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DrumBeat: December 6, 2006
Posted by threadbot on December 6, 2006 - 10:40am
Topic: Miscellaneous
Party not over yet for Big Oil: Oil prices seen remaining high through the decade
Morse said stagnant production among the countries making up the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is a big part of the problem.But fear thee not, they're working on the refinery bottleneck:For example, OPEC-member Venezuela's production stood at 3.5 million barrels per day in 2000. It has since fallen to 2.5 million bpd and is still sliding.
Iran at the start of the decade expected to grow production from 3.5 million barrels per day to 4.5 million bpd but that plan has gone nowhere, said Morse. Project Kuwait, which was supposed to add another 500,000 bpd to that country's production, also stalled.
However, even if output had grown during that time the world would not have necessarily had enough refining capacity to process the extra barrels.
New refineries are expected to sprout up in an arc stretching from Saudi Arabia to India, while many U.S. refineries are being expanded or refurbished to refine harder-to-process heavy crudes into such products as gasoline and diesel.
Credibly Challenging Iran: A Coordinated Plan to Get Oil Below $40/Barrel
He said that there is only one non-military way to break Iran's current course, and that the military option was not credible and would not be supported in the region. This official said that the only way to stop Iran at this point was to make the price of oil plummet.He said that America could engineer this with coordinated support from oil producers in the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Iran replaces dollar with euro in most oil dealings
Iran has started replacing dollar with euro in majority of its crude oil exchanges in the last several months, an informed source with Iran’s Oil Ministry said here on Tuesday...."This can maintain the real value of Iranian oil," he added.
EIA: Oil field delays mean higher 2010 crude price
The U.S. government's top energy forecaster on Tuesday said it raised its estimate for world crude prices in 2010 by about 20 percent to near $60 a barrel due to delays bringing new oil fields on line.African producers like Angola and Nigeria and Latin American states like Brazil will be slower than initially projected in ramping up production from new projects, putting a squeeze on world supply, said Guy Caruso, administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
"It's clearly going to take longer now to bring on the new supplies and to have an impact on price than we were thinking a year ago," Caruso told reporters.
HOUSTON: The majority of oil and natural gas executives think that oil prices could rise to $90 a barrel before triggering a global recession, according to a survey released yesterday by Deloitte & Touche USA.
Senator says no more environment rollbacks
WASHINGTON - The Democrat poised to take over the Senate environment committee promises a "sea change" from six years of Republican inaction on global warming and says she expects Congress to send President Bush legislation to start curbing greenhouse gases.
Arctic ice field could melt by 2080: European research
Nuclear Power Revival
Could Encounter Hurdles
WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration's plan for a "renaissance" in nuclear power may be crimped by tightening world-wide supplies of uranium and a lack of enrichment facilities to turn the uranium into fuel for power plants.
'Chelsea tractor' sales hit by tax hikes
LONDON - Sales of gas guzzling four-wheel drive vehicles have dropped sharply in Britain amid looming tax increases aimed at fighting air pollution and curbing global warming.
US Congress nears final India nuclear bill
New reps urge opposition to drilling bill: Congress pulls Gulf drilling bill in political seesaw
Shell CEO: 'The debate about CO2 is over'
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates -- The chief executive for Shell berated Washington on Monday for spurning the United Nation's Kyoto agreement on global warming, saying U.S. backing for a global regulatory framework would create incentives for oil companies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
During the recent NATO summit in Riga, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar urged the alliance to declare that an energy boycott of any member be seen as an act of coercion against all members of the alliance and one that requires a collective response.
Latin American oil: past and future
2005 was a bumper year for Latin American oil production. According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy, in 2005 oil production reached 10.7 million barrels per day, a new record. This number, however, betrays a troubling fact: Production of conventional oil peaked in 1998 and any future production increases will have to come from either the Venezuelan tarsands or the deepwaters off Brazil and Mexico.
Southeast Asian oil output likely to peak by 2013
Oil production in Southeast Asia will reach a peak in 2013 as fewer new fields are found, forcing the region to evaluate its dependence on crude, said Michael Smith chief executive of UK-based consultant Energyfiles Ltd.
There is something about energy that brings out the sillies in politicians. Everywhere you look you can find politicians and activists who think that “energy is different,” that “the rules of economics do not apply to energy.”
India: Should petrol and diesel prices have been cut?
Moving too fast from a controlled price scenario to a market mechanism may have its pitfalls, as evidenced in the California energy crisis as well as the European gasoline crisis. The transition of India to a deregulated market needs to learn from such experiences.
Itera's Regional Director Murdered Outside Office in Central Russia
Alexander Samoylenko, who led a branch of Russia's largest independent gas producer Itera, was shot and killed as he left his office in the central Russian city of Samara, police said.
Post-peak pessimism: Looking for new tools
"But if you consider for a moment that the future is not more of the same, but is radically different from anything you've ever known, then you are going to need different tools and different skills to meet it."
George Monbiot: We need more buses
Ethanol output has corn prices popping
For the first time in China's history, grain prices are rising not due to a poor harvest or increasing demand but because of soaring international oil prices.
China's Shenhua to quadruple coal production by 2020
Africa: Looking below the surface for tomorrow's energy
David Yuko, a Kenyan renewable-energy consultant, makes a strong case for geothermal power in developing countries as a far cheaper alternative to large-scale conventional energy systems that require massive investment.
The fight for Caspian oil will be one of the biggest issues in international politics in years to come.
Petroleum producers forecast strong oilpatch spending for 2007
CALGARY (CP) - Canada's oil and gas producers will ease off spending in 2007, a move driven by doubts about natural gas prices and several oilpatch giants scaling back growth projections, according to the industry's main association."It's a slowdown, but it's more like a foot off the accelerator rather than someone jamming on the brakes," Greg Stringham, vice-president of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, said Tuesday.
Aramco and Earth Decision launch GeoMorph
What is even more interesting is that this article was released on rigzone.com 02/08/2006 as well stating "...have launched GeoMorph, a powerful new real-time earth modeling..."
So, why are they re-spinning a story from back in February of this year? I don't see anything that has changed between the two stories...anyone else?
-C.
Very interesting book: Nebraska Schoolhouse Blizzard of 88.
Tells how folks used switch grass to heat their sod houses. Also some background on Scandinavian immigrants and why they left for America. The early weather service records and the progress of the storm. First hand History with letters back to the old country explaining their hardships.
- The secretiveness of the Saudi oil establishment as well as other Middle Eastern and OPEC producers for the last 25 years has not been part of an effort to conceal troubling realities or enhance political interest.
- Aramco and its contractors have developed proprietary technology for wringing oil from mature fields and sustaining production that is far superior to that applied by the world's best known publicly held oil companies in other major oil provinces.
- The phenomena that have signaled the onset of decline at oilfields elsewhere in the world, and that have been observed in Saudi Arabia's mainstay fields for many years, somehow do not mean coming decline for Saudi oil production.
- The Saudis have chosen to concentrate production in their aging super-giant fields, even if this risks hastening depletion by overproducing, rather than spread the burden by developing additional discovered fields. But many other fields have been kept in reserve and could make a significant contribution once they are brought onto production.
- Saudi Aramco's exploration program has missed additional giant or super-giant oilfields lying beneath the desert sands, but future exploration efforts will surely find them in time to head off a supply crisis.
- The reserves in Ghawar field really do greatly exceed the estimates made by Aramco in the 1970s.
- Ghawar, by virtue of its unprecedented size, is simply an exception to all the truths and principles that have governed production and depletion of oil in all of the world's other super-giant fields.
- Aramco could have grown its oil output at any time in wanted during the last 20 years, but the world markets never had need for more oil.
Evidence already presented in earlier chapters casts serious doubt on several of these assumptions. Others may simply strike more disciplined minds as prima facie absurd.Matt Simmons, Twilight in the Desert, pages 283-284, posted here by Ron Patterson
We could be smacked into a brick wall tomorrow or in 50 years. This gives KSA and those that know the "real" reserve figures a large advantage over the rest of the world.
If KSA, has enough reserves to cover things in the foreseeable future, then they can play the game however they want to. They can fake a shortage and pressure prices higher, they can just keep the buffer just above demand, or they can ruin Iran by flooding.
He made these graphs:
Alan
Alan says,
"We are, it appears, a long way from Peak Sulphur !
Indeed true Alan, and thus my fascination with (as expressed in other posts) the whole "desulfuring" issue involving Diesel and by the way, gasoline.
The consumption of natural gas is already going up to "desulfer" Diesel to bring it down to the new ULSD (Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel) standard that is the 80% law of the land, due to become the 100% law by 2010. This will only become more natural gas consumptive and more expensive as higher sulfur crude oil is brought into the mix. This is a REAL TIME issue. I know people in the oil trade who say they sit in on almost daily meetings trying to resolve what the refinery industry sees as a very pressing and difficult problem, in other words, man hours and money are already being spent on this NOW.
The prospect for Diesel is, to put it bluntly, very bad. With the Nox emmissions standards already presenting an expensive and technically challenging problem, and the rising price of natural gas (which most folks here on TOD) do not see getting cheaper over the long haul, the Diesel engine is rapidly becoming a burden even the industrial/commercial sector is finding hard to bear.
Sign of the times: Recently at a truck stop, I saw an LPG (Liquid Petroleum Gas, or propane) tractor. It was there while the trucker ate, and NOT to buy Diesel fuel. More and more school districts, and city bus lines are shopping for LPG or CNG buses. And no one, not even those of us who now own and love them, are considering a Diesel car if our aging Benzes and Volkswagens ever bite the dust. We have to face the truth. Diesel may well be past it's peak. As a solution, barring a massive increase in bio-Diesel fuel production, it is not an option.
Roger Conner known to you as ThatsItImout
Consider Carbon-Hydrogen ratios.
Gasoline has a low C, High H ratio. Diesel is richer is C, less H. As oil gets thicker & lower value, the C ratio climbs. Coal has some H, but much more C (coal is not carbon as some people think, but a complex mix of long chain hydrocarbons, very rich in C).
The primary (99% ?) source of commercial hydrogen for upgrading oil is natural gas or oil itself. (This is the source of most refinery gain, where oil products > crude oil).
Early CTL plants (example one announced in Illinois) have announced output will be diesel. In a shortage situation, refinery output will be biased towards diesel (trucks, rail, barge, farms) will be biased towards diesel and the President may waive the ultra-low sulfur requirement for, say, 1/2 the diesel produced in an emergency (today there are two supply & distribution streams, one for 0.5% sulphur and the other for 0.015%)
And diesel can be stored more easily, safely and longer than gasoline. If I hear that Isreal has bombed Iran, my first stop will be a truck stop with containers. I filled up last week for the first time since the beginning of hurricane season (June 1) 16.6 gallons + 5.x gallons top-up mid-season. I can make a full tank + containers last a year or more.
Now, if we can buy a vehicle that can run on #4 bunker fuel, or even better, Orimulsion# !
Best Hopes for Otto, my 31 mpg (city) 1982 M-B 240D (manual transmission) diesel (pun intended on name)
Alan
# Orimulsion is a mix of 30% water, surfactant and "improved asphalt" from the Orinico of Venezula. Burns VERY dirty.
Called Duraterm, it is a $98.23 relay with 4 new glow plugs that
- Speeds up glow time, cutting it in half
- Glows slightly hotter
- Glows for 3 minutes after starting at less power, resulting in less pollution, noise, and better fuel economy during those 3 minutes.
- Glow plugs are expected to have twice the life
One key is patented iron-cobalt alloy whose resistance builds quickly as it heats up, thereby self limiting max heat.My kit is good only for 1981-85 W123 M-Bs. Unsure about other applications. 300Ds need to buy an extra glow plug seperately.
Also, some new tires improve fuel economy. And I have reduced parasitic losses by installed LED bulbs. Glad to give you details.
Best Hopes,
Alan
Alan,
Thanks for the info, I need a set of glow plugs for mine, and with temps in KY getting into the teens for the next couple of nights, I really need them now...:-).
My old Benz has been getting right on 31 MPG, and I just did a full tire check and found that was running a bit underinflated on two of them, so I hope to be doing 32 plus in the near future....needs an air filter change and perhaps later a clutch, but right now, I can't tear it down for the clutch, it spends too much time on the road. :-)
Thanks again, Roger
known to you as ThatsItImout
Please send me your correct eMail address to
Alan_Drake at Juno dott com.
Thanks,
Alan
Sorry about that,
After my Compaq blew, and I went to my Mac, I left my MSN Hotmail account behind....however, I have not been able to get my TOD settings to change for me no matter what...:-(
I will try again in a minute, but in the meantime, use admin@irvingtondesign.com
It's a site associated with some of my energy work, see if it takes.
Thanks for all info and assistance, Roger Conner
known to you as ThatsItImout
I am actually not so sure that production could have kept up with actual consumption, at least until now. The percent utilization of refinery operable capacity has diminished in 2006 but was normally high before. As the graphs posted by leanan show above, the crude input is more sour and heavier over time. So, to say it simply, there is more cracking and less refining going on. Perhaps, as has been often suggested, there is actually less cracking capacity than refining capacity. Of course this situation can reverse if the actual refinery upgrades result in a significant increase of the refining capacity of heavier oil. These upgrades were the reason for the shutdowns beginning 2006 and during this fall.
The import situation is a bit more difficult to resolve. I will leave this aspect of the discussion for WT and RR.
I still think that this situation is dangerous even if it is voluntary, it leaves some regions at risk for real shortages since the situation is very heterogenous over the country. Besides, what reason could lead to a voluntary decrease of these stocks ? Changing requirements for gasoline blending (but the stocks are only 11-12 days worth which makes them easy to replace quickly) ? Replacement by ethanol ? Reduction of the costs of stock management ? Any suggestion could be welcome.
The US refining sector has become more sophisticated (i.e. complex) and is able to convert lower quality crudes into higher value products. Naturally, to take advanatage of this capability, they will purchase cheap lower quality crudes.
I am sure that you could track refinery upgrades around the world and find that in every case where refineries were upgraded, input quality went down.
A more interesting question may be why have companies needed to make the upgrades. The asnwer is, in part, to take advantage of the complex refining margin growth afforded by widening quality (crack) spreads.
While this may be a peak oil metric, I think that crack spreads is a leading indicator and refinery input a trailing indicator.
Published on 18 Nov 2006 by Wall St Journal. Archived on 23 Nov 2006.
As Fuel Prices Soar, A Country Unravels
by Chip Cummins
Has the dieoff started?
If people are dying because of an inability to afford oil, I think that the dieoff has started. It's just not readily apparent here in the US--yet. But the early signs of problems have started to appear.
Look at the first part of the above excerpt, "Expensive gasoline and soaring heating bills make a hard life harder" (for the poor in America). The WSJ had a story yesterday about the rapid increase in mortgage delinquency rates for sub-prime, generally lower income, borrowers. The delinquency rate has almost doubled since last year. Interestingly enough, the delinquency rate started increasing in the summer of 2005, just when oil prices started climbing. Note that oil prices first crossed the $60 mark in July, 2005, before Katrina hit.
Someone suggested that the debate between Robert and myself is extremely important. Robert and I both downplayed the importance of our discussion, but I think I have changed my mind.
I suggested yesterday that I thought that our debate was more or less akin to a couple of engineers debating how long it would take for the Titanic to sink. Robert rejects the analogy, but I think that it is apt. The obvious implication of my analogy is that the debate is not material (it's just a question of when, not if, the ship sinks), but that is not really true. For the passengers on the Titanic, it made a big difference as to whether the ship sank in about 2 hours or 12 hours.
Robert and I have been having some version of this debate most of this year, but IMO the principal focus of the debate has shifted dramatically--from are we going to see lower production and lower exports from Saudi Arabia to:
Why are we seeing lower production and exports from Saudi Arabia (KSA)?
The only readily available current production data we have is for crude + condensate (C+C), while the EIA defines net exports in terms of total liquids, but C+C accounted for 86% of the reported total liquids production for KSA in 2005. Based on OPEC reports, which are certainly confirmed by collapsing tanker traffic, KSA's production (presumably C+C) is below 9 mbpd this month. This is at least a 7% drop from 12/05. I estimate that KSA's net oil exports are down by about 13% from 12/05 to 12/06.
As I have endlessly outlined, KSA is showing the same kind of production decline that we have seen in other regions that have crossed the 50% of Qt mark--Texas; Lower 48; Russia; North Sea and Mexico.
I just went back and checked some of the Seventies Aramco reserve estimates in Matt Simmons' book. The Saudis took over Aramco in 1979. Prior to that, it was run by four major oil companies. The last published recoverable reserve estimates by the old Aramco were in the Oil & Gas Journal in 1977, presumably for the year ending 1976. They showed estimated remaining recoverable reserves for the top five Saudi oil fields at that time to be about 100 Gb. Note that this was 30 years ago.
After the Saudis took over Aramco, we started seeing the miraculous increases in recoverable reserves that most people use as a baseline for discussing the future of KSA production.
Most HL estimates, which have been an accurate predictors of peaks in other large producing areas, give the Saudis around 75 Gb of remaining recoverable reserves.
The two central questions I would like to see Robert specifically address are:
Why are we seeing lower production and exports from Saudi Arabia (KSA)?
How and why is KSA supposed to show rising production in future months and years?
How and why is KSA supposed to show rising production in future months and years?
To me, that's a lose-lose. The last thing I want to do is convince people that Saudi has plenty of oil and that we don't have to worry for now. For this reason, I have really tried to avoid this discussion. My objective here, as will be shown in my debate response, is claims are well-supported. I don't mean the kind of support that convinces those who are already predisposed to agree with you. I mean the kind of support that could hold up in Science. That's the case we need to make in order to convince and influence those who don't hold to his position. Of course if your objective is merely to convince people already holding a short-term Peak Oil viewpoint, you can make a less-convincing case.
I didn't get into detail on Saudi in my debate reply. If necessary, I will do so in the next round. But here are some points to ponder. Again, I hesitate to do this because I may win the battle, but help us lose the war. That's the last thing I want.
You have made a number of comparisons between the HL for Saudi and Texas, and maybe even the U.S. I think the HL implies that there are 70 GB of oil left in Saudi. Let's try to verify that number.
1982 was the last year that the books were open on Saudi reserves. In 1982, their reserves were 164.6 GB. What they are today is an open question, but let's use the U.S. and see what has happened to our reserves.
The following data are all pulled from:
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/xls/pet_crd_pres_dcu_NUS_a.xls
In 1982, U.S. reserves were 27.858 GB. In 2005, U.S. reserves were 21.757 GB. Oil production from these reserves since 1982 totals 56.9 GB. So, we have produced 57 GB of oil and pulled our reserves down by 6 GB. That seems incredible, but unless I made a mistake (someone double-check me) that's what has happened.
Are we to assume that Saudi reserves haven't shown similar behavior? But even if we assumed that all they have been doing is drawing down reserves since 1982, we still get a higher remaining reserve than your Saudi HL indicates. So, what to think here? Their reserves were overestimated when they were still transparent? Your Saudi HL is in error?
I would really rather not debate Saudi reserves. I don't want someone confusing me with CERA, nor do I want someone taking Peak Oil less seriously because Saudi may have more oil than you think. I am more concerned that you use sound methodology and arguments, because that enhances credibility and increases your likelihood of being taking seriously by the public. But you asked me to address Saudi. In my debate response, I will focus more on what's happening with imports.
Note: I am back at work today (another vacation day tomorrow, though), so I will not be getting into a long discussion on this. I would encourage everyone to check my numbers to make sure they are right. In the spreadsheet, proven U.S. reserves are in Column B of "1-Crude Oil Proved Reserves", and production from reserves is in Column J of "2-Changes in Reserves During Year." I would also encourage others to try this exercise on other countries, or on Texas, often used in comparison to Saudi.
As you know, there are reserve estimates and there are reserve estimates. So let's compare apples to apples
The HL method gives us a mathematical estimate of the URR for a region.
Khebab took the Lower 48 production data through the 50% of Qt mark to predict the post-50% of Qt cumulative production for the Lower 48. The actual post-50% cumulative production through 2004 was 99% of what the HL model predicted it would be.
The same exercise for Russia showed that the post-50% of Qt cumulative production for Russia through 2004 was 95% of what the HL model predicted it would be.
KSA is now at the same stage of depletion, based on the HL method, at which Texas, the prior swing producer, started declining, and KSA's production is down by about 7% from 12/05 to 12/06.
Given all of the foregoing, does that give you more, or less, confidence in the HL estimates of KSA's URR and remaining recoverable reserves?
The point about KSA's five big fields is that then (1977)--as now--they account for the majority of their production and reserves.
But are not Reserves defined by the SEC? My understanding is that a publicly traded company can only list as Reserves that percent of OIP that meets some SEC criteria. At some point in the production time period the Reserves drop below this accepted threshold, the major sells off the lease and a 3rd party operates it as a set of stripper wells with an indefinite 8bpd production stream.
This is the only circumstance I can think of to lend credibilty to the quoted set of statistics.
Cheers!
Here is the way the EIA defines proved reserves:
The bottom line is that we have produced far more oil than our reserves would have indicated in 1982. WT is comparing the U.S. to Saudi for his HL of Saudi, but then says we can't do that with the reserves. My point is that HL has not been shown to work in every case. Here, we have what looks to me like a discrepancy.
We are left with either: 1). The HL for Saudi is wrong; 2). The reserves in 1982 - when they were still open to scrutiny - were vastly overstated. But we know that in the U.S. the reserves were vastly understated.
So then we are left with "Yeah, but Saudi production is down." I think once I post my graphs of demand/production/exports/refinery utilization, the case that the cut is involuntary will become a lot less convincing.
One further comment I would make. Note that in this response, after Euan had pointed out that some areas had peaked at different Qts, Jeffrey responded:
Yet isn't this also the case for Texas and Saudi? These are the kinds of things I consider to be ad hoc reasoning. For those who don't know what that means, it means you apply different kinds of reasoning in different situations in order to support the point you are trying to make. It's like saying "A and B are the same, because they are the same color, but A is different from C because it is heavier." Yet heavy wasn't the criteria you used for A and B, it was color. If you use ad hoc reasoning, you can come to pretty much any conclusion you desire.
In any case, Texas and Saudi Arabia have been the only two swing producers of consequence for the past 70 years.
But shouldn't the fact that they are "separated by half a continent geographically and separated in terms of development by decades" have some impact on where each one peaked? Did we use the same technology in Texas in the early 70's as we are using in Saudi today? Why should we expect Saudi to peak where Texas did, other than they were both swing producers? Did they both have the same amount of swing capacity?
The question I was addressing with the Lower 48 versus the Total US was whether to use one HL plot or two.
To apply that situation to Saudi Arabia versus Texas, the question would be to use one HL plot or two.
This discussion arose because of a persistent tendency to isolate the UK from the total North Sea for HL plots. I don't see any reason to do so.
Clearly, the field distributions in Texas versus Saudi Arabia is different. However, I have pointed out that the same is true of the Lower 48 versus the North Sea. The Lower 48 peaked right at 50% of Qt in 1970. The North Sea--vastly different field distribution and totally offshore--peaked right at 50% of Qt in 1999, 29 years later than the Lower 48 (much better technology). (Both C+C)
So, if two vastly different regions like the Lower 48 and the North Sea peak right around 50%, 29 years apart, why shouldn't the two swing producers, Texas and KSA, show similar declines?
In fact, as predicted, KSA is dropping at the same point at which Texas started declining.
So again, you are arguing that we are going to see what we have never seen any similar large producing province do, even as the current data support the HL model.
Stickin with the idea that an HL plot works best when applied to an oil 'province' would it not make sense to include Kuwait and at least the Persian Gulf fields of Iran and Iraq in a more comprehensive ME HL plot?
Basically, if you take constant volume under a bell-shaped curve, but you slide the peak over to the right (via new technology extraction) then there is a greater volume to the left of the peak than the right and the slope beyond the peak must be greater than the slope leading up to it.
If Ghawar has been managed in this fashion then the natural peak has been delayed at the expense of a steeper decline on the backside. If this is true, then Ghawar may not model like Texas.
This is great for the short term future, but horrible for the long term future.
That is exactly right. A peak at 50% of Qt would be much better in the long run, as the decline may be more manageable. A steep decline is the worst case scenario.
The peak is getting sucked to the right by many, many straws (vertical, horizontal, and sideways), massive floods of seawater, and sealing of compartments in the field to improve pressure (ok, I threw that one in as conjecture).
Let's hope that you are wrong!
Robert,
Regarding reserves estimates, you are talking about apples and oranges.
The HL method, if you have enough production data, gives you an estimate of the URR for the region.
As you know, most other estimates are for some combination of proven, probable, etc.
The fact remains that you are asserting that KSA, while it currently showing--as the HL model predicted--lower production, is going to turn around and start showing what no similar large producing region has heretofore done--steady continuing increases in production beyond what the region produced in the vicinity of 50% of Qt.
You are asserting that we are going to see what have never before seen in large producing regions (60 Gb for Qt and larger), even as the current KSA data support the HL model.
One should be able to confirm another. Given that we see a huge discrepancy, you still haven't given any reasoning that would indicate that Saudis reserve estimates in 1982 were wrong. You just keep falling back on the HL, which you know hasn't always worked. In other words, you have a model with no possibility of verification. But we have a piece of data that doesn't fit. Yet you reject that piece out of hand without actually attempting to address it. You are throwing out the real world in favor of the model.
You are asserting that we are going to see what have never before seen in large producing regions (60 Gb for Qt and larger), even as the current KSA data support the HL model.
We have never seen this? What about regions in which the HL has shifted? Saudi has shifted. The North Sea shifted. You are using hindsight, and presuming the shifts are done for Saudi. But there is no justification for believing this.
Let me ask you a question. If the KSA production cut is voluntary, it would still fall in line with HL model expectations, but that wouldn't be accurate, would it? If the cut is voluntary, it actually poses a problem for the HL model. Yes?
Are you ready for my response? It is finished. I just don't want us to feel like we have to get a response out in 3 days, so I can wait until Monday. I either post it tomorrow (if the queue is empty) or Monday.
Robert,
What you are calling "shifts" is just