Peak Oil Update - December 2006: Production Forecasts and EIA Oil Production Numbers
Posted by Khebab on December 14, 2006 - 11:56am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: Ali Morteza Samsam Bakhtiari, bp, chris skrebowski, eia, logistic, loglets, m. king hubbert, oil, oil prices, peak oil, rembrandt koppelaar, stuart staniford, update [list all tags]
An update on the last production numbers from the EIA along with different oil production forecasts.
World oil production (EIA Monthly) and various forecasts (2001-2027). Click to Enlarge.
What's new:
- IEA forecast (World Energy Outlook, 2006)
- IEA forecast (World Energy Outlook, 2005)
- IEA forecast (World Energy Outlook, 2004)
- Forecasts for Saudi Arabia
Notations: 
Fig 1.- World production (EIA data). Click to Enlarge.
Table I - Production estimate (in millions of barrels per day (mbpd)) for September 2006 taken from the EIA website (International Petroleum Monthly). 1Moving Average on the last 12 months.
The share of CO is now only 86.62% of the total liquid production.
Fig 2.- Share of each liquid category to the total liquid production. Click to Enlarge.
Fig 2.- World oil production (Crude oil + NGL) and various forecasts (1940-2050). The light gray box gives the particular area where the Figures below are zooming in. Click to Enlarge.
Fig 3.- Production forecasts assuming no visible peak. Click to Enlarge.
Fig 4.- Forecasts by PeakOilers based on bottom-up methodologies. Click to Enlarge.
Fig 5.- Forecasts by PeakOilers using curve fitting methodologies. Click to Enlarge.
Fig 6.- Year-on-Year production growth. Click to Enlarge.
Table II. Summary of all the forecasts (figures are in mbpd) as well as the last EIA estimates.1Productive capacities.
I've added a simple domestic consumption forecast based on a population forecast by the UN and a constant number of barrels per capita at (see here for details). In order for exports to remain at their 2005 level and assuming the aforementioned consumption model, production needs to grow by (orange dotted line on the charts).
Fig 7.- Saudi Arabia oil production (EIA Monthly) and various forecasts (2001-2020). The EIA estimate is a productive capacity (PC). Click to Enlarge.
Table III. Summary of all the forecasts (figures are in mbpd) as well as the last EIA estimates.1Productive capacities.
October 2006
September 2006
- mbpd= Millions of barrels per day
- Gb= Billions of barrels (109)
- Tb= Trillions of barrels (1012)
- NGPL= Natural Gas Plant Liquids
- CO= Crude Oil + lease condensate
- NGL= Natural Gas Liquids (lease condensate + NGPL)
- URR= Ultimate Recoverable Resource
EIA Last Update (September)
Data sources for the production numbers:
- Production data from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006 (Crude oil + NGL).
- EIA data (monthly and annual productions up to July 2006) for crude oil and lease condensate (noted CO) on which I added the NGPL production (noted CO+NGL).
The All liquids peak is now May 2005 at 85.205 mbpd, the year to date average values (9 months) are down from 2005 for all the categories. The peak dates are unchanged for Crude Oil + Cond., NGPL and Crude Oil + NGL (see Table I below).
Fig 1.- World production (EIA data). Click to Enlarge.
| Category | Sept 2006 | Sept 2005 | 12 MA1 | 2006 9 Months | 2005 9 Months | Share | Peak Date | Peak Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Liquids | 84.64 | 84.01 | 84.43 | 84.41 | 84.45 | 100.00% | 2005-05 | 85.21 |
| Crude Oil + NGL | 81.09 | 80.86 | 81.24 | 81.21 | 81.30 | 95.80% | 2005-05 | 81.97 |
| Other Liquids | 3.55 | 3.15 | 3.19 | 3.20 | 3.15 | 4.20% | 2006-09 | 3.55 |
| NGPL | 7.77 | 7.58 | 7.78 | 7.83 | 7.81 | 9.18% | 2005-02 | 8.04 |
| Crude Oil + Condensate | 73.32 | 73.28 | 73.46 | 73.38 | 73.50 | 86.62% | 2005-12 | 74.08 |
The share of CO is now only 86.62% of the total liquid production.
Fig 2.- Share of each liquid category to the total liquid production. Click to Enlarge.
Fig 2.- World oil production (Crude oil + NGL) and various forecasts (1940-2050). The light gray box gives the particular area where the Figures below are zooming in. Click to Enlarge.
Business as Usual
- EIA's International Energy Outlook 2006, reference case (Table E4, World Oil Production by Region and Country, Reference Case).
- IEA total liquid demand forecast for 2006 and 2007 (Table1.xls).
- IEA World Energy Outlook 2006 : forecasts for All liquids, CO+NGL and Crude Oil (Table 3.2, p. 94).
- IEA World Energy Outlook 2005 : forecast for All liquids (Table 3.5).
- IEA World Energy Outlook 2004 : forecast for All liquids (Table 2.4).
- A simple demographic model based on the observation that the oil produced per capita has been roughly constant for the last 26 years around 4.4496 barrels/capita/year (Crude Oil + NGL). The world population forecast employed is the UN 2004 Revision Population Database (medium variant).
- CERA forecasts for conventional oil (Crude Oil + Condensate?) and all liquids, believed to be productive capacities (i.e. actual production + spare capacity). The numbers have been derived from Figure 1 in Dave's response to CERA.
Fig 3.- Production forecasts assuming no visible peak. Click to Enlarge.
PeakOilers: Bottom-Up Analysis
- Chris Skrebowski's megaprojects database (see discussion here).
- The ASPO forecast from the last newsletter (#71): I took the production numbers for 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2050 and then interpolated the data (spline) for the missing years. I added the previous forecast issued one year and two years ago (newsletter #58 and #46 respectively). There was no revision since August 2006.
- Rembrandt H. E. M. Koppelaar (Oil Supply Analysis 2006 - 2007): "Between 2006 and 2010 nearly 25 mbpd of new production is expected to come on-stream leading to a production (all liquids) level of 93-94 mbpd (91 mbpd for CO+NGL) in 2010 with the incorporation of a decline rate of 4% over present day production".
- Koppelaar Oil Production Outlook 2005-2040 - Foundation Peak Oil Netherlands (November 2005 Edition).
- The WOCAP model from Samsam Bakhtiari (2003). The forecast is for crude oil plus NGL.
Fig 4.- Forecasts by PeakOilers based on bottom-up methodologies. Click to Enlarge.
PeakOilers: Curve Fitting
The following results are based on a linear or non-linear fit of a parametric curve (most often a Logistic curve) directly on the observed production profile:- Professor Kenneth S. Deffeyes forecast (Beyond Oil: The View From Hubbert's Peak): Logistic curve fit applied on crude oil only (plus condensate) with URR= 2013 Gb and peak date around November 24th, 2005.
- Jean Lahèrrere (2005): Peak oil and other peaks, presentation to the CERN meeting, 2005.
- Jean Lahèrrere (2006): When will oil production decline significantly? European Geosciences Union, Vienna, 2006.
- Logistic curves derived from the application of Hubbert Linearization technique by Stuart Staniford (see this post for details).
- Results of the Loglet analysis.
- The Generalized Bass Model (GBM) proposed by Prof. Renato Guseo, I used his most recent paper (GUSEO, R. et al. (2006). World Oil Depletion Models: Price Effects Compared with Strategic or Technological Interventions ; Technological Forecasting and Social Change, (in press).). The GBM is a beautiful model that has been applied in finance and marketing science (see here for some background). The estimation in Guseo's article was based on BP data from 2004 (CO+NGL).
- The so-called shock model proposed by TOD's poster WebHubbleTelescope . You can find a description of his approach on his blog here. The current estimate was done in 2005 based on BP's data.
Fig 5.- Forecasts by PeakOilers using curve fitting methodologies. Click to Enlarge.
Production Growth
The chart below gives the year-on-year production growth (or decline) for each month. Growth has been weak (below 1%) most of the year but went back in positive territory since last July.
Fig 6.- Year-on-Year production growth. Click to Enlarge.
| Forecast | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2010 | 2015 | Peak Date | Peak Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Liquids | |||||||
| Observed (EIA) | 84.49 | 84.41 | NA | NA | NA | 2005-05 | 85.21 |
| Koppelaar (2005) | 84.06 | 85.78 | 86.61 | 89.21 | 87.98 | > 2011 | > 89.58 |
| EIA (IEO, 2006) | 82.70 | 84.50 | 86.37 | 91.60 | 98.30 | > 2030 | > 118.00 |
| IEA (WEO, 2006) | 83.60 | 85.10 | 86.62 | 91.30 | 99.30 | > 2030 | > 116.30 |
| IEA (WEO, 2005) | 84.00 | 85.85 | 87.64 | 92.50 | 99.11 | > 2030 | > 115.40 |
| IEA (WEO, 2004) | 82.06 | 83.74 | 85.41 | 90.40 | 98.69 | > 2030 | > 121.30 |
| CERA1 (2006) | 87.77 | 89.52 | 91.62 | 97.24 | 104.54 | > 2035 | > 130.00 |
| Lahèrrere (2006) | 83.59 | 84.82 | 85.96 | 88.93 | 92.27 | 2018 | 92.99 |
| Lahèrrere (2005) | 83.59 | 84.47 | 85.23 | 86.96 | 87.77 | 2014 | 87.84 |
| Crude Oil + NGL | |||||||
| Observed (EIA) | 81.37 | 81.21 | NA | NA | NA | 2005-05 | 81.97 |
| IEA (WEO, 2006) | 80.10 | 81.38 | 82.67 | 86.50 | 92.50 | > 2030 | > 104.90 |
| ASPO-71 | 80.00 | 81.90 | 84.48 | 90.00 | 85.00 | 2010 | 90.00 |
| ASPO-58 | 81.00 | 82.03 | 83.10 | 85.00 | 79.18 | 2010 | 85.00 |
| ASPO-45 | 81.00 | 80.95 | 80.80 | 80.00 | 73.77 | 2005 | 81.00 |
| Koppelaar (2006) | 81.76 | 82.31 | 83.68 | 91.00 | NA | > 2010 | 91.00 |
| Bakhtiari (2003) | 80.24 | 80.89 | 80.89 | 77.64 | 69.51 | 2006 | 80.89 |
| Skrebowski (2006) | 80.90 | 81.42 | 82.59 | 87.32 | NA | > 2010 | 87.92 |
| Staniford (High) | 77.45 | 77.92 | 78.31 | 79.01 | 78.51 | 2011-10 | 79.08 |
| Staniford (Med) | 75.81 | 75.94 | 75.97 | 75.52 | 73.00 | 2007-05 | 75.98 |
| Staniford (Low) | 70.46 | 70.13 | 69.71 | 67.92 | 63.40 | 2002-07 | 70.88 |
| Loglets | 81.12 | 82.14 | 83.02 | 84.65 | 83.26 | 2012-01 | 84.80 |
| GBM (2003) | 76.06 | 76.27 | 76.33 | 75.30 | 67.79 | 2007-05 | 76.34 |
| Shock Model (2006) | 80.76 | 80.43 | 80.01 | 78.27 | 73.74 | 2003 | 81.17 |
| Constant barrels/capita | 78.81 | 79.73 | 80.66 | 83.42 | 88.01 | > 2050 | > 110.64 |
| Crude Oil + Lease Condensate | |||||||
| Observed (EIA) | 73.58 | 73.38 | NA | NA | NA | 2005-12 | 74.08 |
| IEA (WEO, 2006) | 70.80 | 71.78 | 72.77 | 75.70 | 80.30 | > 2030 | > 89.10 |
| CERA1 (2006) | 76.49 | 76.89 | 78.60 | 82.29 | 83.83 | > 2038 | > 97.58 |
| ASPO-71 | 73.10 | 74.45 | 75.87 | 78.00 | 72.00 | 2010 | 78.00 |
| ASPO-58 | 73.00 | 73.80 | 74.65 | 76.00 | 69.50 | 2010 | 76.00 |
| ASPO-58 | 72.80 | 72.56 | 72.25 | 71.00 | 63.55 | 2005 | 72.80 |
| Deffeyes (2004) | 69.81 | 69.81 | 69.71 | 68.90 | 65.88 | 2005-12 | 69.82 |
Saudi Arabia
The Figure 7 below gives Saudi Arabia production for crude oil and NGPL (data from the EIA: Monthly Energy Review for CO and the International Petroleum Monthly for NGPL).- IEA World Energy Outlook 2006 : forecasts for CO+NGL and Crude Oil (Table 3.2, p. 94).
- IEA World Energy Outlook 2005 : forecast for All liquids (Table 3.5).
- EIA, International Energy Outlook 2006 : World Oil Production Capacity by Region and Country, Reference Case, 1990-2030 (Table E1, p. 155).
I've added a simple domestic consumption forecast based on a population forecast by the UN and a constant number of barrels per capita at (see here for details). In order for exports to remain at their 2005 level and assuming the aforementioned consumption model, production needs to grow by (orange dotted line on the charts).
Fig 7.- Saudi Arabia oil production (EIA Monthly) and various forecasts (2001-2020). The EIA estimate is a productive capacity (PC). Click to Enlarge.
| Forecast | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2010 | 2015 | Peak Date | Peak Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude Oil + NGL | |||||||
| Observed (EIA) | 11.01 | 10.75 | NA | NA | NA | 2005-04 | 11.06 |
| IEA (WEO, 2006) | 10.60 | 10.83 | 11.03 | 11.60 | 13.30 | > 2030 | > 17.30 |
| IEA (WEO, 2005) | 10.62 | 10.85 | 11.09 | 11.90 | 13.62 | > 2030 | > 18.20 |
| EIA (IEO, 2006) | 12.13 | 12.79 | 13.37 | 14.40 | 14.80 | 2015 | 14.80 |
| Crude Oil + Lease Condensate | |||||||
| Observed (EIA) | 9.55 | 9.28 | NA | NA | NA | 1980-11 | 10.41 |
| Consumption | |||||||
| Cont. Barrels/Capita | 1.71 | 1.75 | 1.79 | 1.92 | 2.14 | > 2050 | > 3.43 |
Next update in January.
Previous Update:
November 2006October 2006
September 2006
Khebab, I'm cosistently awed by your mathematical skills, your information gathering ability and great summaries. You da man!
And also must have one of the worlds most understanding wives. I just hope this info gets diseminated to the media and to world politicians, its incredibly important to the whole planet, and its implications are frightening. How can anyone with two or three brain cells firing in sequence not see that we have to conserve and change!
Indeed!
Thank you very much for the time and effort you put into your charts and commentary.
Regards,
Gunga
I believe that we are seeing a similar divergence between the conventional wisdom regarding Saudi Arabia and what the HL model predicts. Right now, the production data fit the HL model.
Almost everyone in the Texas oil patch--except for a handful of people who believed Hubbert--was shocked when Texas production fell instead of increasing, after the RRC went to a 100% allowable.
The worst disservice to the human race right now is the politicalization of issues of scientific fact. We're now another 6 or 8 years into climate change because of this craziness
As for the politics of it: energy waste is a political problem, not a geological one. If you want to solve it you have to talk politics, not science.
GW gives climate change and a need for more fuel for airconditioning, massive infrastructure change and new farming conditions.
Peak Oil gives a shift from natural gas and sweet light oil to heavy oil, tar sands, coal and lower EROEI proceses giving far more CO2 emissions per m3 of ready to use fuel.
These two threats accelerate each other in a scary way.
The "massive infrastructure change" needed to combat GW is not much different from that needed for PO. Both can most effectively be attacked with conservation and renewables. Sure... there are a lot of desperate ideas floating around about CO2 sequestration but that is all theory on the scale needed. Wind and solar can be made reality in no time.
I agree that GW might succumb to the desperation about PO. Which is why it is even more important to seperate the two issues and solve GW first. Its solution automatically includes the correct solutions to the PO problem, while the opposite is not true.
In the local debate I advocate investments that have more benefits then only lowering the CO2 emissions, there are plenty of such opportunities.
What I find the hardest to accept about both the GW and the PO problem is that all serious solutions will require decades to actually show any effect at all. For someone with a short attention span that is torture. And I am sure that a lot of people emotionally link the impossibility for short-term succes to really bad long term odds.
Any idea what do about that?
The problem really begins to be real when people are trying to solve PO without any regards to GW by converting coal to hydrocarbons. Now that would be a catastrophy and I hope we have the sanity not to do that.
I agree with the conclusion that they stem from the same problem: greed.
You say .."oh we will just do this and then do that and we will be fine"....
"Just cut half the sheet metal off our cars and we can drive all we want."
Who needs AC when the sun is shining just use PV and solar cells. Like 'boom' , their in place..let the good times roll.
Tell me...that good stuff your puffing on...can I get some so I can quit worrying about life? Sixty eight years at this and a whippersnapper , snapping his whipper tells how to live thru the worst diaster in the worlds history with just a few motley phrases.
Were you here during the 70's? I was. In the middle of madness on a day when the oil embargo was announced. You likely were not. You have no clue as to what it was like nor what it will be like.
"Were you here during the 70's?"
Sure. I remember seeing empty highways and I remember living through it with no damage whatsoever, just like everyone else. Where was that global catastrophy back then? What happened? We are still here, spending $450 billion for Christmas. So what was the big deal? Can you tell me? That you won't be able to get the toys you want for Christmas for a couple of years? Is that what it is?
"You have no clue as to what it was like nor what it will be like."
Sure I do. It will be the day when I will have difficulty getting a seat on the train. Big deal. Not.
It will be the day when people will wake up and ask themselves why they had to buy that stupid SUV.
It will be the day they discover that the two sticks attached to their body are for walking and that there is a store in the neighbourhood they can walk to.
It will be the day a lot of bikes will get a second lease on life.
And then people will figure out that putting three more colleagues into their SUV every fourth day can cut their commute cost by a factor of almost four.
And that if enough people will share rides, they will get to work almost twice as fast because there won't be any congested highways.
And a week later there will be plenty of gas again at the gas station, again. Big deal...
PO does not mean we are running out of oil. It means we are running out of cheap oil.
It means that wasting it will come at a price that will make you think twice instead of not at all. Big deal. Some people think about it twice already.
Not out of necessity but out of a feeling of responsibility. That is not a big deal, either, just a function of maturity and how you were brought up.
Of course, thinking sometimes leads to headaches, so I expect aspirin to sell well during those weeks.
Are suffering from Angst about the future? I am sorry to hear that, but a lot of people do. You are not alone. A shrink can help with the Angst and a smaller car can help with the cost of gas. The shrink will be a lot more expensive than the cost of gas, even if you keep driving that Hummer.
Don't get me wrong... this is not about me knowing everything. This is about me not being afraid. This is about me looking forward to things that are not completely knowable. To me the spice of life is what hides behind the next corner and the corner after that. PO is nothing to be afraid off. It has been behind that corner for fifty years. In other words... you could have known about it since you are 18, it was not exactly a government secret... and you mean to tell me you didn't?
Squalish mentioned New York City traffic will be in a congested gridlock 24/7 by the year 2030. right here
remembering the 70's traffic is one thing, but bear in mind, world population has doubled since around 1960. only 45 years ago! And we are all more prosperous, i.e more cars on the road!
While science and medicine help us live longer, it also changes the balance of world population to the positive! i mean positive as in more people!
how does that saying go?
Careful what you wish for! It might come true.
This is not about why this is happening or what variable is to blame most. This is about how to solve the resulting problems.
Again, prosperity and the number of cars one owns do not go hand in hand. An old saying that I know goes like this:
"One arse can only ride on one horse at a time."
Gas in my neighborhood is currently $2.25/gallon.
With adjustments for the CPI, that is $1.97/gallon in 1999 dollars.
I think everyone here agrees that the CPI measure is totally bogus, and likely underestimating inflation by half. That would put us at $1.69/gallon if we could still buy gas with 1999 dollars.
If you then factor in the 16% drop of the USD over the past 6 years (the USD Index was right around 100 in 1999, and is at 83.65 today) gas is selling at $1.41.
Yes it's up a little bit, but not nearly as much as it seems.
That's correct, I've made the correction.
re: one thing that strikes me is that the three entities, CO, CO+NGPL, and all liquids graphs all move in lockstep.
I don't think they do, it's probably an artifact due to the fact that the curves are stacked on top of each other. In particular, the growth in the "Other Liquids" category has been very strong lately and exhibit strong seasonal fluctuations probably because of Ethanol.
A different way to present the curves on Fig. 1:
Notice the two big swings in summer 2005 and 2006, I believe it's related to Ethanol production (May RR could confirmed). CO has increased only by 25% since 1980 but NGPL and and "Other Liquids" productions have increased by 125% and 200% respectively.
Kind of important since w/w ethanol prod was around 800 kbpd last year ( 1.6mm boed?) and looks to be much higher in '06. US capy alone - existing or under construction - stands at over 600 kbpd ( 1.2mmboed?)
Maybe you'd have to add in part of a barrel of biodiesel to get a legit boe, but giving bio r/p parity with crude is misleading from a w/w liquid fuels standpoint.
http://www.energyeconomist.com/a6257783p/wpsr/graphs/WTESTUS1.gif
The figure below is giving the cumulated corrections for each fuel category for each month since 2005:
The red line is the resulting correction for the annual production value. We can see that 2005 has been corrected upward for NGPL, and Other Liquids but the correction is downward for 2006 for CO and other liquids. In total, the 2005 production for all liquids has been corrected by + 0.4 mbpd.
I will try to maintain this chart in the next updates.