The depletion of Abqaiq

This is the third post on the life of a large oilfield, after first looking at a very idealized outline of how a major field might be developed, in the second post I gave some of the events that happened at Abqaiq, which is one of the great oilfields of Saudi Arabia, and which approximated my model. What I would like to try now is to explain some of the reasons that the reality is quite a bit different from the ideal, and some of the geological factors that make the considerable difference between the two.

To begin, Abqaiq, like most giant fields, has been around for a long time, and when it was first developed, by a relatively small group during the Second World War, there were many other things going on that limited development so that it took 4 years to go from drilling the first well to the fifth. Technology was not nearly as advanced as it is now, and the wells were spaced considerably further apart than the spacing I placed mine at in the model. Further while I had estimated the OIP as being some 62 billion barrels, based on porosity, in reality the number was half that. I am grateful that both westexas and plucky underdog had the reasons for this.

One is the water saturation (original water in the rock - which I had neglected) and the other is the Oil Formation Volume Factor. To allow PUD to explain
There are several possible reasons, but the most likely is what is known as Oil Formation Volume Factor (FVF for short, mathematical symbol capital B subscript little O). Basically, oil takes up more space in the reservoir than it does on the surface. The main reason for this is that oil in the reservoir contains large amounts of dissolved gas - possibly 1000 or 2000 cubic feet of gas per barrel of oil (say up to 300 cubic metres of gas per cubic metre of oil).

The gas molecules are small and fit in between the oil molecules, but oil with gas in solution is less dense and the oil simply takes up more space. Add to that the fact that the oil is up to 100 degrees Kelvin hotter at depth, so bigger, and then take off a little volume to allow for the high pressure downstairs, and you end up with Bo = 1.4; so for every barrel of oil you produce at surface you need to inject 1.4 barrels to replace what you are taking out.

1.4 is a very typical oil FVF - it can vary from 1.15 or so up to maybe 1.6 or 1.7, depending on a number of factors, principally the quantity of dissolved gas.

The gas content at Abqaiq was 860 cf/barrel. As I mentioned yesterday this was initially re-injected, but more recently has been collected and sold. (The GOSP - gas oil separation plants that are located in or near the oil fields are used for this and at one time Abqaig had eleven of these).

In regard to the spacing, I don't have access to the actual numbers but can do the following: If the surface area is 7 x 37= 259 sq miles and the maximum number of producing wells was 72, then each well was draining, on average some 3.6 sq. miles, or the wells, were about 1.9 miles apart. Making a SWAG on this being the number of wells at peak would indicate that the individual well production rate, at the time, was 1,092,064/72 = 15,000 bd. This seems somewhat consistent with production in later years. At peak, Abqaig produced about 0.4 billion barrels a year. (Incidentally in Ghawar the initial spacing was 2 km, with individual well drainage areas of up to 5 sq. miles, and subsequently this was changed to 1 km, so that these initial numbers may not be that far out.

The real size of the volume that can be recovered from the field is a matter of some debate, and it is not completely clear how much has been extracted so far. If the IHS numbers from the past are used, then the field has produced a total of some 8.2 billion barrels and if we accept the Aramco view (given at the CSIS meeting) that some 78% of the oil that it is possible to recover has been, then this suggests that Jean Laherrere's view that it has a total available of 12 billion is highly optimistic. Roughly, it means that it can potentially recover another 2.3 billion barrels of oil. It is currently producing at a rate of around 434,000 bd, or 0.16 billion barrels a year, which means that, without an annual decline in production rate, it would last for another 14 years. In this regard however, it is worth noting that the IHS analysis changed from 2004 to 2005 in downrating the overall recovery factor for Abqaiq from an anticipated 72% to 60%. Of the oilfields listed it was the closest to being emptied, and is the only one for which the overall recovery factor has been dropped.

Matt Simmons in "Twilight" quotes Greg Croft in that the productivity index at Abqaiq is 110 barrels/day per psi differential across the well. Thus if they were retaining 1,000 psi at the well then to produce 15,000 bd they would need to hold 26,500 psi pressure in the formation. While I don't have data from Abqaiq, we can, again look at nearby Ghawar both for the pressure, and to see what happened to it as the field began to deplete.

Note that they began water injection in 1965, and that oil production here peaked in the late 1970's. (For those who don't know Ain Dar/Shedgum is one of the older, and most produced, parts of the Ghawar oil field.) The slide, which also comes from the Aramco presentation as CSIS in refutation of Matt Simmons, also shows that about the time that production was peaking, so water started to appear in significant quantities in the wells, and has grown to a greater percentage of the take, since that time.

The arrival of water at the production wells is where it becomes increasingly a technical challenge to maintain production from the field. Much of the reason for this has to do with permeability and more specifically relative permeability. As I pointed out in that post, a very narrow crack in a rock can take all the flow, stranding the fluid on either side of it. For those who never saw it, here is the picture I showed.


The arrows point to the thin fracture in the sandstone. And as I commented back then

I have been on a site where the ground was supposed to be as evenly sized and permeable as this sandstone, if not more. A test was being run in which my hosts had pumped some fluid into the rock. Since they did not get the result they wanted, they dyed the next batch of water a bright color and pumped it into the ground. They then dug a hole over the site, and looked down the side to see the thick colored layer that they expected to find. They needed a magnifying glass, all the fluid (hundreds of gallons) had gone into a single flaw, about the size of the one shown in the two pictures, and none anywhere else.
This is relevant since the rock formation known as Arab D zone 2-B, in which Abqaiq is located has zones of high permeability within it. So that, if water is being injected below the oil:water interface, to increase pressure, if that interface rises to meet one of these highly permeable zones, the water can preferentially flow under the pressure head, to the well.

As water is injected (at greater that production volumes as PUD pointed out) and production increases. The water level also rises with time (as I pointed out in the first post) reducing the length of well that is available for oil production. Now in the example I first gave, to make the point, I had assumed that the oilwell was drawing oil from the entire length of the well in the oil bearing rock. This makes it easier to illustrate oilfield depletion with time. However Aramco would, more likely, use one of their workover rigs and since they had cased the well they would seal the water producing levels and reperforate the well higher up. But before I explsin why that didn/t solve the problem, let me continue with that assumption for just one more paragraph, while I explain "water cut".

In the slide from Aramco above, you can see that the water cut ends up at about 36%. In our 300 ft example when we pressurized the well back, we had 180 ft of oil and 120 ft of water in the well. If they both flowed at an equivalent rate then we would get 60% of the fluid coming out as oil, and 40% as water, i.e. we would have a water cut of 40%.

Now unfortunately water flows more easily that oil and so if the hole were left open almost all the fluid would be water, and the well would not produce much oil. Hence the need to seal and reperforate. But this does not, as I said, solve the problem.

If I can make an analogy for the water flow issue, consider that you have a sponge full of lemonade, and you are sucking over the surface to get the lemonade out. Now someone pops a straw through the sponge and leads it down into some cold sour milk that is in the glass under the lemonade.. You don't want to drink the milk, but you do want the lemonade. However if you continue to suck very hard then you will find that the milk flows more easily up through the straw, than the lemonade comes out of the sponge, and so you quit in disgust. There are, however, some controls that can be maintained that don't get as much milk into your mouth. You can, for example, reduce the amount of suction (differential pressure) with which you are sucking on the sponge. One of the problems with doing that is that the amount of suction (or differential pressure) is one of the controls on how far from the well that you can draw oil. So if you drop the pressure differential then you won't get all the oil.

So to reach that oil you can drill more and shallower holes, using computer maps of the fields to work out where, that only go down into the oil layer, and locating them between the wells of the original pattern. Of course, with a relatively uniform water layer rising under the field, and the highly permeable layers being quite common, in most cases you will still find straws sticking up through the sponge, and so you will have to learn to deal, as Aramco has, with a water cut of 35% or more.

However, let me go back to the picture that I ended with last time

which came from a paper in the Journal of Petroleum Technology and where, by using suitable istrumentation, they had found where the water (deep blue), oil (green) and gas (red) layers were in a relatively depleted section across the reservoir. Now you should be able to see why, by putting long horizontal wells across the field, in its latter days, that one could run the horizontal section through the green zone, and thus continue to get more oil out of the area. Unfortunately, in this zone, because of vertical scale exaggeration, the oil looks thicker than it was - less than 40 ft. (Which anywhere else would be a lot).

(UPDATE: The source paper for the figure above is given here. It is worth a read because it has on-site photos and a lot more detail about the field than I can get into a post such as this. It also has the results of a horizontal well - which failed shortly after insertion because of water penetration - although it went on to produce 3,000 bd when pumped using multiphase pumping, and accepting the water cut. Note that wells in that region were closed when they reached 70% water cut).

Unfortunately also the highly permeable zones and fractures that run through the rock will also run into the horizontal wells, so that some gas and water will continue to be drawn in, but one can, nevertheless, get more production from the zone than one could before. I can, perhaps illustrate this with a very simplified version of a sketch that Matt Simmons first drew of the geology of the Arabian oil fields.

I have added some of the open shear zones that exist in the field, and one of a number of inclined "super permeable" zones that lie in the field. You can see that as the suction is applied to the horizontal wells, that these provide passage ways to the well from the gas and water filled regions. I have neglected to add the relatively vertical fractures that are also very common within these fields.

In addition (and one of the reasons that the original paper was written) there is another way to go. By drawing the water and oil combination from some of the original wells where the water cut had risen above 75% it was possible to separate as much as 1,000 barrels per well per day of oil from the multiphase flow that came from them. However this is a considerable short-fall from the early production of 15,000 bd/well that the field enjoyed.
At present, as I mentioned, the field is producing at just over 400,000 bd. Wells continue to be drilled to extract the remaining oil, and it is likely that, for a while longer, production may be sustained at around that level. The second last picture in the last post showed that the drop in production at Abqaiq (ABQQ) was running at 2.8%, despite the drilling of more wells, in 2004, which gives a reduction, per year of some 12,000 bd. However that depends on how well water ingress to the horizontal wells can be controlled in the future. Unfortunately I am not that optimistic.

Incidentally I have tried giving this sort of technical explanation in the past, and since it takes a fair amount of words to try and explain the posts are spread over a number of weeks. The posts are as follows, with topic:
Previous posts can be found at::
the drill

using mud

the derrick

the casing

pressure control

completing the well

flow to the well

working with carbonates

spacing your well

directional drilling 1


directional drilling 2

types of offshore drilling rigs
coalbed methane

workover rigs
As ever, if this is not clear, or if there is disagreement then please feel free to post, and I will try and respond.

Wow.  Thank you Heading Out, this is another one of the in depth articles that make TOD worth reading.
Thank you for all the work you have done Heading Out et al.
Clear and concise!  Who can't understand this.

The implications!!!. An example; I was (for business reasons) in Sun Valley Idaho early this year.  Driving in I noticed there are no trees(enough?) to heat with, it gets very cold in winter, and thousands of people!  I looked very hard to find old homesteads - they were few and far between located in small valleys maybe 10 -12 miles apart, near water.  I assume they raised cattle.  There is no way this area is sustainable with out the rich folks(not me, I was working) who go there.  Without oil/gas/electricity this is no-mans-land- in winter at least for this kind of population.  I bet we can replay this situation over and over again accross the US.  

To many of those here on TOD who think that we can return to a simpler life style I have a few words of caution.  Where I live in western oregon the really choice raw materials are gone.  Specifically old growth western red cedar.  What is the big deal?  Old growth cedar made shingles for houses all over the US. Locals used them for fence posts because of thier rot resistance.  I use a piece to prop up my laptop- to allow the fan more room to move air. It is 5/8's of an inch thick has 28 yearly growth rings.  You will never, ever find this stuff (alive)except in protected forests.  We hord it like gold and use it for kindling of all things.  The blocks that I can find are too short to do much with.  The hundreds of years it took to grow this stuff will not be repeated with the current humans present.  Yes it's just a tree but if we don't have asphalt for shingles, or steel for roofing then what are we going to cover our houses with?  Dried grass?  I suppose if we don't use it for motor fuel...:(
The implications of PO are truely mind blowing.
We might well reach total peak rescouces, not just oil.

Show off you nasty doomer!
You're giving TOD a bad name.
Your posting rights should be repealed.

"nasty doomer"?

Hmmm...

I think that there have been a few oil proffesionals that have been just as blunt.  Jeffee's I believe was quoted in the local paper "war, famine, pestilence, and death".  and you are pissed about resorts and shingles?

My gut feeling is that the people who post here in the oil industry are all too aware of the implications of PO as we move forward.  It is not an "uplifting" conversation which is why the politicians really have thier hands tied in trying to fix it, is because of people like you.  Oil is everywhere you just don't see it.  If you dare, look around you and ask yourself this question "how does oil enter into what I'm looking at right now?." Paint-shingles-electricity-food-clothes-irrigation, etc. Move to the next question - "What will replace it?." When it starts to look ugly don't look away because whether you or I like it doesn't really matter.  This kind of conversation will
become more common in the future.  I guess I get to drag you by the ear to take a look from my limited obsevations.

The "worlds first oil shortage". 2 weeks ago I drove to a newly restored lighthouse at cape foul weather and took a tour.  It was built in the late 1800's during the "worlds first oil shortage" - whale oil, we humans had hunted the whales to near extinction so there was a shortage of whale oil to light the lamps.  They used "pig oil" for 12 years rendered from pig fat.  Then they found a new oil called "kerosene"  which they used until the 50's when they switched to electric lamps.  Which they still use today. The point being- whales like oil are not unlimited.

Electricity in Oregon is from: 42%coal, 7%nat gas, 3% nuclear, <5% bio-gas/wind, and the balance hydro, according the "The Oregonian". My clean-fish killing-hydro myth was busted.  So lets replace fuel cars with battery ones and plug in...to more fossil fuel!  How many enviromentalists think plug in cars are the answer?  Quite a few I bet.

The future has to be very diferent than it is today.  I tried to point out some obsevations that are to me relative to what we face in an oil limited world.  Is it about wells and extraction rates- no.  But I think that we need to come to grips with how pervasive oil is in our society, so that we realize just what we are up against.  I believe that the oil professionals here understand it very well and let us draw the conclusions and get called names.;-)

Unlike the post below you offer no(0)solutions.  Perhaps you should think of some and reply.  Spare me the "nasty doomer" unless you have good suggestions that are not so full of holes that a sieve looks like a good way to carry water.  I would love that debate....your turn.

Spare me the "nasty doomer"

Sorry you did not get the sarcasm, may be you never read my comments because I am "banned"?
What about heat pumps?

Sorry no I haven't read your comment's. I get a bit edgy so and I missed it completely.  I like heat pumps (ground loop?)-pretty much anything to conserve.  Which is where we need to head as fast as possible IMHO.
Best, ( will look up comments later)  
Western Red Cedar. This is what I built my loghouse(3200 sq. ft. ) with back in 1989. I can attest to its great qualities.

Light, low moisture, no haven for insects, high resistance to warp and rot. Looks very good too. Not splotchy like pine.

For those who might be interested I am going to sell my log house and 20 acres that go with it. It has a full poured concrete basement. A very good deep well that will never go dry. Extremely good soil and near 5 major rivers plus close to two of the biggest manmade lakes in the USA.

Deer have to be shooed out of your way. Turkeys are plentiful as well as squirrels. Much fish in the rivers.

For someone looking for a place to ride out the upcoming events this appears to be the best part of the US to do it in. Water,wildlife,forests,live springs and so on. I live 4 miles from the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Once there were enormous numbers of native american indians living on these lands and in the bottoms nearby as well as mound builders all around the area.

Reason: Divorce but I intend to stay on part of the land in another residence in another tract I have surveyed off.

The loghouse sports a geothermal heatpump and has a Buck stove in the great room that I have heated the whole house with. There are some woods as part of the acreage.

Apologies if this sounds like spam. If so you have my permission to delete it.

airdale

Airdale, I may be interested in your property. You can e-mail me at rhmaynejr@hotmail.com Thanks....Bob
What makes you think we need shingles?  A green roof (or a cave!) would provide more than adequate rain protection.  Your personal survival depends on your own ingenuity and resourcefulness -- don't assume nothing post-peak will work, just figure out what will!
If I am interpreting your work correctly you seem to be suggesting that both the human understanding of geology and the technology available for exploiting that knowledge have advanced so far that it is now possible for nearly the whole recoverable capacity of a field such as ABQQ to be recovered with only relatively minor decline rates.   The implication seems to be that production rates in the Kingdom can be maintained at higher levels and for longer time frames than HL would suggest possible.  But also the flip side of this "progess" is that when serious decline rates start to occur they will be much steeper and much faster than the recent history would lead most unknowledgable observers to expect.   In other words, at some point, ABQQ's productivity will fail very suddenly, as will that of similar fields.  Is that about correct?

Thank you, oilaholic, for putting the question in such a concise way.

This is exactly the argument that I have been trying to make and somehow not been able to clearly convey,  Despite my crude efforts at wordsmithing, I seem to have managed to make people annoyed or downright angry, when I say the biggest danger may not be immediate peak (again, it MAY be, we simply cannot know), but that we are running completely and totally in the blind.

The changes in technology and the changes in the exact definition of what is:
OIP
URR
production
production capability
oil
all liquids
are now occurring so fast as to make the HL (Hubbert Linearization)  model more and more difficult to use as a predictive tool in the old way, that predicting peak becomes a complete crapshoot, and runs the risk of undermining credibility of those trying to do so based on the old models.  

There is possible good news in this, if one thinks a delayed peak is good news, in that it "may" give us more time to attempt the "Hirsch Report(s)" type mitigation plans to reduce the chaos and suffering when peak does come.

There is bad news though, in that when, as you point out, and Simmons and Hirsch himself and others try to point out, the "peak" itself may come with virtually no warning whatsoever, and the post peak drop in production may be much more severe than expected  (the "cliff" instead of the "slow squeeze")

We cannot even be sure of the above however, because the changing definition of "oil" per se, and "all liquids" further cloud the picture.  We simply cannot dismiss the effect of NGL (Naturual Gas Liquids or Condensates), "GTL" (Gas to Liquids) different than GTL, although the two are often confused in the popular press, and the introduction of heavy and sour crude in a much bigger way  (notice I am leaving out tar sand and ultra heavy oils, simply because they are too speculative to even think about, but many popular commentators gaining widespread press do not leave them out (Yergin and Lynch comes to mind, and I am not discussing the ethanol issue, which I see as  a giant fuel switching operation, from natural gas to liquids, but again, many commentators now throw this in, thus making the statistical picture murky beyond all comprehension even to the people who spend hours studying these issues....to the average citizen, it must appear more esoteric and complex than subatomic physics!  We cannot, repeat, CANNOT fault the man or woman on the street for being unable to separate the wheat from the chaff!)

What's it all mean?  I have insisted that it means that someone should be getting the message to the public that they should be laying contigency plans for sudden and massive changes, some of them less than pleasant, possibly outright catastrophic to them and their organizations.  Interruptions of energy supply and massive price moves  in any direction are possible.  The long held faith in the stability of energy sources and supply should now be viewed as a dangerous myth.  The complexity of the fuel delivery system means that you and your organization can no longer rely on the simplicities of a "mono fuel" crude oil based world....there may be energy available but it may be the wrong kind, and you may not be able to make use of it.

And for the "peak aware", it should be given as a caution:  Sudden disruption/interrruption/price movement and chaos may NOT in and of itself be proof of "peak" per se, depending on how "peak" is defined  (peak oil, peak all liquids, peak light sweet crude, peak usable liquids, etc)  

Even being aware of the threat above gives us some slight advantage in vision over the general public, but, and I don't say this to be in any way rude, and let me say again that the work here is extremely valuable, useful and informative, I cannot say enough about how highly I regard what I have learned from folks like Standiford, Robert R., and Westexas, and the others, and have NEVER disparaged in any way the efforts and sheer clever and perceptive knowledge of this group), but....we are running, due to the definitional problems cited above, with only slightly more vision than the public at large.
Humility, caution, is the order of the day.....but we can take comfort in the old proverb, "in the kingdom of the blind, the one eyed man is king!"  :-)

Caution.  Strategic and Contigency Planning.  Energy Diversity. Conservation and reduction of waste. Transport alternatives.  The acceptance of workable and usable alternatives and renewables, and the acceptance of something close to "Mitigation options" of the type that Hirsch and others who see the enormous challenge in front of us.  Perhaps not all of the options.  But use the best first, and work outward.
This is the concise, coherent planning that I am accepting, and I am encouraging folks to spread to others and to their organizations.  

"I cannot do a lot, but I will do the little I can do."  Helen Keller

Thank you.
Roger Conner  known to you as ThatsItImout

The volume of oil that is there (Oil in Place) remains the same.  What IHS, which is also CERA, are doing in part is saying that the amount of that oil that can be recovered (the Recovery Factor) can be increased, due to advances in technology.  However in the field that is closest to exhaustion they are now backing away from that conclusion.  Also I am not sure, as I noted above, that it will be possible to reach even the numbers that Jean Laherrere has estimated as the amount that will be recovered.

Bear in mind, however, that as the oilfield production drops, it is not going to be how much, in absolute terms, we get out that is the main concern.   It is the rate of production, since demand is going up, and we are looking to see where we can meet that demand.  There is no question that the field is declining, and I have tried to explain why that is irreversible.  It has implications for the future of Ghawar, which is close, and the Northern parts of which are close behind Abqaiq in relative amounts of oil produced.

Controlling the pressure, to control water movement, also controls the amount of oil that is drawn from an individual well, and the rate at which it is produced.

Thanks.  One question, does the water injection extraction technique totally obliviate the possibility of using stripper type wells for extraction in a resevoir's production.  Having a cursory knowledge of well function for water production it seems if you have rest a well liquid level settles back from a cone shape would it work for oil as well in some resevoir shapes?  
The only difference between a stripper well and an ordinary oil well is the fact that a stripper well has a high water cut. Given enough time, all oil wells in a waterflood turn into stripper wells. Not sure if there is an official definition but probably anything over 95% or so (meaning, nineteen barrels of water for every barrel of oil produced). Large-scale water injection makes high producing watercut more likely, not less likely. So, yes, stripper wells and water injection are very commonly found together. Once the oil has been separated out, the produced water is often re-injected through other wells anyway.

As far as reservoir management is concerned, the ONLY purpose of water injection is to maintain reservoir pressure by replacing the volume of produced fluids. Some folk will say that water injection is "designed" to sweep oil towards production wells, but that is as much a matter of hope as it is of engineering. You try to inject the water in such a manner (i.e. in such a place) that it doesn't immediately channel through to your producers - this is mainly common sense, e.g. you don't normally want to put a water injector immediately updip of a producer.

Yes, water cones can collapse given enough time and the right rock and fluid properties. This sometimes makes a difference to how wells are managed. Another approach is to produce below the critical rate at which the cone will reach the production well. As always, it depends.

Re: Another approach is to produce below the critical rate at which the cone will reach the production well

Could you expand on this remark a bit, plucky? When, where applicable? does it extend production into the future at lower flow rates? Etc.

OK, briefly: oil floats on water in the rock. Horizontal interface between the two phases is called the oil water contact (ignore the transition zone). Production wells are drilled down to somewhere above the contact. When production begins, the area of reduced pressure (drawdown) around the wellbore causes the contact surface to be perturbed upwards until it reaches the production well and you start producing water. This is "coning", so called after the shape of the perturbed contact. If you stop production then the pressure disturbance goes away and the cone collapses, in certain rather complex to define circumstances (has to do with "relative permeability hysteresis", which I can't describe compactly, or maybe at all).

Really hard to interpret diagram here http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/search.cfm and search for "coning"

Coning is promoted by:
High production rates
Narrow interval between contact and bottom of well
High oil viscosity (=> high drawdown & adverse mobility ratio)
Low horizontal permeability (ditto)
High vertical permeability (gas moves faster)
High net:gross (no shale stringers to stop water moving vertically)

If you know enough about the rock and fluid properties then you can estimate the "coning critical rate", i.e. the rate at which the cone will have grown to the point where it just reaches the bottom of the producing well. You can then choose to limit your production rate to just below this level to avoid water production. It certainly extends DRY production into the future at lower flowrates, but if you are willing to cycle enough water through the reservoir then you'll eventually get all the moveable oil out anyway, up to the economic limit. And sometimes the coning critical rate is so low that you just have to shrug and accept that it will happen at any economically realistic well production rate, and manage the water on the surface.

Remember that if you are injecting water below the oil, or if an aquifer is influxing into the reservoir, then the contact will be moving upwards anyway so the coning critical rate will change with time as the contact gets nearer to the wells and eventually breaks through independent of production rate.

Coning can happen with gas as well, this time coming from above not below - think Cantarell (but unlikely there due to very high horizontal permeability).

Horizontal wells spread production out through a larger volume of reservoir (hand wave) and so reduce drawdown and the propensity for coning. Again this delays water breakthrough but once it happens, it happens. See "cresting" in the Schlumberger glossary linked above.

Let me wave an arm back, but in appreciation, for the clear verbal and graphic explanations in this and other threads. I'm certain those contributing explanations on topics like this know the underlying equations and models that are so pleasingly (for me) missing from the posts. Thank you.  
Re: Bear in mind, however, that as the oilfield production drops, it is not going to be how much, in absolute terms, we get out that is the main concern. It is the rate of production, since demand is going up, and we are looking to see where we can meet that demand

This seems to be constant confusion at TOD but I think it is due to many others (eg. IHS/CERA) spreading it publicly, which I'll call "the appeal to URR" argument. Field F has a URR of 10 Gb. You have recovered 4 Gb. If you have a recovery efficiency (factor, rate) of 50% instead of 45%, you can extract 1 Gb over time instead of 0.5 Gb. At what flow (production) rate will you do so?

In other words, what is the shape of the tail? How are you managing it? You might maximize flow rates now and near-term followed by a steep decline (this is the strategy I have called Extreme Production Measures). You still get your extra 5% of URR but then you are hosed--to use a technical term :) The proximate cause for this strategy is economic but there is a deeper reason: a system built on continuous growth must deploy such a strategy and it is always seen as necessary and good.

Or you can manage the tail differently, reduce flow rates from the field by delaying in-field drilling and try to maximize yields over a longer time--again assuming that the recovery efficiency remains unchanged, you will still get your 50%. This strategy assumes that you have a finite resource, better to live a bit more humbly now and longer than burn the candle at both ends. You will meet demand by demanding less and implement other strategies for living.

OK, as David Byrne once said, I will stop making sense now.

best --

In other words, what is the shape of the tail? How are you managing it? You might maximize flow rates now and near-term followed by a steep decline [...] Or you can manage the tail differently, reduce flow rates from the field by delaying in-field drilling and try to maximize yields over a longer time.

Dave, whatever about the ethical dimensions of accelerated versus protracted extraction, I don't really see how speedy oil recovery affects the overall depletion curve except that it might bring on the peak a few years sooner than otherwise.  How can rapid extraction of individual fields impact the overall decline rate? Not all oilfields were discovered at the same time.

If there are lots of oilfields, all of which matured at a different date, and presuming their individual nose-diving decline is staggered over time (say, 20 years), won't the cumulative decline rate be much the same as if all had declined gradually?

In other words the 'slow food' as opposed to the 'fast food' extraction approach will only postpone the hour of reckoning by a couple of years at best. And it won't change the shape of the decline curve to any notable extent.

Copelch,

I am not an oil guy but I disagree with this logic for the following reasons.

  1. I have experience with water wells for irrigation in Texas and New Mexico.  They also have shown decline over time from pumping.  In many places the aquifer recharges so this is not applicable to oil fields which don't recharge.
  2. However there are some aquifers in West Texas near Lubbuck and in much of New Mexico that are not recharging, at least not in the last 50 years, this is water from 10,000 years ago or more in underground lakes.
  3. A lot of places near Lubbuck used to have one well per quarter section that used to pump say 750 gallons per minute out of a lobe of the Ogallala aquifer.  These wells were drilled in the 1940's and 1950's mostly, and for 30 years supplied all the water to grow crops on that quarter section.
  4. Irrigation pivot equipment is often sized for 400 gpm in many of these locations. Over time the well declined until it was pumping below 400 gpm and wouldn't feed the pivot.  Might only produce 350 gpm by the 1970's.
  5. So they "infield" drilled another well between pivots some years ago that also initially delivered 350 gpm.  They were back to 700 gpm (very slight decline) but out of two wells now, not one.
  6. In about another 10 years both of these wells declined rapidly until the net was again below 400 gpm.  So now there is often 4 wells pumping 125 gpm or a total of 500 gpm for the quarter section.  They didn't get back to the original 750 gpm and they have 4 wells now not the original single well.
  7. What is scary is that no matter when the original wells were drilled, or farms developed in those 1000's of square miles, everybody has drilled lots and lots of new wells in the last 20 years.
  8. So at present everybody is still farming using lots of water.  Some farms have more or less water under them but all wells have declined very rapidly in the last 20 years compared to the first 20 years of operation.

So in summary these water wells have maintained a near constant production via lots of new wells.  But they are reaching a point when doubling the number of wells isn't really going to help that much.  And the cost is going through the roof.  So even though these individual pockets of water were developed at different times they are all going to collapse at about the same time.  The reason for this is that new water wells always needed to be pumped at the maximum rate to make up for declining original wells.  People moved more of their high water requiring crops to where the most water could be pumped.  No spare capacity like the original wells had.  

Very late in the day people have come to realize that using irrigation equipment that only uses 250 gpm or less, instead of 400, can work just as well if applied efficiently.  But now wells are dropping below 100 gpm and there just isn't very much water left.  If the same efficient systems had been put in place 30 years ago there may not have been the need to drill more wells and there would still be a lot of water left to use.  But in aggregate all the water has been found and all the aquifers depleted to the same low level because the easiest water is always removed fastest.

So even though these individual pockets of water were developed at different times they are all going to collapse at about the same time.

NC,

Thank you for your highly instructive reply. Until now I had always believed that the US still had a long way to go before groundwater shortage became a problem.

You've certainly given me food for thought -- so I've put my thinking cap on.

Groundwater depletion is even scarier than `peak oil'.

BTW has anybody ever constructed a Hubbert curve for `peak groundwater'?

Whilst your argument is probably valid for individual wells or fields, it fails to address copelch's thesis, which considers the production profile for the world as a whole. Your view reflects an opinion which by my reading, has become quite popular among drummers of late.

Many people on this site at the moment seem to think it self evident that if individual fields all show sharp declines, then the sum total of those fields must show a sharp decline also.

This is not the case.

If this seems counter-intuitive to you, please dwell on it.

I think this idea has become popular mainly because it supports the general doomeristic framework.

Hubbert didn't use a symmetrical curve to model oil production because he thought production from individual fields was symmetrical! This isn't typically the case, and as far as I know, never was. Rather, he knew he could use a symmetrical curve because summing large amounts of skewed distributions will likely produce a more or less symmetrical curve.

It is possible that world oil production will have a significant skew post peak. If so, this would likely be caused by such things as political events. The fact that individual production wells are getting more skewed is unlikely to be a candidate.

If you (ie. anyone) think the post peak production curve will show a skew, you should be able to explain why you think this will be the case without appealing to the fact that individual fields show a skew.

I would think that, if the major oilfields are badly skewed (i.e. fast to catastrophic decline) this would skew the whole data set. We have repeatedly seen data here that the (many) smaller fields tend to decline much more rapidly than the bigger ones, thus contributing their 'collective skew' to the statistical mix.
Re: Hubbert didn't use a symmetrical curve to model oil production because he thought production from individual fields was symmetrical!

You are right. But see my remarks below. Look at the graph for North America from the Hirsch article cited there. I am interested in production curves. Look at Stuart's Extrapolating World Production. Consider this.

Again, it's very important to remember that the high and low models are error bars on where the center of the model would go, if it was truly logistic, and if extrapolation of this last region of linearity in the linearization is valid. Annual production can have significant noisy excursions above and below whatever the true line turns out to be.

The Gaussian peak is in 2024 at 95mbpd, but I don't trust that extrapolation. The linearization-based logistics are a lot more likely to be correct in my opinion. Notice that the last couple of year's production are a big spike above the logistic models. But that's ok, because the spike seems to be ending in the recent production plateau.

Same graph below except with Stuart's SWAG in yellow.

However, please don't take the specific numbers on that yellow curve too seriously - it's just intended to illustrate a general qualitative idea of what might happen.
What might happen. That's what I'm looking at.

I am trying to explain generally the "big spike" (1st graph) and consider the plausibility of Stuart's guess (2nd graph) which does not display a "bell curve" shape. My theory is that it has to do with advanced EOR/IOR applied to old giant existing fields and also the spike in deepwater production. I've called these strategies extreme production measures. I think that yellow line, which shows a sharp decline, may be our future. I've tried to explain why. I've called for production slowdowns because there's no other good explanation for what's happened in the last few years. It's not because we are swamped with new production but we have encountered a demand shock. The world is pumping like crazy to meet it.

It's not because I'm some doomer.

Implicit in your comment (it seems to me) is the idea that, if the world produces XX million barrels in a given year, it doesn't matter which fields it comes from, or whether or not any particular field is squeezed hard.

But we must ask ourselves why individual fields are being squeezed so hard. Globally, the answer seems to be a lack of replacement fields coming on stream to take up the slack. So, individual field profiles will show, instead of a bell-curve decline, a plateau followed by a steep decay.

If it turns out that a high proportion of existing producing fields are past their peak, and are in this artificial post-peak plateau phase (big and small fields alike), then it seems likely that the aggregate production numbers will also be deformed in the same way.

If it turns out, over the next couple of years, that world production numbers are indeed in a plateau, whereas we know that large numbers individual fields are being squeezed, then that would seem to indicate to me, a strong likelihood of a steeper downward slope once the plateau ends. Given that the area under the curve is constant, you can't have your cake and eat it.

Re: If there are lots of oilfields, all of which matured at a different date, and presuming their individual nose-diving decline is staggered over time (say, 20 years), won't the cumulative decline rate be much the same as if all had declined gradually?

There are lots of oil fields but not lots of giant oil fields (like Abqaiq) and these produce somewhere between 40% and 50% of the world's oil daily depending on you how define "giant". If you define it as a field with a URR of greater than 0.5 Gb, then the percentage is closer to 50%. Most of these fields are old (pre-dating 1980 at least, most are much older). See Giant Oil Fields of the World (pdf file).

If a significant number of these fields go into rapid decline close to each other in time--say, within a decade--then due to the large percentage of the world's oil we get from them we will alter the shape of the global decline curve--it will be sharper. Even a few percentage points makes a difference here. Abaqaiq is producing 400/kbd and peaked some time ago. If you manage the tail end production of this field (and others) to promote longevity and not rush to suck them dry, you are partially managing the global decline also. These really big fields are in some sense "priceless" -- they can not be replaced. The discoveries trend shows this clearly. See Hirsch's Shaping the peak of world oil production. Do we want to see a global peak that looks like North America?

Indeed, the trend is toward a greater share of world production from smaller fields in countries like Chad, Mauritania, Malaysia, offshore Brazil, et. al. What you say would be true if all oil fields were created equal. But they are not. If you lose 200/kbd within a few years at Abaqaiq because of the way you produced it, you need to put 20 10/kbd fields onstream just to replace that. At Cantarell, the situation is much worse. Ghawar could go that way.

I might have to post on this again. Concerning the ethical implications of my position, my answer is:

  1. Shall we mortgage our children's oil future?
  2. Shall we start mitigating the peak now?

No to #1, Yes to #2. Why can't humans make reasonable extrapolations about the future and act accordingly? Unfortunately, that's just the way it is.

Erratum

Should read

these produce somewhere between 40% and 50% of the world's daily oil flows depending on how you define "giant"

Thanks for your clarification.  It had indeed occurred to me that most of the elephants might be about to collapse together within the same decade. Well, it occurred to me just after I pressed the 'post' button.

Still, there might be enough relatively immature 'rhino-sized' and 'water buffalo-sized' oilfields (in Chad, Brazil etc.) to compensate and stave off the grand finale just a little bit longer.

Though it takes an awful lot of rhinos and water-buffalos to outweigh half a dozen elephant.

I am far more fatalistic than you are, I suppose -- it's the irreversibility of the oil crisis, not the date of its eruption or even the shape of the downward curve, that is the most depressing. What are ten or twenty years reprieve for the automobile compared with an eternity of the horse and cart?

Except they are not rhinos. The average field size discovered lately is soemthing near 34 million barrels _total_, as I recall. You're trying to cover the death of a dozen elephants with thousands and thousands of bunny rabbits... except these ones are sterile and don't reproduce.