people I can talk to.
    Personally, I'm more worried about how rapid the transition period will be. But at least I can talk to these people.
    I don't know if this provides some kind of insight; I'm still trying to figure this out.

    I'm really looking forward to your report in Houston at ASPO October 17-20th. At which session are you reporting?

    At any rate, your ELM model may be entirely too optimistic. And with the US importing over 2/3rds of our oil while the US foreign policy seems purposely designed to alienate the rest of the world, it seems very likely that other countries will be more than happy to help the US experiment with adjustment on a speedy basis.

    There's really not going to be much choice. The billion barrels in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve isn't going to last long with our imports being over 5 billion barrels per year, just as our military won't go very far if we are fighting the whole Middle East for oil. We would definitely be able to set the producers on fire, but we certainly can't produce and transport the oil to the US. We don't even own the tankers and the crews are not American. Bob Ebersole

    I think that I am speaking on the afternoon of 10/18.

    Apparently, I will be participating in an energy conference on 10/17, at the center of All Western Learning & Culture--Texas A&M University, in College Station, Texas.

    It seems to me that the ELM model is pretty realistic and has a reasonable accuracy. Whether we annoy/encourage other countries to withhold/export more oil to us in the future belongs to an entirely different (political) model.

    Good Luck with your presentation Westexas!

    Good work.

    I see a modelling mistake in not including some factor for the "Law of Receding Horizons".

    Since Coal, Nuclear and Oil sands are apparently making up the losses for conventional oil. Coal and Nuclear are not liquid fuels(discounting CTL), and the production costs are skyrocketing ALREADY for all three of these resources.

    It may be difficult to model these effects, but without them, a pure capacity projection post-oil peak, is possibly flawed.

    While I think it is a great eyeopener, I think the reality is that PEAK ENERGY is less than a decade away.

    Chris C's post is superb indeed!

    The messy parts of this in the real world involve the ways in which we humans tend to self-sabotage.

    We've struck a mortal blow to the habitat which supports us already. Rather than understand this and engage in emergency action to heal the planet, we are mostly engaged in war for resources and misallocation of resources once we have them.

    Piles of smoking military vehicles, weapons, and the other rubble left by war do not come cheaply, in terms of human life and suffering, energy, or dollars.

    So the self-sabotage may be decisive in terms of cutting most of our species off from whatever resources are left.

    This might be a good thing for the rest of the species on the planet, but not so good from the standpoint of most of us humans.

    It is no fun being way out on the limb when it breaks off because we exceeded the carrying capacity.

    Given the fairly high probability that the human race is either doomed to extinction or at least a very miserable existence, perhaps the only hope is that we don't take the rest of the species with us. And why are we so fucking important, anyway? We are clearly incapable of rationally planning our future and, therefore, will suffer the inevitable negative consequences. In our present form, we are not only unnecessary but positively toxic.

    I agree about the receding horizons. My modest excel play-model tries to take this into account via feedback loops (less available energy means less new production). In this scenario the global energy peak comes around 2020, with a steep drop after that (close to zero around 2050). But the population peak will lag by at least half a generation because of delayed feedback. But it won't be pretty..

    Of course, being just a model, and a crappy one at that, it could be totally wrong. Has happened before :)

    Jay

    "If we lose the forests, we lose everything"
    - Bill Mollison

    It could be wrong? You said yourself it is crappy. Can you explain why nuclear, hydro and renewables decline?

    Arkansawyer

    They're all MegaProjects and as Credit is collapsing now

    (See CPDO's default),

    the energy to construct will not be there/here.

    Collapse and Power Down are the only options we have.

    Tipping Points have been reached.

    Think of Housing and instead of retrofitting the home,
    even as
    the owner has to take out a loan, they decide to expand it.

    I am fascinated by the discussion of economics on this site. My impression is there is a lot of money managers trying to figure out what to invest in or trying to promote what they have invested in. Am I wrong? Why is it that half the discussion on this site is about housing.

    2007 Tom Breidenbach

    "Why is it that half the discussion on this site is about housing."

    Because "Housing" has been the Engine of US Growth
    since 911 and the DotCom Bubble.

    And the DotCom Bubble was covering for '87 Crash and the
    1990 Recession which came out of the '85 Bankruptcy of the US.

    All related to Elimination of the Gold Standard by Nixon.

    Which came at the US Domestic PO.

    Housing has therefore engulfed all previous Bubbles.

    All Debt has been rolled into it.

    Something like $415 Trillion in Derivatives.

    (See Fed urges Banks to match up derivatives)

    But now it's too late.

    Once Collapse (in SIV's (Synthetic Investment Vehicles)
    begins, you have to run faster to catch up.

    Housing is ushering in the Long Emergency.

    Derivatives are zero-sum games. You quote a huge figure that scares the s*** out of people but it is largely meaningless.

    The only reason the figure is so large is the 'bet' of a derivative contract is leveraged as the movements in the underlying assets are normally so small. If there was a massive collapse in the underlying asset class, the 'loser' in the contract would simply go insolvent if they can't pay the 'winner'. Some hedge funds would lose, some would win and some would get nothing. While it would cause financial instability, it is not the start of the apocalypse.

    It is potentially much worse than you describe because of the risks associated with insolvent counter parties and the ugly side of leverage.

    Take the hypothetical situation where I am the manager of an otherwise solvent hedge fund(based on a balance of available capital, and winners in excess of losers in my "prudently hedged" derrivative book). The market burps and a significant number of the counterparties to my winning positions default. As this point my otherwise solvent hedgefund also be insolvent as I now have valid losers / liabilities and valid but now uncollectable winners / assets. Obviously the more leverage I have used the more likely I am to be have been wiped out by a few percentage points worth of net defaults.

    At this point, if my fund has become insolvent the cascade countinues with my fund playing the role of the problem counterparty.

    If this situation occurs on a small scale between a couple of obscure entities (and confidence in the overall system is not shaken) these defaults are in a big picture sense only a minor problem. However if the counter party exposure or improperly hedged positions overwhelms something like (just for example) J.P. Morgan, the game is over except for a painful post mortem and the cost to the taxpayer.

    IIRC the exposure of some of the big players expressed as "at risk" position is a large percentage of their capital. Also, IIRC the "at risk" models do not account for massive counter party defaults, which are IMO the most problematic aspect of over the counter derivatives and often inadequately quantify the probablity and impact of unusual market conditions.

    "Derivatives are zero-sum games. You quote a huge figure that scares the s*** out of people but it is largely meaningless.

    "

    Really? And your Big Number is what?

    $1.2 Trillion?

    That SubPrime Bonds are given the same AAA
    rating as risk free US Treasuries is
    no big deal?

    Just a start here on synthetic (notice this
    word) matches.

    From Mish:

    Feb 07-

    Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae both got into trouble with accounting irregularities in part because of the complexities under GAAP rules of accounting for derivatives positions and rules determining which assets should be reported at market and which should be reported at amortized historical cost. Sound risk management practices require that GSE managements base decisions on market values, or estimates as close to market as financial theory and practice permit. The reason is simple: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pursue policies that inherently expose the firms to an extreme asset/liability duration mismatch. They hold long-term mortgages and mortgage-backed securities financed by short-term liabilities. Given this strategy, they must engage in extensive operations in derivatives markets to create synthetically a duration match on the two sides of the balance sheet. These operations expose the firm to a huge amount of risk unless the positions are measured at market value. ....

    Now to you:

    The only reason the figure is so large is the 'bet' of a derivative contract is leveraged as the movements in the underlying assets are normally so small. If there was a massive collapse in the underlying asset class, the 'loser' in the contract would simply go insolvent if they can't pay the 'winner'. Some hedge funds would lose, some would win and some would get nothing. While it would cause financial instability, it is not the start of the apocalypse.

    Again:

    If there was a massive collapse in the
    underlying asset class, the 'loser' in the contract would simply go insolvent if they can't pay the
    'winner'.

    And one more time for clarity:

    "...the 'loser' in the contract would simply go
    insolvent."

    Watch KKR, First Data, and WaMu for details.

    Megaprojects are indeed a problem. Money to finance them is certainly going to be a problem, and maintaining the industrial base on the required scale may be a problem.

    However, there are a lot of renewables that are quite feasible to build and maintain on a small-scale appropriate technology basis.

    The materials required to build and maintain solar water heating panels, passive solar heating devices, solar ovens & dehydrators, etc. can all be made from metals and glass that can feasibly be recycled over and over again. The facilities to melt down and re-fabricate the materials can be done on a relatively small scale. (Not as efficiently as in large modern factories, mind you, but it can be done.)

    PV panels would be a bigger challenge, of course. Whether or not we can succeed in retaining anything of our industrial-age civilization may very well hinge upon whether or not we can maintain the capability to manufacture PV panels at an industrial scale. If we can't, then it is indeed back to the pre-industrial era.

    Generators for wind and hydro would be a similar challenge, though they are a bit easier to build. Pre-industrial water and wind powered mills are of course possible to build, as long as there are still trees around.

    The small hydro turbine designs of MHyLab of Switzerland have been built in machine shops with as few as 5 employees. CNC machine tools required though. Modern, high efficiency designs, 1 MW and smaller turbines.

    Alan

    Can't comment directly...but one thing is REPLACEMENT.

    I think most (informed) Ontarions have seen the issues with refurbishing Nukes...very expensive (before the law kicks in) and not guaranteed to work as we have a couple of nukes taken offline effectively permanently due to problems in refurb.

    Hydro is another...eventually these plants built 50 years ago will need to be refurbed...and some will just have to be closed due to costs, safety, environment.

    Renewables will need maintenance too...if, after 20-30 years you need to replace components...and they are too expensive or not available...goodbye capacity. This is a personal worry for my own solar and wind systems.

    Wind and solar are built mainly from recyclable materials. Stuff like steel and aluminum and silicon.

    You can use the energy created by wind, solar, and tidal to do the recycling.

    (I would assume that most of the materials used for tidal/wave energy production will be recyclable.)

    At the least, we aren't likely to run out of the raw materials for making new steel and aluminum as soon as we will with oil.

    That is great...but it is about the big(ger) picture...

    Those recycled materials need reprocessing, transport(a couple times), packaging, and then installation.

    If OIL-->transport fuel prices go up, then so do all the prices of these items...we are seeing it in action NOW and it isn't any better because these are renewable generation products.

    Once they are built and in place, I love them. But it isn't about what I like, the facts point to EVERYTHING costing more, and most likely substantially, as we move farther past PEAK OIL.

    Believe me...I wish it weren't so.

    You are doing a kind service answering these questions. However, I wish folks would just pick up a copy of Limits to Growth: The 30-year Update.

    OK, so there's steel in that wind tower. And copper in the windings.

    It's time to replace that rig with whatever is new and improved.

    The tower gets taken down and transported back for recycling with an electrically powered vehicle.

    The metals get melted down in an electric furnace.

    Then the metals get reformed in a plant run by electricity.

    Finally the new components are transported back to the site by the electrically powered vehicle that hauled them away in the first place.

    All that electricity is supplied by panels and windgens and whatever other generation systems we have devised.

    --

    Packaging? Right now we seem to be moving away from the intense use of Styrofoam to thin plastic air bags when possible. And to formed wood pulp when not. The plastic can be made from corn starch which makes both packing materials "green".

    --

    All stuff (at least most stuff) will get more expensive as cheap fuel disappears. But as that fuel increases in price the incentive to find clever ways to replace products with non-petroleum products will increase.

    Perhaps we will all experience a small decrease in "expendable funds" when this all plays out. But at the same time, don't forget that basically everything gets cheaper over time as we invent less expensive ways to get jobs done.

    Look back at what has happened to the cost of TVs, computers, cars, etc. over the decades.

    My parents paid ~$600 in 1960-something dollars for their first color TV. You could get a much, much better TV these days for a couple hundred 2007 dollars.

    When I graduated from high school (1962) a VW Beetle sold new for $1800. That's about $12,000 in today's dollars which would buy you a much, much better car. You'd even have a heater that would keep you warm.

    Computers? My first hard drive was 30 megs. Not gig. Megs. Paid $3,600 for it in the mid-'80s. I can now get 400 gigs for $85. Do the math.

    We may find that after a period of discomfort while we transition away from petroleum that our standard of living will be even better than it is today.

    It is the silicon PV chips that worry me. The rest of the stuff can be melted down and refabricated on a relatively small scale, using mostly ca. 1900s technology. If we can't maintain high tech industries that can keep churning out PV chips, then we are indeed back to the middle ages - at best.

    Take a look at this page...

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_cell

    Zip about half way down to the "Light-Absorbing Materials" section.

    Looks to me that we won't run out of raw materials for a while. There are lots of alternatives.

    And, all we need to do is manufacture enough solar panels needed to produce all the electricity new solar panels. At that point we can ween ourselves from the petroleum teat.

    (We've most likely got more than that in service at the moment.)

    First 'set' produces the power to build a second set. Now you've got the ability to double output, and keep doubling, without any further dinosaur power.

    Someone in Omi magazine, several years back, described an automated solar panel plant. One run totally by robots, including robotic sand scoopers and robotic recovery vehicles when the scoopers break down.

    Sounded remotely feasible at the time. Close to a "need" now.

    Was that the plan for a lunar solar program?

    there was an older NASA plan which included a Solar furnace used in The Robotic Lunar Colonization Project

    http://www.gothlust.com/lunarproject.html

    I don't believe so. I remember it as a "we could do this, right now, in Arizona/Australia (or somewhere similar).".

    What the author painted was an interesting picture of a self-sufficient factory where (essentially) all the labor was provided by robots/robotic vehicles.

    GPS-guided trucks moved raw materials from the desert into plants where desirable elements were extracted and converted into new solar panels. All the power for the operation was provided by the initial (startup) panels.

    When we look at the recent DARPA advances in driver-less vehicles and the advancements we've made in robotics the idea doesn't seem to me to be too fantasy-based.

    When/if we were to set up a plant such as this it seems to me that we would enter a phase of decreasing energy costs.

    If the only inputs are free/cheap - solar energy and widely available raw materials - we would greatly undercut oil, coal and nuclear.

    I've now ventured way out of my knowledge pool. Perhaps I'm talking smoke.

    But it seems to me that we should be looking past a panic response to the oil crisis and looking for ways to move back to a time of 'cheap' energy.

    We're going to have to make a shift away from current practices. Why not make one that will greatly benefit those who follow us?

    what about 19th century solar projects? could we not use solar powered sterlin engines? We would not have access to coal and that could be a major problem in terms of Iron Smelting. It takes approx 25 KW hrs/Kg for Aluminium electrolysis as posed to 1.3 KW hrs/Kg for Iron using coal.

    "in the Paris world’s fair of somewhere around 1890 a parabolic heater was used to melt steel, and the British in the late 1800’s built a very larger solar concentrator-steam plant in Egypt. The technical solutions have been around for a long time." [1]

    "In 1910 Harrington erected the first solar storage device of 19 m3 capacity. A solar driven pump was used to pump the water to a storage tank, which was 6.0 m higher. Schuman, an American engineer from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, built the first flat concentrator. Later in 1913, Harrington collaborated with Boys to install the biggest solar power plant ever built in Meadi, (south of Cairo), Egypt. The plant provided irrigation water from the river Nile ([Jordan and Ibele, 1956]). The next large solar plant would not be built for another 63 years." [2]

    [1] http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/06/26/2115/
    [2] http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V50-49H6SK3-2...

    Hi Bob

    While aluminum is abundant in the earth's crust at approximatly 25/kwhr/kg to smelt via electrolysis it may not be readily available.

    However Solar furnaces may be be use extensively to melt steel[1].

    [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_furnace

    The reverse is actually the case; Aluminum is far more readily avaliable than steel when fossil fuels are absent because of simple chemistry. Aluminum electrorefining only consumes carbon in the form of sacrificial graphite cathodes, while iron ore requires coal to scavange the excess oxygen out, and must by design burn more coal than you get steel out. There are some that are researching molten oxide electrolysis for steel production, but its not been successful yet.

    Now sure, solar furnaces can possibly be utilized in the recycling of iron or aluminum, but for primary production, aluminum is far easier, and its readily apparent that we wont be running short of electricity produced by wind, nuclear or perhaps even solar. The reason steel is cheaper than aluminum now is because coal is so damn cheap.

    This is what World3 does with feedback loops. Is your model much different that that one?

    I am a bit surprised this article didn't go into delayed feedback loops for population and explain how even renewables decay, need maintenance, and with much less primary energy even a renewable infrastructure will face a decline.

    At least that's what I would expect the models to show. Be interesting to understand where estimates of maintenance costs come from, e.g., rates of metal fatigue, rust, entropy...

    This is what World3 does with feedback loops. Is your model much different that that one?

    Not much different except mine is just a "sketch" in excel. Gotta learn some serious modeling with real tools..

    - Jay

    "If we lose the forests, we lose everything"
    - Bill Mollison

    How about we say that Peak Energy FROM CURRENT SOURCES is less than a decade away?

    This article does a great job of telling us why it is so important to increase our ability to produce energy in alternative ways and simultaneously reduce our energy needs.

    Clearly there are alternatives that might pan out, and fairly soon.

    40% efficient solar seems to be here. We've got two (apparently) demonstrated technologies. Now we need to redo the numbers for solar. Making panels 5x more efficient frees more money for dark-time storage.

    And tidal/wave is perhaps the least developed "green" source (trailing wind, biomass, and solar. Here's an article about where tidal/wave is today and where it seems to be heading.

    http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/9/9/23226/57294

    I'd like to see this article get wider attention. There's information that should be a wakeup for a lot of people.

    But, perhaps, pitch it along the lines of "Time to Get Busy. Very, Very Busy Creating New Power.".

    I am the first to hope for better technology, low cost and quick to market.

    My only concern is that the law of receding horizons takes effect at or around OIL peak, IMO. Since that is approx. 2005(so far), and we see its effects already in the Oil sands, drilling rigs, ashpalt cost, etc.

    This technology gets hammered by the laws effects as well...so, its payback will be reduced, and time to market extended, and possibly hampering production capacity as well.

    Overall effect still hard to model. Just pointing out the issue.

    Humans, in general, are very incapable of acting to avoid future problems. We seem to have to mess our nest before we will admit that we really need some other place to poop.

    Peak oil, drastic price rise in oil and all the things that require oil for their production and distribution will most likely be necessary to get the world moving.

    I think I see the world moving now. I look at the advances in solar power, the maturing of wind, the breakthroughs in battery design, the venturing into wave/tidal power, the decrease in power used by various devices and see signs of the great battleship, Earth, starting to change course.

    Global warming, which was recognized some years ago, has now become a major factor in many people's thinking. Lots of people are now very concerned. This will help the flow of existing capital (and governmental funds) toward solutions.

    We need wider distribution of the sort of doomsday scenario set forth in this article to speed the directional change. IMHO.

    How about we say that Peak Energy FROM CURRENT SOURCES is less than a decade away?

    Exactly. This post should have been titled: "When is global peak FOSSIL energy? Probably sooner than you think so start building lots of renewables already"

    Bob, you nailed exactly why I thought this piece was important and provocative. I don't agree with everything in here either, but it's better than anything else I have seen on the topic (though I agree with the points that this might be better titled "peak global carbon-based energy"), it uses good extant data (with the exception of the Skrebowski and peak oil data that is still under dispute, which I'd like to see be gamed out down the tree a bit...), and it takes on a tough question.

    There's a lot of effort in this post: Chris clearly discusses his data, methods, and assumptions, which means you can clearly replicate and criticize him on those bases--and THAT is where progress can be made on this line of thought. There's a lot of room for improvement, but there is in any piece worth its salt and that has a question worth answering.

    It's a good beginning, but it is just a beginning. There's a lot of room in here for thought exercises and assumption questioning...but that's how it works! As Euan said somewhere in this string (and I am paraphrasing), there's a lot to be desired in these data, and there's some assumptions in these assumptions. :) Ok, so build on this and IMPROVE upon it. That's how science worked, last I checked.

    Simply put, the normative points I take away from this are: a) if there are alternatives, they need to get past the incubation phase and have an EROEI that matters post-haste, and b) we need to be talking much more than we are about conservation, even with a lot of evidence pointing towards Stuart's recession scenario.

    Chris,
    - Check BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007 for gas energy numbers. They are higher than your source, and comparable to known oil reserves.

    - The nuclear sources you use apparently don't count for advanced fuel cycles. It is unreasonable to assume that future generations won't develop a workable breeder design, and fuel reprocessing technology. You should find there are about 500-1000 years of uranium to provide current total demand of ~15 TW.

    - Your solar assumptions are just wrong. Check Stirling Solar and other CSP suppliers for EROI and cost estimates.

    - The world can indefinitely sustain 6 billion people.
    Just not this 6 billion. It seems to me that an advanced culture of nuclear/solar physicists capable of maintaining a renewable energy/recycling infrastructure would also be capable of using birth control. The challenge is to start teaching kids the science necessary (and stop teaching the superstitions)to develop such. Our leaders have no intention of doing this for us.

    I was just about to make the same point.

    I am frustrated with people talking about peak uranium, it is utter non-sense. The reason reserves of uranium are low is there had been little exploration up to 2003. Since then the proven uranium reserves have increased drastically.

    Now, as the previous poster said, breeder reactors and thorium change the picture further. Not to mention Nuclear FUSION.

    Right. Utter non-sense.

    Mining companies have no incentive to explore for Uranium when they have plenty for the foreseeable future and when they know that finding more is not going to result in more reactors being built.

    That kind of mistake or apparently politically motivated misstatement discredits the entire analysis.

    I appreciate the effort and believe it is good to raise the issues addressed in this post even if I don't agree. My basic counter would be the solar argument that has been made above.

    But I have to weigh in with my opinion on the population issue. Don’t be offended, it is just an opinion. The fact that population growth is considered a primary issue by many people is an example of the human mind grasping at concepts the mind can understand no matter how irrelevant. World population is already leveling off and population decline is a much larger issue in the developed world. More importantly, for example, China is not growing by population but is increasing consumption of all types by 10% a year. Economic growth is the problem not population growth and in my experience children are close to a universal humanizer. Even having children doesn’t drive most to think in the long term – imagine how short-term and selfish people would become with no responsibility to the future. My opinion – keep having those kids.

    Daniel

    Daniel-

    I finally registered after months of reading to respond to your comment. Population is not an irrelevant question. Population*consumption per capita ~= resources used (simplified for brevity). Reducing the population through widespread access to reproductive health services is much simpler and cost effective than convincing billions of people to cook with solar, use an electric scooter, shut down their AC and go vegan.

    In the US, half of all pregnancies are unplanned. One quarter are unwanted, if we eliminated those unwanted conceptions through free and universal contraception the US birth rate would drop to 1.78 births per woman. This would still leave the US with an expanding population due to immigration but on a worldwide scale the population must come down. Rapid depopulation through wars and epidemics are not effective, the population rebounds almost immediately unless alternatives to forced breeding are offered.

    In many areas of the world reliable contraception is not available and couples are having babies they can't care for. These extra children increases the community’s need for immediate resources and prevents them from investing in modernizing infrastructure that would shield them against disaster.

    Starving and ill children are something that should be prevented in any case for the sake of human compassion. Large families generally correlate in most of the world with ill health for the entire family and high infant and maternal mortality.

    You blithely say "keep having those kids" as if it's a painless and pleasant pastime. For millions of families it is an unavoidable and unaffordable drain on their money, health and time.

    Any solution to peak oil, global warming and poverty will depend on wide or universa

    Dear CMDC,

    I am absolutely thrilled that my post got you to register. I disagree with very few of the points you made. Contraception should be free everywhere in the world – children should be wanted. Particularly in the third world population growth is leading to desolate and desperate lives.

    I think you missed my point though. In the first world and many other places, consumption, not babies, is the primary factor behind non-sustainable growth. Until we hold in contempt those who consume simply for the sake of status, there is no answer and this planet will die.

    I want to reiterate the sociological point I tried to make; men in particular need children. These countries that are aborting female babies (China and India) and creating an extreme excess of males who will be without mates, terrify me. Probably not a coincidence that these two countries are racing to adopt unsustainable growth as an ethos.

    Daniel

    Daniel,

    On the off-chance that you're still checking this thread; I agree that in the consumption equation in the US, X (consumption/person) is larger than Y (population). However, I do think that it is probably easier and more cost-efficient to give people the tools they need to do something they already want to do (control their family size) than to convince people to find other ways to prove their social dominance.

    On the over consumption topic, one approach I've considered would be to value possessions according to man-hours contributed instead of resources consumed. This has been adopted by other societies in the past (Aristocracy of Feudal Japan).

    Ideally we would not attribute status according to possessions. I attribute the need to "keep up with the Joneses" to intense social inequality. The way you are treated depends on others perception of your status, particularly if you are part of a minority ethnic or social group, and people tend to treat those they consider non-elite like crap. So people naturally try to get ahead with obvious social markers of status. If we had a flatter social hierarchy and treated everyone with respect, these markers would be much less important.

    Non-elite depends on the community, they can be labeled ignorant, poor, having bad taste, white trash, insert any way of discrimination that occurs in a society.

    I had an experience that made me realize the importance of markers when I was a student. I traveled to the Philippines, suddenly I went from being treated like a student (not bad, I didn't have any problems) to being treated like an important, rich person purely because I'm white. I dressed the same, I acted the same the only thing difference was that my skin was a visible (positive) marker. It was really disturbing. Ever since then I've paid a lot of attention to how people react to markers. I recommend it, it's fascinating.

    Any solution to peak oil, global warming and poverty will depend on wide or universal access to contraception.

    CMDC -

    Your comments appear widely underappreciated here, based on the lack of response your post has generated. Please consider continuing to post, and perhaps also providing a guest contribution.

    "It seems to me that an advanced culture of nuclear/solar physicists capable of maintaining a renewable energy/recycling infrastructure ..."

    It seems to me that we already have at least one advanced culture among us - the Amish. Maybe their lifestyle is what we should teach our children, then science (especially neuroscience and behavior).

    jm,
    Please post any evidence you have that Amish society is sustainable, because I sure can't find it. This reference

    http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/tahb/2002/00000029/00000002/...

    for example states that Amish fertility was 7.7, and that the community population was growing exponentially, even with considerable attrition of young people leaving to join the outside world. These "expats" are of course then supported by the same fossil-fueled technologies as the rest of us.

    If the surplus Amish population had nowhere to go, their communities would reach the Malthusian limit very quickly.

    It has been pointed out before but I'll say it again; applying the word surplus to people is more than just rude.

    half full - You ask me to provide evidence that Amish society is sustainable because you can't find it, while you assert:

    "The world can indefinitely sustain 6 billion people"

    which suggests you haven't read much about sustainability. But if you have, please give me your definition before I go through the hundreds of possible references only to find we're talking apples and pears.

    Yes Amish fertility is high (but not nearly as high as you quoted from your one reference that looked a little-studied Amish sect). But the Amish society consists of about 200,000 people, so they, while concerned about over-population, have a lot more time too choose what they will do.

    The key is that the resource load per capita for the Amish is an order of magnitude smaller than that of the average OECD member per year across resources. That lifestyle may support 6 billion people, but ours won't.

    "even with considerable attrition of young people leaving to join the outside world"

    Actually the young are returning to Amish society at higher percentages than in the past. The Amish encourage their children to move from home for a few years to allow them to decide if the Amish way is right for them, as well as to explore the world for a possible spouse. For this data and more look here.

    HalfFull,

    The scary thing is the earth can very likely permanenently support a population of 12 billion, just not very well. The population of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh is approximately 1/4th of the population of the earth, and they are supporting all those people on a land area thats less than that of the Continental United States.

    The obvvious answer is to help the people of the developing world leap-frog fossil fuels to a post-carbon life style. There are 1.6 billion people in the world who do not even have electricity. If we would spend just a thousand dollars per person per year in getting every village a low impact electrical generator like small wind turbines and microhydro, and get every family an inexpensive computer and sn internet link, it would be cheaper than the combined military and security expenses of the world.

    Most children in horribly impoverished areas go to the equivalent of a Madrassah if they go to school at all. They learn superstition because that's whats available, not because their parents are rich enough to make a value judgement in favor of superstition. Their city cousins want inexpensive transportation, they'd certainly take an electric bike over a gasoline motor scooter if the governments of the world unite to get rid of internal combustion engines by banning their construction and new sale. The same with cars and trucks-construction of electric rail in a country like Niceragua with no railroads whatsoever would permanently enrich them and allow them to totally bypass fossil fuels, while making enough jobs in the peasant villages to keep their population from being forced to become illegal emigrants because of their lack of hope and rural starvation.
    The practical benefits would be immense, people in educated prosperous countries limit their family size, and the desperately poor countries are the places with the highest population growth. And people with hope don't get in wars nearly so often. Since the Marshall Plan enriched Europe the only serious civil war or foreign war was in Yugoslavia, where the Marshall Plan did not reach.

    The whole problem is a mental attitude. If the doomers would spend a tenth as much personal energy on trying to enrich others as they do on hoarding ammunution the world would quickly and permanently change to a better place. We'll run out of energy and everything else unless we start helping the rest of the world to leapfrog fossil energy and all of us conserve. But it really can be done, and cheaply compared to the alternative.

    Bob Ebersole

    Bob,

    This is one of the things I like about all the wheeling and dealing is solar right now. Yes, there are complex financial set ups that look a little suspect. Much of this has to do with accelerated depreciation. But, putting a bunch of solar up on the Walmart stores with ten year power purchase agreements is going to provide a whole lot of solar to countries that have little electricity now in about a decade. At the end of those purchase agreements Walmart is going to want better panels at a cheaper price and Morgan Stanley is going to want the write off for sending what is being replaced off to Hoduras since it will be hard to sell here. The current deals that make solar something that saves money have leapfrog pretty much built in. Our stuff is going to stay on longer most of the time, but if people move and take the system with them, they'll get a new system and the old one will go off in the same direction. It does not take much electrification to make schools much more effective since it opens up a few hours for study.

    Chris

    The population of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh is approximately 1/4th of the population of the earth, and they are supporting all those people on a land area thats less than that of the Continental United States.

    But if the Himalayan glaciers go away, the subcontinent will be a disaster.

    Anyway, I very much agree with the general thrust of your post.

    Your "Optimistic Scenario" fails to consider many of the measures that I have been advocating for the USA. i.e. much greater increases in efficiency and much higher rates of increase in renewables "while we can".

    R-40 to R-100 levels of insulation (depending on local climate) for all new construction, with a move to ground loop heat pumps and solar hot water heating (some space as well).

    Retrofit existing construction to a good % of those levels. Tankless gas hot water heaters where solar is NA.

    Maximum buildout of Urban Rail with resulting TOD effects.
    Shrink travel demand and transform VMT to walking, bicycling, NEVs ( http://www.gemcar.com ) and Urban Rail.

    Make electrified rail the dominant form of intercity freight and majority of passenger travel.

    Make renewables 75% of North American electrical grid and 25% nuke (or 70/30 or 67/33).

    Do likewise elsewhere.

    Best Hopes,

    Alan

    Chris: Great post- an overview of the global energy situation is always useful. With all the talk of solar, it is always shocking to be reminded of how tiny its contribution to global energy currently (1/290 that of oil).

    It would be interesting to me if you took a look a how your calculations change if you include a 19% growth rate for solar and a 28% growth rate for wind. Expected short term growth rates (few years) are higher than these figures since costs for these sources are falling while costs for alternatives are rising. A simulation with growth rates around 60% would also be interesting.

    Thanks,

    Chris

    The underlying assumptions are make believe.

    Garbage in and garbage out.

    There is no reason for nuclear power to peak, especially no reason for it to decline to almost nothing by 2050.

    =====================
    http://advancednano.blogspot.com

    Oh, yes, there are..

    We only have 70 years of reserves of conventional U235, and less if it is to grow in the next future.

    There is no insurance that breeders will ever become economically viable, and the growth rate of breeders is limited by the breeding yield (big problem for a fast development).

    Nuclear power will become increasingly expensive with fossil fuel depletion, because most of the cost is not in the fuel but in the building of the plant: and it will be most sensitive to an increase of commodities cost (iron, copper,concrete) expected with fossil fuels depletion.

    etc...

    Where are you getting your U235 figure from? I would appreciate a link if you have it.

    My understanding is there has been a substantial increase in reserves since 2003 when mining companies actually started to explore for uranium again. Further more, I understand geologists consider uranium to be abundant.

    Your point about cost is absolutely correct, but energy is going to be getting more expensive what ever we do. So we will be using it more efficiently or less of it and it will be taking up a greater portion of our income.

    The cost point is important. People talk about receeding horizons as fossil fuel gets more and more expensive, but not often is it recognized that the receeding horizon is caused by the alternative energy source have an EROI less than oil/nat gas. The lower the new energy source's EROI, the further away the horizon is.

    Nuclear energy, OTOH, has a better EROI than wind or solar. If you want to talk about how much your next GW of energy capacity will cost as oil gets more expensive, I say it'd be smart to realize that, from an EROI perspective, nuclear is likely to be the cheapest option.

    The IAEA/OECD says about 85 years of proven reserves.
    http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/uranium_resources.html

    That is at about $50/lb.

    The fuel cost of uranium for electricity production is about 0.45 cents/kwh.

    http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/quickfacts/quicknuclear.html

    This is the cost for the finished fuel rods.

    That is at about $50/lb.

    Its trading at triple, the reserve base for that price floor is far higher (over ten times as high), and this is before anyone even bothers to do any exploration, which hasn't been done in decades.

    This is the cost for the finished fuel rods.

    Most of that cost is wrapped up in enrichment and fabrication:

    http://www.uic.com.au/nip08.htm

    At triple the contract uranium price of $53, you still end up with less than .7 cents per kw/hour.

    Not mentioned is the possibility that exporters will no longer see a need to short the market. Where is the incentive to increase production in a rising price market? That's like trying to convince people to sell their stock when the price is rising. Unless the price is set to fall... thus a rising price, self fulfilling feedback loop - house prices anyone? - can set in, and maybe already has. If demand destruction doesn't exceed depletion rates it can be somewhat stable in a macabre way.

    I'm pretty convinced that the boogeyman is resource nationalism. That's why the USA is transfixed to the point of stupidity over Iraq, Iran, Venezuela and any other exporter with a functioning nationalist government. When you need to extort another 15 million barrels each morning to get you through the day, the job description is clear.

    Lately, the desperation is also clear. Rather than blame the political leadership, I blame the public for its shortsighted hypocrisy. There is no law preventing people from voting Green or organizing any sort of political entity they want, or investing in solar power instead of Exxon Mobil. But the history has been to elect them and then blame them as if they were public whipping boys for our sins. We are victims of our own hypocrisy.

    You can say that again.

    Cris , thanks for building that platform to view the problem from.

    One thing the view suggest to me is that because of ecological degradation much energy is required, like Alice would say, 'to just stay in the same place'. One could also look on this as an increasing amount of 'friction' in the machine and the resultant loss of 'useful' energy, would you mind commenting on this?.

    Chris
    Thanks for your effort to put peak oil in perspective.

    1) Use Current Solar & Wind Growth Rates for conservative
    Strongly recommend you incorporate current rates of growth for wind and solar. Your 5%/yr values appear ultra conservative. e.g. current solar and wind growth rates are 30% to 40% per year.

    2) Model in War Time Footing effort for optimistic
    During national emergencies, major effort can be focused on survival. On a war time footing, production increases of aircraft of 200% to 1200% per year have been demonstrated. I.e., solar and wind will likely be far higher than your ultra conservative 5%/year.

    Strongly recommend using 100%/year growth for solar and wind till they provide all the energy needed, for war time footing projections.

    3) Incorporate energy conversion rates of at least 30% for solar thermal and photovoltaic.
    e.g., Energy conversion rates of 40% for PV have been demonstrated, and 50% for solar thermal have been published.

    4) Renewable Transport Fuels
    The critical issue is focusing on making transport fuels using solar and wind. Key to these are the sources of carbon. There are numerous paths possible ranging from coal to biomass, and potentially to limestone as needed. The energy cost of carbon is well less than 50% of the hydrogen needed.

    e.g., See:
    http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/aafsd/aafsd_list_of_tables_aircraftequipment... Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (World War II), Aircraft and Equipment, Table 79

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_aircraft_production_during_Wo... United States aircraft production during World War II.

    Type of airplane Total 1940¹ 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
    Grand total 295,959 3,611 18,466 46,907 84,853 96,270 45,852

    But...but...if he uses such growth numbers for renewables, Doom will not be the conclusion of the study!

    using the Fischer-Tropsch process[1] we can even obtain unlimited amounts of liquid fuels. It may be much easier to transport diesel than electricity especially across oceans.

    One major issue however is that up to 75% of the energy is lost in the conversion from electricity to liquid fuel.

    If you then burn the diesel in a car engine that's only 19% efficient at best it all adds up to a VERY expensive fuel. even with 40% efficient solar cells [2].

    [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fischer-Tropsch
    [2] http://www.spectrolab.com/prd/terres/FAQ_terrestrial.htm

    Chris - the best I can say about this post is that it shows Duncan's Olduvai theory in true light. I prepared a post similar to this one some months back and pulled it becuase I was uncertain of my data.



    Chris Clugston, optimistic scenario

    I note you favour peak C+C in 2007 (not 2005?) but also quote Skrebowski and Campbell as influencing your work - and both of them see peak in the future - OK they mix in NGL and Syncrude in their numbers.

    These are Skrebowski's new capacity figures in his 2007 update:

    2007 4.6 Gbs
    2008 4.4 Gbs
    2009 5.1 Gbs
    2010 4.0 Gbs

    http://www.odac-info.org/bulletin/documents/MegaProjects_Feb2007.pdf

    This is more than enough to compensate for decline of 4.5% per annum in C+C+NGL. The main question is, can you back up your peak oil 2007 position?

    I need to join the chorus above pointing out that there will likely be a massive expansion of nuclear - conventional fission, breeders and more complex fuel cycles and eventually fusion.

    What's more, as already pointed out the Sun spews out more energy than we will ever be able to consume. With eroei for wind of around 20 and direct solar reported to be around 40, the notion that these will not undergo massive expansion in a fossil solar depleting world is quite simply absurd.


    Concentrating Solar Power Guest post by Gerry Wolff posted by Chris Vernon.

    Energy from Wind: A Discussion of the EROI Research Guest post by Cutler Cleveland, posted by Nate Hagens.

    Finally, I always feel that those who forecast a massive die off shoudl be obliged to present a model for how this will occur. I happen to agree that the world population must stop growing at some point and that decline will likely follow. Famine is my favoured mechanism. What's your's?

    Disease, viral and bacterial. Death by Pestilence.

    Euan said:

    "I need to join the chorus above pointing out that there will likely be a massive expansion of nuclear - conventional fission, breeders and more complex fuel cycles and eventually fusion."

    I'm also compelled to join the chorus. We have not exploited Liquid Metal Breeder Reactors (LMBR) mainly because they are extremely dangerous. However if we were willing to live with that danger after a peak energy crisis then LMBRs could provide energy for centuries. Also, there are other breeder reactor concepts that might work and are much less dangerous than LMBRs. I've been an advocate of nuclear fusion for most of my life but I'm now a skeptic. I don't see how any derivative of the very expensive International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) design could be commerically competitive against more prosaic energy sources like solar, wind energy, ocean thermal gradiants, etc. Like many good ideas, nuclear fusion initially showed great promise but the technical difficulties later uncovered became show-stoppers.

    Great going Euan your succinct 'model' of famine for population control makes Olduvai look to me like a walk in the park. Our increasing population will use all the energy it can get it's hands on to survive and in the process make the planet so striped bare and degraded that eventually the last leaves of grass will be eaten and the last twigs of the trees used to cook them with.

    We will leave this planet a ball of stone spinning in space ... as the Grateful Dead spoke of so many years ago.

    Euan and John,

    Population declines due to wars and pestilence are not permanent. Most (if not all) European populations recovered from the bubonic plague (both times) within two generations and resumed their exponential paths.

    Also, you're awfully glib about billions of deaths. What makes you so fatalistic and dismissive?

    Resources is a whole other kettle of fish. Read the example of Easter Island population collapse as a frightening example. The only thing that gives me hope is that we have the technology to prevent uncontrolled breeding. Whether we have the sense to do it is the question.

    - Any solution to peak oil, global warming and poverty will depend on wide or universal access to contraception.

    The thing that anti-correlates most closely with fertility is the level of education in women. Get past secondary education and fertility rates go way down. Standards of living also go up substantially. Feminism is the key to stabilizing population.

    My question was actually directed at Chris, who it seems has not turned up for the debate.

    I agree that presenting charts that show billions must die are simple to produce but more difficult to explain.

    I see famine as the most imminent threat. I have only superficial understanding of population dynamics and demographics. The poor countries have more generations per century, higher birth rates, higher death rates - and escalating populations. To halt the rise of human population will require something truly cataclismic. As Mdsolar writes below, fertility I think will have a major role to play - but not necessarily through the education of women. My feeling more likely through some unknown biological control or behavioural control - shock and awe. That will inevitaby leave us with an even more ageing population.

    Has anyone seen "Children of men"

    http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0206634/

    Ultimately disappointing - but thought provoking along the way.

    Global food stocks I think are in need of our attention.

    As one who has posted one of those charts, I'll give you my underlying rationale.

    It's helpful to think of human carrying capacity as coming in two forms, food and social, where "social" includes things like shelter from the elements, medical services, sanitation services, protection from lethal threats etc. The part of the global carrying capacity related to food is pretty fixed on a per-capita basis (say 2000 to 3000 calories per day), while the social part varies all over the map depending on the wealth of the nation. Both these loose groupings will be affected by energy decline, but in different ways.

    The earth's "food" carrying capacity has been declining significantly ever since WWII, as soil fertility declined (now down world-wide by perhaps 30%), we depleted the fresh water and we ate the contents of the oceans. Essentially we have been in overshoot but have been insulated from the negative consequences by the use of oil and gas, particularly in agriculture. As the oil and gas available to a nation decline, it will be increasingly exposed to the effects of the eroded underlying carrying capacity.

    In addition, an increasingly volatile climate over the next two decades and after will limit harvests due to droughts and flooding. This can be viewed as yetr another reduction in carrying capacity.

    This leads to the question of where the effects will be felt most.

    Rich nations (i.e. the OECD) will be OK for quite a while because they have a lot of discretionary GDP that can be reallocated to the food sector as prices rise. The increasing cost of fertilizer will be absorbed into rising food prices, which we will forgo other spending to pay, for instance.

    The poorest nations will be outbid first in the energy/food marketplace because they have very little discretionary GDP. On the other hand, some nations like those in Africa may be insulated to a degree because their agriculture is not yet as energy-intensive as ours. They will still be hit harder than us, though.

    The nations I think will take the hardest hit are those in a band between these two extremes. They are nations whose agriculture has been remade in the modern industrial energy-intensive model, but who do not have the discretionary GDP to redirect towards that sector as oil and gas supplies fall and prices rise. They will be the hardest hit overall - China, Pakistan and India are obvious examples, along with much of Southeast Asia.

    As oil and gas prices rise, there will be an increasing energy disparity between the rich nations and the poor ones. As the agriculture in the poorer nations is hit first, famine will make inroads into the population. These are typically the nations with higher fertility rates, and the increases in mortality will serve to offset their population growth. The rich nations are already at or below replacement rates, so the fact that their better energy position will not result in a further population drop won't really affect the overall decline rate. The basic decline rate will be set by famine in underdeveloped countries.

    On the social side, similar considerations will hold - all the supports I mentioned are energy intensive, and will be more affordable in low-fertility nations. To make matters worse, the drop in medical and sanitation services will hit those nations that are already weakened by poverty and hunger, and the death tolls will be exaggerated as a result. Unlike their small advantage in agricultural production the nations at the bottom of the scale will have no protection, as energy is a fundamental requirement for the maintenance of these social services.

    One final note: fertility reductions will not turn the tide. Even if we could reduce net births world-wide to 0 over the next 40 years we would only stabilize the population at 9 billion in 2050. This is far too high and far too late to avoid the effects of energy decline. Mortality increases are the only mechanism that will actually reduce the population.

    I really appreciate this sophisticated analysis in response to some very pointed questions from some who are a tad more optimistic than myself (and apparently you too).

    Glider - thanks for this. Do you know of any population modelling software / computer game / interactive web site?

    I'd really quite like to be able to play around with population variables to see what had to be done to achieve a 50% drop over a century.

    A few weeks back I had a quick look around Google - but was confronted by big differential equations.

    Unfortunately I don't know of any. I'm doing it the old-fashioned way, with thought experiments and Excel. If I find one in my travels I'll let you know.

    Euan,
    The "Limits to Growth, 30 year update" CD edition comes with world 3. It included the equations, but don't know if it included source code. You can get it from Chelsea Green

    Thanks.

    "Population declines due to wars and pestilence are not permanent."

    No, they're persistent.

    "Also, you're awfully glib about billions of deaths. What makes you so fatalistic and dismissive?"

    No one even knows what the cause of death is for the majority of the world's population. See here and here.

    I fully support the UN Millennium goals. I believe the OECD should give at least 1% of GDP for 20 years to build local economies in developing nations across the world, and to provide basic medical and hygiene facilities. And education.

    I still believe disease is the number 1 killer that is not reported, and probably will be the #1 killer in the future. Or maybe it's death during childbirth. But who would know?

    *edited* corrected bad url link

    Without being able to back it up with numbers, there are qualitative reasons for thinking this is too optimistic a projection. WT's ELM is one (although he can do numbers). Another is Henry's upthread. Yet another is that what I call virtual peak: in global peak, unlike a local peak (e.g. US), there is no place to go, and oil (along with other resources) begin to zoom in value as they sit in the ground -- and the expense of getting them out of the ground zooms -- and therefore there is more and more incentive to get them out of the ground very slowly, if at all.

    Beyond that, I think a lot of the 2025 peaks are totally unrealistic. One is looking only at the resource itself, not at the constraints on getting it out of the ground -- the water, the NG, the land, etc. E.g. the tar sands, there's no way production will wait to 2025 to peak.

    I saw someone say 2007 (or 8) is the year of peak everything. There might be some truth to that. The peaks do feed into each other in a myriad of ways because of the inter-convertibility of forms of energy (at various prices of course).

    It's a good piece, thought provoking. But at least in my case, the title is wrong ...probably sooner than you think.

    Good post, very informative, thanks. etc.

    Yet:

    Overall numbers and ‘averages’ obscure or even deny the tremendous differences between a US SUV driving soccer mom, and a skeletal young woman gathering twigs or brush to burn to heat food - mashed grain of some kind - for her 5, soon to be 6, children. The disparities are so wide, and their impact on world pop so varied that overall analysis like this must be taken only as a rough guide, perhaps even an alarmist measure that does not apply, or is somehow irrelevant, to the ‘rich’, those who have control, military or otherwise. (Which is how many will take it.)

    Even if deep recession bites the US ‘white’ parents will be able to feed their children long after the death rate in Africa soars beyond all bounds. The proper figures won’t be published, ethnic strife, local despots - US / west supported -, will be blamed, etc. The rich and powerful will take from the poor, as usual.

    For all practical purposes, Global Peak energy is in the past, in the sense that it is anticipated and wars are being fought in function of it. Iraqis were prevented from using their oil (oil for food program, sanctions..) and now are bereft - no proper roads, clinics, water, food, industry, etc. Just one example.

    Thanks for the comments on Chris's article.

    The article and the comments bring up the question about the use of such models. Paul Saffo describes a good way to think about them in Six Rules for Effective Forecasting (Harvard Business Review):

    The goal of forecasting is not to predict the future but to tell you what you need to know to take meaningful action in the present.

    I think it's important to make conservative assumptions on a first pass and make those assumptions explicit as Chris has done.

    Breeder reactors, fusion, major growth in renewables, electrification of transport, feedback loops -- all of these seem to be in the realm of speculation and advocacy rather than observed long-term trends. They are important factors to discuss, but I don't think they should be assumptions in the base model.

    It's important to separate our particular desires and beliefs from observed phenomena, to talk in terms of probabilities and possibilities rather than black/white certainties.

    For example, "if transport is electrified, then the model changes in this way..."

    Bart
    Energy Bulletin

    Could you explain how declining solar energy output is based on observed phenomena?

    In the conservative scenario, Chris estimated 6% growth in solar until 2030, 0% to 2050 and 1% thereafter. In the optimistic scenario, the estimate for solar is 6% for solar until 2050 and 0% thereafter.

    Chris can go into details. In general, he said:

    Longer term “pre-peak” growth rate projections (beyond 2030), “peak” projections, and “post-peak” decline rate projections associated with both the Conservative Scenario and Optimistic Scenario are simply syntheses of the scores of studies, reports, websites, and interviews that I have read and heard over the past year and a half.

    (Note that energy derived from each nonrenewable primary energy source is assumed to peak at some point, and then decline thereafter. Energy derived from each renewable primary energy source is assumed to reach a “practical limit” [peak] at some point, and then to decline or plateau thereafter.)

    What would your estimates be, odograph, and on what basis?

    I would not make a prediction. I consider this an unknown.

    In fact, I can point out that the unknowns are not limited to technology, investment, or social response. The unknowns are clouded by those factors and more.

    Our recent defense secretary caught a lot of poop for talking about "unknown unknowns" but he was probably naming something that would be a good lesson in another context.

    But to be clear, I think it is fairly absurd for anyone to say "In the optimistic scenario, the estimate for solar is 6% for solar until 2050 and 0% thereafter." (emphasis added)

    ... and that's probably why I don't come here any more.

    Those figures of 6% and 0% are for growth, odograph.

    I think that such figures are plausible, based on the fact that it takes energy/resources to harvest solar. If one anticipates an energy constrained future, then it is perfectly conceivable that growth in solar will reach a plateau.

    The intellectual framework for such a view is not original. As Jason Bradford reminds us, much of this was covered in Limits to Growth (recently update). What's interesting about Chris's study, is that he approaches the problem from a different angle, coming to similar conclusions.

    I've looked at several analyses that cover the problem of energy sources in the coming years. The same general picture emerges - namely, a shortfall of energy, especially if one tries to move to away from fossil fuels.

    Bart

    I understand "0%" growth. It means no growth after 2050.

    I also understand the meaning of the word "concievable."

    Can you explain how anyone could present this as "the optimistic" scenario?

    Of the two scenarios Chris presented, this was the more optimistic -- opting for the high side of what he saw as the possibilities. I don't think he meant "optimistic" as in happy.

    I agree that this is not a prospect that seems optimistic from most current worldviews. More important than the label, though, is whether it reflects reality and whether it leads to productive action.

    For me, "optimistic" means that given the likely physical constraints, we will act wisely rather than self-destructively. In order to do that, we need to see things clearly.

    Bart

    I think reality is full of unknowns: known unknowns, and unknown unknowns ... but then I've said that already.

    And for what it's worth, when after thorough analysis something comes up as "uncertain" I think the rational response is to leave it there.

    That means, of course, that I must disagree with those who think "uncertain means no problem," as well as those for whom "uncertain means worst case."

    I think it would be more helpful to ask the question: What is the maximum level of energy that we might FEASIBLY produce on a SUSTAINABLE basis? That should form the most optimistic upper bound for the outyears of such long range forecasts. Once we have established that feasible upper limit, we can then proceed to explore questions wrt to how we get there from here.

    Note that just because a maximum sustainable level is feasible does not mean that it is inevitable. There are any number of doom and gloom scenarios that one can spin for futures below that level. Such scenarios may indeed be far more likely than maximum sustainability could be. However, we might as well have a realistic goal to strive for, however much the odds may be against us. The most useful thing that maximum sustainability as an upper limit can do for us is to put out of bounds those "solutions" that are not particularly helpful in taking us from here to there.

    This is where nuclear runs into trouble. No matter what assumptions you make about uranium reserves, no matter what assumptions you make about breeder technology and the like, the fact remains that nuclear fission is ultimately a non-renewable -- and thus non-sustainable -- technology. That does not mean that I am against any and all nukes. I think that we will need what we have, plus some more, as a "bridging technology" to tide us over while we are building out our renewables infrastructure and our energy efficiency infrastructure. However, given a choice between building more nukes and building more solar or wind, the choice is clear to me: if we can't afford both, then invest in the renewable technology.

    An issue which is coming to the fore in this thread is the question of maintaining and replacing the renewable energy infrastructure. Unless we can maintain an industrial base that is up to the task, then it is true that ultimately a lot of these renewable energy sources will not be "sustainable" either. An important question thus becomes: Can we sustain a sufficient minimal industrial & technological base to assure that we can at least repair and replace the installed renewable energy base?

    Once again, I don't think that the answer is either an inevitable yes or an inevitable no. It will depend upon a lot of things. Is it POSSIBLE, though? Given a WWII War Production Board level of industrial policy, I am inclined to think that it just might be possible, at least for the US and many other industrialized countries. It will be a daunting challenge, though.

    Thus, what we really need is a goal toward maximum sustainability, and a plan to get there. Anything else is really not a particularly helpful contribution to the human prospect. Scaring people to death, and giving them the impression that they have no hope whatsoever, is particularly unhelpful in this regard.

    For what it's worth, while I don't invest in far-future predictions, I do think there are a lot of energy 'transitions' we can and should be making right now.

    We can justify increased efficiency and lower consumption based on:

    1) cost, the savings for your business or your family.

    2) environment, the lower emissions (greenhouse gases as well as 'tradition' pollutants) associated with lower fossil fuel consumption

    3) national security, the decreased energy dependency on 'areas of unrest'

    "This is where nuclear runs into trouble. No matter what assumptions you make about uranium reserves, no matter what assumptions you make about breeder technology and the like, the fact remains that nuclear fission is ultimately a non-renewable -- and thus non-sustainable -- technology."

    Neither is the Sun! The sustainablity of nuclear power is on the same order as the lifetime of the sun.

    http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/progress/nuclear-faq.html
    http://thoriumenergy.blogspot.com/

    You are begging the question when you say "non-renewable -- and thus non-sustainable -- technology." Using your line of reasoning, solar, wind, hydro, ocean energy are not "renewable," becuase they are not sustainable forever either.

    "Thus, what we really need is a goal toward maximum sustainability, and a plan to get there."

    Yes!

    "I think that we will need what we have, plus some more, as a "bridging technology" to tide us over while we are building out our renewables infrastructure and our energy efficiency infrastructure. However, given a choice between building more nukes and building more solar or wind, the choice is clear to me: if we can't afford both, then invest in the renewable technology."

    This is a reasonable position, but it is not a question of affording both. There is no energy solution that is right for the whole country or the whole world. Each country/state/city/individual should decide what is right for their situation. There is no reason to "buy both." This implies building more than what is needed. Sometimes solar is the best choice, sometimes wind, sometimes geothermal/ocean/hydro/biomass... and sometimes nuclear.

    The time to consider more nuclear power was about 20 years ago. At present we should just be concentrating on shutting down aging plants safely. The lead time for nuclear power is much too long to deal with the climate problem and if peak oil/coal is a reality, too long to respond to that either. Claims that the fuel resource is abundant fall down on the slightest inspection. The industry itself relies on breeders to make any growth projection. Nuclear power has had two strikes at bat. One more and it is out. Removing insurance subsidies, which will likely be needed owing to our debt-to-GDP ratio and the risk of insolvency for the federal governmnet in the case of a nuclear accident, also makes nuclear power more expensive than coal. Planning for the rapid end of nuclear power should be a big part of our present energy policy. I think that a number of plants will be getting external review as a result of legislation recently introduced in Congress and I doubt that many of those will pass muster. Additionally, 13 US plants are in tidal regions and need to be closed to cool down before sea level rise makes removing the cores very expensive.

    Chris

    Claims that the fuel resource is abundant fall down on the slightest inspection.

    Bullshit. Show me this slightest inspection.

    Oppose nuclear all you want on political, security, or financial grounds, but the fuel resource scaricity argument is a steaming pile of idiocy.

    The industry relies on breeders to make growth projections. Since breeders are not considered economically viable, this means that there is a resource problem.

    Chris

    Sorry, try again? Like maybe link some figures about reserves and resources at various price points rather than oblique nonsense, which incidentally would be wrong even if it weren't nonsense.

    The 'industry' (whatever that means) doesn't as far as I'm aware of use breeders for making growth projections, and then you make a meaningless conection between the economic viability of breeders and resources.

    Again, you are off fishing for uranium. It is all quite fanciful but since you want to make electric power more expensive, it is not going to work.

    Nuclear power has a low EROEI so going to lower grade ores just makes it even more of a waste.

    What is the EROEI of nuclear? What is your source for the low EROEI? This doesn't even pass the smell test as nuclear fuel costs about half a cent per kwh. I don't see how your being anti nuclear helps you be pro solar; on the contrary, being irrational about any energy source makes you less credible. Lets say a city wanted to replace a dirty coal plant. What are their options? How long would it take to install 1GW of solar power? How long would it take to install 1GW of nuclear? I have worked in nuclear power for many years and I would be very happy if solar supplied all our needs, but I recognize its limitations. If we want energy security, then we will need a mix of energy sources. Could you show us your source for the low EROEI?

    Nuclear plants are good only for base load operation; turn them on and run them at constant temperature and output. They are not designed for constantly varying temperatures & related thermal stresses. (I think the French built two reactors for varying load with "limited success")

    Coal plants can, and are, throttled between 40% to 100%. Except where coal plants supply base load only, a nuke cannot replace coal plant.

    If I were replacing a 600 MW coal plant (about as big as most get) I would build 1.5 MW of wind power, a pumped storage plant of 500 MW or so and transmission between the WTs, pumped storage & load.

    I would not have to wait a decade to start burning less coal, MUCH more reliable power, no spinning reserves (vs. MASSIVE spinning reserve required for nukes, the hidden fossil fuel burned by nukes), likely lower cost and no decommissioning costs (make a nice profit there !) and no century+ long waste fuel concern.

    Alan

    Coal plants can, and are, throttled between 40% to 100%. Except where coal plants supply base load only, a nuke cannot replace coal plant.

    Just because a coal plant can be throttled doesn't mean it makes sense. Most coal plants are baseload because they're capital intensive big things with cheap fuel that it only makes sense to have on all the time.

    If I were replacing a 600 MW coal plant (about as big as most get) I would build 1.5 MW of wind power, a pumped storage plant of 500 MW or so and transmission between the WTs, pumped storage & load.

    Fanciful nonsense. Pumped storage isn't quick infrastructure. You'll rely on natural gas peakers the way coal does. You allready know this!

    I can build the WTs FAST and build pumped storage before you can finish your first new US nuke.

    Nukes REQUIRE fossil fuels for spinning reserve, you cannot get away from that. Wind does not. See discussion below.

    By any measure, my option is better :-)

    Best Hopes for a Rush to Wind (already accelerating).

    Alan

    Wind requires more reserve than nukes, Alan.

    Wouldn't pumped storage work with nuclear also? Additionally, there are a lot of storage technologies developing. It is also entirely workable to build large variable power reactors. They have them on aircraft carriers.

    Assuming 1.5MW turbines and a 30% capacity factor for wind you would need 2200 wind turbines fow 1GW. That may be viable, but it may not.

    Aircraft & submarine nukes gave VERY little in common with commercial nukes. Very small, using VERY highly enriched U.

    Variable output commercial nukes is another new, hypothetical maybe technology several decades away. EVERYTHING inside the reactor has to be designed to withstand repeated thermal cycling hundreds (thousands ?) of times/year for decades SAFELY !

    Hint: Ain't going to happen. No market, MASSIVE expense ( and risk) Nuke for baseload and nothing more.

    Pumped storage can supply the spinning reserve for wind since they do not ALL shut down in a second or so. Even for an individual WT, the rotating inertia of the blades will generate ever smaller amounts of power for a couple of minutes. Plenty of time to start up Pumped Storage.

    But Nukes REQUIRE fossil fuel burning that keeps enough potential generation on-line to replace a sudden shut down of the largest nuke without taking down the grid.

    Pumped storage can shift power from excessive baseload to peak demand for any type generation. But it is spinning reserve for wind and NOT nuke. You need fossil fuels for nuke.

    That is why France keeps burning some FF and stopped building nukes.

    Alan

    It is easy to understand why France has not retired their hydropower plants, but why not replace their fossil fuel plants ?

    All night long France sells surplus nuke power at VERY cheap prices to Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, England, Spain and Italy and others. Yet they keep a steady reserve of fossil fuel plants going. Many are coal plants that keep at about half speed and load follow while providing spinning reserve for the nukes.

    Such is life.

    The USA could NOT duplicate the same % nuke, no one to sell excess night power to.

    Alan

    I agree we should use nuclear for baseload, and I like the idea of wind with pumped storage. Do you have any info on potential sites for pumped storage?

    The coal plant does not have 100% availability (and neither does a nuke, but pumped storage availability is typically 99.9+%, very reliable). And 33% to 35% capacity factor is the right number for new US wind. 1.5 GW of wind is a bit too big for replacing a 600 MW coal plant.

    Bigger is better for WTs. And I forgot to mention that I would pick the tallest towers available for the 1.5 GW.

    Alan

    The answer to both you questions is simple. in 2006 it took 7 months to install 1 GW of PV. Assuming that Calvert Cliffs 3 is not aproved owing to concerns about flooding from sea level rise, in the US, it will be the next aproval process plus 6 year to build. In that time presumably Vermont Yankee and Indian Point will be shut down over poor safety records, so in six years you get -1 GW. There are 14 currently operating plants in tidal areas that will also need to be closed. If that happens within a decade then you get less than -15 GW; some plants have more than one reactor.

    The EROEI of nuclear power is easily estimated to be low. There is an oft cited (on TOD) Australian group that claims a high EROEI for nuclear power. If you read what they write, they subsume the energy cost of fuel enrichment in a very deceptive way. I am suprised that so many here are taken in by this sleight of hand given nuclear power's long history of failing to deliver on promises. To correct for this, we just note that the entire output of three French reactors is devoted to unrianium enrichment and that these operate at about 30% efficiency. Then, using the number of French reactors we get EROEI(enrichment) of about 7. Other energy inputs bring it lower. This brings what they are saying into line with more complete and less deceptive studies, resolving the controversy over nuclear ERORI. It is low. It is therefore very sensitive to reduced ore quality and cannot be sustained beyond 85 years at the present rate of use. Increased use of nuclear power will see viable fuel run out before new plants can recoup investment.

    Chris

    That is for the whole world. I was talking about replacing one power plant. Additionally, are those the numbers for average power or peak power? Usually they are reported as peak power, average power is considerably less. It is still impressive though.

    "The EROEI of nuclear power is easily estimated to be low."

    Ok, could you provide a link to your source.

    This one says the EROEI is 58 for centrifuge enrichment:
    http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf11.html

    So far as I can tell from your link, only electicity used to run the centrifuges is counted. This seems a little odd for a purpose built plant. French enrichment uses diffusion and they are hesitating to change.

    Dezakin provides the link below your post where the claim that nuclear EROEI is 93 is made. As you will see, they are being quite deceptive.

    As to peak verses average for solar, right now we should look at peak since it displaces gas. As it displaces nuclear then we'll want to look at average. The price will be substantially lower then owing to scale. Already though, you can see why California would go with solar. At $1/Watt wholesale for Nanosolar, you are getting 1.7 cents/kWh over 25 years. With changing river flows owing to loss of snowpack, new nuclear would be substantially more expensive.

    Chris

    "So far as I can tell from your link, only electicity used to run the centrifuges is counted."

    I don't know how you can say this if you read the link. It covers the EROEI of a nuclear plant from cradle to grave.

    It accounts for:
    Mining & Milling, Conversion, Enrichment, Fuel Fabrication
    Construction & Operation, Fuel storage, Waste storage, Transport, Decommissioning.

    Did you read the link?

    I did not find an a accounting for the construction or maintenance of the enrichment plant and only a number that appears to reflect electricity used in the process. I also saw some wiggle words close to the top that suggested they intended to hide this.

    Chris

    Oh, yeah. And what about the energy required to make the machines, that made the machines, that built the building, that housed the bird, that swallowed the spider, that ate the fly, that lived in the house that jack built in the hole in the bottom of the sea.

    The EROEI of nuclear power is easily estimated to be low. There is an oft cited (on TOD) Australian group that claims a high EROEI for nuclear power. If you read what they write, they subsume the energy cost of fuel enrichment in a very deceptive way.

    First: Bullshit; The numbers for centrifuge enrichment are well known and agreed upon, amounting to roughly 60 kWh/SWU. This doesn't contribute significantly to the energy budget of nuclear power, and relying on gasseous diffusion plants to grossly artificially inflate the energy cost of nuclear power is disingenuous nonsense, especially when most of the worlds enrichment capacity is centrifuge enrichment and the remaining diffusion enrichment plants are scheduled to be replaced by centrifuge enrichment facilities in a decade.

    Second, even if you were right about enrichment making nuclear power uncompetitive, it wouldn't matter because CANDU style heavy water reactors dont require enrichment at all and are competitive with LWR reactors. The fact that the world still considers LWRs is illustrative of the relatively low cost of enrichment for nuclear power.

    I am suprised that so many here are taken in by this sleight of hand given nuclear power's long history of failing to deliver on promises. To correct for this, we just note that the entire output of three French reactors is devoted to unrianium enrichment and that these operate at about 30% efficiency. Then, using the number of French reactors we get EROEI(enrichment) of about 7. Other energy inputs bring it lower.

    It must be nice to just make shit up.

    I assume this is the australian group that you're talking about:

    http://nuclearinfo.net/Nuclearpower/WebHomeEnergyLifecycleOfNuclear_Power

    Where they actually measure the cost of things like enrichment; Whats your source? Gasseous diffusion plants I assume, along with a host of unrelated nonsense like the meaningless 30% efficiency. While you're at it why not include the lost energy from the original supernova explosion for the energy accounting to skew the numbers even further?

    It is therefore very sensitive to reduced ore quality and cannot be sustained beyond 85 years at the present rate of use. Increased use of nuclear power will see viable fuel run out before new plants can recoup investment.

    Even if you were right about nuclear power having a low energy return because of high enrichment costs (which are demonstrably false) and plant construction (which is also demonstrably false just by measuring the inputs) these are fixed costs per GW that are entirely unrelated to the energy costs of ore extraction. As noted from the university of melbourne's analysis of the Rossing mine in Nambia and the Olympic Dam site (where they measured the energy costs), 1 GW year will extract approximately 100000 tons of uranium from ore at 300ppm (low concentration) which is enough to run nearly 500 1GW plants for a year. Even if the ore extraction costs are ten times as high, you don't even dent the energy accounting for nuclear power.

    You're simply wrong about the notion that nuclear power is in jeapordy because of poor energy return on every front.

    In fact they don't include the energy cost of diffusion (French enrichmnet plants) in their EROEI calculation, they deceptively pool uranium used for diffusion and for the power reactor together. You also use deceptive methods, citing reduced use of diffusion while failing to acknowledge that diffusion dominates the energy input. What is the EROEI of nuclear power? It is low. Citing completely bogus calculations and spinning centrifuge numbers does not change this.

    Chris

    Are you being deliberately obtuse or are you naturally that way?

    No one builds diffusion plants anymore! They aren't even relevant for projecting future energy costs.

    You also use deceptive methods, citing reduced use of diffusion while failing to acknowledge that diffusion dominates the energy input.

    This is rhetorical nonsense. Which are you claiming: That nuclear power currently has a low energy return, or that nuclear power must have a low energy return. The first isn't true even considering the 2400kwh/SWU, but its entirely irrelevant to your original claim (which you provided no references for) that nuclear power is incapable of long term energy supply.

    This has been adressed earlier this year:

    http://www.theoildrum.com/node/2323/165163

    What reference do you want? I mentioned yours and provided a calculation. Did you not know how France enriches urianium?

    Being obtuse is about failing to concede that you have been citing a bogus source. Once informed, you should be rechecking its other particulars. I expect that it is misleading in other ways as well. You should have been suspicious from the beginning when it claimed EROEI of 93. Now you know why this is false, go do a little homework. And, your welcome.

    Lets back up a little. Earlier I asked what you thought the EROEI of nuclear was, i.e. a number, and what your source was. I haven't seen either; you just say "it is low."

    Second, you don't seem to be addressing Dezakins comments about your use of old data.

    I provided a calculation suggesting that it is less than 7 while debunking Dezakin's favorite reference on the EROEI of nuclear power. I don't like to link to the site myself since it is so tainted.

    I feel that I did address his comment. World enrichment capacity is currrently 40% diffusion. Given the numbers thrown around on energy costs, this makes diffusion the dominant energy input for enrichment and it will remain so as long as diffusion is used.

    French conversion from diffusion is being held up and US fuel handling is coming under question owing to safety concerns at the Erwin plant, so his statement about how quickly diffusion will cease are not to be give a large weight. I am using present data while he insists on speculation about the future. Reduces relianace on nuclear power, a distinct possiblity given the risk of a large accident, would end plans for any new enrichment facilities while increase reliance on nuclear power would likely change plans for dismantling enrichment capacity. His speculation only applies to no net increase in nuclear power if issues that are coming up in France and the US can be resolved.

    Chris

    Ok, I can see you are not going to provide a link to a study showing your low EROEI.

    "I am using present data while he insists on speculation about the future."

    I thought that what this post was about...the future. Why you think that we would continue to use old, less efficient technology is beyond me.

    As I say, I provided a calculation. If you see a problem with it please say so. I do not know of a reference which takes this simple direct approach.

    You may read my post to understand why diffusion is likely to remain part of the mix.

    As to your response above, aluminum tubes tend to raise questions all over the place. If you claim that your link is a life cycle analysis, but it it not, you should be pleased to have your misconceptions cleared up. We do not know how much energy is needed to enrich uranium using those tubes, only what is needed to spin them. Aluminum is chosen for its strength and weight, but it also takes a lot of energy to make. The Piketon plant may cost as little as 2.3 billion for a 3.8 million SWU capacity. How much of that build cost is an energy cost? Considering the technical difficulties involved, likely only a fraction, but if the equipment lasts only five or so years, then we are looking at a fraction of over $100/SWU, much more than the cost of 50 kWh. One is left with the impression that nuclear power is just barely scraping along even with large subsidies.

    Chris

    Why then, do so many countries want to build new reactors? I mean given all the legitimate concerns about nuclear power such as safety, security and waste managment, it hardly seems worth it with such a low EROEI. What is it that makes nuclear power worth all the trouble? Please tell us.

    Atoms for peace.

    Why yes....you're right; you see they understand the power of the atom and the EROEI of nuclear. I'm glad to see you are coming around.

    http://world-nuclear-university.org/

    God damn you're persistantly ignorant. You continue to hold onto the crux of your argument, gasseous diffusion, and when thats demonstrably false you start making up nonsense about the energy cost of the construction of enrichment facilities. This game has been played before over and over.

    1) Gasseous diffusion enrichment and nuclear power are energy positive enough (well above 10) to provide energy for everyone (tens to thousands of terawatts) on the planet for centuries as demonstrated from measured lifecycle analysis.

    2) Centrifuge enrichment has measured lifecycle costs far lower than diffusion enrichment.

    3) Enrichment isn't required at all! CANDU and graphite moderated reactors run today that dont require any enrichment and we've developed and prototyped fluid fuel breeder reactors capable of utilizing unenriched fuel, U238 and even thorium.

    Your original assertion has been taken apart repeatedly. You're just making yourself look like an idiot. If you like solar, fine. Ride that hobby horse as much as you want. Attack nuclear on cost competiveness or security if you want! Go on about the atrophy of engineering skills required for a rush to reactors, even, or the lack of heavy forging facilities for things like massive pressure vessels for PWRs and the like. But the energy return argument and fuel avaliability canard is demonstrably a pile of idiotic bullshit and your wallowing in it.

    .

    .

    What is the maximum level of energy that we might FEASIBLY produce on a SUSTAINABLE basis?

    Thus, what we really need is a goal toward maximum sustainability, and a plan to get there.

    WNC - Once again, you have deftly cut a path through the thick weeds of opinion rampant on these pages, and have offered thru your questions and comments a viable venue for worthy and useful discussion.

    I hope you and/or others can bring your post here into a future forum; I suspect few eyes will go back to this page now.

    I recall from a few weeks back it was you, or you who motivated sgage, to ask the question about the minimum operating needs for an (or the US) economy. There was some brief but illuminating discussion, but never followed up at the level it deserved.

    These are the key issues and questions. But hey, we had 27+ posts on peak helium on the Drumbeat yesterday.

    Bart -

    "I think that such figures are plausible, based on the fact that it takes energy/resources to harvest solar."

    I think those figures are implausible. At 6%, we'll have 12-times more solar in 2050 than now. You really think, between PV and CSP, that we're going to have only 10x by 2050? It's going to be done in less than 10 years at current rates. And in that time, solar will be competitive or cheaper than FF electricity.

    It might have helped if Chris had put out a solicitation for reasonable numbers, before developing his conclusions. Something akin to the way R-Squared and Gail are getting through their respective works, with the author doing a real time Q&A with the posters.

    There are a lot of resources out there, particularly people that have both a firm grasp of solar technology and appreciation for PO and the potential timeline and magnitude of consequences. As I asked Chris at the bottom of the page, what was his basis for the rates he chose?

    I still think those figures are plausible (=arguable), John; they may not be the best ones. I'm more interested in understanding the trends behind the numbers rather than the specific numbers themselves.

    The point of a model like this is to identify key areas where action will make a difference. Solar and wind are one such key area.

    What are some of the trends that are determining solar and wind growth?

    Positive
    1. Growth is starting from a small base.
    2. Increasing political support because of climate change and arguments for energy independence. Peak oil isn't significant yet as an argument.
    3. We're still in the midst of a boom cycle, with capital to invest.
    4. Energy and materials are still relatively cheap.
    5. Likelihood of technical advances, such as thin-film PV and better storage.

    Negative
    1. The low cost of fossil fuels, especially coal, in relation to solar and other renewables.
    2. Political power of the fossil fuel industries (and hence indirect subsidies and opposition to carbon taxes).
    3. Possibility of resource wars, which would eat up capital and energy.
    4. Possible political disorganization and social turmoil.
    5. Increasing cost and scarcity of energy/materials especially over time.
    6. Countries that most need the energy don't have the capital and infrastructure for high tech alternatives.

    I agree that there are reasons to be optimistic short-term, especially technical reasons. Long-term, the picture seems more cloudy. If I were to revise the numbers, I might raise the growth rate short term (until 2025), keep it somewhat low 2025-2050. I still think that a plateau is likely sometime after that.

    Bart

    I should add that there are several factors that cloud our judgment about solar and wind.

    1. Wishful thinking. Most of us want solar and wind to grow at a humongous rate. If solar and wind cannot save us, then the outlook seems pretty grim.

    2. Technological optimism. Most of us are technical professionals or at least feel positive about technology. We've seen wondrous advances in computers and high tech - why can't we repeat the miracle with energy? (Skeptics will point to the difference between information and energy.)

    3. We've just gone through several of the most prosperous and peaceful decades of human history. We assume that this will continue. Our whole outlook is optimistic.

    4. The conditions for solar/wind have been very favorable in the past few years, and appear to be favorable in the short-term. We assume this trend will continue.

    These are the prejudices, and it is good to be on our guard against them.

    Bart - Thanks for both comments. I appreciate them and as an aside, I greatly respect your efforts and accomplishments with the Energy Bulletin.

    Forecasting anything about the future is fraught with bias, we all know this. Trying to make an analytical forecast requires so many assumptions, extrapolations, and knowledge, that it is most frequently an exercise in selective data mining to arrive at the outcome one 'wants'. I cite typical EIA forecasts and think I could rest my case. Perhaps I am as guilty as anyone else.

    I'll put this to rest with a final comment: If we can't agree on the assumptions, it's unlikely we'll agree on the forecast.

    Good luck with the EB, I read it every day.

    Thanks for the kind words about Energy Bulletin, John. Comments like that keep us going!

    John wrote:
    If we can't agree on the assumptions, it's unlikely we'll agree on the forecast.

    Actually, I think the main point of a model like this is NOT to have agreement on the forecast. Rather, it's to understand the phenomenon better, to make assumptions explicit and to pinpoint critical areas for action.

    The relevant comments seem to fall into two camps.

    • "You have under-estimated such-and-such new source of energy that will grow rapidly and make the outlook more optimistic."
    • "You have omitted complex trends (feedback loops) and difficult-to-predict events (e.g. wars) that make the outlook more pessimistic."

    What I have not seen -- and what I was looking for -- were attacks on the general approach and results. Namely:

    Taking published data and business-as-usual assumptions, the projections are for long-term catastrophe.

    I was looking for comments like "You put the decimal point in the wrong place - we're okay after all." Or "You forgot coal."

    Instead, the comments seemed to confirm the basic point. For an optimistic result, one needs to believe in massive changes in our energy infrastructure and/or ways of life. To predict a catastrophe, it is not necessary to take into account feedback and extraordinary events.

    The technical minds here at TOD seem to be so focussed on getting the "right" answer, that we overlook the basic message that emerges!

    Bart

    "To predict a catastrophe, it is not necessary to take into account feedback and extraordinary events."

    Predicting a catastrophe doesn't require anything except a good imagination. I tend to think that people letting the world collapse around them and doing nothing would be a rather extraorinary event.

    "What I have not seen -- and what I was looking for -- were attacks on the general approach and results."

    Probably because it is so absurd that nobody thought it was worth their time. Here's one for you: Why does solar, our greatest renewable resource suddenly stop increasing, and at an absurdly low level at that? You must have missed that one. How about the credibility of his main source, "Wake Up Amerika". Attacks on the general approach? How do you attack pulling numbers out of your rear besides calling it what it is?

    I think this process, of "refining" the future by layering deeper assumptions is itself, deeply irrational.

    I think people who pause for some real introspection will come to understand that. Though, it might not always be obvious to the newcomer the degree to which these predictions follow a decision tree - one in which uncertainty is discarded, and a path chosen.

    Sensible Energy:
    I tend to think that people letting the world collapse around them and doing nothing would be a rather extraordinary event.

    I don't think you read my comments, SE.

    The point of this model is relatively modest: to extrapolate from existing trends and business-as-usual (BAU) assumptions and see where it takes us. It apparently takes us to a place that is not very good.

    The question in my mind is not whether people will try to do something about it, but will we act wisely? Will our efforts be enough?

    Sensible Energy:
    [Why didn't anyone attack the approach and BAU assumptions.] Probably because it is so absurd that nobody thought it was worth their time.

    Again, I don't think you read my post closely. There were two types of comments, one positing hyper-growth in new energy sources or conservation. You offered the example of solar.

    The other type of criticism emphasized the lack of feedback loops and low-probability, high-impact events (war, civil disorder, etc.)

    Both types of criticism are relevant and realistic. Those trends will occur, don't you agree? Which means that there is no sure thing - neither green techno-utopia nor collapse is guaranteed, and that what we do now is critically important.

    It's an interesting change to be attacked as a doomer. Usually I'm attacked from the other side. The vehemence of some posts leads me believe that the article threatens deeply held beliefs. At least the article is an equal-opportunity offender, getting responses from both sides.

    Bart

    DocScience

    I tend to think that people letting the world collapse around them and doing nothing would be a rather extraordinary event.

    crude oil averaged $40 in 2004
    $50 in 2005
    $60 in 2006
    $70 so far in 2007

    The world is collapsing around us and most people are doing nothing.
    I have been telling people we need to prepare since 2004.

    Most people still do not want to even read about the problem
    I believe most are still in complete denial.

    Would you call this extraordinary ?

    DocScience
    http://www.angelfire.com/in/Gilbert1/grid.html
    .
    .

    I would love to see (even) more pre-adaption in the US economy, but I think I've come to understand why there hasn't been so much.

    If you look at it by income quintile, and at the fraction of household income required to buy gasoline, we have only very recently broken out of historical norms.

    Agoraphila did a chart showing the fraction of household income required to purchase a flat 1000 gallons of gasoline. It has really only broken upward in the last few years, and has not yet reached (based on that gallon/income ratio) the levels that drove such transformation in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

    (The most telling thing about that graph might be the split between the lowest quintile and the second-lowest. And then also the split between those two and the upper three fifths.)

    Now, one of the assumptions people make when they extend "BAU" is to say that our adaption now at this level of expenditure will continue, even as our costs rise.

    I find that very curious given the example of the 70's, but I'm not going to offer my own assumption in its place. I'll just remind you that the real alternative is not to make an assumption, but to accept that what happens when prices are experienced as "high" is actually unknown.

    Most people don't need to know about what is happening to the world's supply of oil.

    Most people need do nothing. At least nothing on a conscious level.

    Prices of oil will rise.

    Companies will market energy from new sources (wind, solar, etc.) and products that replace oil dependent products (electric cars, corn starch plastics).

    Energy and products from oil will continue to increase in price and people will switch to these new products/energy sources.

    We're in the starting stage of a transformation from a petroleum based lifestyle to one based on other sources of energy.

    It won't necessarily be a smooth transition. Most aren't.

    But it's not likely to be the end of the world as we know it.

    It will be a great opportunity for those who can see a clear path to the future and stake out their claim.

    Is BAU static? If it can change as rapidly as it did with the recent (continued) hybrid adoption, how do we chart it?

    Do we need to make assumptions about the rate (or non-rate) of future change?

    "Which means that there is no sure thing - neither green techno-utopia nor collapse is guaranteed, and that what we do now is critically important."

    I agree completely. I am very skeptical of expanding fossil fuel use. I think most new energy should be sustainable, solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, ocean, biomass and nuclear.

    The idea that we would continue BAU seems absurd to me, if it is even possible. How is declining oil BAU?

    To attack the methodology, I would say that assuming BAU over such long periods of time is not very useful. Pointless really, except to scare people, which, I admit, there is a role for. The article could be summed up by saying "If we don't confront todays problems, we will suffer later" Well, duh.

    Bart - I agree with the gravity of the message.

    But in order to change BAU and confront TPTB, you need to show why BAU projections for FFs are wrong (that's what I thought TOD does so well). But in my opinion this wasn't done in anything remotely resembling a semi-rigorous approach. And yes, at a number of places Chris was off by an order of magnitude.

    You don't convince the people who make policy with this type of contribution, you mostly discredit the oil drum, adding to the POV it is a doomer site.

    Chris was preaching to some choir, and many people here rightly called him on it. Unfortunately, he chose not to answer.

    I have a serious question for you: is it the data or is it the process? I mean, can you actually get to a year 2200 outcome with any data?

    Does anyone know, for instance, when the US will implement fossil fuel rationing? How serious that effort will be?

    The Doomer (and I'm afraid TOD) answer to such a question is to assert an answer. That is the process.

    "I mean, can you actually get to a year 2200 outcome with any data?"

    Have some thoughts but gotta run. Back tonight.

    John:

    ... in order to change business-as-usual (BAU) and confront the powers that be (TPTB), you need to show why BAU projections for fossil fuels (FFs) are wrong...

    I'm not sure that's true, John. Questioning fossil fuel numbers is important, and some people concentrate on that. I'm more interested in the big picture: environmental changes, political effects, and the prospects for other energy sources.

    Ultimately, I don't think we're facing a technical problem but a cultural one. As our prophet once said:

    The steep ride up the and down the energy curve is the most abnormal thing that has ever happened in human history. Most of human history is a no-growth situation. Our culture is built on growth and that phase of human history is almost over and we are not prepared for it. Our biggest problem is not the end of our resources. That will be gradual. Our biggest problem is a cultural problem. We don't know how to cope with it.

    - M. King Hubbert

    I think the reaction to the article is based not so much on technical grounds, but on its being a threat to a certain worldview. Doesn't the emotional content of some of the comments strike you as being out of proportion? That's usually a sign that a taboo has been broken.

    If one has followed the reaction to The Limits to Growth over the years, it's a familiar story. (See Matthew Simmons's essay: Revisiting the Limits to Growth (PDF)).

    TOD is great because of the diversity of views, and the technical expertise. It's a great place to get feedback. But when worldviews collide, there's only so far you can go in technical discussions. Numbers aren't really the issue.

    - Bart

    Thanks for a very nice post! While not everyone will agree with your assumptions, your post lays out a neat framework for looking at things. I liked your The End of the Amerikan Dream post also.

    If I did my calculations correctly, your conservative scenario implies a 0.4% annual increase in energy to 2025; your optimistic scenario implies a 1.6% annual increase in energy to 2025. If the 1.6% per year increase in energy actually occurs, it is pretty close to what EIA is projecting to 2030 in the International Energy Outlook 2007 (about 1.75% per year). Even a 0.4% annual increase is not that bad. A country with limited population growth could get along quite well on this kind of increase, if total energy were the only constraint, since most forecast some efficiency growth (EIA says 2.2% per year).

    There are a lot of ifs in this:

    1. Financing has to occur for all of these projects to occur. It is not clear it will with the credit crunch.

    2. Energy is not of the "right form". There are likely to be substantial costs in converting transportation to electric or other non-petroleum basis.

    3. I expect there will be considerable unevenness among countries. If there is a shortfall of any of the resources, exports of that resource are likely to fall precipitously.

    Gail,

    There are substantial costs in converting transportation, but they are committed costs. We convert our transportation fleet every 13 years or so. New engines, new breaks, new frames...

    Toyata plans to sell their hybrids at the same price as their regular models fairly soon. It is not that the hybrid is expensive, just that it takes some time to get cheap.

    Chris

    I'm sorry but I consider such high-level projections (mostly) meaningless. Actually I'm inclined to dismiss any predictions post 2030, not to mention 2200.

    Yes, it is conceivable to make certain predictions about fossil fuels based on their ultimate availability - they have been relatively well explored for in the last couple of centuries. But to apply similar pattern to their alternatives which are in their infancy... is just stupid. From what we know the limits to alternatives are not geological but technical, economical and even political. There are some speculations about the ultimate availability of uranium for example, but at this stage of uranium exploration this is nothing but a junk science.

    It is impossible to model growth rates of nuclear, solar or wind without modeling the technical and economic factors that influence them. In Germany the initial growth of wind was 30-40% per year. Now it is more like 10%. In Denmark the initial rates were also 30-40% and last year it was 0.3%. How much will it be in 20-30 years? Who the hell knows.

    LevinK: From what we know the limits to alternatives are not geological but technical, economical and even political.

    Ultimately I think the limits are geological and ecological. We are unused to thinking in these terms, since we've had abundant cheap energy for many decades. We're like rich children facing the prospect that the allowance will be cut off. Also, most participants at TOD are from rich countries; the bulk of the human population is in poorer countries who are much more aware of limits.

    As energy becomes more expensive, new transport and energy infrastructure will become correspondingly more expensive. Energy sources with poor EROEI like corn ethanol will gradually fall by the wayside. Energy strategies with good EROEI -- like conservation and efficiency -- will become more widely adopted.

    In this way, I think the physical realities provide a basis for long-term prediction. The farther in the future, the more powerful these tendencies.

    Bart

    Global wind power grew 32% in 2006.
    http://www.bwea.com/media/news/070202.html

    US Wind growth was 27% in 2006.
    Annual Report on U.S. Wind Power Installation, Cost, and
    Performance Trends: 2006 NREL
    http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy07osti/41435.pdf

    German Wind power grew by 23.5% in 2006.
    http://www.wind-energie.de/en/news/article/annual-balance-for-wind-energ...

    Denmark's wind power has already achieved 20% penetration of its electrical market. This is about the penetration level considered easy without storage. The transport market has not yet been addressed.

    Solar thermal power has potential for even more competitive energy costs but installation has barely begun.

    Yeap I think I gave the wrong number for Germany. It does not change the point - the rates vary widely both from region to region and year over year based on number of factors.

    Wind power seems to be "booming" because it starts from a small base. In absolute terms it grew from 0.2% of world electricity in 2000 to ~1% in 2006. Personally I expect high growth rates to continue for several more years and then slow down. But it is not a given - if for example an economic large scale energy storage is developed it can boom even further.

    Yet another guest poster with invented and out of context figures for ridiculous alarmism.

    Exactly why is nuclear or wind expected to decline; One would expect those sources to increase to make up the shortfall from fossil fuels. This whole article is just dumb with a bunch of silly assumptions.

    I suppose..........
    The scenarios described by Prof Goose appear to be all too realistic.
    Population decrease coinciding with the decline in non renewable energy will offset the need for growth of renewable energy in the long term.

    Wind power requires considerable maintenance. Energy to manufacture and erect large new towers will be impractical.

    Solar panels do not last forever. Batteries do not last forever, it is not always windy or sunny. Energy is required to manufacture panels, a reliable electricity grid is vital to support large domestic systems.

    Nuclear has the same limitations as above.
    Hydro is practically fully exploited. Dams are already silting up. Maintenance in the future will be impractical.

    I try to envisage a time of horse and cart milk and bread delivery, the ice man and fruit delivery etc.
    Maybe there will be energy available for small business, medium scale food production and supply.

    How much energy is contained in one B52 bomber flying a training mission? Enough to feed, clothe and heat a small rural town for a year I'd guess.

    It is best to dig the well, before you are thirsty.

    Wind power requires considerable maintenance. Energy to manufacture and erect large new towers will be impractical.

    This line of reasoning is silly. When faced with limited resources, the last thing we're going to short are resource multipliers such as primary energy production, and the notion that we wont have enough resources to mantain primary energy production is laughibly absurd.

    The return to little house on the prairie fantasy and other mad max visions of collapse seem to be a popular meme, but an unsupportable one.

    Although the validity of long-range projections can be questioned, I think one point in this article that is obviously true is that there is a tight connection between energy and standard of living. I'm wondering how this relationship will affect the economic growth of China.

    China's economy has been growing in the vicinity of 10% per year for some time now, and they seem to have in mind a fast transition to an automobile-based society with a standard of living close to that of the U.S. Obviously, the energy connection makes it clear that they will never get there and never even get close. They may not even be able to continue much beyond where they are already. India is growing fast too, but if there is an energy-imposed ceiling, China will hit it first, and I would think they would do so fairly soon.

    But how will this play out? Will China hit the ceiling while other countries with a higher standard of living remain unaffected when they hit it? That seems unlikely. Will China's rise simultaneously drag down the richer nations? It's hard to imagine things playing out smoothly, barring a fantastic increase in some energy source.

    It's hard to imagine things playing out smoothly, barring a fantastic increase in some energy source.

    Or possibly steady growth in readily avaliable alternatives, like nuclear wind and solar. Can't possibly imagine that happening though, right?

    It would be great if China's economy grew based on really steady growth in those areas. However, as far as I can tell, their growth so far is relying mostly on rapidly increasing oil imports and building new coal-generated power plants at a furious pace.

    If you stopped to actually look at some of the figures, you would note that nuclear and wind are growing at a steady, significant pace.

    Do you mean figures like this?

    I agree that wind is showing healthy growth, but that's not a big trick for an infant industry. The test will be how long it can keep growing at double digit percentages from here on. Not many industries can manage that for more than a decade or so once they are at all mature.

    Now, if you meant just the growth within China, you have more of a point. China had little nuclear power, so yes they're growing. In fact they have booked 32% of the planned and 40% of the proposed world nuclear development. If they build it all between now and say 2020 they will wind up with 100 GW of new nuclear capacity, or about 8 GW per year. However, they are installing 100 GW per year of coal...

    Do you mean figures like this?

    Sure. Its nearly all positive and there's a lot of new growth in plants under construction and in the planning/licensing phase.

    If coal is going to get expensive as is postulated here, then that only serves to enhance the competitiveness of nuclear; Its demonstrated its clear ability to deliver the majority of the needs of the electric grid. This nonsense about peak energy being imminent is just alarmist garbage.

    "Sure. Its nearly all positive and there's a lot of new growth in plants under construction and in the planning/licensing phase."

    Are we looking at the same graph? What does nearly all postive mean?

    Do you see where the zero is?

    Oh, that's what you're talking about. Nope. By why would I, since you made no effort to indicate what 'nearly all positive' means. Forgive me, I guess I had in the back of my mind your previous post:

    “If you stopped to actually look at some of the figures, you would note that nuclear and wind are growing at a steady, significant pace.”

    Well for nuclear:
    Steady? Not based on this graph. Significant? At 2% mean growth?

    Oh, that's what you're talking about. Nope. By why would I, since you made no effort to indicate what 'nearly all positive' means.

    Hmm, yes I suppose I failed to provide a definition for positive.

    Steady? Not based on this graph. Significant? At 2% mean growth?

    2% mean growth is steady and significant; Its not stagnating. But much of the growth in nuclear power we can expect in a decade as licensing and construction pushes through. There's a rather large surge in nuclear demand, as advancednano noted earlier.

    2% mean growth is steady and significant;

    You did notice the trend line, right?

    "Hmm, yes I suppose I failed to provide a definition for positive."

    No you failed to be clear with the pronoun Its.

    "2% mean growth is steady and significant; Its not stagnating."

    Look again at the graph, growth is swinging (not steady) between 4.5% and -2%. My estimate of a 2% mean will make a small dent in energy needs over the next several decades compared to solar and wind at their current growth rates. Not stagnating?, see GG's comment above, the trend in growth rate is weak but downward.

    If you think advancednano puts up better data, you should quote his rather then get bogged down trying to defend the data that GG put up.

    No you failed to be clear with the pronoun Its.

    Right...

    Not stagnating?, see GG's comment above, the trend in growth rate is weak but downward.

    Select a different timeslice and its upward. Anyone can perform that bit of magic with statistics, but it doesn't offer much predictive power.

    OK, so as not to be accused of data mining, here is a look at everything that's available in the BP spreadsheet: 1965 to 2006.

    First the annual percentage growth:

    See how that curves off, just as you'd expect a mature industry to do? Does that look to you like an industry that will be able to offer 10% growth rates again any time in the near future?

    Now let's look at how much energy it has added to the mix each year:

    It's been averaging a flat 15 Mtoe/year since 1988. Over the same time frame oil has been adding 50 Mt/yr and coal has been adding 45.

    See how that curves off, just as you'd expect a mature industry to do? Does that look to you like an industry that will be able to offer 10% growth rates again any time in the near future?

    Given that nuclear power is a significant portion of global energy supply allready, 10% growth would imply a significant increase in global energy supply growth.

    Its entirely reasonable to assume that nuclear power can erode the marketshare of coal however.

    80 million BTUs per year is 2.7 kilowatts continuous averaged. I hope that pesky global warming doesn't make people want airconditioning.

    Always easier to work in metric.

    Probably the most useful contribution by this article is the emphasis on "The “Population versus Living Standard” Tradeoff", a key point often overlooked.

    However, I disagree with the concept that

    "the maximum supportable human population at any point in time is dependent upon the total amount of energy available to the population at that time",

    no matter how many scholars support it. The direct dependence is not on "the total amount of energy" but on "the total amount of food".

    Accordingly, the following statement

    "Worldwide peak population is determined by dividing the total amount of energy expected to be available during the global peak energy year by the average amount of energy expected to be consumed per capita during that year.

    would be correct only if we change "energy" by "food" throughout.

    Now, this difference doesn't make my view any more optimistic than the author's. As I have stated in several posts, given that biodiesel from soybean, sunflower and rapeseed is a definite net energy gainer, I foresee an ever increasing diversion of agricultural production into biodiesel production. And I'm not talking only, or even mainly, about US agriculture. Just think of a country that is a big exporter of soybean oil. After a few years of crude oil production decline (2012?) and with an oil price of say $200, is it reasonable to think they would be exporting cheap soybean oil and importing expensive crude? And if the soybean oil price goes up, is it reasonable to think a farmer would plant cheap wheat instead of expensive soybean? That's called arbitraging. Once significant biodiesel production capacity has been built, fuel arbitraging will make the price of diesel fuel (however high it goes) set the floor for the price of vegetable oils. Land arbitraging in turn will set the floor for the price of wheat and corn.

    Now, this is where the “Population versus Living Standard” Tradeoff comes into play. Production of biodiesel to meet only food production, processing and distribution needs will leave enough land for producing food for sustaining N billion people living walking and biking lives (not that I don't like that). But if biodiesel-rich countries want to have a higher level of fuel consumption, less food will be produced.

    And as I see it, peak food, which is the direct determinant of peak population, will not be between 2025 and 2030. It is now.

    I'll throw in my 2 cents, as this is something I've been working up myself over the past few weeks.

    I really don't see any point in debating "coulda woulda shoulda" over nuclear energy in either its current or potential forms. That PR battle has been lost, and the entire question is now moot. There is enough opposition to it world-wide to keep development rates down until it's too late to do anything. Likewise, I don't see much point debating energy sources we don't have yet, like fusion.

    My position on energy sources is this:

    * Oil: The peak is now, we will be effectively out of it by 2080.
    * Gas: The peak is in 4 years, we will be effectively out of it by 2070.
    * Hydro: Most of the best sites are already developed. We will continue to develop it at a low rate (~1.5% pa) until a plateau in 2040.
    * Nuclear: The public relations battle has been lost, the question of developing it is now moot. It will rise to a production peak in 2025, then fall off by 5% pa afterwards.
    * Coal: Will rise by 0.5% per year to 2025, then gradually taper off by -0.5% per year after that.
    * Wind etc.: Will rise by 10% pa growth for the next 15 years, after which the growth rate will fall off to a plateau in 2050.

    I think the shape of the world's energy curve will look about like this:

    I put the peak is in 2020, somewhat earlier than Mr. Clugston.

    World population will start to decline in 2020-2025, not because of absolute energy shortages, but due to dislocations between now and then brought on either directly or indirectly by oil shortages. The subsequent population decline will be supported by the decline in total energy availability, and will serve to reduce the demand for further development of most sources.

    One thing Mr. Clugston's analysis ignores that I think should be addressed is the deteriorated state of the ecosystem, and the effect that will have on carrying capacity as oil and natural gas decline. Oil and gas have been primarily responsible for shielding us from the deleterious effects of depleted soil fertility, fresh water and oceans. As the supply of oil and gas declines, it's reasonable to expect the effect of reduced carrying capacity to become more and more important. Of course rapid climate change, manifesting as increasingly chaotic climatic conditions over the next two decades, will also serve to lower the carrying capacity by interfering with harvests. I've included these factors in my model, and they combine to make the drop in population in my model more severe than in Mr. Clugston's.

    One thing Mr. Clugston's analysis ignores that I think should be addressed is the deteriorated state of the ecosystem, and the effect that will have on carrying capacity as oil and natural gas decline.

    Paul Erlich talks about the toxification of planet - not merely the environmental degradation - on Sep 7 DemocracyNow! and ranks its effect right at the top of list with climate change and peak oil. Listen.

    cfm in Gray, ME

    If I understand the energy chart, it's million tons of oil equivalent, and it seems to be broadly consistent with a rough number that I use--about 200 mboe per day from fossil fuel + nuclear sources, or about 6 Gboe per month.

    6 Gb is about the size of the East Texas Field, the largest oil field in the Lower 48, which took decades to fully deplete.

    So, in round numbers we burn through--from fossil fuel + nuclear sources--the energy equivalent of about one East Texas Field per month (or one Prudhoe Bay every two months).

    I would argue that world energy supply, especially exported world energy, is now in decline, or at best flat. IMO, total world energy supply will decline until the rate of increase of alternative/non-conventional energy is equal to the rate of decline of conventional energy, however far in the future that point may be.

    In the mean time, the food supply already seems to be getting critical.

    "In the mean time, the food supply already seems to be getting critical."

    I get the impression there will be many feedback loops that we are only guessing at - such as food production, resource wars, fresh water, etc. - that will affect academic predictions such as these and make the real world realities quite different from our models. "Above ground factors", so to speak.

    Climate Change may be a valuable lesson in such things for us, but perhaps it is a bit late now...

    "You can never solve a problem on the level on which it was created."
    Albert Einstein

    What is missing throughout this entire thread is boe per capita (barrels of oil per capita per Duncan)... or BTU per capita if you insist. It's dinner tijme so I'll have more to say later.

    Todd

    Nuclear: The public relations battle has been lost, the question of developing it is now moot.

    We still live in the era of cheap oil and where coal still gets a free pass on its terrible pollution. But nothing will happen when the energy crisis hits hard? People will not rethink irrational objections? Don't you see how ridiculous that assumption is?

    There is already a gathering nuclear boom. The cover story in the Economist magazine this week is titled "Nuclear Power's New Age" and there have been many other stories recently like it. People do change and will make rational decisions to save their lives.

    Given the responses to this gathering crisis that we've seen so far, I don't see anything outrageous in expecting people to maintain irrational positions that go against their best interests.

    There will be some movement on it, which is why my model incorporates some growth in the industry over the next 20 years. Lead times are another thing thing that may constrain the contribution of nuclear power. Plants started ten years from now will just be nearing completion as TSHTF, and changing conditions may make them harder rather than easier to justify. Also, if anyone tries to rush a plant to completion, cuts one too many corners and there is another accident of any magnitude, public opinion will snap shut with lethal finality.

    For better or worse, nuclear power has had its day in the sun.

    "For better or worse, nuclear power has had its day in the sun."

    Hmmm. Looks like it's morning in the nuclear world to me.

    http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.htm

    According to that page there are currently 34 reactors under construction. Let's assume that all those reactors will all be on line within 4 years, for an addition of 28K MWe.

    There are 81 reactors listed as "planned". Let's say the average planning/construction cycle is 7 years, and we will see two thirds of those projects carried through. So we will see a further addition of 60K MWe by 2015.

    The rest of the listings on that page are in the proposal stage, which is where the speculations and assumptions come it. I think public resistance will keep many (say half) of those from being built, with the highest completion rates in China. That means that about 110 reactors from this group would be built, probably over the period from 2015 to 2025, for an additional supply of 100K MWe.

    So we go from 372K MWe today to 540 MWe in 2025. Converting that into a smoothed percentage increase from today, we get about 2.3% pa from now to 2025. This is almost exactly the assumption I used in the model that generated the curve I posted above. At that point nuclear power would represent about 7% of the global energy mix compared to 6% today.

    Much depends on how many of those proposals get built, and then what happens after 2025. I think the demand for nuclear will peak and decline around then because increasing social and climatic instability will make the perceived risk too great, but that's just my opinion.

    Ok, so you agree that nuclear power will expand until 2025. It doesn't make much sense to predict beyond that anyway. What puzzles me is why you think the perceived risks will be too great in the face of declining energy supplies.

    Global Thank You from Chris Clugston (author of the article),

    Thanks to one and all for taking the time to review my analysis and to offer feedback; you have, both individually and collectively, given me much to think about. I have attempted to address your comments below in a consolidated fashion. (If I missed something, please let me know...)

    Immediate Goal

    I have posted my avowedly “first pass” analysis to stimulate discussion regarding what I consider to be the most critical challenge confronting humanity—the rapidly approaching peak in total available energy—and to propose an analytical framework for assessing and conveying the associated implications for future human populations, in a manner that can be readily grasped by policy makers and the general public.

    Ultimate Goal

    In its final form, with conclusions derived from assumptions and projections provided by credible industry experts, the analysis should serve as a tool to build awareness and as a catalyst to instill a sense of urgency on the part of both policy makers and the general public.

    The Model

    The model itself is quite simple—it is merely an aggregation of assumptions and projections regarding future energy availability by primary energy source. The challenge (and where I obviously need help) is to obtain “the best” possible assumptions and projections from the most credible sources available. Some of you have mentioned energy sources excluded in the current version; fusion etc. If you’ve got specific assumptions and projections, and corresponding sources, please share them. (Thanks to you who already have.)

    Information Sources

    The assumptions and associated projections in the current model version are admittedly NOT derived from the “best currently available information”; they are based on my interpretation of a limited subset of publicly accessible data and information. If you’ve got more credible assumptions and projections (or know where to get them), and corresponding sources, regarding any primary energy source, please share them. (Thanks to you who already have.)

    Time Horizon

    If I hit year 2200 projections, plus or minus 50%, I’ll buy you all a beer! The critical point that I think needs to be made—in a quantified way—is that once we reach global peak energy, the total amount of available energy will decline continuously and irreversibly until we reach an “all renewable equilibrium”—and that might take a long time and hit very low levels compared to today’s energy consumption levels. And, coincident with declines in available energy will be declines in human population levels and/or material living standards.

    Existing Assumptions and Projections

    In a nutshell, energy from each nonrenewable energy source is assumed to increase until peak, peak at some point, then decline thereafter. Energy from each renewable energy source is assumed to increase until peak, peak (or reach a “ceiling of practical deployment”), then either plateau or decline thereafter. Reasons why a renewable energy source could peak (reach a ceiling) and plateau/decline, include:

    1. There are only so many places where some renewable energy sources can be effectively deployed and deliver energy when and where needed—and in the form needed: tides, waves, solar, wind, nuclear, and hydro.
    2. There are limits to available feedstock or useful life associated with some renewable energy sources: traditional biomass, hydro dams (silt buildup), nuclear plants; actually any physical energy converter, especially those with many moving parts, those that dissipate intense heat, or those that exist in harsh environments.
    3. The “subsidizing” energy from fossil fuels and/or the substantial financial investments required to design, produce, deploy, service, and maintain some sources of renewable energy may cease to exist at sufficient levels in the future: nuclear, major hydro—probably most renewable energy sources.

    The amount of energy produced by some renewable sources might also increase indefinitely… As is always the case, if you’ve got more credible assumptions and projections, and corresponding sources, regarding any primary energy source, please share them. (Thanks to you who already have.)

    Findings/Conclusions

    If and when we reach “global peak energy”, the inescapable consequence for humanity will be decreases in population levels and/or material living standards; that much is certain. While the specific decline functions associated with total available energy and human population/living standards cannot be known with certainty, I believe that it is critical to project them both to the best of our abilities, because:

    1. Numbers are easy for policy makers and the general public to grasp.
    2. Understanding the magnitude of the problem should [might] “motivate” us to plan for the “challenges” that lie ahead.
    3. We have not been able to gain much traction with either policy makers or the general public through the utilization of primarily qualitative future assessments.

    Thanks again,

    Chris Clugston

    1. Numbers are easy for policy makers and the general public to grasp.
    2. Understanding the magnitude of the problem should [might] “motivate” us to plan for the “challenges” that lie ahead.
    3. We have not been able to gain much traction with either policy makers or the general public through the utilization of primarily qualitative future assessments..

    Chris,

    As noted just up the thread, I think that we are effectively at Peak Energy, especially from the point of view of importers.

    In regard to quantitative assessments, I have gotten some grief in many quarters for my insistence on using the Hubbert Linearization (HL) method to estimate URR for large producing regions.

    However, the HL method takes the two numbers that we have the most confidence in--annual production and cumulative production to date--to derive a quantitative estimate of URR.

    If I am going to present a Peak Oil/Peak Export argument, I would rather argue the case based on a quantitative method.

    Texas and the Lower 48 as a Model for Saudi Arabia and the World (May, 2006)
    http://www.energybulletin.net/16459.html

    Net Oil Exports and the “Iron Triangle” (July, 2007)
    http://graphoilogy.blogspot.com/2007/07/net-oil-exports-and-iron-triangl...

    In Defense of the Hubbert Linearization Method (June, 2007)
    http://graphoilogy.blogspot.com/2007/06/in-defense-of-hubbert-linearizat...

    The most common response I get to all of this is simply denial. The reserve situation "can't be that bad."

    All I can tell you is what the mathematical models are telling me. In a nutshell, I think that the reserve situation is that bad, and I think that we are facing the near certainty of rapidly declining net export capacity worldwide.

    While reasonable people can disagree on what the annual and monthly production data are telling us about our proximity to Peak Oil, in my opinion it is a virtual certainty that Peak Oil, from the point of view of importers, is here. This virtual certainty is due to the absolutely lethal combination of flat to declining crude oil production in exporting countries and the (sometimes rapidly) rising domestic consumption in exporting countries, resulting in sometimes catastrophic declines in oil exports. For example, based on EIA data, net total liquids exports by the UK dropped at an annual rate of 60% per year from 2000 to 2005.

    In effect, in my opinion the very lifeblood of the world industrial economy is draining away in front of our very eyes. The only question is how fast the patient is bleeding to death.

    Chris - many thanks for your fine effort thus far.
    And kudos on daring a collaborative "work-in-progress".

    My perspective is about the GW impacts on societal coherence, particularly its implications not only for investor confidence,
    but also for global food production.

    On the former, Munich Re reported some years ago that their data show a >10%/yr increase in global weather losses in constant dollars.
    That is, doubling roughly per 7 years.

    That implies a rapidly closing window of insurability for major weather-exposed assets
    e.g. Florida, New York state, etc.
    - viz All State pulling out of apparently profitable marlets.

    The impact is not simply of loss of cover, but of overnight loss of collateral value of the asset for use in other investments,
    and of the difficulty of funding any new investments within such an area.

    This will, I think, further hamper the development of new energy infrastructure,
    as well as of the economic growth vital for its commercial justification.

    With regard to food production there is one aspect that is not widely discussed yet, since it is too humble to have appeal to the MSM -
    namely that of subsistence farming.
    We know that commercial food yields have been badly hit in China, India, Austrailia, America and Europe so far this year,
    but I suggest that the number of subsistence farms impacted will predictably be far greater,
    thus adding to the diverse strains on global food supply.

    As the massive numbers of impoverished people consequently become still hungrier than in the recent past,
    there is a risk of losing the required social cohesion to allow the desired global overhaul
    of energy supply and infrastructure.

    Then again, I may be dead wrong - with sufficiently inspiring global leadership to a simpler fairer way of life,
    most people would, I think, be astonished at what could still be achieved.

    Regards,

    Backstop

    Chris,

    Would you please take a moment to provide your source to estimate why solar, wind, and nuclear only grow at 6%,5%, and 1.4%, and then 0% after 2050?

    Or just give a basis for the solar estimate, or wind, each of which are and will continue to show double-digit gains.

    I appreciate the work you have done, but I believe you've dealt the facts a great disservice, and arrived at incorrect projections.

    There must be some validity to the concept of
    peak renewables. For example a river system may
    not produce any more hydro with extra dams. Denmark is said to be close to peak wind power so there is little point in installing more turbines. Drumbeat links to a review of a new book http://zone5.org/2007/09/09/renewable-energy-cannot-sustain-a-consumer-s...
    that discusses this. So far the law of diminishing returns seems to apply to everything; if for example they perfect 'safe' fast breeder reactors I'd expect there must be some quantifiable downside such as huge security costs.

    The other problem is the emergy requirement of
    additional renewable generation after fossil fuel phaseout. By 2050 can we set aside enough wind power to manufacture more turbines? I'd say we've already seen the best of the consumer age.

    You can install more wind generators and pump water back behind those existing dams for low-wind time.

    I would expect that we have lots of turbines that don't run flat out because the water is rationed to last until the next rainy season.

    --

    Hear about the wind farm in Texas that's going to store extra power via compressed air in played out oil fields?

    --

    IMHO, what's needed is fewer "doomers" and more problem solvers.

    Bob Wallace wrote:
    IMHO, what's needed is fewer "doomers" and more problem solvers.

    Yes, but they have to be solving the right problems. For example, there are many problem solvers working on SUV designs and corn ethanol. Or, in an earlier era, the French problem solvers were busy solving the problem of a German invasion by building the Maginot Line.

    This wouldn't be an issue if our worldview were more in touch with reality. As it is, the common assumptions are for unlimited energy and material resources; for continued growth in consumption and population; for a future that resembles the last 10 years.

    With a different worldview, a different set of problems and parameters emerge.

    Bart

    Sometimes you have to start down a street before you realize that it isn't going to lead you to where you want to go.

    Lots of us got excited about a hydrogen future. Then we began to realize the problems of storage, transportation, and conversion to mechanical movement.

    We got excited about field-grown biofuels and then we began to realize the impact on food sources and resulting cost increases. Not to mention water shortage problems.

    In other words, it's hard to get in touch with reality until one gets past their "We're doomed!" position and actively pursues solutions. And as any scientist can tell you, many great discoveries are made while looking for something else.

    Sitting around bemoaning the coming of peak oil and how we're all going to go back to living in caves gets us no where.

    Better, IMHO, to strike out on many new trails and hopefully one or more will take us to a better place.

    Perhaps if the French had built the Maginot Line *and* worked on other methods of defense they could have repelled the Germans.

    Better, IMHO, to strike out on many new trails and hopefully one or more will take us to a better place

    I STRONGLY disagree.

    We know what works,

    Electrified inter-city trains
    Urban Rail
    Bicycles
    Walkable neighborhoods
    Nuclear Power
    Wind Turbines
    Geothermal Power
    Ground Loop (Euros can them geothermal) Heat Pumps
    Insulation
    Efficient Appliances
    Solar Hot Water Heaters
    HV DC Lines
    Pumped Storage
    Neighborhood Electrical Vehicles

    We can start TODAY on building a future from these building blocks and not waste time & money on "Never Work" technologies like Hydrogen (I knew this in the 1970s ! Before billions were wasted).

    Do spend R&D on extra building blocks that show promise.

    Solar PV (almost made top list, but cheaper is better :-)
    PHEVs
    EVs

    Best Hopes for Reality Based Planning,

    Alan

    I really don't like disagreeing with you but in that list you miss the two things that would IMO make any sense in your solution.

    Those are one: an effort to reduce population as fast as possible, and two: take the growth out of our 'economic' demands on the planets economy.

    As far as I can see unless these two items are addressed, all we have with your well meant solutions, is an extension of our current growth economy with population increase. This will result in the use of all and any energy, dirty or clean to maintain our present course. Your previous agrument that CTL could be held in abeyance with the substitution of rail I do not think holds. As long as there is growth, investment will be found to use all energy and energy efficient devices in feeding that growth.

    I do not consider your ideas without merit, I just feel that without a halt to growth they are unworkable and possibly it would be better to pay our bills now rather than increase our debt to end up paying a far larger bill later.

    Post-Peak Oil I expect a large population & birthrate decrease in the USA for a variety of reasons. See Soviet Union > Russia period.

    And the economy (what's left of it) will adjust to new realities. I expect consistent negative growth for decades post-Peak Oil.

    Both will happen "naturally" and will not require special intervention (a USA One Child policy for example).

    Positive, pro-active solutions attract more supporters than revolutionary denial programs.

    In a second wave, say 25 years post-Peak Oil, as we begin to turn the corner, a "Lessons Learned" movement should start-up.

    Alan

    I am afraid mitigation places that post peak further into the future with more time to use more FF in that process. We could be on the edge of a change in thermohaline circulation and that IMO is some edge to be on.

    http://www.signs-of-the-times.org/articles/show/126103-Wake+The+World+Up...

    I hope you are right but I fear you might not be. Anyway, best wishes to you,.

    We are dealing with a dysfunctional social/political decision making process and trying to modify that will be difficult.

    Thus determining what is 1) good and 2) possible makes for some very difficult decision making processes.

    My strategy is to preposition rational actions in hopes that they will be grasped in a frenzy of reaction post-Peak Oil.

    Thus My Sign-off,

    Best Hopes,

    Alan

    I wish we knew the depth of the fall. That would make it easier to decide what is necessary to promote and what to discard. Maybe what will be needed is a Rosseta Stone and a forge. To build that train from:)

    I think we should prepare for the worst ourselves and leave the politician to themselves. Call it Hippie revolution number II ?

    BTW Did you get a load of our obese Canadian prima dona Prime Minister Harper tying to pirouette in the Aussi Parliament, more than just dysfunctional, he is a national embarrassment. At least Bush isn't a toady.

    we should prepare for the worst ourselves and leave the politician to themselves

    I evaluated that option earlier (and moving earlier is better than later) and chose instead to stick it out as long as possible. I chose the best place (IMHO) for refuge with two back-ups. Very late in the game, when I have given up hope, I will make my run for the rabbit hole :-)

    My choice, my values.

    Best Hopes,

    Alan

    deleted duplicate.

    Bob Wallace:

    Sitting around bemoaning the coming of peak oil and how we're all going to go back to living in caves gets us no where.

    Whom are you addressing, Bob? I haven't noticed any cave-advocates on the site lately.

    I'm interested in critical thinking about peak oil and resource depletion, and spend about 10 hours/day on it. For every "moaner," I think you will find a dozen people actively working on the problem in their own way.

    It is true that I and others are skeptical of magical technical solutions, preferring known solutions such as those listed by Alan - what he calls "reality-based planning."

    If you follow the energy news, you begin to notice a pattern . Complex, centrally controlled systems are preferred to small scale solutions. Technology which favors fossil fuels (e.g. sequestration) gets high priority. Anything that promises continuation of the high-consumption lifestyle is played up. The energy research projects at Stanford and MIT follow this pattern.

    Strategies which are simple and effective (conservation and efficiency) are the unwanted step-children, even though rationally they are superior.

    This is why I think the problem is more cultural than technical. There's a reason why people have pursued hydrogen and corn ethanol despite all the contrary evidence.

    On the other hand, I will say this: thank God for the engineers. We will need them.

    Bart

    Just for the record, my post.

    Better, IMHO, to strike out on many new trails and hopefully one or more will take us to a better place

    I STRONGLY disagree.

    We know what works,

    Electrified inter-city trains
    Urban Rail
    Bicycles
    Walkable neighborhoods
    Nuclear Power
    Wind Turbines
    Geothermal Power
    Ground Loop (Euros can them geothermal) Heat Pumps
    Insulation
    Efficient Appliances
    Solar Hot Water Heaters
    HV DC Lines
    Pumped Storage
    Neighborhood Electrical Vehicles

    We can start TODAY on building a future from these building blocks and not waste time & money on "Never Work" technologies like Hydrogen (I knew this in the 1970s ! Before billions were wasted).

    Do spend R&D on extra building blocks that show promise.

    Solar PV (almost made top list, but cheaper is better :-)
    PHEVs
    EVs

    Best Hopes for Reality Based Planning,

    Alan

    I am open to additions to the list. I have already stated in response to one comment that I expect population & birthrates to decline post-Peak Oil, and so will the economy.

    "Whom are you addressing, Bob? I haven't noticed any cave-advocates on the site lately."

    Well, if the shoe don't fit feel free to not try it on. ;o)

    That wasn't aimed at you Bart, more of a general reaction to what I have read, or read into, some posts on the site.

    To tell you the truth, I find it very hard to read and keep up with discussions on this site once the thread has acquired more than a few posts. I suspect that I arrived at that 'Reply' with some bits and pieces that belonged elsewhere.

    Wish the "New" tags were more sticky and that we could read the thread in a non-flat format. Both would make it easier to keep track.

    --

    I find this paragraph interesting...

    "If you follow the energy news, you begin to notice a pattern . Complex, centrally controlled systems are preferred to small scale solutions. Technology which favors fossil fuels (e.g. sequestration) gets high priority. Anything that promises continuation of the high-consumption lifestyle is played up."

    I'm not sure what the "energy news" is. I visit sites which do emphasize small scale solutions, even ones that aren't particularly (IMHO) promising. So perhaps my news is different from your news. ;o)

    Personally I think we're in the early stages of a cultural change. I think people, in general, are getting the message about decreasing oil supplies, global warming, increasing scarcities of water, etc. I think we're seeing a new Zeitgeist.

    It may be that existing large corporations are concentrating on "(c)omplex, centrally controlled systems". But if they are they might have their lunches eaten by upstarts.

    Remember what happened to Big American Steel? How about Wang, who used to own corporate desktops?

    Bob Wallace:

    That wasn't aimed at you Bart, more of a general reaction to what I have read, or read into, some posts on the site.

    Thanks for clarifying, Bob. Sometimes I feel I'm in No-Man's-Land, getting shot at from both sides. It helps me understand how doomers feel. In the future, when I criticize doomerism, I think I will be more careful with my arguments and not be as dogmatic as I have been.

    Agree with the rest of your post.

    About large-scale vs small-scale energy solutions, I think some of the most interesting work is being done on small-scale solutions, though thin-film PV is exciting too. But if you check out the mainstream and academic energy efforts, I think you will find that it's large-scale all the way. I've asked some of the participating scientists about it, and they readily admit that conservation/efficiency deserve more attention. However funding is available for the large-scale, high-tech research, so what are you going to do?

    Best wishes,
    Bart

    "However funding is available for the large-scale, high-tech research, so what are you going to do?"

    Fire the Administration?

    Just a thought....

    duplicate deleted.

    DocScience

    Denmark is said to be close to peak wind power so there is little point in installing more turbines.

    Denmark is considering that they do not want a higher percentage of wind power on their grid.

    In addition to what "Bob Wallace" wrote that more wind turbines can be used in Denmark,

    Much more wind power can used, by running a separate wire network to heat domestic hot water and home heating, where you do not need highly regulated voltage output for that.

    As far as the future ability to build more wind turbines when fossil fuels run low, we can look at the countries that are now low on energy, like Cuba, and other places in Africa.
    When people ask why they do not have lots of wind energy systems, a common response is that they cost too much and there is not the resources to build them.

    Is there any reason why we will not be in a similar position in the future, if we do not build these systems now ?

    DocScience
    http://www.angelfire.com/in/Gilbert1/grid.html
    .
    .

    As a broad brush stroke, this identifies the problem with the world's carrying capacity with respect to energy-based agriculture and economic activity. However --

    Henry wrote:
    "Forget the math; when does a system disintegrate as smoothly as it integrated?"

    Agree completely. Simply adding up numbers of (possibly) available resources does not take into account the relatively rapid shift in infrastructure and consumption patterns to different energy sources needed to sustain energy-vulnerable economic activities. For example, what happens to all the automobiles produced this year that have an average lifespan of 18 years and cannot run on coal or electricity? Or all of the large suburban homes built in the last 2 decades far from destination centers and reliant on cheap natural gas to heat? As the economy begins to spiral downwards, tax revenues will plummet, and the high cost of maintaining oil-derived asphalt roads, already straining budgets in a booming economy, will rise astronomically.

    A fuller treatment of this topic can be found in Joseph Tainter's The Collapse of Complex Societies.

    Does that really make any sense to you?

    Oil may have already peaked, or may peak in the next couple/three decades. But it will be available for many decades to come. At increasing prices.

    Electric cars are starting to hit the market. They are somewhat limited in range at the moment, but that can (and most likely will) change.

    There will be a fairly smooth transition from petroleum to electric cars. If oil prices go up rapidly then the transition will happen rapidly. If prices rise slowly then we will switch to electric cars slowly.

    Governments will tax electric cars as they tax gas/diesel cars.

    Houses? We'll see more heat pumps and fewer oil furnaces. And people might speed up the migration from the cold northern centers of the continent to warmer climes where their comfort needs can be met by solar powered air conditioners.

    Or global warming may make it feasible to repopulate Detroit. ;o)

    Whatever changes we make will require capital (and return on capital), materials (and profits for those providing materials), and labor (and wages for those who labor).

    Governments will take their cut as needed.

    Greetings Again (from the author),

    First, let me apologize for my late initial response—this is my first experience with postings and comments, and I failed to fully appreciate the “real time” nature of the process. I’ll do better next time!

    Second, several of you have questioned the sources of my energy availability projections. Quite honestly, as Gail pointed out earlier, I used EIA data and projections when and where I could; and IEA information when I couldn’t find global EIA projections—but that only took me to 2030… After that, it’s pretty much all me—a synthesis of information obtained from articles, studies, books, reports, etc. that I’ve read over the past year and a half.

    As is readily evident from your commentary, there are those who feel that I am way too conservative and those who feel that I am way to optimistic—which I think is great because it demonstrates the critical requirement for this type of forecasting exercise. If folks such as you, who live and breathe this stuff everyday, are in this much disagreement about the timing and implications associated with global peak energy, how can we possibly present a coherent, well-documented case to oblivious policy makers and a distracted general public?

    We may never reach unanimous consensus, especially regarding energy availability in the year 2100 or 2200, but I think that it is important to make long term forecasts based on the “best information currently available”—then to continuously improve our process and results through successive iterations. The preceding analysis is obviously a “first iteration”; it will be interesting to look back on it after several more iterations and laugh about just how “rudimentary” it was!

    Finally, I wanted to thank you all again—I’m going to be following up links for weeks!

    Best regards,

    Chris Clugston

    You indicated that you used EIA projections where you could.

    Then the optimistic case would be where one of the 9 climate change bills gets passed. In my opinion this is highly likely given the "Inconvenient Truth" movement. Business supports them and wants a deal done this administration to blunt a more stringent deal in the next.

    Projection if the McCain/Lieberman bill is passed, which would add costs per ton of CO2 (in 2005 dollars per metric ton carbon dioxide equivalent) range from $14 to $31 in 2020 and from $31 to $58 in 2030 in the main S280 cases.

    http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/csia/execsummary.html


    They projected a more than doubling (almost triple) of nuclear power by 2030 to 2209 billion kwh from 790 billion kwh now (the no internationalization case). Renewables go up 1508 billion kwh. (again this is from an EIA projection)

    Coal and fossil fuel usage would be significantly reduced. Instead of coal growing from 50% now to 58% it would decline to 11-35%.

    Passing a bill or one like it that is already being considered in Congress and doom/decline is avoided. (Is this to optimistic an assumption ? apparently you would rather assume an X% decline starting at Y date in the future)

    http://advancednano.blogspot.com/2007/08/more-on-mccainlieberman-climate...

    http://advancednano.blogspot.com/2007/08/lieberman-mccain-climate-stewar...

    Globally nuclear plant orders and building continues to increase
    http://advancednano.blogspot.com/2007/09/tracking-increases-in-global-nu...


    Nuclear plant building and orders increasing

    The 115 building and planned nuclear reactors would be on schedule to complete by 2020. Nuclear power generation would increase by 25-30%.

    Existing nuclear power plants can be uprated to generated up to 20% more power using conventional means. MIT has developed donut shaped fuel and nanoparticle additives to the coolant which could allow 50% power generation increases.

    http://advancednano.blogspot.com/2007/08/nuclear-power-uprates.html

    Reactors that use the new fuel can operate at 700 °C—less than half of the 1800 °C required for conventional fuel. This takes the reactor temperature much farther away from the 2840 ° C at which meltdowns can occur. The temperature is so much lower because the doughnut shape enables heat to flow in two directions and the surface-area-to-volume ratio is about 60% higher, Hejzlar explains.

    Westinghouse is interested in commercializing the new design because the greater efficiencies achievable with the annular fuel would allow new light-water reactors to be significantly smaller, Lahoda says. "The biggest cost in a nuclear reactor is the building... If you can reduce the size of these things—especially the containment building—or keep them the same size and get more power out of them, then you've made money," he explains.

    ten years to commercialize but you are projecting to 2200.

    http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/esthag-w/2007/jan/tech/kb_nuclear...

    double the number of reactors and uprate the power 50% and the world triples nuclear power by 2030.

    =========
    http://advancednano.blogspot.com

    After all the fireworks, I'm still convinced that the article is the start of a very useful way of looking at energy and the future.

    However many of the criticisms strike home. I've been thinking about the comments posted here, and have come up with suggestions for Chris that incorporate many of them.

    I think these comments apply not just to Chris's model, but to any models of the future.

    1. A basic problem is confusion about what the model is. Is it a prediction? Or is it a set of scenarios that can guide us towards intelligent action.

    Paul Saffo in his Six Rules for Effective Forecasting (Harvard Business Review) describes the difference between prediction and forecasting (scenarios) as follows:

    Prediction is possible only in a world in which events are preordained and no amount of action in the present can influence future outcomes.

    ...The role of the forecaster in the real world is quite different from that of the mythical seer. Prediction is concerned with future certainty; forecasting looks at how hidden currents in the present signal possible changes in direction for companies, societies, or the world at large. Thus, the primary goal of forecasting is to identify the full range of possibilities, not a limited set of illusory certainties. Whether a specific forecast actually turns out to be accurate is only part of the picture—even a broken clock is right twice a day. Above all, the forecaster’s task is to map uncertainty, for in a world where our actions in the present influence the future, uncertainty is opportunity.

    Unlike a prediction, a forecast must have a logic to it. That’s what lifts forecasting out of the dark realm of superstition. The forecaster must be able to articulate and defend that logic. Moreover, the consumer of the forecast must understand enough of the forecast process and logic to make an independent assessment of its quality—and to properly account for the opportunities and risks it presents.

    2. A single scenario (or even two closely related ones) gives a false claim of certainty about a complex situation. It tends to restrict our thinking, encouraging a sense of doom and fatality, when instead we need be aware of the choices and what their results might be.

    The purpose should be not to get the "right" numbers, but to stimulate intelligent thinking about possible futures.

    3. Therefore it would be good to present multiple scenarios for different sets of assumptions.

    I think the present two scenarios are a good starting point. Perhaps they should be labeled as "business-as-usual" and "a more optimistic BAU", and representing your view of the most probable futures (if that is what you think they are).

    But there should be additional scenarios, showing cases that you think or likely, interesting or instructive. How many scenarios? Maybe 6, maybe 10. Enough to give the flavor of the possibilities, but not so many as to be overwhelming.

    Commenters seemed to advocate higher rates of growth for renewables like wind, and for longer periods of growth. Some suggested that that nuclear energy, of various kinds, will play a significant role. I would be interested in a scenarios for extremely aggressive efficiency and conservation measures.

    It would be good to see scenarios for possible but hard-to-predict events, such as wars, significant energy discovery, collapse of an environmental system, etc.

    Any scenario should have its assumptions clearly spelled out, as well as the reasons for those assumptions. I don't think it's necessary in a report to have detailed tables with all the results, but they should be available at a website.

    Bart
    Energy Bulletin

    Here's an idea. Assume a world of nine billion people has the same standard of living. Assume reasonable efficiency improvements, but not drastic changes in lifestyle. Then calculate how much energy we will need, or want; energy to stay warm in the winter, to stay cool in the summer, to drive our cars, to build things, to be entertained, to explore our universe. That is how much energy we will supply.