Peak Oil Update - December 2007: Production Forecasts and EIA Oil Production Numbers
Posted by Khebab on December 29, 2007 - 1:00pm
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: Ali Morteza Samsam Bakhtiari, bp, chris skrebowski, eia, logistic, loglets, m. king hubbert, oil, rembrandt koppelaar, Robelius, update [list all tags]
An update on the latest production numbers from the EIA along with graphs/charts of different oil production forecasts. This post is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Ali Morteza Samsam Bakhtiari who passed away last October.
World oil production (EIA Monthly) for crude oil + NGL. The median forecast is calculated from 13 models that are predicting a peak before 2020 (Bakhtiari, Smith, Staniford, Loglets, Shock model, GBM, ASPO-[70,58,45], Robelius Low/High, HSM). 95% of the predictions sees a production peak between 2008 and 2010 at 77.5 - 85.0 mbpd (The 95% confidence interval is computed using a bootstrap technique). Click to Enlarge.
Executive Summary:
- Monthly production peaks are unchanged:
- All
Liquids:
the peak is
still July 2006 at 85.47 mbpd (revised
0.07 mbpd), the
year to date average production in 2007 (9
months)
is 84.32 mbpd (
0.04 mbpd), down 0.25 mbpd from 2006 for the same period. - Crude Oil
+ NGL:
the peak date remains May 2005
at 82.09 mbpd (unchanged),
the
year to date average production for 2007 (9
months)
is 80.99 mbpd (
0.21 mbpd), down 0.35 mbpd from 2006.
- Crude Oil
+ Condensate: the peak date remains May 2005 at 74.30
mbpd (unchanged),
the
year to date average production for 2007 (9
months)
is 73.09 mbpd (
0.14 mbpd), down 0.48 mbpd from 2006.
- NGPL:
the peak date is still February 2007 at 8.01 mbpd (
0.02 mbpd),
the
year to date average production for 2007 (9
months)
is 7.90 mbpd (
0.07 mbpd), up 0.13 mbpd from 2006.
- Decline in crude oil + condensate continues, however, there is a large increase in crude oil production in September by almost 1 mbpd (largest monthly increase since July 2006). Two thirds of this increase are coming from OPEC. September 2007 estimate for crude oil + condensate is 73.50 mbpd compared to 73.47 mbpd one year ago and 73.92 mbpd two years ago.
- Average forecast: the average forecast for crude oil + NGL based on 13 different projections (Figure above) is showing a kind of production plateau around 81 +/- 4 mbpd with a decline after 2010 +/- 1 year.
Notations:
- mbpd= Million of barrels per day
- Gb= Billion of barrels (109)
- Tb= Trillion of barrels (1012)
- NGPL= Natural Gas Plant Liquids
- CO= Crude Oil + lease condensate
- NGL= Natural Gas Liquids (lease condensate + NGPL)
- URR= Ultimate Recoverable Resource
EIA Last Update (September)
Data sources for the production numbers:
- Production data from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006 (Crude oil + NGL).
- EIA data (monthly and annual productions up to February 2007) for crude oil and lease condensate (noted CO) on which I added the NGPL production (noted CO+NGL).
The All liquids peak is still July 2006 at 85.47 mbpd, the year to date average production value in 2007 (9 months) is down from 2006 for all the categories except for NGPL. The peak date for Crude Oil + Cond. remains May 2005 at 74.30 mbpd (see Table I below).
Fig 1.- World production (EIA data). Blue lines and pentagrams are indicating monthly maximum. Monthly data for CO from the EIA. Annual data for NGPL and Other Liquids from 1980 to 2001 have been upsampled to get monthly estimates. Click to Enlarge.
| Category | Sept 2007 | Sept 2006 | Sept 2005 | 12 Months1 | 2007 (9 Months) | 2006 (9 Months) | 2005 (9 Months) | Share | Peak Date | Peak Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Liquids | 84.93 | 84.75 | 84.15 | 84.45 | 84.32 | 84.57 | 84.71 | 100.00% | 2006-07 | 85.47 |
| Crude Oil + NGL | 81.29 | 81.26 | 80.77 | 81.10 | 80.99 | 81.34 | 81.58 | 95.72% | 2005-05 | 82.09 |
| Other Liquids | 3.64 | 3.49 | 3.38 | 3.34 | 3.33 | 3.23 | 3.13 | 4.28% | 2007-07 | 3.81 |
| NGPL | 7.79 | 7.79 | 7.37 | 7.88 | 7.90 | 7.77 | 7.76 | 9.18% | 2007-02 | 8.01 |
| Crude Oil + Condensate | 73.50 | 73.47 | 73.40 | 73.22 | 73.09 | 73.57 | 73.81 | 86.54% | 2005-05 | 74.30 |
| Canadian Tar Sands | 1.30 | 1.22 | 0.98 | 1.34 | 1.40 | 1.07 | 0.91 | 1.53% | 2007-03 | 1.57 |
Business as Usual
- EIA's International Energy Outlook 2006, reference case (Table E4, World Oil Production by Region and Country, Reference Case).
- IEA total liquid demand forecast for 2006 and 2007 (Table1.xls).
- IEA World Energy Outlook 2006 : forecasts for All liquids, CO+NGL and Crude Oil (Table 3.2, p. 94).
- IEA World Energy Outlook 2005 : forecast for All liquids (Table 3.5).
- IEA World Energy Outlook 2004 : forecast for All liquids (Table 2.4).
- A simple demographic model based on the observation that the oil produced per capita has been roughly constant for the last 26 years around 4.4496 barrels/capita/year (Crude Oil + NGL). The world population forecast employed is the UN 2004 Revision Population Database (medium variant).
- CERA forecasts for conventional oil (Crude Oil + Condensate?) and all liquids, believed to be productive capacities (i.e. actual production + spare capacity). The numbers have been derived from Figure 1 in Dave's response to CERA.
Fig 4.- Production forecasts assuming no visible peak. Click to Enlarge.
PeakOilers: Bottom-Up Analysis
- Chris Skrebowski's megaprojects database (see discussion here).
- The ASPO forecast from April newsletter (#76): I took the production numbers for 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2050 and then interpolated the data (spline) for the missing years. I added the previous forecast issued one year and two years ago (newsletter #58 and #46 respectively, in French (sorry about that but the English versions seem to have disappeared)).
- Rembrandt H. E. M. Koppelaar (Oil Supply Analysis 2006 - 2007): "Between 2006 and 2010 nearly 25 mbpd of new production is expected to come on-stream leading to a production (all liquids) level of 93-94 mbpd (91 mbpd for CO+NGL) in 2010 with the incorporation of a decline rate of 4% over present day production".
- Koppelaar Oil Production Outlook 2005-2040 - Foundation Peak Oil Netherlands (November 2005 Edition).
- The WOCAP model from Samsam Bakhtiari (2003). The forecast is for crude oil plus NGL.
- Forecast by Michael Smith (Energy Institute) for CO+NGL, the data have been taken from this chart in this presentation (pdf).
- PhD thesis of Frederik Robelius (2007): Giant Oil Fields - The Highway to Oil: Giant Oil Fields and their Importance for Future Oil Production. The forecasts (low and high) are derived from this chart.
- Forecast by TOD's contributor Ace, details can be found in this post.
Fig 5.- Forecasts by PeakOilers based on bottom-up methodologies. Click to Enlarge.
PeakOilers: Curve Fitting
The following results are based on a linear or non-linear fit of a parametric curve (most often a Logistic curve) directly on the observed production profile:- Professor Kenneth S. Deffeyes forecast (Beyond Oil: The View From Hubbert's Peak): Logistic curve fit applied on crude oil only (plus condensate) with URR= 2013 Gb and peak date around November 24th, 2005.
- Jean Lahèrrere (2005): Peak oil and other peaks, presentation to the CERN meeting, 2005.
- Jean Lahèrrere (2006): When will oil production decline significantly? European Geosciences Union, Vienna, 2006.
- Logistic curves derived from the application of Hubbert Linearization technique by Stuart Staniford (see this post for details).
- Results of the Loglet analysis.
- The Generalized Bass Model (GBM) proposed by Prof. Renato Guseo, I used his most recent paper (GUSEO, R. et al. (2006). World Oil Depletion Models: Price Effects Compared with Strategic or Technological Interventions ; Technological Forecasting and Social Change, (in press).). The GBM is a beautiful model that has been applied in finance and marketing science (see here for some background). The estimation in Guseo's article was based on BP data from 2004 (CO+NGL).
- The so-called shock model proposed by TOD's poster WebHubbleTelescope . You can find a description of his approach on his blog here as well as a review on TOD. The current estimate was done in 2005 based on BP's data (CO+NGL).
- The Hybrid Shock Model is a variant of the shock model described here. The forecast is based on EIA data (up to 2006) for crude oil + condensate, the ASPO backdated disovery curve and assumes no reserve growth and declining new discoveries.
Fig 6.- Forecasts by PeakOilers using curve fitting methodologies. Click to Enlarge.
| Forecast | Date | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2010 | 2015 | Diff2 | Peak Date | Peak Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Liquids | |||||||||
| Observed (All Liquids) | 84.63 | 84.60 | 84.39 | NA | NA | 2006-07 | 85.47 | ||
| IEA (WEO) | 2004 | 82.06 | 83.74 | 85.41 | 90.40 | 98.69 | -1.02 | 2030 | 121.30 |
| IEA (WEO) | 2005 | 84.00 | 85.85 | 87.64 | 92.50 | 99.11 | -3.25 | 2030 | 115.40 |
| Koppelaar | 2005 | 84.06 | 85.78 | 86.61 | 89.21 | 87.98 | -2.22 | 2011 | 89.58 |
| Lahèrrere | 2005 | 83.59 | 84.47 | 85.23 | 86.96 | 87.77 | -0.83 | 2014 | 87.84 |
| EIA (IEO) | 2006 | 82.70 | 84.50 | 86.37 | 91.60 | 98.30 | -1.98 | 2030 | 118.00 |
| IEA (WEO) | 2006 | 83.60 | 85.10 | 86.62 | 91.30 | 99.30 | -2.23 | 2030 | 116.30 |
| CERA1 | 2006 | 87.77 | 89.52 | 91.62 | 97.24 | 104.54 | -7.23 | 2035 | 130.00 |
| Lahèrrere | 2006 | 83.59 | 84.82 | 85.96 | 88.93 | 92.27 | -1.57 | 2018 | 92.99 |
| Smith | 2006 | 85.19 | 87.77 | 90.88 | 98.94 | 98.56 | -6.49 | 2012-05 | 99.83 |
| Crude Oil + NGL | |||||||||
| Observed (EIA) | 81.46 | 81.33 | 81.02 | NA | NA | 2005-05 | 82.09 | ||
| GBM | 2003 | 76.06 | 76.27 | 76.33 | 75.30 | 67.79 | 4.70 | 2007-05 | 76.34 |
| Bakhtiari | 2003 | 80.24 | 80.89 | 80.89 | 77.64 | 69.51 | 0.13 | 2006 | 80.89 |
| ASPO-46 | 2004 | 81.00 | 80.95 | 80.80 | 80.00 | 73.77 | 0.22 | 2005 | 81.00 |
| ASPO-58 | 2005 | 81.00 | 82.03 | 83.10 | 85.00 | 79.18 | -2.08 | 2010 | 85.00 |
| Staniford (High) | 2005 | 77.45 | 77.92 | 78.31 | 79.01 | 78.51 | 2.71 | 2011-10 | 79.08 |
| Staniford (Med) | 2005 | 75.81 | 75.94 | 75.97 | 75.52 | 73.00 | 5.05 | 2007-05 | 75.98 |
| Staniford (Low) | 2005 | 70.46 | 70.13 | 69.71 | 67.92 | 63.40 | 11.32 | 2002-07 | 70.88 |
| IEA (WEO) | 2006 | 80.10 | 81.38 | 82.67 | 86.50 | 92.50 | -1.65 | 2030 | 104.90 |
| Koppelaar | 2006 | 81.76 | 82.31 | 83.68 | 91.00 | NA | -2.65 | 2010 | 91.00 |
| Skrebowski | 2006 | 80.95 | 81.47 | 82.64 | 87.37 | NA | -1.62 | 2010 | 87.97 |
| Smith | 2006 | 80.53 | 82.81 | 85.45 | 91.95 | 88.60 | -4.43 | 2011-02 | 92.31 |
| Loglets | 2006 | 81.12 | 82.14 | 83.02 | 84.65 | 83.26 | -1.99 | 2012-01 | 84.80 |
| ASPO-76 | 2006 | 77.92 | 79.00 | 81.35 | 90.00 | 85.00 | -0.33 | 2010 | 90.00 |
| Robelius Low | 2006 | 81.45 | 82.19 | 82.50 | 81.84 | 72.26 | -1.47 | 2007 | 82.50 |
| Robelius High | 2006 | 81.45 | 84.19 | 86.67 | 93.40 | 92.40 | -5.65 | 2012 | 94.54 |
| Shock Model | 2006 | 80.76 | 80.43 | 80.01 | 78.27 | 73.74 | 1.01 | 2003 | 81.17 |
| Crude Oil + Lease Condensate | |||||||||
| Observed (EIA) | 73.81 | 73.54 | 73.14 | NA | NA | 2005-05 | 74.30 | ||
| ASPO-46 | 2004 | 72.80 | 72.56 | 72.25 | 71.00 | 63.55 | 0.88 | 2005 | 72.80 |
| Deffeyes | 2004 | 69.94 | 69.93 | 69.84 | 69.02 | 65.99 | 3.30 | 2005-12 | 69.95 |
| ASPO-58 | 2005 | 73.00 | 73.80 | 74.65 | 76.00 | 69.50 | -1.51 | 2010 | 76.00 |
| IEA (WEO) | 2006 | 70.80 | 71.78 | 72.77 | 75.70 | 80.30 | 0.37 | 2030 | 89.10 |
| CERA1 | 2006 | 76.49 | 76.89 | 78.60 | 82.29 | 83.83 | -5.47 | 2038 | 97.58 |
| ASPO-76 | 2006 | 71.11 | 72.10 | 73.66 | 78.00 | 72.00 | -0.53 | 2010 | 78.00 |
| HSM | 2007 | NA | 73.56 | 73.53 | 72.82 | 69.53 | -0.39 | 2006 | 73.56 |
| Ace | 2007 | NA | 73.48 | 73.03 | 66.96 | 58.47 | 0.11 | 2006-01 | 73.55 |
Next update probably in March.
Previous Update:
September 2007June 2007
February 2007
January 2007
December 2006
November 2006
October 2006
September 2006
OilWatch last issue:
The Hybrid Shock Model, Bakhtiari (R.I.P.), and Ace still rule the roost. And the IEA predictions look more and more ludicrous with each passing month.
Some predictions were made recently, eg ace made his good guess in 2007 for 2007. Why not show both month and year the prediction was made, useful even for predictions made in 05/06.
Great work showing all this data, Bakhtiari continues to look very good, particularly considering his guess was made way back in 2003... tho if he continues to look good our little raft is just about to go over the falls.
Er.... so what happened to the new all-liquids peak that was discussed here a couple of weeks ago?
Sorry if I'm being a bit thick - is it just that the figures have been revised, or Khebab uses different sources for his data?
Thanks, Chris
The new peak for October (all liquids) is based on the IEA data for which the front month is November, see Stuart post for an in depth discussion:
Does the latest IEA number matter?
The problem with the IEA is that they give only limited public data (only the three last months) and it's difficult to track revisions whereas the EIA can revise its monthly estimates up to three years.
The EIA Short Term Energy outlook (STEO) has also preliminary estimates for October and November:
October: 85.96 mbpd
November: 85.61 mbpd
Trailing v Forward
The world's cereal stocks to use ratio
is even farther behind the curve.
http://www.investmenttools.com/futures/soy/chicago_wheat_futures_market....
That IEA (Monthly Oil Market Report) peak for November 2007 (86.55 mb/d) - in comparison to the July 2006 peak (86.13 mb/d)- has been created by:
(1) an extra 180 kb/d of processing gains - freshly added in the December 2007 monthly report
(2) an additional 310 kb/d (=460 kb/d - 150 kb/d) bio fuels
Sep was strong on account of 300k/d higher other liquids vs 9 month avg... I wonder if this is seasonal? How does this item compare with previous sep vs previous years?
No, it's not seasonal, most of the increase (two thirds) is coming from OPEC (mainly Saudi Arabia and Iraq).
September 2007 estimate for crude oil + condensate is 73.50 mbpd compared to 73.47 mbpd one year ago and 73.92 mbpd two years ago.
Thanks Khebab.
The second graphic links to the wrong version on clicking for the full size version (eg: Crude at 73.50 in the embedded graphic, but at 72.51 in the fullsize version.
Cheers,
--J
Looking at EIA data (IPM table 1.1a) Azerbaijan is down from 910 kbpd in July to 567 kbpd in September. Field maintenance or what have I missed?
Bahktiari GBM and Staniford
Shock Model = Black Swan
Outstanding work, Khebab
You're in the History books.
Khebab,
Many thanks as ever for a very useful post. Looking at the all liquids world production data as a plot of all liquids world consumption, what would be your estimate, of what worldwide production/consumption would have been had unlimited oil been available at the $20-$30 per barrel range?
Just looking at the curve, mine would be, that without the effect on demand of sustained price increases (oil last crossed the $40 per barrel in mid 2004), current worldwide consumption would be about 90 mb/d.
On this basis, the impact of price on demand would be about 5 mb/d, i.e. about a 5% reduction at the present time, co-incidentally just enough to keep consumption essentially flat over the last three years. As you have underlined, during this time there has been an overall increase in overall consumption by the net oil exporters. Could you quantify that overall consumption increase for the main net exporters for the period mid 2004 to end 2007 ?
This means that the ‘rest-of-world’ consumption must have dropped during these three and a half years, by the same amount.
To the extent that this reflects a reduction actual rest-of-world demand, depends on the extent to which we are seeing any rationing. There has been no reports of a major decision by a government to institute formal, sustained rationing, due to a decision to no longer ‘afford’ access to fuel based only on market forces at world prices.
We have however seen some rationing (clearly in the case of Iran, somewhat messily in China ) in countries where fuel prices are subsidised. There have also been a number of reports on TOD of fuel shortages due to local refining capacity shortages, and due to failure of third world distributors to acquire supplies in good time.
All in all is seems to me that, at the margin, decisions are being made to restrict access to fuel, and that therefore there is some, perhaps small amount, to which current rest-of-world consumption is now less than inherent demand.
Homo Semi-sapiens
So, does the 2006 EIA data show any evidence that demand by the largest users of oil is actually falling let alone keeping up with 1.8% growth per year required for BAU – who, if anybody, amongst top 15 consumers is being priced out of the market?
The 15 countries with the greatest demand consume ~60% of the world’s oil but ~80% of net exports.
In 2006 only 4 of the top 15 were growing consumption of oil – China, India, Germany and Singapore.
Of these 15 largest consumers only 4 import less than 90% of their needs – USA, China, India and Thailand – all the rest are very dependent on net exports. Total liquids net exports fell by -3.3% from 2005 to 2006.
According to Henry Groppe interviewed by David Strahan here:
http://globalpublicmedia.com/groppe_iea_oil_spike
the decrease in demand has come from industrial applications. He sees industrial uses dropping sufficiently over 2008-09 to maintain normal prices. Things will get interesting in 2010.
This would explain the price drop in late 2006 which did not correspond to any additional supply. The Chinese especially are using a lot of oil for industry. Of course, they are now substituting coal for oil which is not good news for GW and pollution levels.
There is still a lot of trucking that can be moved to rail and barge as well.
Good interview. I hope he is right.
Just an observation-
everyone knows (or should) that theoildrum is a band of volunteers... we do this analysis and post it for free so humanity can collectively better allocate scarce resources and plan for mitigation and adaptation to scenarios not adequately provided by corporate and government leadership.
Forget the general public for the time being - how long will it take for the investing and corporate decisionmakers to see that 'free' analysis by the 'peak oilers' listed by Khebab above have been dramatically more accurate than the (very) high priced forecasts of CERA and the increasingly marginalized IEA/EIA forecasts?
I'm not trying to stir the pot or win a popularity contest -I am genuinely interested in the answer to that question - can rhetoric, reputation and marketing really trump accurate forecasting in perpetuity?
Nate: My guess is that by 2011 we will be 6 years post peak and at that point the CERA types will have substantially changed their tunes. In the period 2008-2011 Jeff Rubin, Matt Simmons and a few other analysts will gain increasing credibility (IMO)-so by maybe 2011 the timing of peak global oil supply will be agreed to by almost all analysts. I have heard Matt Simmons credit the experts at TOD but most MSM analysts will just jump on board in the next few years (claiming that they knew how this would play out all along).
As long as the rhetoric supports a desired market, rhetoric will trump. When the market changes, the rhetoric changes.
There are levels of investment and corporate decision-makers. IMO, those at the extreme top are very much aware of more accurate forecasts. What is said publically is different than what is said privately, however--and those at the top let others speak for them.
Yes, it most certainly can, and does! I have been banging the drum to some of the people I know who invest in energy to cough up some funding for ASPO and TOD because their forecasts are obviously far better than the utter hooey being peddled by the official agencies and "respected" prognosticators such as CERA...to little effect. Most of them can't even understand the difference, or see the need for funding for the former. Even after I explain it, they sort of shrug and say oh well, that just means there is an investing advantage for those few who pay attention to the ASPO/TOD/etc. analysts.
Some day soon I hope to create a subscription service that will give the better analysts on the scene a proper platform, and proper compensation, for their excellent work, and change all that. Nothing would make me happier than cutting checks to the TOD brain trust.
I think the problem is mainly human habit. People will believe those they know personally, and those who bear some official stamp of approval, before they'll believe some unknowns in the blogger community, even if the latter's work is better. Why? Because they're too lazy to really get their heads around it and see the difference for themselves, so they rely on the familiar and the official. I have heard some amazingly ignorant perspectives on energy and peak oil from the mouths of otherwise educated, aware and wealthy individuals, which were based entirely on something some trusted friend of theirs said to them....and they are remarkably resistant to information that doesn't conform to their existing worldview.
You can lead a man to information, but you can't make him think.
But for those of us who like to think, Khebab's work (and that of the unpaid, unbiased analysts he covers) is a priceless gift, one for which I am eternally grateful.
Sometimes I wonder if we would be taken more seriously if we charged money for subscriptions. Money is seen as evidence of value. People assume anything that's free is worthless.
Like that restaurant that couldn't sell an appetizer for $5, but sold out when they priced the same thing at $15.
But thats just a symptom of the problem we are trying to solve. Most people have chosen to abandon critical thinking. So the choose not to evaluate the facts. I have no problem with people that claim global warming is false based on their own analysis the point is they actually spent some time to do critical analysis on a problem. One of the big reasons we are in the mess we are today is because people don't use their critical thinking skills. Charging money does not really solve the problem.
Thats why I'm not so excited about attempts to solve the major problems we have looming. The underlying problem is on of social failure. In some cases rooted in behaviors from the dawn of time.
My opinion is man is doomed to the rise and fall of empires and the underlying overexploitation of his environment for a lot longer. This did not start with the oil age and it won't end with the oil age. At best we might make a few painful steps forwards. We have thousands of years of past mistakes that we have learned something from and thousands of years to mull and live with the oil age.
Sometimes it helps to take a very long view. I think we are at a turning point in history that will reverberate for centuries just like the fall of Rome. But in the end its just another big event that at best warrants a few chapters in future history books.
It comes from the nature of personal will. If our will is to solve a problem to maximize personal benefit (the egoic will), we create the paradox of the commons. Something fundamental has to change in the will for it to ignore the personal in favor of a common good. Oddly, though, such notions sound quaint. It's as though homo sap is an experiment gone awry--or a genetic branch that will be pruned over the millennia.
Wile we are talking about psychohistory, New Scientist recently ran an article about procrastination (paywalled), based on research by Piers Steel. (ITWire link http://www.itwire.com/content/view/15805/1066/).
His conclusion:
This encompasses several factors of human behaviour we have discussed before. The main factors I guess are perceived Value and Immediacy.
But I think this type of equation also describes behaviour at a governmental level. It is a good fit to why the USA procrastinates on Global Warming, for example.
In business, the ratio V/I describes the driver for the typical "crisis management" style of most middle management. When a problem becomes both urgent and important, they fix it, otherwise it is left. "Not on the radar".
I wouldn't necessarily say prioritising the immediate problem is a failure, in most cases this is a sensible strategy. The upshot is though, that PO will not be generally regarded a major problem until it is really in everyones face. The best we can do is accumulate evidence for E, V and I.
I think IEA and even CERA already have changed position from what has gone before. CERA set out as being opposed to PO, but they effectively agree on a plateau. I think they realised they had to address PO in order to be credible. In doing so, they have put PO on the table.
It might seem like free analysis falls on deaf ears, but I believe that journalists and investors do pick up on it, and it does have an effect.
My family cared for my schizophrenic brother for five years as he slowly died from cancer. We had no expectation of success. It certainly was not pleasant. It was horrendous on all of us and caused my parents to divorce. Yet the care continued. There was no social reward or desire to continue.
Sometimes we do things for the sake of others without benefit to ourselves--the S variable. My sense is that there is a lot of S at TOD.
Many families care for terminally ill members at great expense. It is done for selfish reasons. They would like to be looked after if they became ill or got injured and of course in old age.
The question is, will those same family members care for a terminally ill stranger at personal expense?
Altruistic behaviours are very rare maybe non existent if examined closely enough.
"To the person wearing shoes, the world is covered in leather." (I don't know who said that, but it seems appropriate here.)
The failure of our educational, academic, spiritual, financial, and governmental systems is the exponential increase in the belief that the egoic-will (doing things for personal benefit) is the only game in town.
I used to think like this. Read the Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins. Altruistic behaviours do exist. It is call kin selection.
How can kin selection be described as altruistic? Just the opposite in my estimation.
As far as I know I have read all of Dawkins' publications.
He touches on altruism in The God Delusion.
I repeat when examined closely enough there is NO altruism in human behaviours or in any animal behaviours for that matter. (That I am aware of).
You sound like you don't have many true friends.
Even Apes have altruistic bahavior. When gorillas get old and sick, the healthy ones will bring the sick one food. This behavior has been documented on dicovery channel.
They do it because of conditioning, just like mother ducks look after their chicks.
The apes behaviour evolved with natural selection.
The behaviour is related to survival of the species and therefore the individual.
Do you think that they should let the old, sick and injured die of starvation to be non altruistic? Which sort of community do you think would have the best chance for survival?
The old can play a part in the community and the sick and injured recover and assist the community.
Obviously religious people have difficulty with the evolution of behaviours because it places primates and humans in the same category as just another life form and excludes their god in human development.
So you can accept it or not. I don't want to argue with religious zealots trying to defend their beliefs.
I wouldn't call anyone a religious zealot just yet. It is a common assumption in the greater western world that humans are fully conscious, rational beings, that we have free will to control our actions. And anything that suggests that our unconscious moves our hand in daily dealings or that there are primitive forces within us that influence us is deemed a blasphemy by both religious and so called scientific rationalist people. Since modern science is essentially mechanistic and does not make value judgements, the values that guide both religious and non-religious people are the same baggage from western education system, essentially pseudo christian ones.
A true friend is indeed worth many altruistic actions. Unfortunately altruism doesn't exist. What exists is a perception, the outer appearance to the actions we perform because of specific reasons other than absolute-unselfishness. Behaviour evolutionists find many advantages to us from having friends, where as species biologists argue that it is good for the species as a whole.
The illusion of altruism is maintained for our benefit. It makes us feel good about it and cuts down any doubt or convoluted rationalizing that we otherwise would have to make every time we are faced with a situation where we make choices to help out others. It is preprogrammed behaviour to feel this way towards our kin: our immediate family, our relatives, our tribe (friends). Nationalism and group think further extend this but rely on rather weak social games to make us think that for example every citizen of a country or every employee of a company is kin to us.
By the way its Dawkins' own fault that nobody reads his books. He's an ass. So smug and annoying about everything he sais that nobody wants to listen to him. And he hasn't actually developed any of his ideas to any conclusions. So to me he remains just another ego maniac peddler of pseudo manifest destiny for our brilliant civilization and limitless man.
Before Dawkins wrote about God, he wrote some of good books on evolutionary behaviorism. Go read the Selfish Gene, which talks about kin selection. Or go to wikipedia. Altruism isn't an illusion; it has been scientifically observed and described.