World Oil Exports: A Comprehensive Projection
Posted by Prof. Goose on October 10, 2006 - 10:13am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: algeria, argentina, azerbaijan, canada, colin campbell, colombia, denmark, ecuador, egypt, eu, exports, iran, kazakhstan, kuwait, malaysia, mexico, norway, oil exports, oil prices, peak oil, qatar, russia, united arab emirates, united kingdom, venezuela [list all tags]
This article is a first simplistic (but comprehensive) assessment of World Oil Exports, here defined has the total amount of liquid hydrocarbons that are surpluses in producing countries. This assessment is made by projecting in to the future fixed change rates that reflect current trends in liquids production and consumption in countries where presently the difference between the two is positive. The outcome of this assessment is worrisome.
Introduction
Although the debate is growing around the point in time when global oil production starts to decline permanently, for countries or regions where oil production is null or very low, the amount of oil available for trade in the market is a much more relevant issue. Such is the case of the European Union; with oil consumption topping 14.5 Mb/d, only two of its member states figure in the exporting countries list, and both with marginal numbers. More than worrying with a Peak Oil date, importing countries should worry on the future availability of tradable oil.
It is therefore of the highest importance for importing countries to know in advance the amount of oil available to the market, and from which countries/regions it may come, in order to prepare correctly for the future.
This assessment uses as data sources the Statistical Review of World Energy, published yearly by BP, and the monthly newsletter published by ASPO, where assessments for future oil production are available for more than 40 individual countries. Future oil consumption and production is projected using static change rates for the period starting in 2006 and finishing in 2020. These rates are determined by current trends and by reserves/future discovery assessments made by Colin Campbell and published in the ASPO's newsletters.
In this text the word "oil" is used for simplicity as synonym of liquid hydrocarbons, for the past data on consumption and production used includes Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).
Oil Exporters
Oil exporting countries are defined as having in 2005 an oil production greater than oil consumption, thus resulting in a surplus. Using the data published by BP on its Statistical Review of World Energy of 2006, the following countries are identified: Saudi Arabia,
Former Soviet Union (where individual data is available for Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), Norway, Venezuela, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, México, Algeria, Qatar, Canada, Malaysia, Ecuador, Argentina, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt and United Kingdom.
Due to lack of data for consumption, Angola, Nigeria and Iraq are left out of this first assessment. This issue will be revisited in the concluding stages of this article.
Figure 1 shows how these exporting countries rank in the world oil market.
Figure 1 - Oil producing countries identified for 2005. The "Others" slot contains all countries producing less than 400 Kb/d.
The statistical review contains historical data from 1965 to present, which is worth observing:
Figure 2 - Past oil exports from countries where data on consumption is also available.
The well know energy crisis of the past appear in an interesting fashion: the major declines in exports come after the events that generated it. Such might be a sign of a market ruled more from the Demand side than from the Supply side. That situation is likely to reverse as the peak in world oil production is approached.
The early 1980s are years of marked difficulties for exporters, on both wealthy sides of the Atlantic internal production backed off demand (Alaska and North Sea). Exporting numbers of the 1970s are only surpassed in the mid 1990s. This fall on oil demand can be a reasonable explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Future Oil Production
Future oil production is projected applying the decline/growth rates identified by Colin Campbell to the data published by BP. In most cases the numbers of each source for daily production do not match, Campbell's assessments focus on Conventional Oil, while BP's historical data on "All Liquids" (a somewhat loose definition which includes Liquefied Natural Gas and other non-specified liquids). Still these differences are usually small, requiring special treatment only in three cases.
Following is a list of the countries assessed. Next to the country name is the year of original assessment by Colin Campbell and in quote the author's view at the time. A brief explanation of the rate used for projection then follows.
Saudi Arabia - 2006
Production stands at 9 Mb/d giving a low depletion rate of 1.9%,, which itself is reason to doubt the higher official reserve estimates The country is endeavouring to offset the natural decline of its aging fields by infill drilling as well as advanced horizontal drilling to tap the less productive zones in the reservoir. A tar-seal on the eastern flank of Ghawar, deprives it of a natural water drive, meaning that massive amounts of water have to be injected. It is also bringing on new much smaller fields, including offshore extensions. While the country claims to be able to increase production to 12 Mb/d, it is here thought more likely that it will be hard pressed to hold present production, which is here modeled to remain about flat for another twenty years before decline sets in at about 3% a year. It may not be able even to do that.
Sweet Oil production in Saudi Arabia has likely peaked leaving the country in some sort of momentarily difficulties to replace past production rates with sour crude. The declared recoverable reserves stand at 270 Gb, a number hardly with geological meaning, given that original oil in place is declared to be 720 Gb. Including the 105 Gb already produced; that would imply a mean recovery rate of over 50% for the entire country. The current assessment by Colin Campbell stays around 160 Gb, which is probably optimistic for it implies a mean recovery of 37%, roughly meaning the successful application of tertiary recovery methods for the entire country. Still this last estimate is used which make it plausible for Saudi Arabia to continue producing liquid hydrocarbons at rates in excess of 11 Mb/d.
Russian Federation - 2003
Accordingly, we may expect a second peak around 2010.It is clear that the reserve estimates of around 50 Gb as reported by the Oil & Gas Journal were far too low. Exactly how far is difficult to know, but we tentatively favour an figure of about 60 Gb, still giving a fairly low depletion rate of 3%, which is one argument against higher estimates.
Production rose steeply up to 2005 and stalled there after; a peak is still expected circa 2010 at 10 Mb/d.
Kazakhstan - 2005
Insufficient is known about the country to make a very reliable assessment but the indications are that about 37 Gb have been discovered, of which only 6.6 have been produced. Future discovery is here assessed at about 8 Gb, giving a rounded total of 45 Gb. With such substantial reserves, the country has little incentive to explore for more. If this is approximately correct, it might be reasonable to model production rising to about 1.4 Mb/d by 2010 followed by a plateau to the onset of decline around 2030.
This projection is kept without change.
Azerbaijan -2004
Production is currently running at about 300 kb/d at far below capacity pending the construction of the new export pipeline when it may triple. The midpoint of depletion is forecast for around 2015, when production would decline at about 2.5% a year.
This projection is kept without change.
Norway - 2003
Oil production commenced in 1971 and has grown steadily to just over 3 Mb/d. Some 16 Gb have been produced, which is close to half the total discovered. Peak production was passed in 2001 (barring any shortlived surge from new small developments), and will be followed by a relatively high decline of almost 7% a year.
From 2004 to 2005 the depletion rate for Norway was actually 7%.
Venezuela - 2006
On this basis, the depletion rate of Regular Conventional production stands at no more than 2%, suggesting that even the present reserve assessment may be too generous. It is here assumed that production can be held at 1.8 Mb/d until around say 2015 before a gentle decline sets in. As already mentioned, the East Venezuela Basin has substantial reserves of Non-Conventional heavy oil, lying at depths of between 500 and 1500m.(...) Production commenced in 1990 and has risen to about 650 000 kb/d. It is assumed here that production will be flat to 2015 rising thereafter at 3% to peak in 2030 before declining at 2% a year.
This projection is kept without change.
Iran - 2003
(...) production could in resource terms rise to a second peak in 2009 at almost 5 Mb/d before commencing its terminal decline at 2.6% a year, but operational and investment constraints may prevent such a level being reached in practice, with 3-4 Mb/d peak being perhaps more likely .
Production rose to 4 Mb/d in 2004 and stalled beyond that. Based on the same resource base this daily production could be maintained up to 2020. Like Saudi Arabia, Iran's declared recoverable reserves (130 Gb) have been under great criticism. While Colin Campbell's estimates sit around 70 Gb, Samsam Bakhtiari, a retired head-man of the Iranian Oil Company, declared this year that recoverable reserves stay around 40 Gb. The projection here used can be considered fairly optimistic.
Abu Dhabi (UAE) - 2004
Oil production stands at 1.8 Mb/d, and is here assumed to remain flat at that level to the depletionmidpoint in 2026, declining at about 2% a year thereafter to about 1 Mb/d by 2050.
Assessment not available for states other than Abu Dhabi. Production for UAE has in fact been flattening in the last years, making Colin Campbell's assessment quite plausible.
Kuwait - 2004
Kuwait's production is expected to rise from a present 1.8 Mb/d to a second peak (depletion midpoint) at 2.7 Mb/d in 2018, before entering its terminal decline at about 2% a year.
This projection is kept without change.
Mexico - 2003
Mexico is here assessed to be capable of producing a total of 50 Gb to 2075, giving a midpoint ofdepletion in 1999, some fourteen years after what appears to be a premature actual peak in 1985.
Production now stands at about 3.2 Mb/d, being subject to a fairly high depletion rate of 5% a year.
Mexico seems to have peaked only in 2004, but the future decline rate is maintained.
Algeria - 2004
Production is currently running at 1 Mb/d, and is expected to rise to a peak of 1.4 Mb/d by 2006 at the midpoint of depletion, before falling to about 850 kb/d by 2020 and 300 kb/d by 2050.
Algeria produces large amounts of LNG, reaching a total of 1.8 Mb/d for Liquids in 2003 and 2 Mb/d in 2005. Future production is modeled with Colin Campbell's assessment (3% annual decline) for Conventional Oil plus a constant of 0.8 Mb/d for LNG.
Qatar - 2005
Conventional OilProduction 2004 0.78
Forecast 2010 0.53
Forecast 2020 0.27
The country has been exporting Liquefied Natural Gas for some time, and has plans to expand the capacity greatly, such that production is expected to rise to 1.4 Mb/d by 2011, making it the world's largest exporter. Several gas-to-liquids plants are also being developed by Chevron/Sasol, Exxon, Shell and others, which are expected to yield 1 Mb/d in a few years' time. Petrochemical production, including the world's largest ammonia-urea plant providing critical synthetic nutrients for agriculture, is also set to expand.
Productions rises of 9% were experienced in last years, which should continue up to 2011, beyond that an annual increase of 3.5% is used.
Liquids:
2011 1.93
2020 2.67
Canada - 2004
[Tar Sands] production, including derivatives, is here estimated to rise from about 1 Mb/d today to a plateau at 2.6 Mb/d starting in 2020, in a slow, labour- and capital-intensive process, also carrying environmental costs.
Canada seems to produce around 1 Mb/d of LNG, a figure likely to fall due to Natural Gas depletion. Total liquids production is projected increasing around 2% annum to 4.1 Mb/d in 2020.
Malaysia - 2005
Production stands at 855 kb/d, which is believed to be the peak, being set to decline at about 6% ayear, which is typical of an offshore environment. If so, production will have declined to about 570 kb/d in 2010 and 300 kb/d in 2020.
Change rate from 2004 to 2005 was -4.3%; since this was the first decline year, Colin Campbell's 6% seems quite reasonable.
Ecuador - 2003
Production now stands at about 400 kb/d, the capacity of the line. The depletion peak has been accordingly somewhat delayed by the limits to export, not being expected until 2004. Production is likely to have fallen to about 250 kb/d by 2020 and 80 kb/d by 2050.
From 2004 to 2005 production still increased by 1.1%, which indicates a near term peak. A new projection is made with a decline of 4% to a liquids production of 290 kb/d by 2020.
Argentina - 2003
Production peaked in 1998 declining to 750 kb/d in 2002. It means that Argentina will become a net importer by around 2010 assuming no increase in demand, which will no doubt further stress its economy and financial stability.
Decline rates have been erratic since 1998, with a fall of 7% from 2003 to 2004 being the highest. Henceforth decline is modeled at 6% per year decreasing production to 290 Kb/d by 2020.
Colombia - 2006
Production, reflecting the two main discovery cycles, reached a peak of 816 kb/d in 1999 at the midpoint of depletion. It has since declined to 520 kb/d giving a current depletion rate of just under 5% a year.
Projection kept without change.
Denmark - 2004
Indigenous production peaked in 2002 and is set to decline at about 7% a year.
A final peak was set in 2004 at 390 kb/d, with a decline of 3.3% for the next year. The 7% figure is here used for it's a common number for offshore terminal declines.
Egypt - 2003
Production 2002 0.27Forecast 2010 0.17
Forecast 2020 0.09
Current Depletion Rate 5.9%
The country will become a net importer of oil within about five years as domestic production continues to fall.
There's a big gap from Colin Campbell's numbers to BP's, almost 500 kb/d; which most likely is LNG. Depletion rate for Liquids is has been stable around 4%, hence this is the figure used for projection.
United Kingdom - 2006
Current (2005) oil production of 1.8 Mb/d is set to decline at the current depletion rate of 7.5% a year, meaning that it will have halved in ten years.
The days of UK as an oil exporter are already over.
Future Oil Consumption
This is an all but easy assessment, and is performed with some risks. Unlike western importing countries, most of the analyzed countries experienced profound changes in consumption patterns since the turn of the century. Future consumption is mainly obtained by projecting the change rates observed in the last years, especially since 2003 when higher oil prices started being felt. There is a clear pattern in recent years of growing affluence in these exporting countries, which are mostly outside the wealthy importer blocs (Europe, North America, Japan and Oceania). The hardest question to answer is for how long will these countries continue in the soaring consumption growth path.
Saudi Arabia
After a period of slow growth during the years of low oil price, consumption in Saudi Arabia soured above 7% during 2 years to settle down at 4.7% in 2005. Future growth is modeled at 4% annum.
Figure3 - Oil consumption and change rates in Saudi Arabia.
Russian Federation
Oil consumption has been steadily growing around 1.5%/year, with 2004 being the exception with 2.6%. The increasing incomes from oil exports do not seem to affect much the country consumption; the 1.5% figure is kept.
Figure 4 - Oil consumption and change rates in the Russian Federation.
Kazakhstan
Erratic decline/growth through the last years makes projections difficult. It is likely that the 2005 figure will be maintained for some time as the country experiences greater affluence as an oil exporter. Future consumption growth is modeled as slowing down 1% each year from 10% to 5% from which point it settles.
Figure 5 - Oil consumption and change rates in Kazakhstan.
Azerbaijan
After two spectacular declines in 2001 and 2002, the country came back to life the next three years, going above 10% in 2003 and 2005. Future growth is modeled has maintained at
10%/year, for Azerbaijan is currently a somewhat undeveloped country.
Figure 6 - Oil consumption and change rates in Azerbaijan.
Rest of FSU
Consumption in the remaining countries is modeled as growing 2%/year.
Norway
Consumption history yields years of growth alternating with years of decline; still the mean since 2001 is positive. Future consumption growth is modeled at 1.2%/year.
Figure 7 - Oil consumption and change rates for Norway.
Venezuela
In the last 5 years 2003 was a clear outlier with a decrease of almost 20%; without this year the mean growth stands at 8%/year. 2004 can be argued has a correction year from the previous crisis, but 2001 and 2002 had similar large numbers, thus 8% is the figure used to project future growth.
Figure 8 - Oil consumption and change rates for Venezuela.
Iran
Steady growth since 2000 between 4% and 7% annum with 2001 a clear outlier. The mean of these figures from 2000 to 2005, barring 2001, is 5.75% which seems reasonable to project future growth.
Figure 9 - Oil consumption and change rates for Iran.
UAE
After a long period of decline, consumption growth came back strongly in 2001. From 2003 onwards growth rates are settling on the 5-6% range. The mean of these last 3 years, approximately 5.5%, is thus used.
Figure 10 - Oil consumption and change rates for UAE.
Kuwait
Strong growth in the late nineties was followed by tow years of stillness; from 2002 onwards growth picked up again with rates varying between 5% and 10% annum. The mean rate of these last 4 years, 8% is used for projection.
Figure 11 - Oil consumption and change rates for Kuwait.
Mexico
Since 2000 a trend of erratic slow growth is visible, with 2002 a clear outlier. The mean of these figures since 2000, and excluding 2002, is 1.75% and looks like a reasonable number for future growth.
Figure 12 - Oil consumption and change rates for Mexico.
Algeria
Steady growth in the range of 3% to 6%, with an outlying 11% in 2002. The mean figure since 2000 without 2002, 4%, is thus used for future growth.
Figure 13 - Oil consumption and change rates for Algeria.
Qatar
A nation very hard to model, registering growth rates of 22% for 2001 and 47% for 2002, followed by a 3% decrease in 2003, in turn followed by strong increases in 2004 and 2005. Oil production in the country will increase beyond 2020, hence a high growth rate, circa 10%, is quite probable.
Figure 14 - Oil consumption and change rates for Qatar.
Canada
After 4 years of growth with rates above 2%, 2005 comes as the first year of declining consumption in a long time. The mean figure for the 2001-2004 period is 3.8%, probably a too higher number for a wealthy country. Still oil production is projected to grow beyond 2020, making likely future consumption growth, here set at around half of the 2001 - 2004 period.
Figure 15 - Oil consumption and change rates for Canada.
Malaysia
Growth years alternate with decline years in a nation already on terminal production decline. Future consumption is modeled as decreasing 2%/year; still Malaysia will stop being an exporter before 2020.
Figure 16 - Oil consumption and change rates for Malaysia.
Ecuador
After a decline in 2002, growth came back in the following years staying above 3%. The mean of the last 3 years, approximately 4%, is thus used.
Figure 17 - Oil consumption and change rates for Ecuador.
Argentina
As for many others not so wealthy exporters, a decline period is followed by strong growth from 2003 onwards. Future growth is modeled at 5%, reflecting the last three years.
Figure 18 - Oil consumption and change rates for Argentina.
Colombia
The country experienced shy consumption growth in the last 3 years, in spite of high decline rates in production. Future production is projected as growing 1.5%/year, a number close to the mean of the last 3 years.
Figure 19 - Oil consumption and change rates for Colombia.
Denmark
2005 seems to be an exceptional year for the country, the first where consumption didn't decline since 1996. The good student is projected as keeping up the good work and declining consumption 3%/year, in line with the trend observed in the 2000 -2004 period. Such keeps Denmark as a marginal exporter through out 2020.
Figure 20 - Oil consumption and change rates for Denmark.
Egypt
A country that illustrates perfectly the affluence growth in less wealthy oil exporters. After 3 difficult years of decline, consumption gets back on track toping 8.5% in 2005. The mean of these last 3 years, 5%, is used for 2006; beyond that Egypt's days as an exporter are over, and consumption will probably have to accommodate to the declines in production.
Figure 21 - Oil consumption and change rates for Egypt.
United Kingdom
Although experiencing a period of 3 years in a row with consumption growth above 1%, UK is a card out of the set of exporters.
Figure 22 - Oil consumption and change rates for the United Kingdom.
Future Oil Exports
The final result can be observed in Figure 23, obtained by subtracting the projected consumption from the projected production for each country. Once a country stops being an exporter is thereafter left out of the total. The countries leaving the exporters club are: United Kingdom in 2006, Egypt in 2007, Argentina in 2010, Mexico in 2015, Malaysia in 2019 and Colombia also in 2019.
Figure 23 - Total Oil exports from the assessed countries, including the projections for the 2006 - 2020 period.
The graph in Figure 23 depicts a very clear scenario: total exports from the assessed countries declines from hereafter, never recovering again. The decline rate grows with time, as seen Figure 24:
Figure 24 - Total Oil exports and evolution rates for the assessed countries, including the projections for the 2006 - 2020 period.
The declines rates resulting from the projections made are never higher than those observed during the early 1980s, still in 15 years total oil exports decline almost 40% from 36.2 Mb/d to 22.6 Mb/d. This period ahead might not have much in common with the crisis lived in the 1970s and 1980s, but if economic recession takes over in importing countries, periods of heavy decline might happen, followed by periods of recovery. It's worth looking closely to this period in figure 25.
Figure 25 - Decline rates in total oil exports for the assessed countries during the projected period, 2006 to 2020.
Four different periods can be identified:
. 2006 - 2010 : slow decline below 2%/year;
. 2011 - 2013 : first acceleration to a decline rate close to 4%/year;
. 2014 - 2016 : steady decline at 4%/year;
. 2017 - 2020 : new acceleration up 5%/year.
The first acceleration is probably the most critical period and follows the peak in world oil production. The final years of the 2010s decade will present great challenges for oil importing nations.
Finally is worth mentioning that these four periods seem to fit on Samsam Bakhtiari's Four Transitions of which the first started last year.
Important countries left out
There are three main countries for which consumption data is not available, hence not included in the calculations: Angola, Iraq [ed] and Nigeria. For the last two even if the data existed projection would be difficult. Both countries are experiencing serious social disturbances, Iraq is unfortunately undergoing what is technically a war, and in Nigeria social inequity is leading to rebellion from people to whom oil has only brought disadvantages. Some sort of social transformation is to expect in the following years in these countries, hopefully towards more stable environments.
As for Angola the times of social unrest seem to be gone, although elections are yet to take place, the liberal opposition is now unarmed. In 2003 the 5 million Angolans consumed little over 40 Kb/d. Today that number is unknown but is surely much higher, perhaps several orders of magnitude, due to an explosion in the housing market, an to a sharp increase in population (there are reports of 1 million Chinese living in Luanda alone). The latest assessment made by Colin Campbell pushed the peak in Angola's production back to 2011 (from circa 2018), more inline with other specialists (e.g. Cramez). The adding of future oil exports from Angola would not change much the overall picture, probably softening the decline rates before 2011 and augmenting them thereafter. Still this is an oil exporting country worth assessing if consumption data can be found in the future.
Conclusions
This assessment should be taken "with a grain of salt", it is not to be expected that the future will follow these projections. But looking at these numbers, there some trends that clearly arise, the most important being a decline from 2005 onwards of the amount of oil coming to the market. This situation is a consequence of consumption growth at higher pace than production in most of oil exporting countries.
Once the amount oil available for export becomes lower than the amount required by the importing countries costs start to rise, forcing an abnormal wealth transfer from buyers to sellers. This newly acquired wealth will improve affluence in exporting countries, which in turn drives up internal consumption (better automobiles, better and farther from center houses, more goods imports and transportation, etc). This feedback loop will perpetuate itself until some event or constraint tackles consumption growth in the exporters' side, or until the importers collapse from lack of new wealth to transfer. The former is the most likely scenario.
For oil importing countries like EU these projections bring a worrisome conclusion: mitigation strategies for oil scarcity should have started taking effect in 2005. For this to happen, planning should have started in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Although programs for liquid hydrocarbons replacement exist in the electric generation sector in the EU, US or Australia, none of these countries seems to have prepared to phase out oil in the transportation sector. In the case of the EU it is also important to note the failure to plan an alternative to nuclear electric generation, an important energy source in some member states, since its stalling due to negative public opinion.
Finally another consequence must be observed: unfortunately, as laid down originally by Colin Campbell (and further improved by the folks at PostCarbon and Rich Heinberg), the Oil Depletion Protocol may only function if exporting countries restrain their oil consumption. Up to the Peak Oil epoch the Protocol can work if exporting countries match their consumption growth to the production, freezing the amount of oil coming on market. After Peak Oil these countries would have to decrease their internal consumption in order to mach the decline rate of world production with that of world consumption. It is hard to envision less wealthy countries reducing their consumption in order to provide oil to wealthier countries. Let's just hope for the best.
Acknowledgements
First to the TOD editing team for once more making possible this sharing of ideas.
Secondly and most importantly to Colin Campbell, for his time long work on Peak Oil, of which the invaluable country by country assessments, that made this piece possible, are part of.
There is probably something to be learnt about communication of finite oil concepts by how it is attacked there (they won't hold back).
So far I see appeals to 'cry wolf', appeals to alternative authorities, ideas that peak oil is all the trick of the oil companies, its all fud, its all too far away, future improved extraction techniques increasing reserves and new technology making oil obsolute. A winning argument therefore needs to nail each of these, preferably in a quick and succinct way.
Otherwise, TOD makes a winning argument everyday. Unless someone is willing to put the time in to understand the issues or, at least, they are open-minded, there is no way to persuade them. This is merely denial, which is common enough -- whether it is slashdot or Forbes.
But maybe we'll catch a few fish here, heh?
For the others, I always love it when people who don't know shit tell us we're wrong.
To my reading it is an issue of scalability, timelines and %age rates. The assumption is that time exists for handwaving technology solutions to match the threat of decline, and indeed overtake it so that dependence on imports can be reduced. It is difficult for people to get a handle on how much and how fast change would have to come, let alone something like EROEI.
In reality its less about the specifics of the particular technologies - more about levels and rates. Is there a pithy way of capturing how extensive and quick the expansion in a particular technology would need to be to address the problem? For tar sands its easy timelines and rates make it obvious its an also ran as far as solutions go.
Just how tractable is coal-to-liquid fuel in terms of mines, plant and cost? Can people be given a simple way to understand how much has to be done to make 1 mb of oil per day?
No.
Tell them that one barrel of crude = 25,000 hours of physical labor. One gallon of gasoline = 600 hours of back-breaking labor. Ask them to shovel dirt for 600 hours to 'discover & recover' one gallon for their vehicles: this will hammer home just how rare & precious FFs really are to detritovore existence.
Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?
- Electrify US freight railroads, at least the main lines. Add back double & triple tracks torn out in the 1960s, 70s, 80s.
- Put tolls on the Interstate Highways, like that good Republican Eisenhower wanted to.
The worse Peak Oil gets, the more freight ton-miles will flow on non-oil transportation (perhaps still local delivery via truck, but businesses will move onto or build rail spurs for the competitive advantage).Together, heavy trucks and railroads use ~2.5 million barrels/day of diesel. Cut that in half is quite doable. Cut by 3/4 or 80% over time.
Another easy to understand solution. Look at Washington DC Metro. See how much oil it saves (40+% commute by it in DC) and how DC area is beginning to cluster around it. Miami wants to build the same thing (90% of population within 3 miles of a station) bur it will take them 25 years. Build it within 5 years and two dozen more like it within ten years. Streetcars in a hundred US cities & towns, then two hundred.
Save several million more barrels/day.
Simple ?
Best Hopes,
alan
Simple ?
Maybe we could add a check box and line item to form 1040 for those who feel like they want to pay even more taxes. Me - I have had enough of them.
-PoP
God, I'd settle for an ethos of sufficiency rather than excess. Enjoying what you have rather gluttony. The good news (I think) is we are soo wasteful and gluttonous that if we just take was we need it would make a big difference without ever needing to get to sacrifice.
Of cource this doesn't apply to the poor countries which are already in states of deprivation.
I-70 through the mountains of Colorado is approaching gridlock even on non ski weekdays. Something has to give, but it does not seem feasible to expand the highway through the mountains. The economies of all those mountain towns, mostly built up since the introduction of the interstate, are completely dependent upon that highway. In this case, part of the solution has to be interstate specific. If the gas tax is to be relied upon, there is no particular disincentive to get out of your car if your destination is say, Vail, coming from Denver. Since long term solutions like rail won't be available for at least 20 years, wide scale bus transit must occur in order to prevent 24/7, 365 days per year gridlock. Just providing buses, even if subsidized, won't get the job done. Ergo, provide heavily subsidized buses, park and rides, and impose heavy tolls to get people out of their automobiles. There will still remain the problem of truck traffic which will have to wait for diversion to rail.
The purpose of road tolls is to tax congestion, that is to say the cost you put onto other people by jamming up the road, (and they put on you).
On the subject of overall taxation, UK gas prices are roughly twice American, the entire difference being tax.
So say our total tax is $4/gal, and yours is $1/gal.
The estimate is that gas taxes and car taxes are about 1/3rd the total cost to society of driving in the UK: cost of accidents, cost of air pollution (that's not including the cost of global warming).
DC has a population of around 600,000, while the surrounding area of what most people would consider a single region easily has over 2 million inhabitants (Fairfax County alone has more than 1 million inhabitants).
The lack of parking in DC over the years as the open spaces available for offices filled in meant that Metro became more practical. This process is perfectly seen in the L'Enfant Plaza complex, which I sort of grew up with. Originally, parking wasn't hard, access to the interstate system was assured, but as time went on, the density of the government/commercial buildings in the area grew, parking became not only more expensive but also unreliable (and DC's parking enforcers are the one truly efficient branch of that city's government).
However, Metro was also being built, and L'Enfant Plaza plugs into the system very well, and with current plans including tying up with VRE - though the freightyards in Arlington are long gone, to make space for malls, condos, and offices. This meant that many of the federal workers at L'Enfant Plaza could use Metro - however, this did not mean they were using Metro alone.
This is where the 40% number has to be treated with a very skeptical perspective. No hard numbers to contradict it directly, just some comments on how that 40% may have been arrived at, and a data point or two to set against it.
First, DC is no longer the central goal of most federal workers in the region, though federal workers are still the largest single workforce in DC. Second, even Metro's density (apart from new places like the Ballston corridor in Arlington, or old places like Silver Spring, Maryland) is low, and the buses really not that useful. A lot of people drive to parking lots first, then take Metro to DC. When this number of commuter-riders is compared to the population of DC, the number is likely to approach 40%. (The same is definitely true of VRE and MARC and their light rail function.)
Simply look at the number of cars per hour on the Cabin John Bridge (Woodrow Wilson is more distorted by 95 and its north/south traffic) to get a feel of how many people are driving over a single bridge in an hour compared to the capacity of the entire Metro subway system to carry. Then add in a number of other choke points (DC's bridges for Northern Virginia traffic, for example to give a good estimate of commuters compared to Metro riders), and pretty soon, another picture is likely to emerge - that is, the number of cars in Northern Virginia staying within its boundaries is likely larger than the entire number of cars being used by commuters in DC. And of course, road building remains the favored solution to congestion.
The way most people currently live in the DC metro area means a car is essential. A small but growing number of people do live in areas where not having a car makes sense (though these tend to be inadequate places to raise children - no green/open space at all, for example), but in general, most people consider a car indispensable to how the live, and feel that keeping the car is normal, while changing the way they live is unacceptable - this is hard to grasp for someone who lives in a true city, but a lot of people in a place like Northern Virginia feel that life in a city is to be avoided - what I especially liked was how often I heard and read that the suburbs I grew up in (those demographics are for another time) are now becoming too 'ethnic,' so it was good to live even farther away, among people who were just like you, the way it was decades ago. When people drove big cars, and ignored things like conservation or long term planning, becoming increasingly shrill against other viewpoints, while growing silently frantic as their personal economic situation grew increasingly uncertain or threatening. (I'll stop there, though the fact that a major, stupid war is being fought again, in large part in both cases to defend the American Way Of Life, is also striking.)
I have no experience of New Orleans, but only a few cities in America do not think this way. And yes, it is a huge divider.
A new station was added to the old Red Line, and a series of office buildings (some private, also ATF HQ) sprang up for 3 blocks.
Without Metro, GAO said that they would disperse federal office buildings in the suburbs. Figure oil consumption with & without Metro !
DC wants to build 40 miles of streetcars to feed Metro and connect neighborhoods. The Dulles and Purple lines need to be built. Metro is NOT all it could be !
Miami voted a half cent sales tax to expand Miami Metro from 20 miles (memory) to ~103 miles. This suddenly made Metro "Hot" from a real estate POV. During my visit there in 2004, 15 of 23 construction cranes were within three blocks of a Metro station (and signs/excavation for at least two more high rises that I saw).
BTW, anyone been to Miami lately and ridden the Metro ? Is reale state still booming next to the stations (within 3 blocks).
One of the values of New Orleans is that it is a living example of a high quality of urban life coupled with low energy consumption. Check out my comments on the contrast with NYC (another low energy city).
http://nyc.theoildrum.com/story/2006/9/28/124514/971
Peak Oil will be a large and brutal hammer. If there is an escape (urban rail, TOD) then people will flock to it. If there is no escape (typical US post WW II city/suburbs) then people will be beaten down by it.
Best Hopes,
Alan
Not to diss New Orleans, as was, is, or will be,
but
it had one of the highest murder and other crime rates of any US city, was (in)famous for its corruption and civic mismanagement, and some of the poorest urban dwellers in America.
A very special place. A place of music. A place so unlike much of America, where you work to live not just live to work.
But an urban idyll? Hardly. A desparately poor place, whose major industry was providing a glimpse to a past life, for an America that had moved beyond it.
Contrast that to a 'we all love to hate' city. Las Vegas. High average income, high unionisation, a place where ordinary people move to and can enjoy the fruits of the American dream. An invented place, much like America itself. That high average income and benefits and the correlation with unionisation is no accident-- it is unionisation that has always brought those benefits for American workers, and the absence of same that has meant they do not have it. A place where black people move to so they can live like whites-- with a place in the suburbs, a car, a steady job, the things the white middle class used to take for granted. A place where ordinary people who can no longer afford LA, can move to and buy a house.
Now LV doesn't look 'sustainable' to me-- out in the desert, no water, dependent on cars and cheap flights. But there it is, and it works, and it delivers both the dark and the bright side of the American dream.
My own view is that with Global Warming, it is more than likely that the US will abandon NO within this century: perhaps a big dike around the French Quarter and a sort of 'Williamsburg-like' historical district, but much of the city will just not be sustainable with the kinds of storms we are likely to experience by the middle of the century.
Watching Toronto struggle with its problems, and Toronto had one of the best transit systems in North America ('ride the Red Rocket'), now seriously financially troubled, I am not sure light rail/ subways work in the modern urb. A lot depends on whether you can change the zoning, to build the apartments, offices and shopping malls along the streetcar nexuses (nexi?).
But for the 4.5 million people of the Greater Toronto Area (projected to be 8 million before 2050) I think the transit solution will be 'smart car' whether it be minivan taxi systems, road pricing or some combination of car-based measures.
(this written by a man who lives in Europe, and loves Toronto for its old streets and streetcars)
The old City of Toronto worked well and had a density that easily justified that (I think 25k people live within half a mile of Yonge and Eglinton alone).
The TTC always ran well and at a profit in the old Boroughs: Toronto, York, East York. It was never so successful in the post war suburbs (North York, Scarborough, Etobicoke) where the densities are so much lower.
And the suburbs fought against increases in their density-- this is what screwed the Spadina Subway extension (I still remember the bitterly cold day it opened in ?1975?). There just hasn't been that much development at Glencairn and that. With the honourable exception of Mel Lastman when he was Mayor of N. York and NY City Centre.
I wonder if the mistake will be fixed on the Shepherd Subway? Don Mills and that are still pretty low density (condo blocks notwithstanding).
My point remains that though Metro is working well, and is actually a fairly functional system within its fairly narrow confines, it is only a fraction of the total amount of travel in the region, and until that car travel declines, it will remain a significant factor, but lower than 40% of all commuter trips in the region - and using DC in isolation is deceptive in terms of how many Metro riders reach Metro.
As for the Metro being full this summer - yes, it was, more than I expected. On the other hand, I have been informed by people who work regularly at various federal facilities, all parking at such buildings includes under vehicle inspections and various other time consuming security measures - parking in DC is really, really a major hassle even if you have one of the dwindling number of 'free' parking spaces in government buildings (except Congress - the parking near Union Station is just so cute, and I am sure it will expand as required).
The move of the military out of Crystal City is he best externally-initiated thing to happen to Arlington in a while. The majority of the land owners (ie Charles E Smith/Vernado) are chomping at the bit to redevelop the 60's era buildings and re-tenant with commercial enterprises. The tenants-to-be are also clamering to get Crystal City space once the whole area is renewed. It's really quite amazing. We appreciated the Navy folk that were there, but the concrete-canyon decor was not much appreciated (due to lack of sidewalk activation and just plain bad architecture) and that is all being changed for the better. See link for ongoing planning:
http://www.arlingtonvirginiausa.com/index.cfm/11250
And yes, Crystal City is the sort of place which needs some improvement to make it inhabitable. Though what a great example of America's vision of the future, ca. 1960/70 - nothing but glass and concrete and cars.
I would say Crystal City needs improvements to make it beautiful, as it is alread inhabited by over 6000 residents and probably 5 times that many office workers. Quite a bit out of balance for what we like to see at our metro stops, but that is changing. We just approved a project to convert a large office to residential. I was dubious about it, but they are totally reskinning the outside and making it work well with the street, and the apartments inside will have very nice high 12 ft ceilings since it is commercial-grade construction.
Crystal City was named by the majority land-owner after his wife, Crystal so he already thinks it is beautiful - here's his website
http://crystalcity.com/
Of course, I disagree. Although, its not mearly the beige, 60's style architecture, it was the philosophy at the time to seperate the cars and pedestrians so Crstal City was designed with a whole network of human tunnels and shops underground as well as many skywalks. This had the effect of sucking the human life off the street, turning the streets into traffic sewers, and of course as a result they paid little attention to the design of the building at the street level. The street-level makeover is making the biggest difference to the area with shops and restaurants now opening onto the street in places.
Arlington resident, Adrian Cronaur (The Good Morning Vietnam guy) and others actually seem to like the underground shops as he documents here:
http://walkarlington.com/go/crystal.html
I haven't been there in over a year, but I have heard that the transformation is well underway and people who live there seem quite happy with it. It's funny that it is only 2 miles from my house but I haven't been there in so long, but there's plenty to do in my own neighborhood so haven't had the need.
London as well. My father actually helped install flood doors in some of the London Tube lines after the war (they could then double as atomic war shelters, which was a concern at the time).
But the Tube already regularly floods.
Our government is always talking about 'joined up thinking' (ie interdepartmental policy coordination).
However the intention is to put new nuclear reactors on existing, licensed reactor sites. To combat global warming.
It was then pointed out that some of these sites are, on the Environment Department's forecasts, likely to be under water by the middle of the century (at least during a bad storm).
Comments:
Metro has been great in spuring densification near a number of its stops. Part of that is no doubt economic in nature, encouraged on by the local jurisdictions. Many of the inner suburbs are quite urban in feel and car use more of a liability than an asset. However the relative affluence of those areas in conjunction with the extremely dispursed nature of the high paying jobs further out in Tysons, Reston, and across the Potomac along I270 ensure those "urban residents" continued to use their cars. Immigrants, the poor and those working in DC proper would generally use Metro.
Then there is this whole issue with these "high density suburbs" that cluster about the landscape, places with urban levels of population density (residential and office towers) plunked down in a distinctly suburban land use patterns (single use zoning) transportation networks (hierarchical). I blogged that last summer, but my criticism still applies today.
It's an oldie, but goodie introduction to the "sucking chest wound" (as one of my commenters put it) that is metropolitan DC.
http://unplanning.blogspot.com/2005/07/high-rise-suburbia.html
The rest of the DC area beyond the Beltway is your garden variety sprawl with little use for public transportation (beyond subsistance level bus service for the indigent, elderly or immigrant). With the metro "boundaries" reaching to the mountains in the west, the bay in the east and damn near to Fredricksburg in the south, no amount of "public transportation" will rectify this mess. At least here in the West, topography generally has limited the extent of our sprawl. Not so there.
Although I left the area in 92 and the East in 96, my family still lives in NoVA so I get to periodically reaccquaint myself with some of the many reasons I left the area when I go to visit.
It doesn't really work. People seeking fun go downtown by subway or car, and what you have is a long canyon of buildings, boiling in summer, freezing cold in winter, and massive traffic jams. No street life to speak of, no atmosphere.
http://www.globalairphotos.com/large/ON/Toronto/North_York/2002/114/2
It's still got no character, no cover from the icy cold winds or the blazing sun, no sense of the pedestrian. You feel completely marginalised by the traffic. And I've never found a decent restaurant (maybe I am not looking hard enough).
Contrast that to the top of Avenue Road, where you still have the little shops and restaurants along the road and a neighbourhood feel.
Even Bathurst and York Mills has more character, albeit a bit spooky sometimes? My lawyer has his office in a strip mall up there.
The true part of this statement is that the freightyyards are gone. People think I'm strange when I wonder aloud if we will ever need freight yards back some day.
However, the rest of your statement is misleading. Of the 45 acres in the freightyard on the Arlington side (we call it the North Tract), about 28 acres will be devoted to a tremendous open-space recreation area with multiple gardens/parks, soccer fields, a world-class aquatics (swimming etc) facility and other indoor recreation. The exact mix isn't finalized, but the community process and designing is well underway and the funding is already secured through an 80 million dollar bond.
It's true that in the other 18 acres, there will be condo's offices, retail and perhaps some cultural facilities and these will all be connected into the North Tract Rec area as will the rest of Arlington though transit and yes, some parking will be provided.
This link will take you to the Arlington site where another link goes to the PDF task force report for the North Tract
http://tinyurl.com/lrfma
Arlington (which I lived in for a few years) always struck me as one of the hardest to classify areas in Northern Virginia. Alexandria, Fairfax, Prince William / Manassas, Loudoun / Leesburg - not hard to stereotype and fairly easy to predict what they would do. But Arlington? You just never knew - music and art, good food, mixed with fairly poor police and some clear distinctions between north and south.
Not sure what you mean about the police. I was upset when the new chief reduced the bicycle patrols because I thought it made them more approachable and the ones in crusiers tend to speed a bit much. But, they still are not bad at community relations as far as cops go.
Any TOD person should come out for the Clarendon Day party in the Clarendon Neighborhood of Arlington, Oct 21 - one of the many street festivals that Arlington has - food, bands, arts etc
Here are some pictures from last year:
http://www.beyonddc.com/privatesets/ClarendonDay05/
More info at the Alliance
http://www.clarendon.org/index.html
- it was built for commuters as a hub and spoke and now there is MUCH more demand for inter=city travel in DC as almost every neighborhood in DC is, or is becoming a destination where people live,work,shop and play (so there is much more demand to travel between these neighborhoods at non-commute times). This is also very true of the inner suburbs like where I live in Arlington.
- It is busting at the seams in terms of utilization. The off-peak times are where the peak-times were 20 years ago and the peak times are packed to the gills. Unfortunately, they made the decision when they built it to not easily allow for adding parallel track so the remedy is limited to adding longer trains (doable, but limited in effect), and making a spot improvement at the Orange/Blue line crossing at the potomac.
DC and the inner suburbs are adding residents quickly, however the biggest by far land-use problem is the lack of affordable housing. The desire to live in the city and in the close-in, walkable communities is so great that land prices have shot up many-fold over the last 10 years. This also is squeezing out independent retailers that gave the neighborhoods their character, being replaced by more national chains who can afford space renting at 40-60 a square foot when it used to be 4-10 a sq ft.Most of the people swarming back to the city are 20-30 somethings and 50-60 empty-nesters, but there are some with children as well and they are very active in the community. Arlington public schools are among the best in the country and that attracts a lot of people, also you can get a single family withing walking distance of your school, your daycare, the grocery, movie theatres' restaurants, the metro etc - although it will cost you from 800K and up. I live in such a house but it was bought 10 years ago when it was a third the price.
The outer suburbs are a completel different story. Whereas DC and the inner suburbs put land-use and zoning in place when the metro was constructed to turn the areas around the metro into mixed-use villages, the outer suburbs did very little planning and mostly reacted to the increasing number of single family houses that ate up their farmlands by building and widening roads. Their metro stops are basically parking lots. Now Tysons Corner, the most inner of the outer suburbs is trying to become a real downtown since they may get a metro extension, but I'm not too optimistic. They will have lots of office, retail and residential, but the form of the development and street network will not be very urban. The attitude of their community is still focussed on people driving rather than making a great place for people first.
I wrote this fast, so apologies for typos etc.
http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/dpz/tysonscorner/nofind/Drftgridconcepts.pdf
It remains to be seen how successful this endevor will be. If we maintain a degree of order for another 5-10 years as our energy supplies begin to contract -OR- we begin a wholesale re-engineering of our cities in expectation of said decline, then I think Tysons may be kindof neat a decade from now. Otherwise this planning process will grind on until the collapsing economy kills it off and squatters inhabit the abandoned structures. Who knows. I'm just glad I am not there to witness it.
In anycase, I agree Arlington is an attractive place in general. I've been there a number of times (mostly via Metro) and enjoyed myself. Too bad the rest of the area is not like that or even better, DC proper.
A winning argument is one that convinces people, not one that you think should convince people. Failing to understand that fundamental difference is why normal people write you off...
...no matter how many elitist ad hominems you resort to.
Most of the highly-rated serious comments on Slashdot were of the form "for reason X, I don't think their analysis is correct." If your response to reasonable skepticism is to complain about how stupid Slashdotters must be, then perhaps you have less of an investment in empiricism and more of an investment in faith than you're willing to admit.
If you look at the comments now, they really aren't all that bad. This has to do with the way comments are rated and displayed on the site. If you scroll half-way down the comments, down to where comments with a rating of 1 or 2 start appearing, their will be plenty of chaff with your wheat, but the highly rated comments (which means that Slashdot readers saw their value) really aren't that bad.
Although Slashdot's comment rating scheme is far from perfect, I often wish that TOD had something similar.
It seems like it all comes down to ignorance. Smart people don't like to admit their ignorance any more than anyone else, so they take logical shortcuts that support their gut feelings - whether optimisic or pessimistic.
Myself, I KNOW I'm arguing from a POV of expecting scarcity in a world that says otherwise. For people who expect abundance, there's NO argument that will convince the future will be otherwise. I imagine if every debate could continue in depth, both sides would have to conclude we just don't know exactly what the facts are.
I don't know how to effectively "argue ignorance" to promote concern and defensive responses, but it seems all I can do. Of course the optimists have FAITH the people in-the-know will keep things humming, and give us fair warning if there's a problem. I'm curious about that too, but my explanation is most technical people are not looking at the bigger picture, but only three steps ahead in their little corner.
I think Heinberg, Simmons, and Hirsh are all pretty good at the ignorance argument, while Campbell, and others who try to PREDICT get into more trouble with the "crying wolf" risks, not that prediction is bad, just that it must somehow state every other sentence its limits.
At this point in time it may turn out that peak oil will be simply an interesting transition period. My own country, Australia, cut petrol consumption by 5% in one year of oil prices above $60/barrel. There are numerous technologies and social constructs available to replace Oil for transportation or at least to use it far more efficiently.
I think for the most part the slashdot crowd see Yet Another Set of Profits of Doom and yawn. Been there, down that.
It's not that I don't think we have a problem, I do. I'm just rather optimistic that it will be solved in various reasonably unpainful ways.
They even discredit their fellow geeks (geologists) and won't listen to those in the know. Oh well, when we start having natural gas issues in the US in a few more years, their PCs will be the first to "powerdown."
I guess we know better now, eh? Sad.
The Slashdot posters are in the technofix camp. Because they have grown up with that model "always" working. They live on and off the upper parts of the energy consumption world.
If they can make it work, more power to them, and no skin off my nose.
It is not like the future is cast in stone.
Lets say there is a 'magical working' POOF energy source.
Any highly energetic energy source has a history of being a destructive explosive also.
If the world became awash in excessive energy, will man spend alot of that energy attempting to mittigate environmental damage - or just keep the consumption party going?
The tendency of energy sources to be bombs and the consumption-biosphere degradation cycle still looks to me like a skinned, broken or shot off nose.
FWIW, I think the slashdot crowd might be unschooled on oil depletion, but I think there's something to be said for being open to answers ... whatever they prove to be.
"if energy_crisis, do whatever_works"
Also, while SDers can deliver good commentary on computer related topics, their knowledge (and appreciation) of other fields is not always that deep.
Ironically, Peak Oil is likely to occur also around 2013!
Because if it doesn't the future could really be an abstraction.
We'll make an interesting archaeology Phd thesis for some future visitor from another civilisation.
Oh, and don't take anything personally over there.
No one denies that resources of fossil fuels are finite. Note that resource indicates the total endowment of a mineral (metals, non-metals or energy fuels) on earth, which is clearly finite in a geologically short timespan. The concept of reserves takes a moment longer to understand. Reserves basically represent how much of a particular mineral resource (let's say oil) is known with a degree of certainty, and economically viable to extract at the current price. There are two key elements here...
- that the reserve is known;
- it is economic at current prices.
Reserve data are highly mutable... if the oil price were to drop to US$20/bbl for WTI the world reserve base instantly declines, while a rise in prices achieves the opposite. If oil companies spend more dollars on exploration the known reserve base will also increase as new fields are discovered (e.g. the massive field recently discovered in the Gulf of Mexico, which is only economic at our currently highish price of oil).If one takes a couple minutes perusing the BP oil slides one notices a very interesting one. Despite oil consumption relentlessly increasing over the last few decades, the oil reserves to consumption ratio graph shows that we have had a reserve/production ratio of 40 years for the last two decades. That is to say that we have enough known reserves to supply the world oil needs at current production rates for 40 years. And guess what, at the much lower consumption rates of 20 years ago the picture was exactly the same.
What does this tell you? There is no incentive for oil companies to map out the next 200 years worth of oil reserves. It would be wasted exploration funds that could be better spent elsewhere. They spend the funds to keep the reserve inventory nicely stocked (40 years is a nice comfortable margin) and then attend to spending funds elsewhere.
I haven't even talked about substitution effects here. In my opinion, I think it far more likely that the world will have substituted away from non-renewable fossil fuels due to global warming concerns, long before any threat of Peak Oil rears its ugly head.
Separately, but related, some day the techno-freaks are going to have to come to terms with the un-paid-for costs of technology: water resource damage, loss of biodiversity, etc, etc.
The second piece of evidence that would put the above "40 years supply rule" in question is that every year's oil consumption is only replaced with 1/3 as much reserves addition. I suspect the BP figures may include oil sources that are technologies that will never be brought to market like oil shale. Furthermore, the reserve numbers of nearly every OPEC member has grown by a factor of two in the 1990's without explaination by further exploration or reanalyzing exploration data. This lack of transparency (recently rescinded by Kuwait when they cut their oil reserves in half after reexamining data) shows that current world reserves are questionable.
The last important factor in peak oil is production capability. Saudi Aramco is working like there is no tomorrow to increase capacity from 10 MBPD to 12 MBPD and it will cost many tens of billions of $$$. How are they ever going to reach the 18 MBPD figure the EIA says KSA will have to reach to satisfy world needs by 2025? And I have not even brought up the issue of costs both in environmental remediation and actual dollars to bring any oil shale to market. Most of the oil shale deposits, which many optimists like to count as reserves, will likely remain forever "horizon technologies", never being brought to market because the cost of production continually goes up as fast or faster than the value of the resource.
'Do Reserves Tell Us Anything?'
http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/4/26/18109/8251
IMO reserves are at best a SWAG.