Of Oil Supply trains and a thought on Ain Dar
Posted by Heading Out on April 3, 2007 - 11:44am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: Ain Dar, china, GOSP, japan, saudi arabia, spr [list all tags]
One of the critical factors in making sure that there is enough of an energy supply to meet the growing international demand lies in the logistics of the supply train that is going to have to provide it. When CERA and others point to the totality of the available resource, as Nate is pointing out in his series, they neglect the realities of that chain, and the parts that all have to work if the electric light is to go on the next time that you flip the switch on the wall.
Thus, if for example, Saudi Aramco tells Asian refiners that it is cutting supplies by 9% that does not mean that when a Japanese driver pulls into the gas station tomorrow that he will face a large EMPTY sign. Rather, in March Aramco tells the refiners that it will cut supply in later months, and thus the impact is not immediately evident. :
Saudi Aramco will cut exports of Arab heavy crude by as much as 20 percent to Japan, 9 percent to South Korea and 15 percent to China, refinery officials said. A Taiwanese refiner will receive a 10 percent cut in Arab heavy supply.
The gas that is in the pump came out of the oil well some time ago, and has had to pass though pipelines, storage, tanker shipment, refineries and additional storage before it actually leaves the pump nozzle to flow into the car gas tank. This takes away some of the immediate impact of the OPEC cut back in supply, and if this is, concurrently, occurring when the refineries normally reduce demand because of maintenance, then the impact can be further concealed.
Refineries in Asia typically close from April to June for repairs. Japan will see a peak of 26 percent of its capacity closed in May and South Korea will have 19 percent shut, mainly during the second half of June and the first half of July.
Unfortunately that “not-quite-just-in time-production” nature of the supply train also has a downside at the other side of this situation. When production increases again, if it does, then there will be an equivalent lag-time before our Japanese retailer can take down his EMPTY sign because the gas is back in town.
One way that individuals, companies and nations can protect themselves from the violent price fluctuations that usually occur during shortages it to provide themselves with a strategic reserve. Now I don’t call it that when I buy 4 cords of wood in the fall, so that I don’t have to struggle through the blizzard to the store for my daily wood supply, but I could. There was discussion on fluctuations in coal production a week or so ago, and part of that was because of the more common national strikes that used to occur in struggles between management and unions. With strikes lasting up to a year power stations would build stocks of coal ahead of time so that they could continue work during the strike, but this exacerbated the fluctuation. And power stations must now, because of the variable timing of coal by rail, have an operating reserve just to ensure stable operation over a month. And as a passing comment, driving down the Delta after Katrina I was surprised to see how little damage the coal stockpiles had suffered.
Nations and corporations normally have operational stockpiles for oil (and the relative state of these get posted and commented on fairly regularly). And beyond these short-term reserves the US has a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) which we are in process of enlarging. It proved useful after the Hurricanes of 2005, and China has built and filled some, but is, interestingly renting out space to Sinopec at the Zhenhai SPR. This does not seem consistent with plans discussed last year for China to build a reserve of 800 million barrels. If they are still waiting for the price to come down, they may have a long wait. India is also moving ahead with the creation of underground space.
It is the more normal stocks, however, that are first run down, should supply become inadequate, but since current U.S. stocks are at typical levels, around 22 days supply, this is still more of a conjectural scenario. However it is a point of vulnerability and is one place to see the impact of a prolonged OPEC reduction. OPEC, for example, see the size of these inventories as a sign of oversupply.
Moving further back along the supply train, and skipping the refining process itself, and recognizing that it takes several weeks to ship oil from Ras Tanura to Houston, or other distant destinations, one arrives back at Saudi Arabia, and two more points that I would like to interject into the debate on Aramco production. And they are more intended to be helpful to those who don’t know some of the language and technologies.
The first relates to the debate between Stuart and Euan on the decline in Saudi production. Foregoing, for now the intent of the Saudi Government (see reference above) and the sudden chilling we seem to be seeing in the U.S. relationship with them, the need for time in changing oil production should be recognized.
When Aramco decide to increase production from a field, or to add another field to their supply network, they cannot just drill another well, hook it into the line and see their exports increase. Because of the nature of the fluid that actually comes out of the hole, it has to be run, first through a GOSP , or gas oil separation plant. Here the oil, formation water and gas that come out of the well together are separated, so that they can be piped to the different treatment plants. (And as a side point readers might want to look at some of the articles on oil production from Saudi Aramco World since they are written more for a family audience than a technical one.) These plants are generally rather large, the one in the article treats 450,000 bd of oil, and they take considerable time to build, install and connect up. Thus when new production is planned one has to wait for the plant to be in operation before the wells themselves can be productive. The new addition that is planned for Khurais , for example, must also have a new central processing plant constructed, and when Haradh Stage 3 began, it had, first to have the new GOSP in place and running, which is was by the second quarter of 2006. Thus the production increments in the country are controlled by the rate at which these can be brought on line. In addition the older ones are being upgraded. (Side comment, though the KSA centralize their GOSPs they don’t have to be that big we have had an individual well unit hauled through our yard behind an SUV).
The final point that I wanted to slip in was to extend the "back of the envelope" type of calculation that I had originally done for Abqaiq (continued here and here ) to do the same thing for Northern Ain Dar, since this was the subject of the one of the papers that Stuart quoted the other day.
As you may gather from that post Ain Dar has been producing for some 50 years, and for the last 30 of these water has been injected around the edges of the field to gradually push the remaining oil up towards the crest of the anticline (fold) that caused the oil to be trapped there. And while the pictures that Stuart posted tell some of the story, it may also help to look at some numbers. If we begin by seeing how much oil that there can be in this part of the field, we can do this by calculating the total volume of the reservoir, and then seeing how much of this is not rock (the porosity).
This part of the field is roughly 7 miles wide, and some 20 miles long (from Greg Croft and is some 200 ft thick. This gives a volume of rock of some 836,000,000,000 cu ft. If this has a porosity of 25% then the volume of space that can be filled with oil is 209,000,000,000 cu. Ft. If it were all oil, then at 7.48 gal/cu ft this would be 37,237,000,000 barrels, or 37 billion barrels give or take. And I should, here, point out that this is only Northern Ain Dar, and that when larger figures are quoted I believe that they refer to the whole field, which extends about another 25 miles further South, and which is often combined with the adjacent Shedgum which, in 2001, for e.g. was producing about 2 mbd, to the roughly 0.5 mbd coming from North Ain Dar.
Now this is, at maximum, the total volume of oil. However there is, at Ain Dar, apparently a certain amount of water already in the formation with the oil, so this will reduce the total volume that can be recovered. At the same time, even with water flood only a certain fraction of the oil in the rock will be recovered. So that if we say. For example, that the oil filled about 80% of the space, then the total would drop to around 30 billion barrels. And of this one might, at best, anticipate recovering about half of it. So that the ultimate resource recovery might be about 50%, which would mean a total of 15 billion barrels. The reality is, however, of that ultimate potential resource we are only likely to produce a certain fraction. It is the value of that fraction that is often the subject of debate, since by increasing the number, without doing anything else, we can, apparently, increase the amount of oil that is available in a reserve.
Well let us say, just for the sake of creating an example, that the amount we can recover is 70%. (I am going to include in this the oil formation volume factor that plucky underdog explained.Then this drops the available oil down to around 10 billion barrels. Now of this, over the past 50 years they appear to have produced around 7 billion barrels (adding up the columns in the first graph of the paper Stuart used). Which would give them about 3 billion barrels left. If they are producing about 200 mb a year, then this would give the field a remaining life of around 15 years – which is the length of time that they say that the field can continue to produce in the paper. But then, of course, it will be all gone. And, considering the condition of the rest of Ain Dar and Shedgum, as Stuart pointed out, and the condition of Abqaiq, one may presume that they also, by that time will be out of oil also.
The other interesting thing, that I thought to note in the paper was that while they had drilled some horizontal wells in this field, they had only started to implement their use in water control in 2005, and the first MRC well had only been completed at the time of the paper and was not yet on stream. They will be used to produce relatively dry oil from the upper layers of the field, and to mix it with the oil and water coming from the rest of the field through the conventional vertical/inclined wells that go into the area that the water has already reached to maintain the overall water cut at around 42%.



I don't really get this last part Heading Out:
"They will be used to produce relatively dry oil from the upper layers of the field, and to mix it with the oil and water coming from the rest of the field through the conventional vertical/inclined wells that go into the area that the water has already reached to maintain the overall water cut at around 42%."
Oh, sorry - basically (and you may need to go back to the pictures that Stuart posted ) the field is an inverted bow shape in section, and the water has come up on both sides so that only the center portion is still above the water flood. This oil is now being tapped using horizontal wells
,
as I tried to explain in the first Abqaiq post . The oil from those wells does not contain any water from the water floods, and thus I have called it "dry", while the water in the area where the wells go down into the water flood will also bring out some water (the water cut). Thus these are "wet" and it is by mixing the two that they are trying to stabilize their water cut at 42%.
Hi, HO. Here's hoping you're doing well.
I've got a source, a very prominent petroleum engineer (now retired), who kindly reviewed the SPE paper Stuart found and that you reference. I'm not ready to release the details indeed, I don't have them all yet but the upshot of his reading about North 'Ain Dar is this what's all the fuss about? He expressed some surprise that SPE had even bothered to publish the paper since, I assume, he found little of interest in it.
I'll be publishing on this when I have all the data & interpretations I need. However, I myself was pretty convinced by the paper, especially the graphs showing how waterlogged the field was becoming. But, then I thought to run it by some people who know what they're talking about. So, mea culpa.
I think this should serve as a general warning to people here at The Oil Drum who have been especially eager to jump to conclusions about Saudi production, or have come up with some strange interpretations of the public record (what there is of it). This strikes me as grasping at straws.
It is hard to live with uncertainty. There's a lot we don't know about Saudi production. We all want to come to a conclusion. But sometimes, we can't.
best,
Dave
I can't comment on the expertise exhibited in these articles.
However, I do believe that it is likely that KSA will have to demonstrate some of that reserve production capacity this summer...so I guess we will have something to discuss as a group then. Perhaps with a little more certainity, one way or another.
Hi, Dave, glad to see you here!
My take on the paper were that it had three points of interest, the first of which was that they weren't using the rigless water shut-off (WSO) more frequently (this is where they seal the bottom part of a well that goes down vertically into the partially flooded zone where the water flood has reached, so as to reduce the water make in the well).
The second was that they had not started to use MRC in North Ain Dar yet - though they have started putting in the wells, and bearing in mind that the paper was written a while ago. Interestingly they had also put in the control valves on the laterals, so that they could control extraction as the water came nearer the well horizon.
The third was that (and this was partly why I made the calculation) it seems to suggest that in 15 years the field will be over.
There were some technical points also that were interesting - vide the success rate of the WSO, and the fact that they have been using more conventional horizontal wells (of the type I just illustrated) to revive some of the "dead" wells.
Dave,
I don't mean to quibble but your post says absolutely nothing about why Stuart's interpretation of the Saudi information is wrong. All you've done is cast an unspecific aspersion without any data other than an unnamed source with unnamed conclusions. In the computer world this is called "FUD" (fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) and is deeply, deeply frowned upon.
I'm sure you have interesting information on hand but please refrain from posting until you are willing to share.
Thanks,
Gary
I have things to do, and won't be hanging around here today. But, I said
And I will do this, so stay tuned. I'm sorry if you think my giving everyone "a taste" of what's forthcoming is inappropriate.By the way, just who is spreading "Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt" about Saudi Arabia's oil production? It isn't me. You might examine your own confusion around this point.
Dave: if you can get experienced people with no conflict of interest to discuss the issue in detail publicly, that will be valuable.
Did you get an email about demand/supply?
Subject: Saudi Oil Production
Even if there is a conflict of interest, but it is open and declared, then I'll be very interested.
But I do agree that it does little good to use an anonymous source to cast doubt on Stuart's and Euan's work. It's no answer to say that Stuart et al are doing the same: they laid out their case -- whether one finds it conclusive or not is a separate issue.
I'll send you some mail.
"I don't mean to quibble but your post says absolutely nothing about why Stuart's interpretation of the Saudi information is wrong. All you've done is cast an unspecific aspersion without any data other than an unnamed source with unnamed conclusions."
Dave does this all the time, and what he does produce in the end tends to be questionable and biased, doesn't actually address the issue or remains ambiguous.
I guess we should just all trust the professionals in the oil industry to keep production rising and prices stable, huh? I'm sure they all know what they're doing and we'd never see any problems with our energy supply. Oh, wait...
Stuart-
I am looking through your "nosedive" topic to see how much net oil you are missing with the additive effects of the new projects.
I think the after breakthrough cut in Ain Dar/ Shedgum should be about 90% water... so you should be missing 1.7 MMBOPD less the new oil on the SA total curve.
Production in Ain Dar/Shedgum is now 300,000 BOPD and 2.7 MMBWPD... from 2 MMBOPD and 1 MMBWPD in 2003 if the water has risen to the top of the crest. Until someone shows me different, I find it hard to see any other way.
No doubt confirmed by the announced export cuts.
If it helps I did a bit of digging into oil consumption in the KSA it looks to me like the numbers could easily be low.
By about 200-500kbd.
I sent the info to WT. So if your seeing say 2GB of oil missing it could have well gone into internal consumption.
I could find nothing that would justify the low average oil consumption for KSA compared to Kuwait for example.
The US is at like 0.08mbpd per million
And Kuwait is at 0.12mbpd per million
If you plugin 0.10 per million for KSA you come up with 2.4 mbpd.
The above is the historical flood front velocity in North Ain Dar.. it appears to be moving at 4.6 ft/day.
This cannot be the rate of vertical movement (the field would have watered out in 250 days) .... so it must be the horizontal movement towards the crest (or approximately east and west on both sides of the North South structure).
What we seek is the vertical movement associated with this horizontal movement. This is related to the dip angle of the structure. It appears from the Greg Croft structure that the dip angle of North Ain Dar is about 3 degrees, I have a reference which says it is 5 degrees.
But 3 degrees is the most conservative, and at this angle, things happen vertically at 1/20th the rate of the horizontal, at 5 degrees, it is 1/11th .
Now, it appears that we have a cut-off date of 1/1/04, so it has been about 1185 days since the cross sections of the water level in that reservoir were effective.
At a horizontal rate of 4.6 ft/day over 1185 days, what water front has converged a distance of 5450' on both sides towards the crest of that structure.
So, the water level has moved up 237 feet since that cross section in the paper was published.
I think the Western cross shows a water level on 1/1/04 of -5,900', based on a vertical scale off of the 1940 picture with the original water oil contact.
Now if I'm correct, the current water front is -5,900 + 237 = -5,663'. If you or your friend look at the Greg Croft structure, how much of that reservoir is left water-free??
Note that through the saddles between North Ain Dar, South Ain Dar, and Shedgum, all areas spill into each other and we would expect gravity equilibration. So the water level is likely consistent between all three. Now if we have 2 MMBOPD which is going to no water free (dry oil) area, could that not result in some production problems??
Look at the wet area % contribution graph and the oil production water cut curve for North Ain Dar. Note that if you factor out the increasing dry area contribution and take into account the 100,000 BOPD loss in production for the area, the true water cut in the wet area is 65%... despite all the horizontal schmontel WSO umbrella plug BS the prior historical trend in water cut behavior continued unabated.
You went from 42% water and 90%+ wet area in late 98 at 600,000 BOPD to 42% water 65% wet area at 500 KBOPD at 1/1/04. Do the algebra, the wet area is 65% water and plot it on Figure 1 of that paper.
And over the course of the last 3.33 years since that paper was written, the water cut in the wet area on the same trend has risen to 80.30%.
NC did a good translation for the mathematically challenged, confirmed by FF last time they talked about this:
NC on March 27, 2007 - 11:10pm | Permalink | Subthread
Fractional_Flow,
Wonderful set of information you have been posting the last few days. I have been struggling to keep up with the math posted. At the risk of sounding very stupid on this forum I will try and paint a picture of what I understand is happening in Gharwar. Helps me consolodate information and maybe it will help others.
I think 3-dimensionally and it seemed obvious to me after your's and Stuart's posts that what has happenning in Gharwar is that the water was "crowding" the oil into the top of the reservoir. The shape is a very gentle curved, elogated dome, think of just the top surface (with a bit of down curving sides) of a very large diameter pipe lying on the ground. The side go down a distance say 10-20 times the thickness of the wall. With this model only the thickness of the pipe wall contains oil.
The thickness of this wall (oil) region is very thin from outside to inside, but very thick when viewed in tangential section where a horizontal straight line would enter from the outside pass just above the inner surface and pass out the opposite side. By using water injection oil in the pipewall below this horizontal line can be "crowded" upwards from both sides where it is removed at the top.
By using horizontal wells placed at very strategic locations along the long axis of the pipe shaped field oil a constant flow of oil output can be maintained as long as the pressure is maintained and the water is below the level of the horizontal well. The Saudis can maintain essentially constant BPD from the field by capturing almost all the oil dispaced upwards by the water.
There will be mixing of oil and water near the contact point but if the rock is porous enough (and the water is injected at the bottom) most of this mixing will initially be well below the horizontal wells. Very little water/oil mixing will occur at the horizontal wells because they are reltively far away from the water front, hundreds of vertical feet and also "around the bend" of the curved wall.
All is fine until the water layer gets up into the flat, top part, of the imaginary pipe wall. At that point the water can race across the wide flat part of the pipe wall (top of the reservoir) and mix with the oil column which may be miles wide but only a few hundred feet thick. Again the Saudi's can work around this a bit by finding the high spots (after all it is not a smooth surface like our pipe wall) above the general top of the reservoir and lay in a bunch of horizontals to maintain extraction rates.
In this manner the oil is continually pushed (for decades) from the lowest part of the reservoir to the top with very little water mixed in at the well location. A very constant, high rate of extraction can be maintained that is all out of proportion to the amount of oil remaining compared to most reservoirs. This is due to the combination of horizontal wells, porosity and the unique shape of the reservoir.
The problem comes when the water finally gets to those last series of top level horizontal wells. By the time you get significant water mixed with the oil, the water % is going to increase very quickly. In my simplistic model and understanding there isn't really much oil left. It's all water below the mixed zone and that mix zone is now restricted to the very top of the reservoir.
If my overly simplistic model is even close to accurate you can't pump water in for another 30 years and get significant oil out like in Texas. All you are going to get is water, because the oil was washed out of the lower rock strata years ago.
All comments, clarifications and even hoots of derision (at my lack of understanding) are welcomed because Id like to be completely wrong so I can sleep at night.
Parent | Parent subthread | Reply | Start new thread
Fractional_Flow on March 28, 2007 - 7:39am | Permalink | Subthread
No your physical description is just about right.
The high rate of extraction up until the last possible moment is quite a reality of this type of geometry (I believe West Texas has shared some such experience).
We need someone with advanced imaged analysis capabilities to tell us everything there is to extract from the Ain Dar cross sections in that SPE paper.
Dave-
Tell your retired petroleum engineer that the impact of that paper is that if what I did above is correct or close to correct .... then 2 MMBOPD-- is essentially gone.
And I didn't correct it for contracting geometry- Stuart (and others) will know what I mean.
But I am looking for an error somewhere- it just cannot be.
"But I am looking for an error somewhere- it just cannot be."
Oh, yes it can. More important(as if this isn't bad enough news), how many other fields have used the same technology for how long? How many others are on the verge of collapse?
Thats in a sense what I'm asking in my other posts. I think I lack a perspective on Ghawar vs other fields.
This brings to mind another question; What if world crude oil production were down to 50 mb/d by 2010? What if we discovered we have just stepped off the cliff and are currently in in the freefall of a World Crude Oil Production Crash?
Cid,
This is extreemly sobering.
I'm reasonably certain that I followed how FF came to the conclusions he has. This only makes it worse. I read this mid-day and it literally sent a chill down my spine. I reread it tonight and I find that I didn't get my understanding wrong. I guess we really should be have been expecting this kind of post at some point from someone very knowledgeable, pragmatic, detailed, and willing to get the word out. I do notice a lack of credible or for that matter uncredible rebuttals to FF, this adds greatly to my fear. You can follow along, and know he is right. It has that ring of truth to it and it makes sense, friggin' deeply disturbing and unfortunate sense. I have been following this for over a year now, I think new readers are going to get a bigger shock to this kind of post. This is not good stuff.
FF's post would make sense and explain KSA's coolness toward the Bush Admin., that the US is pushing KSA and KSA is saying repeatedly that there is nothing they can do and are getting tired of being pushed to do what isn't possible. We are in the end game now.
Bush and Cheney cannot be ignorant or stupid on the topic of PO. Thier idea of handling this with the Iraq invasion will probably be looked back historically as the last nails in the coffin. I wonder if they had a chance for painful mitigation given the euphoric state of current lifestyles. I don't see people willingly powering down, and that is what's required. The people won't vote for it, and you won't get campaign contributions if ELP is your platform. Maybe later but not now and not for the last 30 years.
We live in temporary, unsustainable, high technological times, yet we haven't physically evolved into anything superior to what our most recient ancestors were. We are more advanced, better educated, have a greater understanding of many things but are still the same as they were. It's too bad I liked the startrek/starwars idea of some day long distance space travel. I see that it will never ever happen and I think that is very sad but also very fortunate for the rest of our solar system.
There was an article in Natl' Geo. about Disney in florida and how horrible the sprawl is down there. They had a comment from a dade co. commisioner "Just because we have destroyed 90% of everything doen't mean that we can't do something wonderful with the remaining 10%". We have trashed our planet. You hear people talk of limited nuclear war as if this is a solution to something. They want to mark nuclear waste sites with some sort of warning that will be able to be understood 25,000 years from now. This is the very best we are able to do collectively as a species - it doesn't really say much. "Here is the posionous leftovers from our "advanced" civilization" Oh BTW sorry we fucked up the place.
Watching how people work in groups makes the whole PO problem so very understandable. How our politicians are elected and the special interest money needed to run a campaign and the favors owed to people and companies that do not have the well being of the greater population at heart. and for what? Money for more plastic crap we don't need? More security? A way to look down thier noses at others? We are still so very primitive...
HO and FF - a heart felt thank you! Looks like we had better get prepared, this can only get tough, and alot sooner than I had hoped for.
Best of luck to you guys.
D
Thats me I assure I don't agree with the concept. But in playing devils advocate to explore the position I did not see that it was unreasonable for people to take this option.
I certainly don't agree with it in any shape or form.
Hi m,
re: "...playing devil's advocate...I did not see it was unreasonable..."
I had an exchange (began w. my reply to bunyon) w. Cid, which may also apply to what you say here. If you get a chance to read it, I'd appreciate it. http://www.theoildrum.com/node/2375#comment-169763. (and if you could also read down to my next reply. Thanks.)
Darn. I just wrote a response and lost it all and don't have time to re-do it.
Bottom line? You can't reason with this type of testosterone driven male thinking because it has NOTHING to do with reason. It IS a "failure of imagination and heart" as you so eloquently put it, but you will never be able to make them see that side. In simpler terms, it's that Alpha Male Syndrome and it dooms mankind (like the Chimp said). When was the last time we elected a nerd? As far as I can tell, every male politician is an Alpha Male. Our leaders are Alpha Males to the extreme and the solutions they choose will undoubtedly be very bad.
Cheryl
George Bush an Alpha Male? HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA(falling to the floor)HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA... ROTFLMAO
How about Nancy Pelosi for Alpha Female?
Thanks, Cheryl,
There is something to the idea that people approach things differently, and men and women often seem to.
In my post, I intended to discuss the ideas of reason and logic in relation to the argument (I mean "argument" in the sense of rhetoric - or a justification.)
I may not have said it as well as I could have. There's an inherent problem with the argument itself. (IMHO). Though it's quite good to take a look from "inside" what appears to be an unreasonable stance, in order to understand it, my
point was simply that the logic doesn't hold, as far as I can see. There's a kind of insularity to it.
It's difficult to talk about things like this, especially when we have a format where we tend to drop things after a day or two and it's hard to "finish" a conversation.
I was asking (and would still be interested) to see if the argument I presented was at least laid out well. Did Cid agree it represented his view?
Would memmel agree it is a fair re-statement of what he was looking at as "Devil's Advocate"? In other words, does the argument, just to begin with...represent the "Devil's" position, as memmel sees it?
I'm a little confused about whether memmel is/was referring to:
1) using nuclear weapons (and we may as well include conventional weapons) as "trade items" or
2) about the idea of reducing the population (or some part of it) in this way.
3) (Or both.)
In terms of the trade concept, Chalmers Johnson has written at length about this, as have others. If I may quote Johnson from memory "The US is the only empire in the history of the world to arm its colonies."
I believe memmel had another reply to his concern as well.
On the practical side, I wanted to encourage people to get in touch with some of the people who now work (actively) to prevent nuclear war. This might be a good "peak oil outreach" action item, if one is interested in some positive "networking". (www.idds.org, www.fas.org, www.cdi.org).
Memmel, I understand. There are those who view this an an option. After 9/11 there was some lady being interviewed on her way to work that wanted to use "small" nuclear weapons to get Ossama. "one or two" - " we have some don't we? small ones?" ( if I remember correctly this was the jist of what she said)
I think because of Japan and WWII there is a sense of limited use and survivability in many folks minds. I just think it would get completely out of hand.
By all means, throw in a little "X" chromosome for a slightly gentler touch and let's make it just "one or two, we have some don't we, SMALL ones?" as opposed to the Alpha Males who would choose to "juse a BIG one and just wipe them all off the face of the planet forever. Problem SOLVED." I can pretty much guarantee that the woman didn't come up with this on her own--she has been listening to the men around her, but she softened it with "small ones," which is what she has--no "female cajones" of her own (and trust me, they do exist).
No matter how advanced "civilization" becomes, humans seem unable to control, or even comprehend, their limbic instincts, which is why I'm not optimistic about the future.
Has anyone seen production figures for Burgan since the 1.7 mb/d stated in Nov 2005?
"I'm reasonably certain that I followed how FF came to the conclusions he has. This only makes it worse. I read this mid-day and it literally sent a chill down my spine."
It is interesting that as we followed it, we were able to see the conclusion it was leading to well before FF was willing to state it. That just shows he tried very hard to prove himself wrong and still didn't want to say it when he could find no where else to go.
"...he tried very hard to prove himself wrong..."
Yes, and it makes it all the more sobering. You can understand and see that he doesn't like his conclusions and would welcome someone to point out some error. I would like that as well. I just don't see it happening. Deep down you know that oil is finite and other places around the world are in undeniable decline so we are just getting another one. So, I sit here at my dinning room table wanting...what? The truth? I think I have it. The implications of PO are so staggering. I don't know what I feel, dread, remorse, defeat, foresight, understanding, motivation? People are going to be numbed by the multi-front way this hits.