OPEC Declines and the World Plateau

Average daily oil production, by month, for OPEC countries (stacked). Click to enlarge. Runs from Jan 2002 to Feb 2006. Believed to be all liquids. Source: EIA.

The EIA came out with the latest International Petroleum Monthly yesterday, which allows us to update the plateau graph, and triggered me into a little investigation of what's going on with OPEC production.

Firstly, the world situation:

Average daily oil production, by month, from various estimates. Click to enlarge. Runs from Jan 2002 to Feb 2006. Believed to be all liquids. Graph is not zero-scaled. Source: IEA, and EIA. The IEA corrected line is calculated from the month-on-month production change quoted the following month.

As you can see, the EIA confirms the IEA's impression that February production is down from the all time peaks of May/December 2005, but still definitely within striking range. The EIA is slightly more negative than the IEA for this month, but the discrepancy between the two is not large by historical standards.

In short, the plateau continues for now, but there certainly is not compelling evidence that we have seen the all-time production peak month at present.

A quick update of the graph for the two most key players gives:

Average daily oil production, by month, for Russia and Saudi Arabia. Runs from Jan 2002 to Feb 2006. Click to enlarge. Believed to be all liquids. Graph is not zero-scaled. Source: EIA.

As you can see, February saw Saudi Arabian production continuing in the plateau they've been in for over eighteen months now. More significantly, Russian production in February has not resumed the upward march of the last few years, following a weather related anomaly in January. Is this due to the continued effects of the cold winter in northern Eurasia, or more than that? Time will tell...

Moving onto my main theme, here's an update of the OPEC versus non-OPEC production. Each is expressed as a percentage of the peak month (September 2005 for OPEC, and December 2005 for non-OPEC).

Average daily oil production, by month, as a percentage of peak month, for OPEC and the rest of the world. Runs from Jan 2002 to Feb 2006. Click to enlarge. Believed to be all liquids. Graph is not zero-scaled. Source: EIA.

Non-OPEC production has been in a bumpy plateau for two years now (being within 1/2% of peak production on four occasions: Dec 2003, Nov 2004, May 2005, and December 2005). However, OPEC production was increasing rapidly through the middle of 2004, then slowly through September of 2005. Since then, production has been declining. It's too early, I think, to call the decline a trend, rather than a typical chunk of noise in the production curve, but it's been going on long enough to start to make one scratch one's head and want to investigate further.

If we stack all the production profiles for the OPEC countries we get this:

Average daily oil production, by month, for OPEC countries (stacked). Runs from Jan 2002 to Feb 2006. Click to enlarge. Believed to be all liquids. Source: EIA

This graph makes it clear that most of the short term wiggles in the OPEC production total are caused by the gyrations of Iraqi production, but longer term trends are harder to discern here.

Instead, let's try plotting the curve of each country's production as a percentage of its peak month:

Average daily oil production, by month, for OPEC countries as a percentage of peak monthly production for each country (in the period of the graph). Runs from Jan 2002 to Feb 2006. Click to enlarge. Believed to be all liquids. Graph is not zero-scaled. Source: EIA.

Ok, still rather tough to see what's going on in this curve-knitting soup. But it did inspire me to separate the OPEC countries into two groups. I'm calling them the regular OPEC producers, and the irregular OPEC producers. The regular ones have that name because their production profiles all follow an approximate common pattern. The irregular ones are so named because they all dance to their own individual pipers, unrelated to the common pattern.

First the irregulars:

Average daily oil production, by month, for selected ("irregular") OPEC countries as a percentage of peak monthly production for each country (in the period of the graph). Runs from Jan 2002 to Feb 2006. Click to enlarge. Believed to be all liquids. Graph is not zero-scaled. Source: EIA.

The case of Indonesia is pretty clear: they have peaked and are now declining at a very healthy rate of knots. The others are all cases in which production is noticeably affected by internal political factors of one kind and another. Iraq is the most severe, with production all over the place depending on the relative success of insurgents and coalition/government forces. Venezuela still hasn't restored production to pre-coup-attempt levels. Since there are huge reserves there, it is hard to view this as any kind of permanent peak, as opposed to a reflection of ongoing political developments. Nigeria was steadily increasing, but the political problems that have started to affect oil production in recent months seem quite severe (see Dave's nice summary) and it's not at all clear that they are transitory, so I have placed it into the irregular group also.

The rest of the OPEC countries (the regular ones) have these production profiles:

Average daily oil production, by month, for selected ("regular") OPEC countries as a percentage of peak monthly production for each country (in the period of the graph). Runs from Jan 2002 to Feb 2006. Click to enlarge. Believed to be all liquids. Graph is not zero-scaled. Source: EIA.

As you can see, these countries have the common pattern of steadily increasing production in the early years of our period of interest, followed by each hitting their individual plateau production. The date of that plateau varies from mid 2004 to mid 2005, but what is significant is that no OPEC country has increased production after September 2005! That's the latest that any of these countries hit their individual production plateaus. And a few of them have declined a bit (Iran looks most noticeable in this respect, though whether this is an additional form of sabre-rattling or due to purely technical factors is unclear).

And that's a key part of the story about why OPEC production has been declining for the last six months. No OPEC country has been both willing and able to increase production to offset disruptions in Iraq and Nigeria.

So which is it: willing? Or able?

Past coverage relevant to the plateau:

Other relevant coverage:
Are the Saudi's filling their tank farms?
Do you really think they would be filling their tanks farms instead of selling it at over $70 a barrel?
If they were convinced that oil a year from now might be $80 or $90 a barrel (and no, that's not a prediction on my part), then they would very likely try hoarding some.
This is interesting, but does it really work this way? If they don't sell it now, then they don't have the cash that they would have if they did. And can't invest or use that cash.

They also risk that the price will go down. And if it does go up because of this very supply being withheld from the market, doesn't putting it back on the market lower the price by about the same amount?

This hoarding issue comes up all the time and I wonder if such conspiratorial manipulation of the market is more trouble than it is worth.

Remember recent reports that Goldman Sachs was buying warehouse space in Amsterdam and millions of barrels of oil to store? A VLCC supertanker holds 2 million barrels. Those things are huge. How was Goldman planning on storing the oil - in actual barrels? On pallets, moving them with forklifts? How much warehouse space does Holland have? And two million barrels, well, that's about 35 minutes worth of oil.

Only the Saudis and maybe the Russians could hoard that much. Someone made light of the fact earlier that Ghawar is a great place to store oil, so the Saudis would be pumping it out to pump back in. Good Idea.

But I'm still open to hearing how this hoarding thing might work.

Sincerely,
Lee Raymond

Simmons says the Saudis have an extensive tank farm system.

SPK: How large are the Saudi tank farms in country and internationally, like the ones in the Caribbean?

MRS: Somewhere between 50 and 70 million barrels of domestic tank farms and they have about 10-15 million barrels of Atlantic basin tanks farms that is broken out between some storage they rent in Rotterdam but the majority is in the Caribbean. The only times there is clear evidence of a Saudi surge was during the Iraq war where it jumped by about 800,000 barrels a day for about 45 days. I bet you they were just emptying the tank farms.

I totally agree, but remember, 85 million barrels is one day's usage and 9 days of Saudi production. In relative terms that is nothing. So they sock away 85 million barrels. Then what? I mean, if anything, it just seems prudent.
85 million barrels is one day's usage and 9 days of Saudi production.

Ah, but they don't have to supply the whole world, or replace their entire production.  The rest of the world will still be producing.  They will still be producing.  There is no swing producer any more, so a few million barrels either way can make a big difference.

The question was if they are hoarding some oil.  I think they could be.  Surely they'd want to replace the oil they released during the Gulf War, wouldn't they?  Just to be prudent.

Tough questions. I think about them too much. Is storing hoarding? We have 700 million barrels in our SPR. Is that hoarding? I think hoarding might be(with oil at least in many cases)just stored oil that someone else would rather you be selling.

The food in my neighbor's refrigerator is just that, in fact I  don't know what's in it, nor have I ever even seen the refrigerator. But if I'm starving, hey, now my neighbor is hoarding.

The Saudis or the "speculators" weren't doing anything wrong until gas hit the still ridiculously low price of $2.90/gallon. Now they are hoarding. I think this might just be another case of Americans needing something or someone to point a finger at.

We have 700 million barrels in our SPR. Is that hoarding?

That's a big YES in my book.

The us still manages around 7mmb/d, so what is in the spr is 100 days of us production. how is it hoarding to pump from one hole in the ground to another one? Is it hoarding to not produce oil in alaska's preserve?
The us is accused of insufficient savings. the spr is one of the few places where the us is actually storing something for future use that is likely to have value at that time.
The American Heritage Dictionary defines hoard this way:

A hidden fund or supply stored for future use; a cache.  Or To keep hidden or private.

It's not really hidden, so you could argue it's not a hoard.  OTOH, it certainly is "private," in that not just anyone can use it.

Personally, I don't see anything wrong with hoarding.  As long as it's not carried to extremes, anyway.  

everone hoards.  the spr is a hoard on a large scale.  keeping the car above 1/2 tank as "preparation" is hording on a small scale.  iirc, one of the factors in the 70's shortages was that everyone tried to get their cars up to F (full) at once.  200 million cars, and say 10 gallons per car, that's a sudden (fear fueled) 2 billion gallon blip in quantity demanded.

i think politicos try to argue against that kind of small sacle hoarding, and set as "bad" buying extra containers & etc.

storing is hoarding in any resource constrained environment.
Profiting is to Gouging
as
Storing is to Hoarding
Storage is just that, and the term "hoarding" is someone's negative judgement on the motivation for that storage.  I can see lots of reasons to store, which could be good or bad, depending on whether your the one doing the storing or not.
I think an argument could be made that they are hoarding, and we are not.

Hoarding has a connotation of secrecy.  Hoards are hidden, stores are not.  Everyone knows about our SPR, but no one knows exactly how much the Saudis have.  

I thought they had exactly 261 Billion barrels. That number never even changes. How great is that!?
If I have gun and I'm hungry, and you want maintain any control over your your supplies, perhaps you might want to keep quiet about it.  
It would seem the only way to store quantities of oil that are at all significant in size relative to the volumes of oil used is to keep it in the ground.  Maybe in transport, as was discussed before?

I would think that the amount you need to be able to store to affect the price would decrease as the demand gets close to the supply maximum.

I guess it all depends on why one is storing the oil.  If you really want to have a buffer, or a strategic reserve -well you need a hell of a lot of storage capacity.  If you only want to affect price as the supply/demand ratio goes to 1, you may not need so much.

Its probably just a small buffer stock for normal, commercial ups and downs
Again, I don't think they'd fill tanks instead of selling at these prices. If they were to be hoarding the oil, they would have to know peak is here with pretty good certainty or they'd be taking a chance of prices dropping in the future. I don't believe they think they're at peak yet.
If anyone is going to know if the Peak is here, then I would say that the Saudis are the best placed to make that call.

Personally, I think their anti-peak propoganda over the last 12 months tells us that they already know.

Thanks for responding to my question with some real data. Most of the responders just offer their opinions without any references.

hint, hint...

Real data is only known to the Saudis, and they aren't telling. Even Simmons' figures are estimations of storage capacity but don't tell us what they are doing today with their oil. If you can find something concrete, let us know.
There is a company in the Persian Gulf that monitors tanker sailings by looking out the window. Does anyone know where it is published?
I recollect some such company, think it was started by a swiss, dutch or german chap and it might be based in Geneva. As far as I know the info is not posted online, costs money to receive the data - not surprising since it costs money to run a tanker spy network. The data apparently has a good reputation.

If I stumble upon any references or links to / about it I'll post them at TOD, can't even remember the company's name atm, sorry.

I'd like to draw a bit more of attention on the case of Iran, which is the second biggest producer. The upward trend seen till last September is now inversed. This doesn't seem to be a political issue, in countries where that have been the case the curve have much stronger fluctuations.

This five month period of decline wouldn't be much of a concern if we didn't knew that discovery peaked in 1961, and if professor Bakhtiari hadn't written that alarming piece in the Peak Oil Review.

If Iran is permanently on the decline I do not see any other OPEC country capable of filling the gap.

well this could be political. just increase the pressure on the market ever so slightly in order to make it known exactly how much impact a war would have upon the market.
Here's the link for that piece from professor Bakhtiari:

Peak Oil Review Vol 1. No. 7

Scroll to the end of the file.

This is why Iran wants to build Nukes (stations that is)
They have a burgeoning , young population.
They need to keep the lights on
They need to sell oil and reduce internal consumption itn order to carry on selling oil.

The alternative is an econmy based upon exporting carpets and pistachio nuts

In principle I agree with you. But what about their huge gas reserves?

I don't know if nuclear power is really needed in Iran. Still, they have some considerale reserves of Uranium.

I would argue that, in the long term, the same case can be made for their gas supplies as for their oil currently. The gas is (or will be) more valuable as LNG shipped to North America, Japan, or Western Europe than if it is burned for electricity domestically. Also, it's a decision that can be reversed fairly quickly -- combined-cycle natural gas generators are relatively cheap and can be easily obtained. And finally, if I were Iran, looking at the history of the Middle East with respect to the US, Russia, and Western Europe, I probably wouldn't be willing to put much faith in any of them as a reliable, trustworthy supplier of nuclear fuel.
Gas is a useful export commodity and can also be useful at home (as we are finding out). I agree, they dont need nukes tomorrow, but it may well be a very different picture in 5-10 years time. I think they are planning ahead. They have had 2500 years of practice after all.
In principle I agree with you. But what about their huge gas reserves?

They are pumping as much gas as possible into their oil fields to keep oil production up. Mexico uses Nitrogen, Iran uses Natural Gas.

Our two cleanest HL case histories were the US Lower 48 and the North Sea--they peaked (29 years apart) at slightly less than 50% of Qt and at slightly more than 50% of Qt respectively.  As they say, always start with the simplest explanation, i.e., that Deffeyes had it right that we did peak in or around December, 2005.  

In the first four months of 2006, we have seen:  (1)  new record high (nominal) oil prices; (2)  declining US petroleum imports; (3) falling world oil production and (4)  in today's NYT, a headline saying "Energy Crisis."  

IMO, we should all base our plans on the following three assumptions:  (1)  US discretionary income will drop by at least 50% (probably closer to 75%); (2)  gasoline prices will go to more than $6 per gallon and (3) your current household income will drop by 50%.  

Your scenarios are about what I'm assuming for my future.  I'm not poor now, but I expect to be.  You have to take a realistic look at your chances of being in the top tiny fraction of peole who are wealthy enough to reamain financially secure.  I'm not gonna be there, so I have to prepare now while I have a decent income and options.  Every time I think about buying something, I ask myself if I REALLY need it, or is it just a luxury.  And I look to see if it will last, and if it can be repaired.  

I try to think like my grandparents - they were frugal, and left an investment to their children when they died.  If they bought something, they bought ONE, took care of it, and kept it forever.  Of course, things were not made to be disposable then either.  People do not realize how much engineering goes into reducing the cost and time of assembly, as opposed to making a better product.  We see the advantage of a lower cost item, but not the disadvantage of having to throw it away after a very short lifetime.  I have an old Emerson window fan - all metal, with oil cups on the bearings.  Try to find a quality fan these days - half-decent ones can be found, but they are pricey!

As they say, always start with the simplest explanation,

Science usually agrees with your statement above and call it "parsimony" or "Occam's Razor".  See Wikipedia's definition of parsimony.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parsimony

In science, parsimony is preference for the least complex explanation for an observation. This is generally regarded as good when judging hypotheses. Occam's Razor also states the "principle of parsimony".

In systematics, maximum parsimony is a cladistic "optimality criterion" based on the principle of parsimony. Under maximum parsimony, the preferred phylogenetic tree is the tree that requires the least number of evolutionary changes.

In biogeography, parsimony is used to infer ancient migrations of species or populations by observing the geographic distribution and relationships of existing organisms. Given the phylogenetic tree, ancestral migrations are inferred to be those that require the minimum amount of total movement.

Parsimony is also a factor in statistics: in general, mathematic models with the smallest number of parameters are preferred as each parameter introduced into the model adds some uncertainty to it. Additionally, adding too many parameters leads to "connect-the-dots" curve-fitting which has little predictive power. In general terms, it may be said that applied statisticians (such as process control engineers) value parsimony quite highly, whereas mathematicians prefer to have a more predictive model even if a large number of parameters are required.

My own big-picture-simplest (parsimoniest?) explanation is in 2004 demand begins to push prices up radically, OPEC, in a final attempt to exert control over the markets, opens the taps on whatever 'spare' production capacity is left, and that's where we sit today, at basically maximum production with demand still pushing prices up. The rest is 'noise' in the system.
Iran declining, but no one can admit it because that would essentially admit world decline could be soon and make Iran's desire for nuclear power look reasonable. It sounds like you expect this to be deflationary. Or did you mean "inflation adjusted" when you wrote "discretionary income" and "household income"? Sounds like they're ending "That 70's Show" a bit early.
It doesn't matter if it is inflationary or deflationary. He expressed himself in percentages of discretionary income. So if you have 50% less discretionary income, does it matter whether you've been hyperinflated to 20 times your current salary or deflated to 1/10th of that? The result is exactly the same - the amount you have to spend on discretionary items is reduced massively, which leads to reduced consumer spending, which leads to the end of the consumer way of life.