Peak Oil Update - November 2006: Production Forecasts and EIA Oil Production Numbers
Posted by Khebab on November 20, 2006 - 10:55am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: Ali Morteza Samsam Bakhtiari, bp, chris skrebowski, eia, logistic, loglets, m. king hubbert, oil, oil prices, peak oil, rembrandt koppelaar, stuart staniford, update [list all tags]
Note, if you are coming in from Wikipedia, the latest updates can be found at this link.
An update on the last production numbers from the EIA along with different oil production forecasts.
Fig 1.- World oil production (EIA Monthly) and various forecasts (2000-2020). Click to Enlarge.
New forecasts added:
- The shock model (Crude oil + NGL, 2004)
- The GBM model (Crude oil + NGL, 2006)
- Deffeyes (Crude oil + condensate, 2004)
- Jean Lahèrrere (All liquids, 2006)
- Forecasts from CERA (All liquids, 2006)
EIA Last Update (August)
Data sources for the production numbers:
- Production data from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006 (Crude oil + NGL).
- EIA data (monthly and annual productions up to July 2006) for crude oil and lease condensate (noted CO) on which I added the NGPL production (noted CO+NGL).
The All liquids peak is now August 2006 at 85.10 mbpd, the year to date average values (8 months) are down from 2005 for all the categories. The peak dates are unchanged for Crude Oil + Cond., NGPL and Crude Oil + NGL.
| Category | Aug 2006 | Aug 2005 | 12 MA1 | 2006 (8 Months) | 2005 (8 Months) | Share | Peak Date | Peak Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Liquids | 85.10 | 83.90 | 84.32 | 84.30 | 84.37 | 100.00% | 2006-08 | 85.10 |
| Crude Oil + NGL | 81.55 | 80.60 | 81.16 | 81.20 | 81.25 | 95.83% | 2005-05 | 81.87 |
| Other Liquids | 3.55 | 3.30 | 3.16 | 3.10 | 3.11 | 4.17% | 2006-08 | 3.55 |
| NGPL | 7.88 | 7.36 | 7.69 | 7.78 | 7.76 | 9.26% | 2005-02 | 8.04 |
| Crude Oil + Condensate | 73.67 | 73.24 | 73.47 | 73.42 | 73.50 | 86.58% | 2005-12 | 74.06 |
Table I - Production estimate (in millions of barrels per day (mbpd)) for August 2006 taken from the EIA website (International Petroleum Monthly). 1Moving Average on the last 12 months.
Fig 2.- World oil production (Crude oil + NGL) and various forecasts (1940-2050). The light gray box gives the particular area where the Figures below are zooming in. Click to Enlarge.
Business as Usual
- EIA's International Energy Outlook 2006, reference case (Table E4).
- IEA total liquid demand forecast for 2006 and 2007 (Table1.xls).
- A simple demographic model based on the observation that the oil produced per capita has been roughly constant for the last 26 years around 4.4496 barrels/capita/year (Crude Oil + NGL). The world population forecast employed is the UN 2004 Revision Population Database (medium variant).
- CERA forecasts for conventional oil (Crude Oil + Condensate?) and all liquids, believed to be productive capacities (i.e. actual production + spare capacity). The numbers have been derived from Figure 1 in Dave's response to CERA.
Fig 3.- Production forecasts assuming no visible peak. Click to Enlarge.
PeakOilers: Bottom-Up Analysis
- Chris Skrebowski's megaprojects database (see discussion here).
- The ASPO forecast from the last newsletter (#71): I took the production numbers for 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2050 and then interpolated the data (spline) for the missing years. I added the previous forecast issued one year and two years ago (newsletter #58 and #46 repectively). There was no revision since August 2006.
- Rembrandt H. E. M. Koppelaar (Oil Supply Analysis 2006 - 2007): "Between 2006 and 2010 nearly 25 mbpd of new production is expected to come on-stream leading to a production (all liquids) level of 93-94 mbpd (91 mbpd for CO+NGL) in 2010 with the incorporation of a decline rate of 4% over present day production".
- Koppelaar Oil Production Outlook 2005-2040 - Foundation Peak Oil Netherlands (November 2005 Edition).
- The WOCAP model from Samsam Bakhtiari (2003). The forecast is for crude oil plus NGL.
Fig 4.- Forecasts by PeakOilers based on bottom-up methodologies. Click to Enlarge.
PeakOilers: Curve Fitting
The following results are based on a linear or non-linear fit of a parametric curve (most often a Logistic curve) directly on the observed production profile:- Professor Kenneth S. Deffeyes forecast (Beyond Oil: The View From Hubbert's Peak): Logistic curve fit applied on crude oil only (plus condensate) with URR= 2013 Gb and peak date around November 24th, 2005.
- Jean Lahèrrere (2005): Peak oil and other peaks, presentation to the CERN meeting, 2005.
- Jean Lahèrrere (2006): When will oil production decline significantly? European Geosciences Union, Vienna, 2006.
- Logistic curves derived from the application of Hubbert Linearization technique by Stuart Staniford (see this post).
- Results of the Loglet analysis.
- The Generalized Bass Model (GBM) proposed by Prof. Renato Guseo, I used his most recent paper (GUSEO, R. et al. (2006). World Oil Depletion Models: Price Effects Compared with Strategic or Technological Interventions ; Technological Forecasting and Social Change, (in press).). The GBM is a beautiful model that has been applied in finance and marketing science (see here for some background). The estimation in Guseo's article was based on BP data from 2004 (CO+NGL).
- The so-called shock model proposed by TOD's poster WebHubbleTelescope . You can find a describtion of his approach on his blog here. The current estimate was done in 2005 based on BP's data.
Fig 5.- Forecasts by PeakOilers using curve fitting methodologies. Click to Enlarge.
Production Growth
Fig 6.- Year-on-Year production growth. Click to Enlarge.
| Forecast | 2005 | 2006 | 2010 | 2015 | Peak Date | Peak Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Liquids | ||||||
| Observed (All Liquids) | 84.41 | 84.30 | NA | NA | 2006-08 | 85.10 |
| Koppelaar (2005) | 84.06 | 85.78 | 89.21 | 87.98 | 2011 | 89.58 |
| EIA (IEO, 2006) | 82.70 | 84.50 | 91.60 | 98.30 | 2030 | 118.00 |
| CERA1 (2006) | 87.77 | 89.52 | 97.24 | 104.54 | 2035 | 130.00 |
| Lahèrrere (2006) | 83.59 | 84.82 | 88.93 | 92.27 | 2018 | 92.99 |
| Lahèrrere (2005) | 83.59 | 84.47 | 86.96 | 87.77 | 2014 | 87.84 |
| Crude oil + NGL | ||||||
| Observed (EIA) | 81.29 | 81.20 | NA | NA | 2005-05 | 81.87 |
| ASPO-71 | 80.00 | 81.90 | 90.00 | 85.00 | 2010 | 90.00 |
| ASPO-58 | 81.00 | 82.03 | 85.00 | 79.18 | 2010 | 85.00 |
| ASPO-45 | 81.00 | 80.95 | 80.00 | 73.77 | 2005 | 81.00 |
| Koppelaar (2006) | 81.76 | 82.31 | 91.00 | NA | 2010 | 91.00 |
| Bakhtiari (2003) | 80.24 | 80.89 | 77.64 | 69.51 | 2006 | 80.89 |
| Skrebowski (2006) | 80.90 | 81.42 | 87.32 | NA | 2010 | 87.92 |
| Staniford (High) | 77.45 | 77.92 | 79.01 | 78.51 | 2011-10 | 79.08 |
| Staniford (Med) | 75.81 | 75.94 | 75.52 | 73.00 | 2007-05 | 75.98 |
| Staniford (Low) | 70.46 | 70.13 | 67.92 | 63.40 | 2002-07 | 70.88 |
| Loglets | 81.12 | 82.14 | 84.65 | 83.26 | 2012-01 | 84.80 |
| GBM (2003) | 76.06 | 76.27 | 75.30 | 67.79 | 2007-05 | 76.34 |
| Shock Model (2006) | 80.76 | 80.43 | 78.27 | 73.74 | 2003 | 81.17 |
| Constant barrels/capita | 78.81 | 79.73 | 83.42 | 88.01 | 2050 | 110.64 |
| Crude oil + lease condensate | ||||||
| Observed (EIA) | 73.55 | 73.42 | NA | NA | 2005-12 | 74.06 |
| CERA1 (2006) | 76.49 | 76.89 | 82.29 | 83.83 | 2038 | 97.58 |
| ASPO-71 | 73.10 | 74.45 | 78.00 | 72.00 | 2010 | 78.00 |
| ASPO-58 | 73.00 | 73.80 | 76.00 | 69.50 | 2010 | 76.00 |
| ASPO-58 | 72.80 | 72.56 | 71.00 | 63.55 | 2005 | 72.80 |
| Deffeyes (2004) | 69.81 | 69.81 | 68.90 | 65.88 | 2005-12 | 69.82 |
Table II. Summary of all the forecasts (figures are in mbpd) as well as the last EIA estimates.1Productive capacities.
Next update in December.
Previous Update:
October 2006September 2006
Another thing--how about sending this post of Khebab's to someone new today...just one person...or talk to someone about this who you haven't spoken to about it before...or something new.
You can see why my efforts at doing HL work were cut short when I saw Khebab's work.
My point was that Hubbert was correct about the Lower 48 and that Yergin was wrong about a rising tide of oil driving oil prices down to $38 by 11/1/05.
Deffeyes, a former associate of Hubbert's, predicted a crude + condensate peak for late 2005.
Jackson, like Yergin before him, is predicting steadily rising oil production (from all sources) for decades to come.
I see a green curve, seems like Koppelaar CO + NGL ,2006, going out of the graph, never coming back in. Is this correct? Stranger even more so that Koppelaars' ALL, 2005, is less then CO + NGL, 2006.
I also note similar declines on the backslope of the curve for all (except this strange green curve going out of the graph) scenarios; all curves show the same steepness. I didn't know there was such a consensus on decline rate.
But start taking different routes to work
and check your Brake Hydraulics regularly... :-(
But next time you see him, wind him up by telling him the middle film was the weakest :-)
My Precious!!!
For info of those who don't know: there is another Jackson who was involved in production of the movie, Lord of the Rings --and "My Precious" is a line by the oger in that movie.
http://www.theoildrum.com/comments/2006/11/20/83027/063/5#5
Too bad Peak Oil is going to be lost in the cloud of geopolitics - which is what Dannyboy Yerginz et. al are counting (Betting) on and iw what they will use as their excuse for ever more - "If THAT didn't happen we would have been right!!!".
MY Peak Oil PRoJecTion:
A Head & Shoulders chart pattern starting with a rapid decline in world production soon (btwn Tomorrow morning and 2008 - caused by geopoliTICs), followed by a strong recovery in world production starting around 2020 (+/- 4 yrs), peaking by 2030, slightly below the GeopoliTICal Peak of 1980, and then ...
and then those who had successful Profoundly Local Plan Bz can get together and cobble the next civilization. Maybe.
Well, there you go again; making fun of the obvious.
Let's say I was an eXXceedingly large oil company and I wanted to donate $1,000,000 to CERA for all the good work they do, but I don't want it to look like a donation on the books? Why then I would simply order 1000 copies. Put it down on the books as an expense item: purchase of "expert" reports for distribution to, and reliance of by, the many nonexperts working here at my company.
WOPR
"Hello, Homo Sap. Would you like to play a game?
Though it doesn't look like any of the projections is matching reality all that well. Bahktiari is probably the best fit at the moment.
But should we not always rememeber that past "production" is actually demand ± stock draws?
The Loglets are still right in there though. This requires some careful thought.
I think only WestTexas and Bakhtiari do a good job of taking into account decline of the super giant fields and exports.
I think everyone else chooses to underestimate the effects and if you add them in it would bring most of the curves into agreement. Also I think that even with this the actual drop in production rates for the super giant fields is still underestimated. This is why I think you will see a steep cliff in the first few years post peak as we loose about 5mbd of production from the super giants then the slopes will follow the mathematical models. We won't know until they start into serious decline but I see no reason to expect the decline rates of the super giant fields to be shallow. Most have been produced using advanced extraction methods and these seem to lead to collapse of fields after they past their peak. Once these are gone we could even see the remaining oil production rate increase slightly later as the world oil prices spiral or at least a sort of plateau.
The reason is oil will be expensive allowing marginal extraction and next other existing fields will probably be driven beyond sustainable pumping rates for a time.
After this period of semi-stability which which might not last even a year I see another round of fairly steep declines as more fields fail.
Thus overall I think we will see a 10mbd loss the first 5 years post peak. This is caused by a combination of crashing giant fields reckless extraction and political turmoil.
Since the world peak looks a but spread out its tough to say when the clock starts ticking but 2007-2008 looks about right this its a 10 mbd drop by 2012-2013
This is almost in agreement with Bakhtiari actually I think he is still to optomistic on political factors and I think WestTexas is correct on a increasing export land effect.
Think of a world without KSA thats what we will be facing.
Maybe if we could get those numbers out in the open, we could start to actually work on the theory about why they might be declining. Until then, we might want to consider why they are rising.
WestTexas has posted his export land model a few times.
It needs a permanent home I suspect.
Now if some one can figure out political risk factors in a declining export world.
WestTexas is would it be possible to overlay your export land predictions on top of these models ? I'd love to see the results.
EU Oil Import Export model here:
http://europe.theoildrum.com/story/2006/9/22/95855/4850
So do you have data showing Norwegian oil exports rising? Curious to know - cos I'm turning up loads of BS numbers all over the place these days.
As for Salmon fishing in Alaska - just send the tickets!