When Will Russia (and the World) Decline?
Posted by Stuart Staniford on November 6, 2007 - 1:10am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: original, peak oil, plateau, russia [list all tags]

Year-on-year change in centered moving average of Russian oil production according to three data sources: EIA Table 1.1c, IEA Table 3, and JODI. Black line is an extrapolation of the current trend and is a scenario, not a forecast
Here I just want to update and extend a fairly simple analysis of the situation. But first let me set some context. We have been discussing the plateau in global oil production on this site for the last two years (pretty much since the plateau first began). The latest statistics show the plateau continuing, indeed there is even some hint of decline now in both the IEA and EIA series for total liquid fuel production:

Average daily total liquid production, by month, from EIA (green) and IEA (plum), together with 13 month centered moving averages of each line, recursed once (LHS). WTI spot price (blue - RHS). Click to enlarge. Graphs are not zero-scaled. Source: IEA Oil Market Reports, and EIA International Petroleum Monthly Table 1.4. The IEA line is taken from Table 3 of the tables section at the back of the OMR in the last issue for which the number for that month is given. WTI spot price is from the EIA
- continue,
- end in renewed production climbs, or
- begin declines
I have been of the view for a year or two that peak oil is happening as we speak. The fact that production is plateaued tells us that over the last two years or so, all new capacity brought on has been cancelled out by the forces of entropy and chaos: production declines in existing field production, geopolitical problems, the depradations of hurricanes and other accidents, and any voluntary cuts made by OPEC (I am with Jim Hamilton in being deeply sceptical that any voluntary cutting is actually going on). Thus future lists of new projects must be balanced against estimates of the future forces of chaos, and our ability to enumerate those with any precision is extremely poor.
I find it more instructive to look at trends in particular countries. If we look back before the plateau, during the period 2001-2004 when production was increasing robustly as the world economy came out of a slump following the Internet stock crash, we can examine the key declining countries and key increasing countries:

Average annual increase/decrease in daily oil production for top five increasing and decreasing countries 2001-2004. Source: BP (includes NGLs).

Average annual increase/decrease in daily oil production for top five increasing and decreasing countries 2004-2006. Source: BP (includes NGLs).
Let us now focus more closely on Russian statistics. The next graph shows the monthly production statistics from three different sources, together with counts of rigs operating in the country. This is from 1997-2007 so it encompasses the entire period of the Russian revival in which Russia's oil industry first got its infrastructure working again following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then began applying the expertise of Western service countries to boost declining production (particularly in the fairly mature West Siberian fields that counted for more than half of Russian production during late Soviet times).

Monthly Russian oil production according to three data sources: EIA Table 1.1c, IEA Table 3, and JODI. Solid smooth lines are 13 month centered moving averages, recursed once (note last 13 months rely on an incomplete window). Graph is not zero-scaled. Rig data are from Schlumberger data and include both oil and gas rigs.
Before we go any further I want to stress an important caveat here. Baker Hughes does not produce figures for Russia, which means we only have the Schlumberger counts, which do not separate out oil and gas rigs. It's also unclear how accurate counts in Russia might have been especially during the chaotic years of the 1990s. For the purposes of this analysis we shall make the simplifying assumption that the number of oil rigs is roughly proportional to the total number of rigs, and that the counts are accurate enough to be useful. However, this caveat has to be borne in mind in considering the strength of evidence for the conclusions of this post.
After noting that production has been increasing, the second observation is that the rate of increase is falling steadily. In particular, if we take the year on year change in the moving averages, we get the following picture:

Year-on-year change in centered moving average of Russian oil production according to three data sources: EIA Table 1.1c, IEA Table 3, and JODI. Black line is an extrapolation of the current trend and is a scenario, not a forecast
If we take into account the rig count picture, things look more serious. This next graph shows how much increase in production occurred for each rig in the country (expressed in thousands of barrels per day increase, per year, per rig).

Rate of increase in Russian oil production per rig in country. Production is 13 month centered moving average, recursed once, of IEA Table 3 production estimates. Rig data are from Schlumberger data and include both oil and gas rigs.
This suggests either that the opportunities for new drilling projects are much poorer than during the height of the revival, or that the base production is declining faster so that it's harder for new projects to increase overall top line production. Probably some of both. Either way, it tends to the view that Russia cannot increase production much further, even if the rig count goes up a lot more.
And if Russia were to begin declining next year, it's likely we would see the world as a whole move out of plateau, and into unmistakable decline.



OPEC's declines are not voluntary, therefore
KSA's decline is also not voluntary??
Could we at least agree that KSA's decline is "managed"?
Cheers, Dom
Let's keep the focus on Russia for this thread :-)
Thanks for a summary!
With the above ground uncertainty currently being what it is, it seems easy to side with Sadad Al-Husseini's 85ish Mbpd currently being the peak.
I wonder if Libya's Shokri Ghanem's / Margerie's 100 Mbpd max prediction is also a reference to crude + condensates or some other combined category? I can't find the original exact discussion on this.
It'll be interesting to see what Fatih Birol and his team make out all of this in their EIA November revision of USGS and other reserve figures, and thus, production estimates.
They were sitting in the front row in the same conferences as the gentlemen giving the forecasts above and have already given signals that revisions are due. It'll be interesting to see if they'll be minor concessions or real revisions.
To me, it seems that now even the mainstream estimates for peak are converging to a quite narrow range. The peak estimate range has clearly shrunk from 30-50 years (2005-2050) to 10 years (2012-2020), with most starting to drop near 2012ish or lower for at least a temporal peak, if not final peak. This of course includes most of the UK/US IOC estimates.
I expect to see more widespread downward revisions and more converging of estimates at increasing frequency in near future. At the same time, I hope I'm wrong :)
Also, it looks like the peak will for all practical purposes be a combined above ground + underground factors peak. Not a pure geological peak.
Meaning it might run for a slightly bit longer as an "undulating plateau" than a pure geological peak would, IF the political issues can be solved in time to keep the production steady for a while.
If so, it could be that once the peak timing discussion is at least somewhat settled in the inner sanctums, the length of the undulating plateau (& final decline rate) will be the next battle frontier.
IHS: "The plateau will stretch out to 2040"
ASPO: "Fairly short plateau, 6+/-3 years"
etc.
Yes, thanks for a very nice summary Stuart. Your efforts are greatly aprreciated. With all the talk about Saudi Arabia, we tend to forget that Russia is equally as important.
Picture is getting clearer and clearer thanks to your work and that of other contributors to this site.
Ken
I agree. Very helpful article. Thank you.
I read somewhere some months earlier, that a russian minister had said, that Russia would stop exporting oil about year 2010. Anybody with more knowledge about that?
If this is right, then West Texas ELM surely would make the big impact, he claims.
Following is the Russian commentary portion from our draft of the final written report on Brown/Khebab Net Oil Exports by the top five:
"And if Russia were to begin declining next year, it's likely we would see the world as a whole move out of plateau, and into unmistakable decline."
I think Russia is already in decline. Numbers
from Russia come late. And they will be unable to comply with their contractial NG obligations to Europe. Shortly. This is partially due to underinvestment.
The above image is from Jeff Rubin's (CIBC) October 2007 presentation OPEC's Growing Call on itself (PDF).
You probably mean this news which has been circulating for 2 years now:
The latest I could find about that was this IHT article:
Coincidentally, Rosneft is also renegotiating their deal with China after 2010:
There has also been discussion about overstated reserves:
Then again, there's been discussion about Russia capping it's production voluntarily. High prices really is good for Russia (and esp. Putin's cabal):
As for actual export data, exports did fell in 2006 2.4% according to Prime-Tass news agency (article not available on web anymore). Rian reported a 1% fall y-2-y for 2006 exports for Russia.
However, according to Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections, Russia's 1-8/2007 oil exports grew by 4.75% compared to year earlier.
Stuart,
Excellent work, and I think this should help build the case for calling on mitigation efforts to be started now by governments and industry. The probability that we are at at or past peak is not zero.
BTW, The legend on the plot of monthly Russian oil production has the moving averages for IEA production and rigs swapped.
Clint
You're right on the swapped legends. I'll fix it tonight.
I also wanted to congratulate you for having your work on KSA referenced in the EWG's report. I've always enjoyed your objective analysis and was glad to see some credit given to you and TOD.
Clint
The lables for rig count and IEA are swapped in the rig/production chart. It freaked me out seeing such a vast difference in the IEA and EIA figures, which are always reasonably close. Blue is rig count and the dark red/green is production. This is very telling and goes a long way in refuting the standard argument that high prices will cause more drilling and more oil. A similar chart for Saudi Arabia would probably look the same.
That's basically the argument of the piece. A collapse in the marginal return on effort of drilling is probably a symptom of being very close to peak.
Colin Campbell's forecast in 2003 (ASPO newsletter 31):
A short plateau 2007 - 2011, followed by a 3 %ish decline.
As can be seen in Dave Cohen's piece Campbell's assessment of remaining reserves is one of the most pessimistic.
http://digg.com/business_finance/What_do_we_know_about_the_decline_of_Ru...
http://reddit.com/info/5zva3/comments/
thanks for your support!
I recently heard the presentation that is going around called "The Hard Truths: The NPC Study and Outlook for Energy Supply and Demand". As relates to world-wide oil supply, convincing arguemensts are that supply will last for many years. Russian supply may have cycles that result from slow adoption of enhanced recovery technology, but I believe the long term Russian supply is vast.
One approach is to look world-wide at geology that has not been tested but has geographic features like the sites of significant past oil production. That approach leads to potential oil supply for maybe 50 years.
I do find the articles interesting and I feel that geopolitical rather that geology are the predominant uncertainty in near tern oil supply.
High prices leading to reduced oil burning will bring more efficiency in oil use and less emissions.
I agree. I think most people equate Siberia to Saudi Arabia or Texas. Siberia is much larger then all of USA but at the same time the weather is very harsh. I do not think that Siberia is as well explored as Texas or Saudi Arabia, which in turn means that there is potential (but of course no guarantees) that there are additional large oil fields.
Of course, that is what the whalers said when the whales became so difficult to find in the Atlantic. There must be a bunch of whales up in the arctic where we haven't looked yet!!
Better to find the oil (whales) first, plan to use it (them) afterward!!
Ken
I've posted this link a few times and would be interested to know if anyone has an update, or more information from the same source.
Seems there has been exploration in East Siberia. There is a note that there is oil there but much of it in non-anticlinal traps (i.e. diffuse and hard to extract).
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8399-19.cfm
claassen,
I wish I had your confidence that supplies are sufficient for the next 50 years. Most of the studies I've seen claiming this use a lot of hand-waving compared to the hard analysis arguing for a near-term peak in oil production.
IMO the urgency of the need to begin mitigation cannot be understated.
Clint
First time poster here. I'm not sure if this link has been posted before, but Russian daily energy production numbers can be monitored here: http://www.riatec.ru/en/shownews.php?id=37028&sha=1&sfa=1
Thanks for this BP...and welcome.
Thanks BulletProof, this is a great link. I had no idea Russia would be so transparent in their energy production numbers, yet this link gives daily numbers. If I read it right, it shows they produced 1348.4 tons of oil on October 30, which at 7.3 barrels per ton is about 9.84 million barrels (I'm not sure 7.3 is the best figure to use, though).
Absolutely brilliant link. Perhaps TOD should get a feed off it :=)
Stuart, your comment that you're with "Jim Hamilton in being deeply sceptical that any voluntary cutting is actually going on" is central to the discussion whether the supply/demand balance will tighten in the near future and by how much. If you assume oil producers produce with an eye to maximizing financial return to their oil assets, they will produce in a manner that 1) maximizes total oil produced relative 2) to expected returns for remaining oil in place. These two factors, in my mind, set up a dynamic that disallows predicting with accuracy what any given oil producer will decide as the best production guess going forward. I suspect producers share a real concern about market shifts affecting oil price (people adopting more efficient travel habits, electrification of transport) and about the price at which demand destruction, and economic recession, begin to dig. In my mind, a prudent producer would tentatively tease out these thresholds by withholding producible oil from market, whether by "producible" is meant oil that, if produced, would or would not compromise future production by some degree.
If this analysis is correct, one can expect the production plateau we've seen to continue longer than shorter. My larger point is that discussion about world decline is inevitably uncertain given the dynamic variables at play on the factors I've mentioned.
Why would they be ramping up rig count like crazy if they were saving their reserves for later?
Another beautiful theory rendered nonsense by an ugly little fact.
It might make sense for producers to hold back, but with $96 oil that just does not appear to be happening.
I can think of a reason.
Money in the bank, baby!!!
Reduce the number of rigs available to the competition, oil prices go up, more revenue for the same production.
That's it, I'm buying shares in Rig Reduction Corp. Now, what's their ticker symbol?
About a month ago, I had the pleasure of spending 5 hours with the Chairman Emeritus of the most prestigous petroleum engineering consulting firm in the world as part of the SPE Distinguished Lecturer program. His firm has done reserve/ engineering studies in every major producing area of the world.
He spent a lot of time in Russia over the past 12 years. He told me I wouldn't believe the principal reason for the Russian production increase from 1995 to 2005. They didn't have well tubing that had the tensile strength to run below 1,000'!!! As a result, the bottomhole pumps were set to 1,000' or shallower in all their wells. When they started tubing them deeper and pumping them down, here came the oil.
He said the Russian reservoir engineers in terms of waterflooding etc etc were outstanding. It was never a question of them not knowing what to do.... it was just having the kit to do it.
FF
Edit for time warp
Interesting! If so, that would presumably also account for the relatively low recovery factors seen during the soviet era.
The other limit of my Russian industry knowledge is this. A petroleum engineer I broke out with in Wyoming was deputy director of one major oil company JV in Russia. Lived in Moscow in a compound with 2 kids in junior high "like living in a black and white movie".
I asked him if it was "bird's nests all over the ground compared to working in the US". His response "hell no we were making better wells in New Mexico and Texas with the same money last year".
That's it.. I'm tapped out.
FF
I'm no expert on Russian production, but here was my analysis in January, 2006:
http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/1/27/14471/5832
Hubbert Linearization Analysis of the Top Three Net Oil Exporters
Posted by Prof. Goose on January 27, 2006 - 1:47pm
[ED: This is a guest post by westexas...]
My post in the comment section to this January, 2006 article:
And the production boost since. 'New' tech like this is a one time helper... so, its not just lots of extra rigs, its a boost in tech which effect must be fading... gloom.
Yikes.
That would be the kiss of death for low oil cut REDA / submersible production. As I understand it, the key to managing production from those types of wells is having a large enough pump to pump them down, but not so large a pump as to uncover the pump and have it run free / burn itself up. Having a thousand or more feet of standing fluid could dramatically reduce the oil cut.
Russia's very big part in the global peak can not be considered apart from the very large impact of the very large Soviet Union. The Russian production chart isn't a case of a single peak per Hubbert's theory, but what is going to be a twin peak - the first controlled by Soviet thugs and the present second peak controlled by a state run industry that by many opinions including that of Jim Rogers is as inept as ever (a "disaster going on a catastrophe" as Rogers has phrased it). As the production curve shows, their oil industry was pretty dormant in the 30s and 40s, but then was thrown into high gear in the 50s to the early '80s when the Evil Empire went on the war path for world domination. The Soviet economy had little to offer in world trade except a lot of oil. This was their funding for world conquest to the extent that Deffeyes suggested that a more powerful reason for the Soviet collapse than Reagan's arms race was an oil price war OPEC conducted with the less adept Soviet oilfield "managers" - a price war in the middle of an arms race, and they lost badly. I suspect that, during this desperate race with the free world, Soviet oil field management was done more from the point of a rifle than from a geology 101 textbook. This likely produced a lot of reservoir damage from overproduction, although if they were only tubing 1000' deep or less as Fractional Flow says, I don't know how much they would damage reservoirs. Would this mute or amplify overproduction damage? Anyway, they apparently were endangering the world's oil supply to the extent that the U.S. military was monitoring Russia's oil industry pretty closely during the Soviet years. One interesting article is this one written by an Air Force major in Air University Review in 1980. Way back then, he sounded just like Simmons today only talking about Soviet fields and predicting a production collapse by the mid '80s (which, in fact, did happen). He pointed out the big, easily developed fields playing out and the numerous new fields in inaccessible, hard to develope areas with a lot of technical issues. He points out that Russia ambitiously directed over half of their oil exports to Eastern Europe and other parts of the expanding empire, and other geopolitical factors that led to serious overproduction where "...rewards for exceeding goals are given without regard to productivity over the long term ...The consequences are...overproduction of existing fields using low productivity techniques that reduce the total amount of recoverable oil." The major was thus accurately predicting